






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# **FEMINISM**

# SOCIALISM AND FEMINISM

WITH AN INTRODUCTION ON

## THE CLIMAX OF CIVILISATION

BY

CORREA MOYLAN WALSH

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# FEMINISM

BY

CORREA MOYLAN WALSH

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## PREFATORY NOTE

Here may be repeated in slightly altered words what was said in the Prefatory Note to the volume on *Socialism*. Simultaneously with the present volume are published two others, the said work on *Socialism*, and one entitled *The Climax of Civilisation*. The three form a series, of which this is the third volume. *The Climax of Civilisation* is the introductory Part, and the Preface to it explains the connection of the three and the reason for separating them. The connection of the three, and especially of this volume with the volume on *Socialism*, is also frequently alluded to in the course of the following pages, and the references back to those volumes are marked merely as to vols. i. and ii. respectively. Yet this volume constitutes a work by itself, which the reader can understand without reading either of the others. Still, his comprehension of the argument running through it would be improved by consultation at least with the introductory volume. The present book is complementary to that on *Socialism*, as no student can have a full grasp of all the tendencies and bearings of socialism without knowledge of the feminist teachings which are its consummation. That feminism may be advocated without socialism — without the whole of which it is a part, — and woman suffrage be supported similarly without the rest of feminism, is only an illustration of the fact that consistency is not a necessary ingredient in the human mind. As feminism simply is sometimes advocated alone, it may here be criticised in a work standing by itself. Within this volume the two chapters on woman suffrage may also be regarded as forming a treatise complete in itself.



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# **FEMINISM**



# FEMINISM

## CHAPTER I.

### THE WOMAN MOVEMENT AND ITS HISTORY

THE socialist movement always includes the woman movement, or what to-day is called feminism;<sup>1</sup> and the socialists are almost unanimous in advocating one of the necessary implications of feminism, woman suffrage.<sup>2</sup> But feminism, by stopping short, does not go so far as socialism, and may be satisfied before that is attained, some feminists and many suffragists even being anti-socialists, regardless of consistency. It is an offshoot—branch or twig—that is growing by itself. As such, it may be contrasted with socialism, with which it has many points of analogy.

As socialism is a demand for equality of the poor with the rich, so feminism is a demand for equality of women with men. They have in common that they both seek excessive equality, with the difference that the one reaches out for complete equality of property, the other for complete equality of the sexes.<sup>3</sup> They both violate nature; for the one is contrary to the natural constitution

<sup>1</sup> Lily Braun-Gizycki: *The woman question is only a part of the social question, Frauenfrage und Sozialdemokratie*, Berlin, 1896, p. 3. Cf. Isabella O. Ford, *Woman and Socialism*, London, 1904 (published by the Independent Labour Party).

<sup>2</sup> There are very few exceptions. Ernest Belfort Bax is the only prominent socialist who is systematically opposed to woman suffrage: see the essays on "The 'Monstrous Regiment' of Womanhood," "Some Current Fallacies of the Woman Question," "Feminism in extremis," in his *Essays in Socialism Old and New*, London, 1906, also his *The Legal Subjection of Men*, 1908, and *The Fraud of Feminism*, 1913. Gronlund opposed woman suffrage at least in the present régime, *The New Economy*, 126-30, 358; though others rather take the view of Hillquit, that it is a "transitional demand," precisely most needed now, *Socialism in Theory and Practice*, 102, cf. 141. While in our country the socialists are now as one for it, in Europe there is some holding back, for opportunist reasons. In the Gotha Programme only by implication, in the Erfurt Programme directly demanded was universal suffrage without discrimination of sex. But since then the direct advocacy of it has been abandoned at times and in places, because of fear its adoption would not further the cause, especially in Catholic countries, such as Belgium, where the influence of the priests would be adverse. Yet the demand was re-inserted at the International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart in 1907.

<sup>3</sup> Feminism is defined by Teresa Billington-Greig as "a movement seeking the re-organisation of the world upon a basis of sex-equality in all human relations; a movement which would reject every differentiation between individuals upon the ground of sex, would abolish all sex-privileges and sex-burdens, and would strive to set up the recognition of the common humanity of woman and man as the foundation of law and custom," *Feminism and Politics*, *Contemporary Review*, Nov., 1911, p. 694. According to W. L. George, feminists "propose to identify absolutely the conditions of the sexes," *Feminist Intentions*, *Atlantic Monthly*, Dec., 1913, p. 721.

of society, and the other to the natural constitution of the human body. They both aim at emancipation, as it is termed, or the freeing from bondage,—the one of working people, the other of women,<sup>4</sup> these latter desiring to break down all discriminations and barriers that hem in the female sex;<sup>5</sup> and while socialism excites class-consciousness and stirs up class-antagonism, feminism excites sex-consciousness and stirs up sex-antagonism, and places reliance on sex-loyalty.<sup>6</sup> Their advocates have a confused notion of justice, in whose name they demand their "rights," and because of which they think their claims so self-evident that they must speedily be achieved in this age of enlightenment, the feminists, as well as the socialists having at first had great expectations.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, as we know, evils develop in advanced civilisations, such as lack of self-employment and homelessness, that give rise alike to socialism and to feminism. There is, therefore, in each case, a real problem—in the one, to restore to the majority of men the means of employing themselves; in the other, to restore to women labour at home in the midst of their children. Only as the equalisation of weak men with strong men is not the proper solution of the labour problem, as we have seen, so, as we shall see, the equalisation of women with men is not the proper

<sup>4</sup> Annie Besant: "We mean to set women free," *The Political Status of Women* (undated, apparently between 1870 and 1880), p. 16. Lily Braun: "The Woman movement has set itself the aim to free all women from economic slavery through independent work," *Die Frauenfrage*, Leipzig, 1901, p. 193. Ethel (Mrs. F.) Snowden: "The chief purpose of feminists . . . is the achievement of freedom for womanhood and its equality of opportunity with manhood," *The Feminist Movement*, London, 1913, p. 13, cf. 246, 258. Elizabeth S. Chesser: "Women are striving for economic, legal, and sexual independence," *Woman, Marriage and Motherhood*, New York ed., 1913, p. 257.

<sup>5</sup> Maurice Parmelee: "The term 'feminism' . . . seems to be used as a name for the present extensive movement for removing discriminations against woman on the basis of sex and for placing her entirely or as far as possible on an equality with man," *The Economic Basis of Feminism*, Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Polit. and Social Science, Nov. 1914, p. 18. Mrs. Beatrice Forbes-Robertson Hale: Feminism is "a struggle . . . to bring about the removal of all artificial barriers to the physical, mental, moral, and economic development of the female half of the race," *What Women Want*, New York, 1914, p. 3. Yet throughout this work the authoress nowhere inquires what barriers are artificial and what natural. She seems to think them all artificial. She might have answered her title more quickly with the words of another, an ultra, feminist: "If the woman's movement means anything, it means that women are demanding everything," Floyd Dell (Miss Dora Marsden), *Women as World Builders*, Chicago, 1913, p. 51. Cf. Juvenal's "nil non permittit mulier sibi," VI. 457.

<sup>6</sup> Feminism "is advocated by women of every class who have an instinct of sex-loyalty," and women are now "learning sex-loyalty," says Mrs. Hale, *op. cit.*, 3, 73. She adds that they must be "woman-conscious, and class-unconscious," 90. This last requirement brings feminism into conflict with socialism, which enjoins class-consciousness. This opposition is not much felt in England and America, where feminism is the stronger of the two, but is pronounced in Germany, where socialism is the stronger, and there women of the upper and of the lower classes have separate organisations. But the ultimate goal is harmonious, the one aiming at the suppression of classes, and the other at the obliteration of the sexes, while meanwhile both class-antagonism and sex-antagonism may be employed as means.

<sup>7</sup> "We fully believed," said the Rev. Mrs. Antoinette Brown Blackwell, "so soon as we saw that woman's suffrage was right, every one would soon see the same thing, and that in a year or two, at furthest, it would be granted," quoted by Mrs. Mary Putnam Jacobi, "*Common Sense*" applied to the *Woman Question*, New York, 1894, p. 9. Cf. Ida H. Harper, *The Life and Work of Susan B. Anthony*, i. 129.

solution of the sex problem, the latter suggestion being as impracticable as the former, and even more so; and the advocates of these solutions resemble each other in their lack of seriousness in adapting means to ends and of foresight as to consequences, like children playing with fire—and both expect, with equal light-hearted optimism, to reduce work to play in a happy world of calm and concord, with "equality of enjoyment." Indeed, the remedies offered in both cases are exactly the opposite of what they ought to be, having the tendency to increase the evils they are intended to cure. The social conditions proffered as such remedies have, in fact, both existed in primitive times, as communism and the so-called matriarchate; but those times were the long-drawn-out and almost stationary periods of savagery and barbarism, prior to civilisation, which began after they were superseded, the one by private property, the other by male supremacy, and which will probably end if they be brought back. Both have likewise in historical times been imperfectly tried, and both have failed lamentably. Attempts at both have always attended the decline of civilisations.

Feminism is not new, any more than socialism. The modern movement, with its elaborated doctrine, is a product of the peace and prosperity of the nineteenth century; but the movement, without the complete doctrine, had appeared long before. The literal emancipation of women, or the taking of them out from under the hand (*the manus*) of their husbands, took place, at first by the aid of legal fictions, in Rome, as it rose in the cycle of its civilisation toward the point we have reached in ours. Women then enjoyed the freedom of owning the property bequeathed to them by their parents or acquired by their own efforts or speculations. Their indirect influence on legislation in effecting the repeal of the Oppian law against luxury, by thronging the streets and besieging the doors of the opposing tribunes, was but a flash in the pan. The Voconian law only forbade men to leave property to women outside their families. The serious and deleterious influence of women on politics, as we have seen, became noticeable toward the end of the republic, and continued under the empire. Anciently, when a woman had appeared in the forum to plead her own case, the affair seemed so monstrous as to require the oracle to be consulted.<sup>8</sup> In the first century B. C. women were admitted to practise as lawyers, till the intemperate conduct of a certain Caia Afrania caused them to be excluded.<sup>9</sup> In the Grecian sec-

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch, *Comparison of Numa and Lycurgus*.

<sup>9</sup> *Digest*, III. i. 1. § 5; Valerius Maximus, VIII. iii. 2—Soon after the opening of the bar to women in one of our western States an enraged female lawyer threw a glass of water in the face of the presiding judge; but without a similar result.

tion of the empire one of the last philosophers and public lecturers was the woman Hypatia, who dissuaded a wooer by disgusting him, and whom the Christians murdered. From then, through the dark and middle ages, during which women were again reduced to a subordinate position in the family, though not to the same extent as in early antiquity, it is a considerable jump to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when in Italy, again degenerate, some learned women, whom Erasmus admired,<sup>9a</sup> once more disputed with men and lectured in the universities, and among the race of monarchs, verging toward decline of power, women again became prominent as queens and regents, against whom John Knox wrote his *First Blast Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women*.<sup>10</sup>

It was the long civil wars at the end of the Roman republic that gave their emancipation to the women, though it was the long peace of the empire that recognised and consolidated their quasi independence. It is during revolutions that women come to the front, but in the clash of arms they are soon driven to the rear, only to push forward again after the restoration of peace. Their own excesses have sometimes been the cause of their repression. Thus in the English civil war the women of London petitioned the House of Commons in 1641, 1643, and 1649, at first humbly and were politely answered, and at last scoldingly and tumultuously and were rudely told to go home and mind their own business.<sup>11</sup> In our revolution so much moderation and decorum were observed that little room was offered for women to interfere; yet principles were established the indefiniteness of whose terms admitted of perversion, and as men refused obedience to the British parliament, women somehow found therein reason for refusing obedience to their husbands, and the word "obey" was razed from the marriage service of some of the reformed churches.<sup>12</sup> From principles learnt here of the equality of man-

<sup>9a</sup> In his colloquy *Abbatis et Eruditæ*. But Erasmus was by no means the feminist that Vance Thompson in his recent book, *Woman*, New York, 1917, would make him out to have been. He wrote a skit (the colloquy *Senatus*) in which he represented some modern women reviving Elagabalus's "little senate," and committing therein similar absurdities and putting forth some ridiculous pretensions; all which Thompson swallows as serious, but ignores what he did teach seriously, that women should suckle their children and be economical at home while their husbands worked for them abroad (see the colloquies *Puerpera* and *Procis et Puella*).

<sup>10</sup> This was published early in 1558, when Catherine de' Medici was Queen of France, Marie de Lorraine Queen of Scotland, and Mary Tudor Queen of England, and Marie's daughter Mary (afterward Queen of Scots) and Mary's sister Elizabeth (afterward Queen of England) were personages of importance. Knox denounced "the monstriferous empire of women"—"phrenetic" he also called it—as repugnant to nature, contumelious to God, and subversive of good order and of all equity and justice.

<sup>11</sup> Cobbett's *Parliamentary History*, London, 1807-8, ii. 1073-6, iii. 160-1, 1311. So Etioles tried to dismiss the troublesome Theban women, in *Æschylus's Seven Against Thebes*, 219 (or 230) ff.

<sup>12</sup> This fact was noticed by Cobbett in his pamphlet *A Kick for a Bite*, p. 24.

kind Condorcet in France, in anticipation of the convocation of the estates of the realm, advocated the right of women to vote and to be eligible to office, deducing it also from this "principle of the English," that "one is legitimately subject to pay only the taxes which one has voted, at least by a representative";<sup>13</sup> for, aristocrat that he was, he was willing to confine participation in the government, and even citizenship, to landowners,<sup>14</sup> among whom, then, he would draw no line of distinction according to sex. So again in 1790, in the *Journal of the Society of 1789*, he disapproved of keeping "half of the human race" from taking part in the formation of the laws, and argued that as "the rights of men result solely from the fact that they are sensible beings, susceptible of acquiring moral ideas and of reasoning on these ideas," therefore "women, having these same qualities, necessarily have equal rights."<sup>15</sup> But later, in office, he confined himself to practicality, and in expounding the plan for a constitution in 1793, while extending beyond landownership the principle of citizenship and of the franchise, he restricted the latter to all adult males;<sup>16</sup> only to repeat, in his last work, his own opinion, that the inequality of rights between the sexes had no other source than "the abuse of force."<sup>17</sup> Women themselves, at the outbreak of the French revolution, did take a prominent part, and were among the most violent in wreaking vengeance for past wrongs. To the men's declaration of rights Olympe de Gouges (whose real name was Marie Gouze) opposed a declaration of the rights of women, demanding full civil and political equality, on the principle of recognising the sovereignty of the nation, which is "nothing but the reunion of men and women." "The law," she said, "ought to be the same for all," and "as woman has the right to mount the scaffold, she should have the right to mount the tribune."<sup>18</sup> So great were the disturbances raised by them, that even the terrorists were offended, and the Convention ordered the suppression of their clubs and prohibited them from assembling in public places.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Lettres d'un Bourgeois de New Heaven*, 1788, in *Œuvres*, Paris, 1804, xii. 20-1; cf. also v. 268, xiii. 35-6.

<sup>14</sup> xii. 16-17; cf. 233, and also v. 225.

<sup>15</sup> *Sur l'Admission des Femmes au Droit de Cité*, No. 5 of that journal, July 3, 1790, in *Œuvres*, Paris 1847, x. 121, 122; cf. the *Fragment sur l'Atlantide*, in *Œuvres*, Paris, 1804, viii, 561; also xii. 20.

<sup>16</sup> *Œuvres*, 1804, xviii, 227-32.

<sup>17</sup> *Tableau des Progrès de l'Esprit humain*, in *Œuvres*, 1804, viii. 359.

<sup>18</sup> Ostrogorski, *La Femme au point de vue du Droit public*, 29-30. Similarly Wendell Phillips: "While woman is admitted to the gallows, the jail, and the tax-list, we have no right to debar her from the ballot-box," *Shall Women have the Right to Vote?* Address at Worcester, 1851, reprinted by The Equal Franchise Society of Pennsylvania, 1912, p. 14.

<sup>19</sup> For an account of their extravagant acts see Lady Grant Duff's article on *Women in the French Revolution* in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, May, 1912, pp. 1009-18.

Robespierre championed them. Mirabeau wrote, but death prevented him from speaking, to the effect that "as men and women play an entirely different rôle in nature, they cannot play the same rôle in the social state, and the eternal order of things makes them co-operate for a common end only by assigning to them different places."<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile, across the Channel, Mary Wollstonecraft, who had led a hard life as a governess, in her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, published in 1791, and strangely dedicated to Talleyrand, protested against the place assigned to women both in fact and in the theory of male writers like Rousseau and others, denied "the divine right of husbands,"<sup>21</sup> desired "to see the distinction of sex confounded in society" (71), recommended co-education of boys and girls (171-9, cf. 58), and demanded both preparation of women for work and opportunity of work for women, that they might "earn their own subsistence" and thereby be "independent of men" (97, 149, 172), incidentally suggesting that "women ought to have representatives" in parliament (154). Even in Germany, in the extreme east, Hippel, a magistrate at Königsberg, who published all his works anonymously, advocated more liberal treatment of women and their admission to political rights in his *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber*, in 1792, and already in the successive editions of his *Ueber die Ehe*, first published in 1774, had inserted passages to similar effect.

In one State of the American Union the principle of indiscrimination between the sexes was at this time put into operation for a short while. New Jersey, in its constitution of 1776, had opened the franchise to "all inhabitants of this colony of full age, who are worth fifty pounds proclamation money." Whether this was expressly intended to extend the right of voting to women freeholders, is not known; and it is not known that any use of it was made till 1797, when a special suffrage law definitely referred to persons being entitled to vote only in places where "he or she" resided.<sup>22</sup> Thereupon a fitful use was made of the right on special occasions in some localities, the politicians of one party unexpectedly bringing women to the polls and thereby

<sup>20</sup> Ostrogorski, *op. cit.*, 30-1. Feminists often complain (e.g., Kaethe Schirmacher in her *Modern Woman's Rights Movement*, C. C. Eckardt's translation, p. 178) that the French revolutionary laws of freedom took away many of the old "rights" of women. Among these are instanced the land-owning noblewomen's "right" to levy troops, raise taxes, and administer justice, and the abbesses' unlimited power over their convents. Most people look upon these things as privileges. They were, in fact, among the abuses the revolution did away with.

<sup>21</sup> P. 56 of the Humboldt Library ed., references to which are inserted in the text.

<sup>22</sup> In this very year, by a curious coincidence, Fox said in the British parliament, that "in all theories and projects of the most absurd speculation, it has never been suggested that it would be advisable to extend the elective suffrage to the female sex," Woodfall's *Reporis of Debates*, iii. 327.

turning the election in their favour. This was done notably in that year at Elizabethtown by the adherents of a certain "federal aristocrat"; again in 1802 in Hunterdon County; and lastly in 1807 in a hot contest in Essex County, where, it is said, both white women and coloured people vied with white men in illegal voting. Thereupon the legislature passed a new suffrage law, which confined the franchise to "white male citizens." As far as this law repealed the law of 1797, it was legitimate; but if the constitution itself authorised female and coloured suffrage, these legislators exceeded their powers, as no legislature can abrogate a right conferred by the constitution. But no protest seems to have been made any more by women than by negroes,—not indeed till after the constitution of 1844 had confirmed the law, when, in 1858, Lucy Stone, a temporary resident from Massachusetts, refused to pay her tax on account of having no representation.<sup>23</sup> That early incident passed almost without remark, and was nearly forgotten by history. In all probability so very few women then had the property qualification entitling them to vote, that the law which disqualified them seemed only like shutting the door to opportunities for false swearing, repeating, and other irregularities.

The times, moreover, convulsed with wars in Europe and the possibility of war in America, ending in its actuality, were not propitious for women's taking part in the world's affairs till after the peace set in, in 1815. Then began the period of expansion and easement, which, as already described, led to the development of democracy. Labourers were attracted to the free lands elsewhere, and wages rose. Women were invited into the lower ranks of factory service, where all sorts of abuses soon called for legislative restrictions. Highest of all were wages in our country, and here need was felt for women as school teachers, for which positions there were not men enough serviceable at the rates that could be afforded when the public school system was rapidly being extended, especially in the west.<sup>24</sup> For the purpose of attracting settlers, especially with their families, our western States began breaking down the barriers of property rights that were hedged around personal rights, and opened the suffrage to all men; and our eastern States had to follow suit, in order to retain their lower classes from emigrating; while in Europe was produced by reflection a similar though feebler movement, the suffrage being extended in England to lower and lower strata of

<sup>23</sup> Cf. H. Bushnell, *Woman Suffrage: The Reform against Nature*, New York, 1869, pp. 110-13; also an article in *The New York Evening Post*, April 5, 1913.

<sup>24</sup> There Miss Catherine E. Beecher did pioneer work in sending young women from New England to teach in Ohio and other western States.

the male population, and in France at one bound broadening out to all men. The movement, of course, when once started, everywhere gathered force from the fact that each political party by favouring it would attach to itself the new voters. Individual politicians likewise feared to antagonise possible future voters. No wonder, then, the tide was carried over to cover the female half of the population also. In the French Republic in 1848, when all Frenchmen became voters, a man's voice was raised for women, Victor Considerant unsuccessfully proposing in the National Assembly the extension of this right to all French women. In America, in the same year, there was a gathering of women at Seneca Falls, New York, and in 1850, in the spring, another at Salem, Ohio, and in the autumn, a Woman's Rights Convention at Worcester, Massachusetts, largely attended from nine States by both sexes. Then such leaders as Mrs. Lucretia Mott, Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Miss Susan B. Anthony were coming to the front. Decided upon at the first of these meetings, they issued a parody of the Declaration of Independence in a *Declaration of Sentiments*, after laboriously delving in law books for the requisite number of grievances.<sup>24a</sup> The meeting last mentioned had a reverberation in England, where it called forth an essay on *The Enfranchisement of Women* by the wife of J. S. Mill, in collaboration with the latter himself, who probably wrote more of it than he acknowledged, his radicalism having early taken in this subject, following Bentham's lead, but departing from the teaching of his father.<sup>25</sup> In England, too, in 1851, a petition of women, agreed to at a public meeting at Sheffield, claiming the electoral franchise, was presented to the House of Lords; while in our country, in that year, was founded a Woman Suffrage Association in Indiana, followed the next year by another in Ohio, after which, during several years, many Woman's Rights Conventions were held. From then on, also, down to the present, most of the conventions for revising State constitutions were confronted with the question of woman suffrage and eligibility to office, although for many years they al-

24a It may be read in the Stanton-Anthony-Gage-Harper *History of Woman Suffrage*, i. 70-1.

25 See Mill's *Autobiography*, 104-5. Bentham, in his advocacy of parliamentary reform in 1817 and thereafter, admitted he could see no reason for excluding women from voting, although he did see a reason for excluding them from membership in the legislature — mischievousness arising from "the reciprocal seduction that would ensue," *Works*, iii. 463, 567An., ix. 108, cf. iv. 568B. Yet he did not advise agitating for their enfranchisement, ix. 109A. James Mill found a reason, as we shall see. His article on government elicited from W. Thompson an *Appeal of One Half the Human Race, Women, against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to retain them in Political, and thence in Civil and Domestic, Slavery*, 1825. Also S. Bailey advocated woman suffrage, with a higher property qualification than in the case of men, in his *Rationale of Political Representation*, 1835, pp. 236-42.

ways rejected it. Yet in this period other claims than that for the franchise called for attention, and, in fact, most of the women's demands were for civil and even social emancipation — for the right to own property though married, to divorce their husbands on the same grounds as their husbands could divorce them, to have equal control of their children, to have the same education and to be permitted to enter the professions and official employments on an equal footing with men, and even to speak in public and have a chance to become famous (or notorious) without disgrace. Most of these claims were quickly granted in most of our States,— in New York, for instance, between 1848 and 1860, and in the west, where the first co-educational college had been established in Ohio in 1833, still more quickly, as notably in Indiana in 1850, under the lead of Robert Dale Owen, the son of the socialist. Some of these rights had all along been recognised by the Civil law, inherited from the late Roman, in the countries of southern and central Europe, and many of them have since been conceded; but most backward, in contrast to its lead in other respects, was England, which, however, has of late been rapidly overtaking the rest and bidding fair again to take the initiative. This period was also one of successful emancipation — of the Jews and the Catholics in England, and in America of the negroes. Women, especially here, who were taking an active part in the anti-slavery movement (and for their own emancipation were reciprocally aided by the male abolitionists, such as Garrison, who himself refused to vote, Wendell Phillips, the eccentric George Francis Train, Theodore Tilton, and others) now felt hurt at the thought that the franchise was never extended to any of them. Before, they had companions in exclusion among men; now they stood outside alone.<sup>26</sup>

Since their success in breaking down the legal if not the social barriers to all occupations side by side with men, although women have advanced still other more radical and even more flippant demands, they have concentrated (at least in England and America) their efforts upon winning their electoral enfranchise-

<sup>26</sup> Speaking for them, T. W. Higginson wrote: "As matters now stand among us [in the northern States, where the negroes voted] there is no aristocracy but of sex: all men are born patrician, all women are legally plebeian; all men are equal in having, political power, and all women in having none," *Ought Women to learn the Alphabet?* in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Feb., 1859, p. 149 (an article suggested by a satirical law proposed by our old friend Sylvain Maréchal, the author of *The Manifesto of the Equals*). Mill made a point of it, that the disabilities of women are the only ones due to birth still left in modern legislation, *The Subjection of Women*, 34-5; cf. also 147 about marriage being "the only actual bondage known to our law." This is a great cause of complaint to Mrs. Jacobi, who states that upon the enfranchisement of our emancipated slaves, "the furthest possible limit of the franchise for men was reached. For the first time in the history of the world, all the women of the state were rendered the political inferiors of all the men in it, and so remain," *"Common Sense,"* 74, cf. 85-86, 210-11.

ment. In England was formed, in 1867, the Manchester National Society for Woman's Suffrage, prominent in which was a Dr. Pankhurst. The occasion was the extension of the male franchise, which was then accomplished; at which time Mill vainly argued in Parliament for the substitution of "person" in the place of "man" in the electoral bill. But the claim was immediately raised that "man" meant "person" even so, by virtue of another law, known as Lord Brougham's, which prescribed that words importing the masculine gender should be understood to include females, unless the contrary was expressly declared. Cases were brought before the courts, one appellant also going back to the statute of 8 Henry VI., and were lost; but the decision came so late before the election of 1868 that some women's names were left on the registers and a few women actually voted. At this time, and especially by the publication of Mill's *Subjection of Women* in 1869, such recruits were won to women's cause as John Morley, Sir Charles Dilke, Professors Masson and Cairnes, John Bright and Goldwin Smith, though the last two soon turned back to the opposite side; but the brother of one of these, Jacob Bright, remained the women's parliamentary champion; and Charles Kingsley occasionally took up the cudgels in their defence, more especially for their scientific and medical education. After their defeat in 1868, a sop was given them in 1869 by renewing to them, on equal terms with men, the municipal franchise, strictly confined to rate-payers; for this right had from time immemorial belonged to women rate-payers, and had only been taken from them by the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835. This raised hope of success with the parliamentary franchise; only to be shattered by the rejection of the proposal the next year, although in that year women of property were further admitted to the school franchise, and again in 1884, when the franchise was still further widened for males; and yet again propertied women were permitted to vote for members of the new county councils. Already in 1881 in the Isle of Man women were admitted to the franchise on a property qualification narrower than the one for men, giving preponderance to members of the upper classes. To prevent this effect, the House of Keys desired to extend the franchise to women on the same terms with men; but the Council, to preserve it, resisted. So in Great Britain at large, the Conservatives have shown a willingness to extend the franchise to women of large property, while the Radicals, even those desiring woman suffrage (Lloyd George, for instance), are determined that it shall not be accorded unless to all classes of women corresponding to the enfranchised men. There, too, the same Con-

servatives, or upper-classmen, were glad to make use of the prestige of their ladies,<sup>27</sup> and with the Primrose Dames set the fashion of admitting women into the arena of politics.<sup>28</sup>

On the continent of Europe, as in England, there had existed an old wide-spread right of land-owning women to take part, either directly or by proxy, in the local government of communes; and sometimes this right was even extended up to representation in higher bodies, when such were formed. It was not an important right, since, wherever it existed, there were few women so qualified; for the custom was for women to inherit land only in default of male heirs, and when an heiress married her property passed to her husband and her right lapsed, to re-appear only in case of widowhood without an adult son. This right still exists in some of the backward countries, such as Russia (of late somewhat curtailed), Galicia, Bohemia (where only in 1906 propertied women ceased to vote for the imperial parliament), and even in some rural districts of Germany. It existed in ancient France, and was recognised by the Convention in 1793, but was abrogated by the Republic of 1848, when universal male suffrage was introduced without reference to property, and an attempt by Pierre Leroux to restore it, in 1851, met with no success. Universal male suffrage has become the principle also of the Third Republic. There, in 1885, some women tried to have themselves registered by a similar quibble to that which had been invoked in England, maintaining that the term "les Français" in the electoral law included women, as it undoubtedly does in other laws; but they could make no impression on the courts. Still, women engaged in business have since been given the right to vote for judges of the Tribunal of Commerce. Of course, the right of suffrage now demanded in our and so many other countries is an individual, "human" demand, based on a claim to personal, in distinction from a property, right, and so is entirely different from that suffrage once widely and still in those backward countries locally accorded to a few women exceptionally placed as property-owners or heads of families.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, too, the right of all women to enter political

<sup>27</sup> Two hundred years ago Addison remarked that English ladies were "the greatest stateswomen in Europe," *The Freeholder*, No. 23. He likewise observed that "a gossip in politics is a slattern in her family," *ibid.* No. 26. Also in *The Spectator*, Nos. 57 and 81, he gently rebuked them for their party-rage.

<sup>28</sup> Then, for instance, such a Tory as Lecky advocated a "female franchise on a property basis," as "probably having the great incidental advantage of imposing a real and powerful obstacle to the further degradation of the suffrage"; as "probably being a conservative influence, very hostile to revolutionary and predatory change"; and as "probably tending somewhat, though not in any overwhelming degree, to strengthen ecclesiastical influence, especially in questions relating to religious education," *Democracy and Liberty*, ii. 552, 555-6. The advocacy of such a restricted suffrage by Lecky, Cairnes, and others of their kind, has no application to the advocacy of universal female suffrage on top of universal male suffrage.

<sup>29</sup> The difference is clearly recognised by the suffragist Clara Zetkin in her *Zur Frage des Frauenwahlrechts*, Berlin, 1907, pp. 5-6, 68, 69.

office generally, if they can get themselves elected or appointed, is very different from the occasional elevation to queenship or regency of women in default of male heirs or near male relatives.

Even on our side of the Atlantic, a claim to that sort of property representation was made in 1647 by an heiress of Lord Calvert in Maryland; but already the principle of personal representation was too strong and her claim was disallowed.<sup>30</sup> But in Massachusetts the records show that women property-owners did vote at times; but this old right was gradually abandoned without a struggle. In America the old feudal property rights, that imposed on personal rights, never struck root. But here, as we have seen, the claim for the extension of the personal right to vote from men to women, as inclusive under women's rights as parallel with men's rights, first broached in France and England,<sup>31</sup> was first widely agitated in connection with all sorts of wild socialistic, communistic, spiritualistic, prohibitionist, and other schemes,<sup>32</sup> and made a practical issue. The cause was put to sleep during the Civil War, only to awake again with redoubled energy when the war was over. Here, too, the same method of quibbling was resorted to, by interpreting the first section of the fourteenth amendment as if, in forbidding the States to "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," it forbade them to deprive women of the franchise. Yet, had that been the case, all negroes would equally have had the right to vote, and there would have been no need of the fifteenth amendment, which, by the way, by implication sanctions the exclusion of women. Some women, however, succeeded in voting, and were fined for so doing. Here, too, again, as has happened also in France and in England, some women refused to pay taxes till they could vote, and only suffered in consequence. At a convention in 1871 a woman's rebellion was urged,<sup>32a</sup> but nothing came of it. Then the movement languished for a while. When Bryce wrote *The American Common-*

<sup>30</sup> Ida Husted Harper in her *Brief History of the Movement for Woman Suffrage in the United States*, a campaign tract issued in 1914, treats this as the first instance (apparently in the world) in which a woman "asked a representation," p. 1. So far is this from being the case, that directly the opposite is true, and this is one of the first instances of such a rare demand being refused!

<sup>31</sup> Abigail Adams's banter with her husband on this subject can make no pretension to serious consideration.

<sup>32</sup> Well described in the late Mrs. Rossiter (Helen Kendrick) Johnson's *Woman and the Republic*, ch. iv.

<sup>32a</sup> Especially insistent was Victoria C. Woodhull, who proclaimed: "We will have our rights. We say no longer by your leave. . . . We will try you just once more. If the very next Congress refuses women all the legitimate results of citizenship, . . . then we give here and now deliberate notification of what we will do. . . . We shall proceed to call another convention expressly to frame a new constitution and to create a new government, complete in all its parts, and to take measures to maintain it as effectually as men do theirs. . . . We mean treason; we mean secession, and on a thousand times greater scale than was that of the South. We are plotting revolution." In Paulina W. Davis's *History of the National Woman's Rights Movement*, New York, 1871, pp. 117-18.

*wealth* in 1888, he was able to report that women's suffragism was "bad form," and not so forward as in England.<sup>33</sup> Yet nearly twenty years before (in 1869) had been formed two Woman Suffrage Associations — the National and the American, the former to work for a federal amendment, the latter for winning over the States individually; and both societies, both names, and both objects were combined in 1890.<sup>34</sup> In that earlier year (1869), also, the full territorial franchise (including eligibility and jury duty) had been granted to women in Wyoming, where at the time the population amounted to a little over nine thousand souls, among whom females of all ages fell short of two thousand, or about one female to every fifty square miles of territory. The grant was by no means creditable to the cause, put through as it was principally by the wiles of one member of the legislature, who played off the two parties against each other<sup>35</sup> and was acquiesced in principally because of its service in advertising the community. Two years later the legislative council tried to repeal it, but was prevented by the governor's veto; and it was retained when the territory became a State in 1889-90. In the territories of Utah and Washington, whose legislatures gave the suffrage to women in 1870 and 1883 respectively, these grants were nullified, in the former in 1887 by the federal Congress for fear of polygamy, and in the latter in 1887 and 1890 by the federal courts, which with their customary irritating high-handedness denied competency to the legislature. Washington, on becoming a State in 1889, did not re-enact that measure, but has recently done so. Colorado, in 1893, and Idaho, in 1896, gave full suffrage to women, and in the latter year Utah did so immediately on becoming a State. In 1887, Kansas, which so early as 1861 had given women the school suffrage, partially admitted women to the municipal franchise; and since then several of our States — six or seven — have permitted them to vote on town taxes, but not for town officials, and as many as thirty have opened to them in some form the suffrage on school questions. Few women, it happens, vote at these partial elections; but if they be only the best educated and the ones that take the most interest in such matters, especially of the schools, the staying away of the others is all the more desirable.

Nine of the Canadian provinces have female municipal suffrage. Women have some voting privileges in British South Africa. The

<sup>33</sup> 2d ed., ii. 446, 447.

<sup>34</sup> The presidents of the combined society have been Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Miss Susan B. Anthony, Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, Rev. Anna Howard Shaw, and Miss Jane Addams.

<sup>35</sup> See Bryce, *op. cit.*, ii. 441n.

Australasian British colonies granted to women the municipal franchise between the years 1867 and 1886. In 1893 New Zealand gave them the full state franchise.<sup>36</sup> Before 1902, when federation was effected, two of the Australian States (as we should call them) — South and West Australia, in 1895 and 1900 — had extended the full franchise to women, and in order not to disfranchise them there, the federation opened the federal franchise to women everywhere, and the other four soon followed suit with their own franchise — New South Wales immediately, Tasmania the next year, Queensland in 1905, and Victoria in 1908. The British government, it may be added, over thirty years ago enfranchised the women tax-payers in Burmah, where the women carry loads and work in the fields, and the men sew and embroider, inverting things as in Egypt of old. It has given the municipal franchise also to the tax-paying women of a couple of cities in India, and in the town of Belize in British Honduras.

In England, in 1889, was formed the Woman's Franchise League, which was discontinued after a few years. In 1903, Mrs. Pankhurst and her two daughters founded the Woman's Social and Political Union, with headquarters at Manchester. This society adopted the slogan of "Votes for Women," began to hold unauthorised street meetings and make other public demonstrations, in imitation of the workingmen whose riots in Manchester had recently been effective in causing the passage of the Unemployed Workmen's Bill, and also because of an admission by the Premier (Balfour) that the Scottish Churches Bill was passed in consequence of "a crisis" in that region.<sup>37</sup> They gradually adopted the various tactics which have received the ridiculous appellation of "militancy"<sup>38</sup> — interrupting with their own eternal question meetings held for other purposes (1905); parading the streets without license and attempting to invade Parliament and to visit ministers who had declined to see them, raising a rumpus in the women's gallery in Parliament, "going for" one of the new ministers said to be their enemy (Asquith) at the suggestion of Lloyd George, refusing to recognise the authority of courts that enforce laws made only by men, and choosing imprisonment rather than pay fines, but at the same time claiming the treatment given to political offenders (1906); forming so-called Women's Parliaments to consider the King's speech, in imitation of the real Par-

<sup>36</sup> The method by which it was carried there was little better than in Wyoming: see an account of it in *The Fortnightly Review*, Feb., 1894.

<sup>37</sup> See E. Sylvia Pankhurst's *The Suffragette*, New York, 1911, p. 18.

<sup>38</sup> The term "militant" applied to them came into use in 1905. In 1906 the term "suffragette" was invented for them by *The Daily Mail*: see E. S. Pankhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 61n. The term "wild woman" had been given to their upper-class predecessors long before: cf. Mrs. Lynn Linton's *The Wild Women as Social Insurgents*, in *The Nineteenth Century*, Oct., 1891.

liament, advancing the plea that if the government did not give to women "their undoubted right to vote," the government would be responsible for the disorders that might ensue,<sup>39</sup> taking part in elections in favour of any candidate who would pledge himself to support the cause, advertising it by "sandwich" women, redoubling their efforts to attract attention because the newspapers ceased to report their doings<sup>40</sup> (1907); chaining themselves to railings before Parliament building and the residences of ministers, ringing a bell at an election, holding monster meetings (in answer to Herbert Gladstone's challenge to act like men, who had won the franchise by assembling by tens of thousands), and breaking windows, first in the houses of opposing ministers, then in public offices, and at last indiscriminately (in answer to Haldane's advice that women should not wage war with bodkins, as men do not like pin-pricks), invading private receptions and parties (1908); trying to force their way into Cabinet meetings, entering disguised or hiding in advance in halls where meetings were to be held so as to make a disturbance, or shouting through windows or skylights, mauling ministers at golf and elsewhere, refusing to eat in prison (hunger-striking), objecting to forced feeding, and refusing to submit to prison discipline, endeavouring to destroy ballots at elections (1909); after a brief truce (1910), snipping telegraph wires (1911); burning letters in mail-boxes, and (in answer to Hobhouse's reminder that the Chartist had burnt down Nottingham Castle) committing arson on unoccupied buildings such as sporting pavilions, railways stations (1912), and even closed private houses (sometimes of woman suffragists), and finally incommoding Sunday worship by loudly praying for their imprisoned leaders (1913); exploding bombs in empty churches, slashing pictures in public galleries, destroying national monuments, and insulting the inoffensive King and his unwilling consort (1914). These practices, which were finally met by the so-called "Cat-and-mouse" Act of 1913, and which came to an abrupt end in the middle of 1914 (for *inter arma silent et feminae*), have probably alienated more men and women from the cause than they have gained; but their beginnings, equally obstreperous though less destructive, attracted attention to the subject everywhere throughout the world, and undoubtedly gave a new impetus to the movement for the franchise.

Even some independent countries have adopted full national woman suffrage, but as yet, with a single imperfect exception, only

<sup>39</sup> E. S. Pankhurst, *op. cit.*, 143, again 275. The Germans, it may be noted, in 1915 made a similar claim, because the Allies would not give in to them.

<sup>40</sup> E. S. Pankhurst, *op. cit.*, 176.

small countries, and they are confined to Scandinavia. Norway was the first of these. There, where the influences of Fredrika Bremer and of Ibsen was strong, women's emancipation began in 1854, and made such rapid headway that by 1901 the municipal franchise was granted to tax-paying women, and in 1907 these received the national, which was thrown open to all women on the same terms as men in 1913, after the municipal had been thus thrown open to them in 1910. Denmark followed suit, opening the municipal franchise to women in 1908, and but recently, in 1915, the national. There, it may be noted, George Brandes helped the cause by translating Mill. Semi-independent Iceland, likewise, having given to women the municipal franchise in 1907, a little later extended to them that of the whole state. Sweden has not yet taken the full step, although she began as early as 1862 to grant the municipal franchise to tax-paying widows and spinsters, and extended it to married women in 1909. The neighbouring, no longer independent Finland, with the sanction of the Czar, after the bloodless but successful revolution of 1905, in 1906 gave to women equally as to men the parliamentary suffrage, along with eligibility. A few years ago Bosnia and Herzegovina converted the ancient privilege of land-owning women to vote by proxy into a personal right. Recently the Chinese republic passed a law giving the vote to women; but as that republic has passed away, nothing came of it. In Japan, the strongest country of the East, women take no part in politics.

In America a lull took place after 1896, but after 1910 for a few years the western States fell over one another in adopting woman suffrage — Washington leading off in that year, California following in 1911, and in 1912 Oregon, Kansas, and Arizona. In 1913 it was adopted in the Territory of Alaska, and the Illinois legislature granted it to all the offices within its jurisdiction. Montana and Nevada adopted it in 1914. Then, perhaps, the movement came to an end for the present. In 1912 Michigan escaped woman suffrage by a very narrow margin, but the next year gave a majority against it of nearly a hundred thousand. Ohio likewise increased an adverse majority of eighty-seven thousand in 1912 to a hundred and eighty-two thousand in 1914. In the latter year also North and South Dakota and Nebraska voted it down with majorities ranging around ten thousand each, and Missouri with a majority of a hundred and forty thousand. In 1915 New Jersey rejected it by a majority of fifty-one thousand, Pennsylvania by fifty-three thousand, Massachusetts by a hundred and thirty-three thousand, and New York by a hundred and ninety-four thousand. In 1916 it was rejected again in South Dakota by

a small and in West Virginia by an overwhelming majority, as also in Iowa. In the eastern States women have taken up a habit which men have gradually been abandoning in electoral campaigns, of parading through the streets of cities with banners and floats and in uniform, to demonstrate their numbers by public exhibitions; but they have committed no futile violence or indecency of the English "militant" stripe. They now hope to force their suffrage upon the recalcitrant States, even in local elections, by the votes, not of the people, but of the politicians, lobbied by women, in the States whose legislatures are amenable to such influence, just as the northern States once forced negro suffrage upon the southern States. In this year of grace (1917) they have already obtained some successes in this surreptitious manner.

This outburst of activity on the part of women in demanding the franchise has called forth counter activity on the part of its female opponents, and in England was formed the Woman's Anti-Suffrage Society in 1907, and similar associations have been established in twenty-four of our States. In the early stages of the movement, some forty years ago and more, the women opponents were known as "remonstrants." Now they are called "antis." Then the movement itself had been one of "strong-minded women" claiming their "rights," in echo of the political philosophy of the eighteenth century. Now, though the old claims are retained, they are supplemented by knowledge obtained from biology and sociology of the greater equality of the sexes in animals and primitive peoples; and it has become a fashionable fad of propertied women demanding more privileges for themselves and promising better conditions to other women. The movement has spread so widely, that in 1904, after an International Council of Women had been in existence since 1888, was formed the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, in which twenty-six countries are represented, and of which the president has been Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt.

Meanwhile feminism has extended from these women and their political agitation to the more diffusive realm of higher literature, under the leadership in America of Walt Whitman, who would have had even children "taught to be laws to themselves," and in Europe of Ibsen, who wished everybody to be him- or herself, busy with their duties toward themselves. And under the Slavic (and slavish) influence of Tolstoi, pacifism has become its attendant. Cowardice is always sporadic; but now even men urge one another to act as cowards act, and pride themselves on their superior morality.

## CHAPTER II.

### SOME FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS OF FEMINISM

THE woman movement has been almost synchronous with socialism (like Jill, tumbling after), and the advocates of the rights of working men and of women have sought the ones the others' help as natural allies.<sup>1</sup> But feminism has in some details won actuality, which socialism has not yet attained; and while socialistic theory began in the old and populous countries, this woman movement became operative in the new—in the west especially, in thinly settled regions, where women were still fewer than men; where consequently women were, so to speak, in demand, and inducements were held out to attract them, their work being lightened and their privileges extended. As yet women have got the franchise only in provinces or colonies or our so-called States, or in a couple of barren northern countries whose peace is preserved by the mutual jealousy of their mighty neighbours. No large state exposed to war, and supporting the balance of power, has yet admitted women to anything but local suffrage; and perhaps no large country, except ours, for a special reason which will be noticed later, ever will permit women to direct its destinies—at least till the millennium.

It is, in fact, the belief that something like the millennium is

<sup>1</sup> According to Bebel, in his *Die Frau*, women must seek allies, whom they will naturally find in the proletariat movement, as the movement of an oppressed class of men, 225; for they can expect no more help from men as such, than labourers can from the middle classes, 117; and the two problems will be solved together, 5. Similarly Edward Carpenter: Women "must remember that their cause is also the cause of the oppressed labourer over the whole earth, and the labourer has to remember that his cause is theirs," *Love's Coming of Age*, New York ed., 1911, p. 60. A "twin struggle," in sex and in economics, Mrs. Gilman calls "the woman's movement and the labour movement," *Women and Economics*, 138. "The sex problem is at bottom the labour problem," said Keir Hardie, *From Servitude to Socialism*, 63. "The solidarity of women," according to May Sinclair, has comparable with it as a sociological factor only "the solidarity of the working-men"; and, she adds, "these two solidarities are one." *Feminism*, London, 1911, 33-4. "The day of women and the working-class is dawning," prophesies Mrs. Atherton on p. 266 of her novel *Julia France*, which deals with feminism. "There is a sex-war, just as there is a class-war," Edna Kenton, *The Militant Women—and Women*, The Century Magazine, Nov., 1913, p. 13. For clear statements about this parallelism, due to the connection between ownership of property and the part played by females in its descent, see Pearson, *Ethic of Freethought*, 377, 414-16, 421, *Chances of Death*, i, 226, 230-1, 251, cf. 238. "Labour and women," he here says, "meet on the same ground and turn to the same remedies," 255. "To the thoughtful onlooker the socialist and the advocate of 'woman's rights' are essentially fighting the same battle, however much they may disguise the fact to themselves," *Ethic of Freethought*, 415.

already at hand, that has encouraged the expectation of women's admission to politics and statesmanship, as well as to all the occupations of men. The theory of feminism, like that of socialism, is based on the false belief in future peace, prosperity, and plenty. This is an age (*the age, some say*) of reason, and somehow reliance on human intellect is to keep the strong from attacking the weak more effectually than faith in God hitherto has done. "The age of war is drawing towards a close," said the presidentess of the Woman's Rights Convention at Worcester in 1850, "and that of peace is dawning; and the uprising of womanhood is its prophecy and foreshadow."<sup>2</sup> "We are living in a transition age," said another woman at the same convention, "when the minds of the community are asking the why and the wherefore of all things,"<sup>3</sup> — an age, it may be added, in which the new is to be welcomed because new, and the old rejected because old.<sup>4</sup> But instead of its being merely a transition from the ascending period to the culminating period of the same cycle of civilisation, preparatory to the decline, it is taken to be the transition from an old and worn-out to a new and up-springing civilisation,— yea, from the civilisation of the past, semi-barbarous, now ending, to another and full civilisation that is to last for all time into the future.<sup>5</sup> According to this view, we stand now at the centre of the world's history, at the division between a past and a future that are to balance each other, forming two halves, the one of which is departing and the other approaching. And for the feminists, of course, the new era is to be woman's era,<sup>6</sup> to which the twentieth century,

<sup>2</sup> Mrs. Paulina W. Davis, *Proceedings*, p. 8. Cf. Wendell Phillips: "The age of physical power is gone, and we want to put ballots into the hands of women," *Suffrage of Women*, 1861. And only recently Mrs. Hale: "The days of its [the fighting instinct's] domination is past," *What Women Want*, p. 293.

<sup>3</sup> Harriet K. Hunt, *ib.* 45.

<sup>4</sup> So G. W. Curtis spoke of "the general enfranchisement of women" as a "novelty," and "therefore," because this "is true of every step of political progress," it is "a presumption in its favour": in the New York constitutional convention of 1867, re-published in his *Orations and Addresses*, New York, 1894, i. 182. And of certain objections to some feminist claims Mrs. Jacobi in her "*Common Sense*" says: "Precisely because these objections are very old, may it be suspected that they are beginning to be somewhat worn out," 36-7; and of another, that it "is very funny, but very old. It has, indeed, an air of venerable senility," 105. Such is the spirit in which many of our most serious problems are confronted. Mrs. Jacobi herself calls this age "an inter-regnum of lax and facile time," in which thought may "achieve its own realisation," 150.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Emma Hardinge: "All [things] portend that a change is at hand, that a transition state in society is being passed through. The butterfly must be born of the worm, which is now writhing in the effort to cast its shell," *The Place and Mission of Women: An Inspirational Discourse*, Boston, 1859, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> In 1864 Eliza W. Farnham published in New York a long work, *Woman and Her Era*, in which she taught that "the grandest Era of Humanity must be that which is dominated by the Feminine qualities" ii. 430, which "incoming era" was about "to rise to view first in the Western World, with its democratic theory, based on the essentially feminine sentiment of trust in human nature," 450, and in which woman, "her long suffering ended," was "now to enter upon a career of sovereignty," 83. Leo Miller published at Buffalo in 1874 a pamphlet with the sufficiently explanatory title of *Woman and the Divine Republic*; and under the pseudonym of Virginia Leblick, Emer-

since its advent, is heralded as the dawn.<sup>7</sup> Statements of this sort have been made right up to the outbreak of the European war in the middle of 1914.<sup>8</sup> That they will be repeated, may well be doubted.<sup>9</sup>

The belief in the absoluteness of the transition confronting us was furthered by the writings of Maine and of Spencer, but it was held even before they advanced their distinctions between status and contract and between militarism and industrialism. Mill, having become a moderate socialist, believed not only that the division of mankind into capitalists and hired labourers would not much longer be the rule of the world, but that already in modern life command and obedience (which the youthful Spencer had pronounced "radically wrong")<sup>10</sup> are becoming exceptional facts, and equal association the general rule.<sup>11</sup> But Mill knew that at least one element in this transition, the substitution of "the morality of justice" for "the morality of submission," or something as near-resembling the former as is now likely to take effect, had taken place once before, in ancient civilisation, though he gave no heed to the results then obtained.<sup>12</sup> Not so others. One

ence M. Lemouche published in 1910 (place not designated) a book with the descriptive title: *The New Era Woman's Era, or Transformation from Barbaric to Humane Civilisation*.

<sup>7</sup> "The Woman's Century has dawned." Vida D. Scudder, *Woman and Socialism*, Yale Review, April, 1914, pp. 455, 467. "The twentieth century is the age of Woman; some day, it may be, it will be looked back upon as the golden age, the dawn some say of feminine civilisation"—so Mrs. Walter M. Galliehan (C. Gasquoine Hartley) opens her *The Position of Woman in Primitive Society* (New York ed., 1914, under the title of *The Age of Mother-Power*).

<sup>8</sup> Once more at the eve of the war, Mrs. Hale: "We stand at the beginning of the end of the rule of force, and on the threshold of the rule of intelligence," *What Women Want*, p. 300. She does not seem to understand that intelligence, such as it was, has always ruled (in the sense of guiding), and it has ruled through force (which performs), and always will, and cannot otherwise. More intelligence is being displayed in this war than in any previous one, and also more force.

<sup>9</sup> Since the last sentence was written, however, Mrs. Florence Guertin Tuttle has boldly renewed the old refrain: "Civilisation has left its dark period . . . and entered a new era: the period of mental conquest — of social and spiritual development," *The Awakening of Woman*, New York, 1915, p. 53, cf. 80-1, 114, 116.

<sup>10</sup> *Social Statics*, Part II, ch. xvi. § 5, probably getting the idea from the youthful Shelley, who in his *Queen Mab* (Part III.) had written:

"The man

Of virtuous soul commands not, nor obeys."

Spencer also at that time argued that the weaker state of women's faculties did not detract from their right to the full freedom of exercising them, II. xvi. § 2; nor did he hesitate to apply the same reasoning to children, xvii. § 1, concluding that neither should be subordinate and both should have the suffrage. But in the case of women, as of children, he conceded that society was not yet civilised enough to recognise their rights, and therefore he did not advocate them, xvi. § 8, xvii. § 9. No wonder he afterward retracted these views; for which retraction he had even better justification than in the case of his views about the right of all (and the non-right of individuals) to own land.

<sup>11</sup> *The Enfranchisement of Women (Dissertations*, iii. 111, cf. 104), *The Subjection of Women*, 79, cf. 81.

<sup>12</sup> For he added: "We are entering into an order of things in which justice will again be the primary virtue; grounded as before on equal, but now also on sympathetic association," the "before" referring to late antiquity when "the joint influence of Roman civilisation and of Christianity obliterated [successfully?] these distinctions," to wit, between "sex, class, or social position," *Subjection of Women*, p. 80. He did not perceive that the obliteration of these distinctions, and the breaking down of command

of the most earnest of his contemporary supporters of the woman's rights movement, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, wrote a little before our civil war, in explanation of "woman's social inferiority in the past," that "to all appearance, history would have been impossible without it, just as it would have been impossible without an epoch of war and slavery. It is simply a matter of social progress,—a part of the succession of civilisations. The past has been inevitably a period of ignorance, of engrossing physical necessities, and of brute force,—not of freedom, of philanthropy, and of culture. During that lower epoch, woman was necessarily an inferior. . . . The truth simply was, that her time had not come. Physical strength must rule for a time, and she was the weaker. . . . From this reign of force, woman never freed herself by force. She could not fight, or would not. . . . The reason, then, for the long subjection of woman has been simply that humanity was passing through its first epoch, and her full career was to be reserved for the second. . . . Woman's appointed era was delayed, but not omitted. It is not merely true that the empire of the past has belonged to man, but that it has properly belonged to him; for it was an empire of muscles, enlisting, at best, but the lower powers of the understanding. There can be no question that the present epoch is initiating an empire of the higher reason of arts, affections, aspirations; and for that epoch the genius of woman has been reserved. Till the fulness of time came, woman was necessarily kept a slave to the spinning-wheel and the needle. Now higher work is ready; peace has brought invention to her aid, and the mechanical means for her emancipation are ready also. . . . How is it possible for the blindest to help seeing that a new era has begun, and that the time has come for woman to learn the alphabet?"—i. e., to take full part with man in the administration of the world.<sup>18</sup> Fifty years have passed, and we are no nearer "the empire of the higher reason" than was Higginson. He and his fellow northerners freed the slaves of others, but have fast been losing their own freedom ever since. Culture is being diluted; philanthropy is taking the form of leaving endowments to charitable institutions; art is degenerating into "cubism," and women's share in it into "hobble skirts" and the "slouch"; while morals are becoming so lax that mothers allow their daughters to discuss prostitution with young men under the euphuism of "white slavery," and, setting the example themselves, to be promiscuously hugged in public, breast to breast,

and obedience, were causes of the decline and fall of a civilisation that has reached its culmination.

<sup>18</sup> *Ought Women to learn the Alphabet?* Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1859, pp. 145-7.

belly to belly, legs to legs, on the pretext of dancing; and in some countries the "higher work" ready for women is leading them still more into factories and behind the desk and the counter and into the lower ranks of some of the professions. Some women, indeed, have become freer to do what they please, and what they please seems to be to earn pin-money and have a good time, or be sporty. New eras, at least higher ones, do not make their advent in this way.

And like the socialists with regard to their own scheme, the feminists actually seem to believe that the entrance of women into political life by means of the suffrage will bring about the new epoch,<sup>14</sup> or at all events the reign of peace. The entrance of women into political life by the grant of the suffrage they conceive as taking place everywhere at once. Even so, they forget that women have been inciters of men to wage war on others since the world began. "On that day," says Mrs. Schreiner, "when the woman takes her place beside the man in the governance and arrangement of external affairs of her race, will also be the day that heralds the death of war as a means of arranging human differences."<sup>15</sup> Yet this same Mrs. Schreiner lingers with pleasure over the picture of the Germanic women of old, who, "bare-footed and white-robed," arranged the differences of their race with the Romans by leading "their northern hosts on the long march to Italy," "animated by the thought that they led their people to a land of warmer sunshine and richer fruitage."<sup>16</sup> But no more will feminism, than will socialism, be introduced everywhere at once. If it comes at all, or if any such portion of it as female suffrage comes among the great nations of the earth, it will come in one, or at most in two, long before others will dream of admitting it; which latter will enjoy the spectacle of the enfeebled influence of men in the former, and will abandon their dream,

<sup>14</sup> Mrs. Abby H. Price, at the Woman's Rights Convention, Worcester, 1850: "Give us our rights inalienable, and then a new era, glorious as the millennial morning, will dawn on earth, an advent only less radiant than that heralded by angels on the plains of Bethlehem," *Proceedings*, p. 35. And she quoted Elliott's verses:

"Wait, boastful man! Though worthy are  
Thy deeds, when thou art true,  
Things worthier still, and holier far,  
Our sisters yet will do."

<sup>15</sup> *Woman and Labour*, p. 176. Again: "War will pass, when intellectual culture and activity have made possible to the female an equal share in the control and governance of modern national life"; for "it is our intention to enter into the domain of war and to labour there till in the course of generations we have extinguished it," p. 184. Cf. Mrs. Warner Snod: "The influence of their [women's] intuitive and peace-loving nature upon Parliament will increase the tendency to arbitration between nations and hasten the time when war shall be no more," *A Plea for Justice*, Westminster Review, July, 1892. She, however, does not forget that "before now women have led armies."

<sup>16</sup> Pp. 149-50. So to-day the women of Germany and Austria are no doubt urging their husbands and sons on to the seizure of Belgium and Serbia, to give them and their children a better "place in the sun."

if they ever got so far as to dream of admitting it. The women in those feminised countries may be determined, like our late Secretary of State, that no war shall take place during their rule; but as it takes two to make a quarrel, it takes two to keep the peace, and be they as anxious as ever they may to preserve peace at any price, they will thereby only invite insult and derision, or attack and invasion, and their own overthrow.

For there is still another analogy between feminism and socialism. We have seen that, although socialists speak as if they were going to level the poor up to the rich, their system will have the opposite effect of levelling the rich down to the poor. Similarly the feminists, in demanding the equalisation of women with men, always conceive of it as if they were to raise women, in the qualities of independence, ability to support themselves, and the like, up to the level of men; but the result of their efforts will more likely be to reduce men toward their level, so as to need, for instance, support from the state,—or in short, more to feminise men than to masculinise women. The process of evolution has been to differentiate the sexes in many of the animals, and going very far in the human species, producing, as we shall see, hundreds of secondary sexual traits, in addition to the primary difference of reproductive function which constitutes the sex differentiation. This process is contemporaneously illustrated both by the fact that in backward barbarous and savage races of mankind there is somewhat less differentiation between men and women than in the more highly civilised, and by the fact that in the young the differences are much less marked than in the full-grown. Some of the differentiation is without doubt due to the influence of reason in the human species, itself more developed in the civilised than in the uncivilised races; and lastly it is due, too, to education or training under the guidance of reason. But the process is one that has been going on for myriads of years, and cannot be undone in a much less period of time. So at least in the case of the deep-seated physiological differences, some of the mental and moral differences being more superficial and a later efflorescence at the top; and yet they, too, mostly are due to discipline through thousands of years, which has bred them in and made them as natural as are other inherent characters; wherefore they are not effects of differences of up-bringing merely of individuals, though they are more or less modifiable thereby.<sup>17</sup> Modifiable by individual

<sup>17</sup> Hence the error of Sydney Smith's assertion (commended by Mill) that "as long as boys and girls run about in the dirt, and trundle hoops together, they are both precisely alike. If you catch up one-half of these creatures, and train them to a particular set of actions and opinions, and the other half to a perfectly opposite set, of course their understandings will differ, as one or the other sort of oc-

training are the highest moral qualities of men and women, and minor configurations of their bodies. Somewhat deeper differentiations of these sorts have gone on from cycle to cycle of civilisation, as the later have advanced beyond the earlier; and within the cycles, more superficial differentiations proceed as the civilisation rises from its pristine condition toward its culmination.<sup>18</sup> But at the culmination the advanced stage of civilisation tends, as we have seen, to bring together and mix up men and women economically and socially, and, as it both leads men to the easier, safer, and more comfortable circumstances which were sooner obtained for women, and reduces the totality of men to a subordination and even subjection in the nexus and complexus of a highly developed society and state, somewhat similar to that of the other sex, its effect is much more to make women of men than to make men of women: sternness gives way to mildness, and the masculine virtues recede before the feminine, since it is easier to make the hard and strong soft and weak than it is to make the soft and weak hard and strong.<sup>19</sup> If some women ape manliness, they cannot make up for the loss of real manhood on the part of men, and the country in which this tendency goes the furthest is inevitably exposed as a prey to those in which men have remained men. Now, the whole operation of modern feminism is consciously and purposely to increase this tendency. For women know that they cannot become like real men, and so they would first have men become as much as possible like women, in order that they may then resemble and equal such men. And

cupations has called this or that talent into action. There is surely no occasion to go into any deeper or more abstruse reasoning, in order to explain so very simple a phenomenon," *Female Education*, Edinburgh Review, Jan., 1810, vol. xv. p. 299 (Mill. *Dissertations*, iii. 106n.). He overlooked that some deeper reason would yet have to be sought for, to account for people catching up and training differently two half-portions of children who would otherwise grow up undifferentiated. Whately disposed of this passage neatly by referring to a difference which increases in after-life: "He [Smith] was ingenious, but often rash and inaccurate. It did not occur to him that when they are all taught together to write, and by the same master, in nine cases out of ten, people will rightly guess which is a man's hand and which a woman's," *Miscellaneous Remains*, 187. Cf. Maudsley: "To my mind it would not be one whit more absurd to affirm that the antlers of the stag, the human beard, and the cock's comb are effects of education; or that, by putting a girl to the same education as a boy, the female generative organs might be transformed into a male organ," *Body and Mind*, New York ed., 35. Perhaps, however, Smith's error has been matched on the other side by the American editor of A. Walker's *Woman*, who wrote (p. 377): "As long as the little girl prefers her doll and the boy his top, it is useless to talk [as Mrs. Childs did] of the 'same moral and intellectual condition' of the sexes"; which has again been outdone, on his own side, recently by Mrs. Schreiner, who attributes our opinions on the distinction of sex, not only to artificial training, but also to artificial difference of dress! *Woman and Labour*, 165-6, 187-91.

18 Cf. Finck: "The history of civilisation has been to make men and women more unlike, physically and mentally," *Romantic Love and Personal Beauty*, 175, and so 290, 541.

19 Even in Germany about fifty years ago Otto Ludwig noted that "the sex vices of women have now become those of men; our culture is predominately romantic and feminine, educating the man to be the tender mate of the woman, not the woman to be the strong, masculine companion of the man," (quoted from Rosa Mayreder's *Survey of the Woman Problem*, Scheffauer's translation, pp. 90-1).

they begin at the beginning, in advocating co-education throughout childhood<sup>20</sup> and youth, as much as possible under female instructors. But the ultimate effect, the danger ahead, as shall be more fully pointed out, they do not foresee,—nor do their male abettors.<sup>21</sup>

On the contrary, the hopes of woman's advancement to a position beside that of man, without retrogression on his part, are encouraged by the advance in that direction which undoubtedly has taken place during the last fifty years or so. Women, by receiving a better education, and by being admitted to more and more of men's occupations so as to be able to support themselves better than before, have become less dependent in their feelings—less home-staying, retiring, modest, and more restive, self-assertive, and ambitious. And because this change has been quickly effected in a couple of generations—and exaggerated in novels which depicted the maids of the early nineteenth century as much coyer and feebler and more easily blushing and fainting than they really were,—the induction is made that the advance, as it is called, will go on and in a couple of generations more will bring women up to the level of men.<sup>22</sup> But this induction is false, because it overlooks the fact that education of the individual may produce certain changes in his development and then cease, the limit of his capacity being reached; it may increase his knowledge up to a certain point, but not the size of his brain. For the individual's capacity is limited by his innate qualities, or character, determined by his physical constitution, inherited from his ancestors.

<sup>20</sup> "Co-education, at least during childhood, should be a feminist truism," says Mrs. Hale, as she recognises that it fosters feminism, *What Women Want*, 163.

<sup>21</sup> Mill, or his wife, made the sapient statement: "In the present closeness of association between the sexes, men cannot retain manliness unless women acquire it," *Dissertations*, iii. 117. This he amplified in his speech in Parliament, May 20, 1867, in advocacy of woman suffrage: "The time has come when, if women are not raised to the level of men, men will be pulled down to theirs. [A laugh] . . . Those who have reflected on the nature and power of social influences, know that, when there are not manly women, there will not much longer be manly men. [Laughter] When men and women are really companions, if women are frivolous, men will be frivolous; if women care only for personal interests and trifling amusements, men in general will care for little else. The two sexes must now rise or sink together." But there is no reason why women should be frivolous or occupied only with trifling amusements, because they are not admitted to the franchise and to all the occupations of men. On the other hand, never have sporting men been so frivolous as they have become since women have been received as companions in their sports. Similar statements, however, have been repeated. Thus Henry George: "Nothing will fully interest men unless it also interests women," *Works*, ii. 244. Mrs. Gallichan: "Man must fall with woman, and rise with her," *The Truth about Woman*, 10. Cf. Tennyson:—

"The woman's cause is man's: they rise or sink  
Together."

*The Princess*, VII.

<sup>22</sup> As Godwin would not have the capacity of men under socialism judged by the capacity of present men, (above, ii. 25n.), so the feminists would not have the capacity of women under feminism judged by their present capacity. In each case there is an expectation of a higher being, to be produced soon, however miraculously; only in the case of feminists this expectation requires no more than that women shall not fall short of men.

The character of his qualities, to be sure, may go on improving and becoming more capacious in his own descendants, the size of their brains growing, but only in the slow process of evolution through the ages. Thus if a portion of a population are backward from lack of education and opportunity, the children of this portion might in one generation be educated up to the highest level the capacity of that population is capable of attaining; but the next generation of children could not go appreciably further, and it would be a false induction from the rapid progress of the one generation, in peculiar circumstances, to suppose the continuance of anything like the same progress in the next. Such is the phenomenon we have lately witnessed in the female portion of modern society.<sup>23</sup> Independent and well-educated women have already exhibited what they can do: they have advanced beyond women who were not well-educated and not independent; but this advance in no wise prognosticates an advance of independent and well-educated women in the future over independent and well-educated women at present. The circumstances and conditions are changed. The progress actually made has been one of acquirements; the progress inferred and believed in is one of capacity: the occurrence of the former affords no reason to anticipate the occurrence of the latter.<sup>24</sup>

There is one more fundamental assumption made by feminism. Just as socialism wishes all classes to be melted down into one class, so feminism wishes people at least to shut their eyes to every difference of sex (except the primary) and to treat all grown-up individuals (for the distinction between these and children they will still allow) as specimens of only one kind of entity — as human beings. We have seen this claim put into the

<sup>23</sup> In a similar period of women's "progress" in antiquity, Seneca wrote: "Non mutata feminarum natura, sed vita est," *Epist.* 95, § 20.— During the same modern period, by abandoning tight stays, women's waists have grown considerably in size in one generation; but this does not mean that similar freedom in the future will go on enlarging their waists.

<sup>24</sup> Here may be cited the testimony of a scientist, who is himself a feminist, Forel: "When certain people maintain that a few generations of activity suffice to elevate the intellectual development of women, they confound the results of education with those of heredity and phylogeny. Education is a purely individual matter, and only requires one generation to produce its results. But neither mnemonic engraphia, nor even selection can modify hereditary energies in two or three generations. Tied down hitherto partly by servitude, the mental faculties of woman will doubtless rise and flourish in all their natural power as soon as they are absolutely free to develop in society equally with those of men, by the aid of equal rights. But what does not exist in the hereditary mneme, that is to say, in the energies of germs, inherited through thousands or millions of years, cannot be created in a few generations. The specific characters, and consequently the sexual characters, have quite another constancy than is believed by the superficial prattlers, who deafen us with their jargon on a question of which they only grasp the surface. There is no excuse at the present day, for confounding hereditary correlative sexual characters with the individual results of education. The latter are acquired by habit, and can only be inherited as such by an infinitesimal engraphia, possibly after hundreds of generations," *The Sexual Question*, 68.

mouth of an adulterous woman under the Roman empire;<sup>25</sup> and it made its appearance early in the modern woman movement. "Is not a woman a member of the race," asked Mrs. Abby H. Price at the Woman's Convention at Worcester in 1850; and she answered, "Yes, for above these titles of wife and mother, which depend upon circumstances and are accidental and transitory, there is for a woman a title eternal, inalienable, preceding and rising above all,—that of human being, co-existent with man."<sup>26</sup> Even before that, Fanny Wright (later Madame Darusmont), the Scotchwoman who first brought feminism to America, said in her parting address at New York in 1830: "What is the purpose of our souls? The equalisation of our human conditions, the annihilation of all arbitrary distinctions, the substitution of the simple character of human beings for that of all others."<sup>27</sup> And a little later Higginson quoted from Jean Paul Richter's *Levana* (published 1806) a statement that "before and after being a mother, a woman is a human being."<sup>28</sup> And Mill followed suit, declaring that "the mere consciousness a woman would then [when emancipated] have of being a human being like any other [i. e. like a man] would effect an immense expansion."<sup>29</sup> The idea has continued to be harped upon ever since.<sup>30</sup> It is a constant refrain in the writings and lectures of Mrs. Gilman. "We women," says Mrs. Pankhurst, "in trying to make our case clear, always have to make as part of our argument, and urge upon men in our audience, the fact—a very simple fact—that women are human beings."<sup>31</sup> Only recently at New York, February 20, 1914, six feminists conducted a public symposium on the subject of "Breaking into the Human Race," at which Marie Jenney Howe, who presided, maintained that "the world is human, and women want to be human, not merely emotional, personal, feminine creatures. We're sick," she cried, "of being specialised to sex. We intend simply to be ourselves, not just

<sup>25</sup> Above, i. 99.

<sup>26</sup> *Proceedings*, 28.

<sup>27</sup> *Parting Address*, in pamphlet form, p. 11.

<sup>28</sup> *Ought Women to learn the Alphabet?* p. 147. The original is: "Bevor und nachdem man eine Mutter ist, ist man ein Mensch," § 87. So G. W. Curtis, possibly with the same in mind: "They [women] are not only parents, they are human beings," *Fair Play for Women*, Address at New York, 1870, in *Orations and Addresses*, i. 230. Ibsen also has made his Nora talk this way. Still earlier, in 1792, Hippel asked the strange question: "Why should not women be able to say *I*? . . . Why should they not be persons?" *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber*, in *Werke*, vi. 119; they should, he replied, have the rank due to them as human beings, 250, because, as man and woman are only one human being, we ought not to divide what God has united, 143,—an argument which would not be tolerated to-day!

<sup>29</sup> *Subjection of Women*, 155. During the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1853, W. B. Greene seems to have been converted to the doctrine of woman's rights by reflecting upon the fact that women are people and human beings, *Official Report of Debates*, ii. 726 A, B, 731 A.

<sup>30</sup> E.g., in Mrs. Jacobi's "*Common Sense*," 100.

<sup>31</sup> Speech at Hartford, Nov. 13, 1913, *Verbatim Report*, p. 6.

our little female selves, but our whole, big, human selves.”<sup>32</sup> Even among the Slovenes the leader of the women’s movement, Zofka Kveder, has formulated the motto: “To see, to know, to understand. Woman is a human being.”<sup>33</sup>

In all this it is ignored that human is only what is common to both men and women. Women cannot become like men by becoming human, because they are human already, however different from men they be. They can become like men only by giving up what is distinctively womanly and adopting what is distinctively manly — by becoming “virile,” as we shall find a prominent feminist urging. Yet this sophism is sometimes openly made, and it probably is latent much more frequently. Thus, setting the fashion at the outset, Mary Wollstonecraft wrote: “Women, I allow, may have different duties to fulfil; but they are human duties”; whence she concluded that, as she “sturdily” maintained, “the principles that should regulate the discharge of them must be the same.”<sup>34</sup> Then, at the Worcester Convention, Maria L. Varney asserted that “woman’s rights are the rights of a human being,” and immediately deduced therefrom that “all law should be made without regard to sex, either in the governor or the governed.”<sup>35</sup> And lately Mrs. Gilman, in advocacy of making all social, economic, and political activity “common to both sexes,” lays down the principle that “human work is woman’s as well as man’s.”<sup>36</sup> Now, the argument here implied is the simplest of all fallacies pointed out in every work on logic, being the fallacy of undistributed middle; for, when fully expressed, it runs in this form: Man’s work and rights are human work and rights, Woman’s work and rights are human work and rights, Therefore woman’s work and rights are (or are the same as) man’s work and rights. The error comes from supposing that the denotation in the subject is as complete as in the predicate. Mrs. Gilman’s first principle is correct; but her and Mrs. Varney’s deduction therefrom is true only to the extent that woman’s rights (and work) are the rights (and work) of *some* human beings — not necessarily of all human beings, as wrongly implied. And Mary Wollstonecraft’s inference is true to the extent that the broadest principles that regulate the dis-

<sup>32</sup> Reported in *The New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1914. The meeting was probably inspired by an article under the same title in *Hampton’s Magazine*, Sept., 1911, by Rheta Childe Dorr. There she characterised “the whole woman movement” as “a mighty effort to break into the human race” (p. 13 of the reprint). She might better have described it as a futile attempt to break out of the female into the male sex.

<sup>33</sup> Schirmacher’s *Modern Woman’s Rights Movement*, 135-6.

<sup>34</sup> *Vindication*, 65. She also says “the sexual should not destroy the human character,” 67, though how it could do so, is not explained.

<sup>35</sup> *Proceedings*, 74, 75.

<sup>36</sup> *Women and Economics*, 52, 53.

charge of human duties are the same for women as for men, but not to the extent of excluding other principles regulative of men's duties alone, and still others regulative of women's peculiar duties. For what is distinctively woman's work, and what are distinctively women's rights, are not the human work and rights common to men also, but that work and those rights which are not held in common with men. And so men's work and men's rights, distinctively, are not the work and the rights held in common with women.<sup>37</sup>

It is a pity that the languages of the English and the French, the peoples who have most insisted on "the rights of man," have no distinctive terms for the human species as a whole and for its male division. If they had such terms, it would have helped them to perceive that a large proportion of the "rights of man" talked about are the rights of human beings, but that some are the rights of men distinctively, and that there are some other distinctive rights of women, as when they are maids, wives, and mothers. Yet the Germans, whose language has distinctive terms for the two senses of our "man," have not always been saved from this confusion of thought. For the misogynist Schopenhauer held that, contrary to the spirit of his mother tongue, the genuine human being (*Mensch*) is man (*der Mann*);<sup>38</sup> and before him, Hippel was not prevented by the clearness of his language from taking the trouble to assert that "women are as well human beings as are men," and from drawing therefrom the unauthorised conclusion that "the same rights belong to them," and, further, from complaining that "under 'rights of men (human beings)', people mean only rights of men (proper)"; which last is simply not a fact, since almost all the declared rights of man, wherever insisted on, have been extended by men to women.<sup>39</sup> Our language, however, like all others, contains distinctive terms for the two sexes, though in ours that for the male sex is blurred by being extended to the whole species. The term "Mensch," or "human being," we should remember, is more abstract, that is, it connotes fewer attributes, than the words "man" or "woman." We properly deal with human be-

<sup>37</sup> Dogmatism and illogicalness often result from not observing this distinction. For instance: "As woman is human the same as man, and as she is [in consequence?] justly and logically endowed with [all?] the same rights, privileges, and immunities by nature, as is man, it follows that by no process of reasoning [except right reasoning, which takes differences into account] can she be denied their exercise and enjoyment," Henry Frank, *A Plea for Woman Suffrage*, No. 3, *Justice, not expediency*, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> *Parerga und Paralipomena*, ii. § 377. We shall see this matched by some feminists making the same claim for woman.

<sup>39</sup> Hippel's words are: "dass die Weiber eben so gut Menschen sind, wie die Männer, und ihnen gleiche Rechte gebüren." "Man meint unter Menschenrechte nichts anders als Männerrechte." *Ueber die Ehe*, Reclam's ed., pp. 152, 165.

ings only when we are dealing with them in distinction from other animals, real or imaginary;<sup>40</sup> for then we are dealing with the more general attributes which men and women have in common, and to cover which (and no more) a single term is useful. But when we are engaged with a subject within the human species, that involves the very differences of its sexes, we ought to avoid the common term and use the two words we possess in their distinctive senses. We should especially try to avoid error from, instead of making capital out of, the ambiguity lurking in the fact that the term "man" also at times includes woman.

The quotations above made from Mrs. Price and Fanny Wright disclose another lurking fallacy induced by certain terms, in the references to "accidental circumstances" and "arbitrary distinctions." The distinction of sex itself is by the feminists treated as an arbitrary distinction, just as is the distinction of classes by the socialists. "Sex," wrote Margaret Fuller, "like rank, wealth, beauty, or talent, is but an accident of birth."<sup>41</sup> And Mill called "the aristocracy of sex" "a distinction as accidental as that of colour."<sup>42</sup> The supposition that the distinction of colour is the only thing that distinguishes Africans from Europeans is as shallow (it is literally only skin-deep) and as naïve as the supposition that men and women are distinguished only by their most prominent sex characteristic. But still more unworthy of a philosopher is it to speak of birth and all that it brings as an accident. I ought then to be treated the same as a noble, rich, beautiful, talented person, because it is an accident that I was born without these advantages. I ought not to be incapacitated from voting in France, because it is an accident that I was born in America. I ought even to be able to vote for a Roman consul, because it is an accident that I was born fifteen hundred years after Roman consuls ceased to be voted for. Birth, indeed, is the most determinative thing in our existence. By it we are determined to be human beings, and not lions or dogs or spiders or nothing. By it we may be given the inheritance

<sup>40</sup> So the feminist Grant Allen once made a right use of words when he wrote: "We must cease to be Calibans. We must begin to be human," *The Woman who Did*, Tauchnitz ed., p. 207.

<sup>41</sup> *Memoirs*, ii. 143.

<sup>42</sup> *Dissertations*, iii. 99. Similarly he couples "the accident of sex" with "the accident of skin," *Representative Government*, 180, and asserts that "to be born a girl instead of a boy" should not have influence "any more than to be born black instead of white, or a commoner instead of a nobleman," *Subjection of Women*, 33, cf. 149. Also in *Political Economy*, IV. vii. § 3, he repeats "the accident of sex."—In the woman-suffrage debate in the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1853, W. B. Greene asked: "Are not the differences of sex and colour accidental, merely, in human existence," *Official Report*, ii. 731 A. So G. W. Curtis classed sex with "height and weight" as "purely arbitrary tests," *Orations and Addresses*, i. 189. Others have said the colour of the hair would be no worse a test. We have seen that Mrs. Hale seems to regard all barriers to women's development equally with men's as artificial: above, p. 42.

of the higher races, or only of the lower. By it we may be brought forth sound and intelligent beings, or cripples, or idiots, or abortions. And is it itself indeterminate? How does Mill know? Because the sex of a child is not determined by the choice of its parents, is it undetermined? Neither the materialist nor the theist can affirm this. If sex is an accident, so is everything we possess and are: so is our existence, our being human beings, our being entities at all; all which is metaphysics gone askew, and is absurd,<sup>43</sup> and from it nothing whatever can be inferred. So, to add, as Mill does,<sup>44</sup>—and it is the objective point of all the others,—that the distinction of sex is as “irrelevant” as the distinction of colour “to all questions of government” because they are both equally accidental, is a pure begging of the question. Arbitrary distinctions, to be sure, ought to be done away with. The distinction of the sexes is not arbitrary, and whether the distinction between the sexes in matters of government is arbitrary or relevant, is the question at issue. The question of colour, really of races, is another question of a similar nature, but involving different elements. Each of these questions should be settled on its own merits, and it is possible they might receive opposite solutions.<sup>45</sup>

Modern feminism, however, has, of course, a deeper cause or occasion than a mere mistaken use of words or foolish talk about the accident of being born what one is. This would-be masculinisation of women, in fact as well as in language, and contrary to nature’s determination at birth, is a result also of modern industrialism, which has taken women from the home, where they worked by themselves, into the factory, where they work side by side with men, and whence they return to the home as money-earners like men; and the same industrialism, by putting men side by side with women, is likewise operative in the opposite direc-

<sup>43</sup> Especially absurd is it for Mrs. Price to speak of any woman’s being a wife and mother as accidental in comparison with her being a human being; for her being a wife and mother depends on her own determination, while her being a human being depended on the determination of her parents. Of course the association of one’s birth with some attribute may be regarded as accidental when there is no causal connection between the two, as in the case of one’s being born a Christian or a Mohammedan, a Democrat or a Republican. But there is a direct causal connection between our birth and our sex, as also between our birth and our inherited qualities and our temporal and spatial surroundings.

<sup>44</sup> In the passage first quoted, and in other words in the rest.

<sup>45</sup> Another case of begging the question by Mill, or his wife, is the following, where it ought least of all to occur. “The real question,” he says, “is, whether it is right and expedient that one half of the human race should pass through life in a state of forced subordination to the other half,” *Dissertations*, iii. 113. The real question is, whether their subordination is forced or natural, or to what extent it is forced and not natural. Of course if, or to the extent, it is natural, it may need legal enforcement; but this does not deserve the derogatory term of “forced.” Mill would not speak of the “forced” subordination of children to their parents, although there is legal enforcement also of this.

tion upon men, tending toward their feminisation.<sup>46</sup> The out-of-home labour of women of the lower classes has spread up to the middle classes, whose women aspire to enter the professions, and is spreading up to the upper classes, whose women look forward to entering politics and even diplomacy. Thus the individualism of men, who have left the old status of birth, every one to seek his own fortune as best he can, is going over to women also;<sup>47</sup> and the family as well as the state is to break up into its constituent atoms, in physical isolation, without any chemical combination in the permanent molecules of stable substances. So Margaret Fuller advised that "as you would not educate a soul to be an aristocrat, so do not to be a woman";<sup>48</sup> and Higginson followed suit: "Soul before sex. *La carrière ouverte aux talens.* Every man for himself, every woman for herself, and the alphabet [*i. e.*, education] for us all."<sup>49</sup> This individualism run mad of the feminists—this individualism which Ellen Key calls "the principle of the woman movement,"<sup>50</sup>—has outstripped socialism, which has come to individualism only through collectivism, while feminism jumped to it directly. And while socialism is trying to get rid of the wage-system, the feminists are trying to extend it to all women.<sup>51</sup> Even the house-wife, some say, should demand definite pay from her husband (or receive by law a definite proportion of his income) for her domestic

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Havelock Ellis: "Savagery and barbarism have more usually than not been predominantly militant, that is to say masculine, in character, while modern civilisation is becoming industrial, that is to say feminine, in character, for the industries belonged primitively to women, and they tend to make men like women. Even in quite recent times . . . it is possible to see the workings of this feminisation. . . . To-day a man also is a tender thing," *Man and Woman*, 392-3. O. T. Mason would have us speak rather of sexes, than of ages, of militancy and industrialism, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, 2. An age of industrialism, then, is predominantly a woman's age.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Mrs. Jacobi: "This idea [of individualism], at first suggested only for men, has, little by little, spread to women also," "Common Sense," 143.

<sup>48</sup> *Memoirs*, ii. 143. How much truer is Clarke's "physiological motto": "Educate a man for manhood, and a woman for womanhood, both for humanity," *Sex in Education*, 19.

<sup>49</sup> *Ought Women to learn the Alphabet?* 145.

<sup>50</sup> *The Woman Movement*, 97. An extravagant specimen of it may be found in Elizabeth Cady Stanton's address on *The Solitude of Self*, in which, among other things, she says: "Her [woman's] rights, under such circumstances [as an individual, in a world of her own, a female Crusoe, the arbiter of her destiny], are to use all her faculties for her own safety and happiness," 3. "We ask for the complete development of every individual, first, for her [or his] own benefit and happiness . . . Again, we ask complete individual development for the public good," 6. In another address she had laid down the principle: "In the settlement of every question we must simply consider the highest good of the individual," reprinted in *The History of Woman Suffrage*, i. 717. Cf. also Josephine P. Knowles: "I go on the assumption throughout that every soul has a right to search for happiness (not amusement) on their [sic] own lines," *The Upholstered Cage*, London, 1912, p. xiii.

<sup>51</sup> Against this false tendency of feminism Karl Pearson has raised a warning voice. The cry for "equal opportunity" he ascribes to the fact that the woman's movement was started by superior women, *Chances of Death*, i. 235; but for women in general it is as fallacious as is the cry for "freedom of contract" for labourers, 233, 238; for women as well as men, according to this Fabian socialist, need the "special protection" of the state, 234, 238, 240, 246, 254.

labours;<sup>52</sup> and George Bernard Shaw has even advised women to ask a lump sum for every child they bear. This, however, appears to be recommended only as a temporary measure until socialism be reached. As extremes are said to meet, the thought may be that the leap from such feminism to socialism may be rendered shorter.

<sup>52</sup> So, e.g., Cicely Hamilton, *Marriage as a Trade*, New York ed., 1909, p. 233, cf. 252 (else they are advised to "shirk the duties" men impose upon them, 117, cf. 251,—a kind of sex-sabotage). Also Christabel Pankhurst, *Plain Facts about a Great Evil*, New York ed., 1913, p. 120; and Forel, *The Sexual Question*, 370-1, 523. In England The Homemakers Trade Union has been formed, one of whose objects is "To insist as a right on a proper proportion of men's earnings being paid to wives for the support of the home." Mrs. M. H. Wood hopes thereby to do away with "pocket searching" by the wife while the husband is asleep.

## CHAPTER III.

### ERROR OF THE FEMINISTS' FIRST PRINCIPLE

COMMON to all feminism is the aspiration of women to become equal to men — to be admitted to all the rights, privileges, powers, and emoluments that are possessed and enjoyed by the other sex. Yet there is some haziness about the amount of use to be made of this equality. Full feminism demands that practically all differences between the male and the female of the human species shall be obliterated except the one big difference of begetting and of bearing children (of being fathers and mothers), which belongs to all but the lowest species of living beings. In physiological language, they recognise only the primary sexual differentiæ and would ignore all the secondary.<sup>1</sup> Just as full socialism seeks abolition of the distinction between social, economic, and political classes, so full feminism desires that, socially, economically, and politically at least, the two sexes shall be undistinguished. Besides this, just as a semi-socialism is satisfied with equality of ownership of one kind of property only, so a semi-feminism goes no further, at present, than to insist upon the requirement that women shall be accorded all the political rights of men, being content to wait and see what they will do with their votes when they get them.

The latter kind of feminism it would be possible to introduce forthwith, and yet its effects would not be completely perceived for a generation or two. The full feminism could not itself be brought into operation in less than several generations, and its effects would be concomitant with its extension. Either kind of feminism might be introduced with or without socialism. If full socialism should ever come, feminism, it is true, must come too, as it is an integral part of such socialism. But feminism might come without any further amount of socialism. If so, instead of doing away with competition, as socialism would do, it would broaden competition; for its tendency is to set up competition between the sexes, whereas, since the beginnings of cy-

<sup>1</sup> So Higginson, not only of the human species, but of all animals, that the two sexes move, breathe, run, and do everything in precisely the same manner, "except as to the one solitary fact of parentage," *Ought Women to learn the Alphabet?* 144. Higginson wrote thus in sheer ignorance of physiology.

cles of civilisation till their culminating periods, the sexes have had their own lines of labour, with as little competition as possible between them. Men have now invaded the upper ranks of women's work, and women have been invited into the lower ranks of men's work. This process, already begun, the feminists wish to carry on till the work of men and women no longer be differentiated. Competition is to be free not only between men and men, and between women and women, but also between men and women and between women and men.

The demand for complete equality of women with men (with which we may now first deal) includes a demand for the complete independence of women on men—in the sense that one man is independent of any other particular man, when he is self-supporting, living either on his own property or by his own labour: an economic independence. It includes also a demand for equal independence, which is effected only if the amount of support, or income, which women obtain for themselves, is equal on the average to that which men obtain for themselves. This condition of perfect economic equality with men might be attained for women under full socialism, since this distributes equal incomes to all without discrimination between strength and weakness, and consequently without discrimination between the sexes. But it would be attended by all the evils of full socialism, already reviewed, and unnecessary to repeat. Without such socialism full feminism simply runs against nature; for it assumes, that if women were admitted to free competition with men, they would produce and earn as much as men do, and gain economic equality, by their own efforts. The demand for equality rests on an assumption of equality. The first principle of full feminism is the simple equality of men and women. And it is an erroneous principle.

For here nature steps in and forbids its achievement. Women have not the same strength as men, and consequently not the same earning capacity. Their child-bearing function stands in the way. Then the feminists say: this itself is labour, and must be allowed for: the woman who bears must be paid. But if she is to be paid by the state, here is quasi socialism; or if she is paid by the father, here is a remnant of present conditions, with dependence on the male. The scheme is unworkable without socialism, and it is unworkable as socialism. It would of course be unworkable without child-bearing, as the race would then come to an end; but it would be incompatible even with the minimum of child-bearing that would keep the race going long enough to see the effects. For woman has the additional handicap, not only of

being hampered by the burden of the breasts, but also of the cata-menial drain upon her system. In the "forming" age of maid- enhood (for a few years after puberty) assiduous application to study or to any one of many kinds of industry, especially to those requiring much standing on the feet, interferes with the regularity of that discharge, causing, if not a breakdown of health, at least a weakening of the capacity for motherhood. This result was pointed out by physicians shortly after the commencement of the movement of women into the higher education and into industry and the professions, as soon as the effects could be studied on a wide scale.<sup>2</sup> But to their representations little heed was paid. The movement has continued, and the birth-rate has sunk. In our country the falling-off of births began in New England, where these features of the woman movement were first put into operation.

Women simply are not equal to men in capacity for self-support or independence, not being able to stand the same stress and strain. Women must work, and they do work, as much as, if not more than, men; but their work must be varied, intermittent, interruptible. Man's work may be incessant, or it may call at any moment for full exertion and always find him ready.<sup>3</sup> He also can prepare himself assiduously in youth for any of many kinds of life-work, work at it throughout manhood without interrup-

<sup>2</sup> So especially Ed. H. Clarke, *Sex in Education*, 1873, and A. Ames, *Sex in Industry*, 1875, both at Boston. Shattered health or "undeveloped ovaries," the former pointed out (p. 39) as a common alternative result of a strenuous school and college education pursued by girls on the notion that they could do what boys do. It is possible also that a too persistent application in early youth may enfeeble or destroy the sex-vitality even of men,—and it would seem that this happened in the case of J. S. Mill. But, because of the much greater application required to produce the same effect, this is much rarer in the male.

<sup>3</sup> "Periodicity," says Clarke, "characterises the female organisation, and develops feminine force. Persistence characterises the male organisation, and develops masculine force," *op. cit.*, 120-1. He pointed out, too, how much more the healthy women of Germany respected the menstrual period than do the less healthy women of our country. G. Stanley Hall recommends a monthly rest for young women, or four Sundays together every four weeks, *Adolescence*, New York, 1904, i. 510-11, ii. 639. "The genius of man," says Laura Fay-Smith, "is for specialised and concentrated effort, while that of woman is for adapted effort and distributed energy," in *The New York Times*, April 25, 1915. This is not recognised by the feminists, who will have women work promiscuously with men, at the same work, with the same persistency. Yet it is recognised by the lower races, who are so often taken for their models. Among the Zuñis, for instance, where is division of labour between the sexes, women are not expected to fetch water from the well during menstruation: so Mrs. James Stevenson, *The Zuñi Indians*, in the 23d Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington, 1894, pp. 303-4. But even in Germany Lily Braun pooh-poohs the idea of the menstrual function interfering with woman's work; ascribes the bad effects to other causes, such as unhealthy clothes and injurious habits; and tells men that they can know nothing about the subject, as it is not a function of theirs, *Die Frauenfrage*, 1912-2. In America soon after Clarke's work Mrs. Jacobi published *The Question of Rest for Women during Menstruation*, 1876, in which she concluded there is no reason why normal women should rest during that period, pp. 26, 227; and recently Leta Stetter Hollingworth has made some investigations, published in a monograph on *Functional Periodicity*, New York, 1914, in which she found no more disturbances during their menses in four or five women performing certain tests for two or three months, than at the same time in a couple of men whom she used as controls.

tion, always advancing in skill, and in later age be able to guide and direct others in it. Such work interferes in no wise with his function of fatherhood, nor his function of fatherhood with it; but it renders him better for fatherhood, and fatherhood spurs him on to be better at it; whereas in the case of women motherhood interferes with any kind of life-occupation except domestic labours, and any kind of life-occupation except domestic labours interferes with motherhood.<sup>3a</sup> The distinction between man's labour and woman's labour is not merely due to custom, or to economic conditions: it is physiological.

Women's bodies, and in consequence women's minds, are different from men's. "Nature," said the presidentess of the Woman's Rights Convention in 1850, "does not teach that men and women are unequal, but only that they are unlike; an unlikeness so naturally related and dependent that their respective differences by their balance establish, instead of destroying, their equality."<sup>4</sup> The respective differences may sum up to equality, if you like, and if you can measure them by any common standard.<sup>5</sup> Before God men and women may be equal: the Mohammedans deny that, but nobody in Christendom, at least since the Council of Mâcon, cares to do so.<sup>6</sup> In the world women may equal men in usefulness, and consequently in worthiness:<sup>7</sup> this is indisputable, especially as the world is believed to be ruled by a

<sup>3a</sup> Cf. Mrs. El. C. Stanton: "A man, in the full tide of business or pleasure, can marry and not change his life one iota; he can be husband, father, and everything beside; but in marriage, woman gives up all," in *The History of Woman Suffrage*, i. 720. But she spoke complainingly, as if this difference ought not to be.

<sup>4</sup> Mrs. Paulina W. Davis, *Proceedings*, p. 9. This is extended, as we shall see, by Mrs. Antoinette B. Blackwell to the sexes in all species: they are, she says, "always true equivalents—equals, but not identicals," *The Sexes throughout Nature*, New York, 1875, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> There is, however, no meaning in such a statement as this: "Woman, in her peculiar sphere, is entirely the equal of man in his," Kaethe Schirmacher, *The Modern Woman's Rights Movement*, p. xiv. As well say the hand-labourer is the equal in his peculiar field of the capitalist in his, and conclude that therefore the hand-labourer should be put on an equal footing in the management of the capital with the capitalist. Something of this sort is, in fact, maintained in Keir Hardie's dithyrambic effusion (playing a variation upon *I. Cor. XV. 41*) to the effect that "if there be one glory of the sun and another of the moon, they are each equal within their own domain," *From Freedom to Socialism*, 69.

<sup>6</sup> Feminists quote *Galat. III. 28*, as a divine authority, but ignore *I. Cor. XI. 3, 7, 9*, *Ephes. V. 22, 23, 24, 33*, *Col. III. 18*, and *Gen. III. 16*. The French feminist Jules Bois preaches feminism, with woman suffrage, etc., because "the soul of man and woman is equal," as reported in the New York Evening Sun, April 15, 1915. This is peculiar. God, nevertheless, has given them different bodies, with different functions to perform in society. Then why should they not have different duties in the state? Whatever is to be the treatment of their souls in the next world, would seem to have nothing to do with the matter. The early Christian Father, Clement of Alexandria, said women share equally with men in perfection, *Stromata*, IV. c. 19 and 20, but he did not assign them the same rights in the church. He recognised that "in what pertains to humanity" men and women have the same nature; but he expressly added that "so far as she is female," woman's nature is not the same as man's, c. 8 (cf. above, near end of last chapter).

<sup>7</sup> "We agree," wrote Miss C. E. Beecher, an early remonstrant, "on the general principle, that woman's happiness and usefulness are equal in value to those of man," *Woman Suffrage and Woman's Profession*, Hartford, 1871, p. 4.

God who is no respecter of persons, and who rewards merit for work performed according to ability; and men certainly are as much concerned for the welfare of women as for the welfare of other men, and there is no reason why women should be more interested in other women than in men. But the existence of differences means that in some respects men are superior, and in some respects women are superior. Women may be superior in some moral qualities or virtues, and in certain aptitudes where delicacy and nimbleness of thought, feeling, or touch are important: how many superiorities she possesses, those who will may inquire. In the enumeration care should be taken; for, for instance, it would be absurd to say she is superior in the race-propagating function, to which man's contribution is likewise indispensable, merely on account of her labouring harder than man in the work. On the contrary, it is one of man's excellences that here, too, he does his work more easily.<sup>8</sup> However this be, men do much work that women cannot do, and in much work that both can do, men do it better; and much work that is left to women as properly woman's work, is left to them not because they do it better (tending of children, of course, is an exception), but because men are fully occupied with other more important work.<sup>9</sup> All this is due to the greater bodily strength of men, and their greater staying power in continuous and monotonous activity; to which is to be added their greater willingness to go ahead, run risks, and experiment, and their greater mental aptitude for combining,<sup>10</sup> organising, and

<sup>8</sup> Cf. E. Ferri: "One can no longer deny the physiological and psychological inferiority of woman to man. . . . A being who creates another being — not on the fleeting moment of a voluptuous contact, but by the organic and psychological sacrifices of pregnancy, child-birth, and giving suck — cannot preserve for herself as much strength, physical and mental, as man, whose only function in the production of the species is infinitely less of a drain," *Socialism and Modern Science*, trans., Chicago, 3d ed., 1909, pp. 20-21.

<sup>9</sup> Some feminists, beginning with Plato (*Republic*, V. 455A-456A) and including Pearson (*Chances of Death*, i. 247-8) Mrs. Jacobi ("Common Sense," 100), and D. G. Ritchie (*Darwinism and Politics*, p. 30 of the Humboldt Library ed.) — cf. also Spencer, quoted above, p. 22n., and Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 93-4. — seem to think it sufficient if women can engage in all the labours that men perform, even though it be admitted that on the average they cannot do them as well. But this gives away their case entirely. Men can do one thing which women cannot possibly do, and women can do another thing which men cannot possibly do; in everything else they can both act somehow, but their natures are such that many things which men do women can do so poorly in comparison (e.g. fight, and all hard and stressful labour), that it is better for women to give up the attempt altogether, and, to make up for these, men leave to women many occupations which they can do well enough, besides the supreme one which they do better and which is interfered with by too many others. Hence there naturally springs up a great diversification of the activities of the two sexes; which, however, itself varies at times, with perfect naturalness, as new occupations are invented, tried out, and assigned.

<sup>10</sup> "In co-operation women have always been weak. There are few duties that they have in common. Even as beasts of burden they seldom worked in pairs," Mason, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, 160. Men's greater aptitude in this respect has, of course, been explained by the greater need for co-operation, from the very beginning, in fighting.

systematising.<sup>11</sup> Here is inequality in a couple of details, whatever be the equality of the whole. And they are details essential to all the questions involved in the woman movement. In the very points which women need for the movement they are inaugurating, for economic and political independence, they fail in possessing equality with men.

The bodies of men and women differ not only in essential and primary organs that distinguish them, but (as has already been noticed, and may now be followed up) in innumerable other respects ranging from some of considerable importance down to trifling minutiae that seem utterly insignificant.<sup>12</sup> The human male and female differ in numbers at birth and in tenacity of life, in the periods of growth, in proportions of the limbs, even in the relative length of the fingers and the shapes of the ears, in their bones, especially the pelvis and the skull, in their teeth, in their voice, in the odor they emit, in their hair, in amount of fat, in the rate of pulse and respiration, in the instinctive direction of the movement of their hands (wherefore their clothes are buttoned oppositely), in the composition of the blood, in resistance to diseases and to poisons, and in such facts as that males are more frequently color-blind, yet are of keener sense, and more liable to deaf-mutism and to the habit of stammering, but women more exposed to swelling of the thyroid gland. The differences in the sizes of their bodies and their shapes are marked. Women are smaller-chested and larger-hipped than men. Their tallness is found to be on the average about seven *per cent.* less, their weight seventeen *per cent.* less. Their brain averages about ten *per cent.* less in size and weight. Hence their brain is smaller relatively to stature, but slightly larger relatively to body-weight.<sup>13</sup> This difference appears even in the embryo, wherefore the birth of a boy is

<sup>11</sup> Even the feminist Ellen Key admits that "if man invades the so-called woman's spheres (for example the art of cooking or of dressmaking), it is most frequently he who makes new discoveries and attains great success!" *The Woman Movement*, 181n. The preparation of food has, in fact, been women's business since time immemorial, yet it is not they, but men, who developed the art and science of cooking: cf. Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, § 234. Even in such peculiarly woman's work as obstetrics, improvement, it is said, has been rather hindered than helped by women, P. J. Möbius, *Ueber den physiologischen Schwachsinn des Weibes*, 9th ed. 1908, p. 12, cf. 146-7.

<sup>12</sup> For most of the following, see Havelock Ellis's *Man and Woman*, London, 1894, an authoritative work in this subject. For earlier opinions A. Walker's *Beauty and Woman* may be consulted. See also the opening pages (1-26) of the first volume of H. Ploss's work *Das Weib*, Leipzig, 1885, and W. I. Thomas's *Sex and Society*, Chicago, 1907, pp. 3-51.

<sup>13</sup> Topinard seems to take the relation to tallness as more important, for he says "the brain therefore is really lighter in woman," *L'Anthropologie*, Paris, 3d ed. 1879, p. 123. Similarly Möbius, *op. cit.*, pp. vi., 4, cf. 39-42. But Ellis argues that the relation to weight is more important, and that (here following Manouvrier) it is enhanced if woman's excessive fat be left out of account; on the other hand he points out that as a rule in animals the larger the body, the smaller the relative size of the brain, and the advantage of this, epileptics generally having relatively large heads, *op. cit.*, 95-101, cf. 89n.

usually more difficult than that of a girl.<sup>14</sup> It is found in savages as well as in the higher races.<sup>15</sup> The cerebellum is relatively larger in women than in men, as also the frontal lobes,—the last in apes too.<sup>16</sup> The spinal chord has a twofold difference, being smaller above and larger below in women than in men.<sup>17</sup> The absolutely greater size of man's brain Bebel called "the highest trump-card" of the anti-feminists, and he himself found the triumphant joker in the relatively greater size of woman's brain in the latter mode of measurement, overlooking the other.<sup>18</sup> Women in civilised lands to-day have about two-thirds the strength of men, although in this respect they fall less short of men in primitive peoples. Their athletic records are always poor in comparison with those of men.

The minds of men and women also differ. No, says the feminist leader, Mrs. Gilman, "there is no female mind; the brain is not an organ of sex: as well speak of a female liver."<sup>19</sup> This is a mistake, as male and female distinctions run through organs that are not organs of sex, and even the liver is different in men and women,<sup>20</sup>—indeed, the Danish zoölogist Steenstrup has maintained that sexual characters are present in every part of the body. The brain, in which there are between men and women so many differences of size and internal conformation,<sup>21</sup> and which, as the seat of the nervous system, contains the nerve-centres that control the sex-organs, can hardly be an exception. "The mind has sex as well as the body," rightly says Mr. Finck.<sup>22</sup> The pioneer woman physician, Elizabeth Blackwell, was better informed than Mrs. Gilman. "Sex in the human being," she wrote, "is even more a mental passion than a physical instinct."<sup>23</sup> And the

<sup>14</sup> Forel, *The Sexual Question*, 59.

<sup>15</sup> *Id. ib.* 190-1.

<sup>16</sup> Ellis, 111; 92, 28; likewise Forel as to the first, 66, but he still maintains the older view that these lobes, the seat of intelligence, are larger in men, 66-7.

<sup>17</sup> Ch. L. Dana, in *The New York Times*, June 27, 1915.

<sup>18</sup> *Die Frau*, 188, 191-2, 194. Mill's reply had been that woman's brain might be of finer quality, having the advantage "in activity of cerebral circulation," hence enjoying greater quickness, but sooner subject to fatigue, *Subjection of Women*, 120-2. W. I. Thomas also attaches little importance to absolute brain size, *Sex and Society*, 255-6.

<sup>19</sup> *Women and Economics*, 149, *cf.* 159. Accordingly Florida Pier asserts that "there is not a jot of difference between the masculine and the feminine minds," *The Masculine and the Feminine Mind*, Harper's Weekly, Sept. 24, 1910, p. 21. Long before, Edward D. Mansfield, in his *Legal Rights of Women*, Salem, 1845, p. 97, asserted "mind has no sex." But he based his opinion on religious grounds, and avouched it in the sense that "soul has no sex," which is another matter, about which we know nothing.

<sup>20</sup> According to Pearson the liver is more variable in weight in women than in men, so much so that he treats this difference of variation as a secondary sexual character, *The Chances of Death*, i, 318.

<sup>21</sup> Besides those already noticed, see Möbius's abstract of Rüdinger's investigations, in the former's *op. cit.*, 4-5, *cf.* 41.

<sup>22</sup> *Primitive Love and Love Stories*, 64.

<sup>23</sup> *The Human Element in Sex*, New York, 1894, p. 7, *cf.* 18. She here, however, uses words with feminine inexactitude, as sex can be neither a passion nor an instinct.

feminist physician August Forel is even more emphatic, asserting that "the mental correlative sexual characters are much more important than those of the body: the psychology of men is different from that of women."<sup>24</sup> Girls are more precocious than boys, as are also the children of low races compared with the highly civilised. Women read and think more rapidly, men more deliberately.<sup>25</sup> Men are more taciturn, women more loquacious.<sup>26</sup> Women are more receptive of opinions from others, less originative of ideas, and less tenacious of tenets, of their own; less able to stand alone, craving sympathy more, not having the same sturdy independence as men.<sup>27</sup> Ellis finds that of six hundred religious sects prior to about a century ago, only seven were founded by women.<sup>28</sup> In impersonal emotions women are inferior to men, in personal emotions superior, especially in parental, if not in connubial love.<sup>29</sup> Hence their virtues are different, not absolutely, but in degree, as we have already had occasion to remark; and in general men hold more to justice, and women incline more to mercy.<sup>30</sup> Women are more extensive in their labours, men more intensive; but in space women are more confined, and men spread more. For women are more centripetal—clasping and holding to the bosom; while men are more centrifugal—pushing aside and shoving their way through. Women,

<sup>24</sup> *The Sexual Question*, 65. Forel says further: "The difference in the sexual functions leads to the formation of differences in other parts of the body, and in instincts and sentiments, which find their material expression in the different development of the brain," 50. He holds that in women the sexual appetite is situated in the higher brain, the seat of love, while "the masculine appetite is situated more in the lower cerebral centres," and therefore is more separable from love, 258, cf. 67, 77, 128-9; 95, 98. Hence, too, "the brain is the true seat of nearly all sexual anomalies," 208. Physicians often attack venereal troubles by applications to the brain and the spine.

<sup>25</sup> Frederic Harrison: Woman's intellect is "more agile," but "less capable of prolonged tension," *Realities and Ideals*, London, 1908, p. 73; similarly, 87-8, 94, 134. "Women in general," says William James; "train their peripheral visual attention more than men," *Psychology*, i. 437. Even Mill had asserted that women have "greater quickness of apprehension," but their minds are "sooner fatigued" and they "do best what must be done rapidly," *Subjection of Women*, 110-11, 122.

<sup>26</sup> A difference supposed to have been slowly acquired through primeval ages when the women worked together, and with their children, at home, while the men hunted or fished solitarily, or in company on military expeditions had to keep silence: cf. Mason, *op. cit.* 190. On the importance of women's "chatter," to teach language to children, see Miss Ida Tarbell's *The Ways of Woman*, 68 (following Remy de Gourmont).

<sup>27</sup> "The truth remains," says Mrs. Gallichan, "woman's need of love is greater than man's need, and for this reason, where love fails her, her desire for salvation is deeper than man's desire," *The Truth about Woman*, 322.

<sup>28</sup> *Man and Woman*, 190.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Finck, *Romantic Love and Personal Beauty*, 19. Women, says Frederic Harrison, are at their best in affection, men in activity, *Realities and Ideals*, 75, cf. 95, 99-100.

<sup>30</sup> So E. D. Cope: "In departments of morals which depend on the emotional nature, women are the superior; for those which depend on the rational nature, man is the superior. When the balance is struck, I can see no inferiority on either side. But," he adds, "the quality of justice remains with the male," *The Relation of the Sexes to Government*, 13-14. For the last cf. E. M. Cullen in *The New York Times*, Sept. 3d, 1915; also Schopenhauer, *Parerga und Paralipomena*, ii. § 379, and Aristotle, *Physiognomonica*, c. v.

again, are more utilitarian, men more æsthetic;<sup>31</sup> women more practical in little things,<sup>32</sup> men better managers in the larger concerns of life. Hence, also, women's thoughts run more to particulars, while men deal more with generals, or with wholes, as Lotze maintained.<sup>33</sup> "These are equivalent faculties," says Paul Lafitte, "but they are not the same: woman's mind is more concrete, man's more abstract."<sup>34</sup> "Women," said Buckle, "are more deductive in their reasoning, and men more inductive"; whence he concluded that the influence of women has been beneficial in counteracting the too great tendency of men to be merely empirical in their scientific enquiries.<sup>35</sup> Mill considered women more suggestive of ideas, which men with their greater application elaborate.<sup>36</sup> Women are universally allowed to be more intuitive, which means that they jump more instantly to conclusions, and this habit has become almost an instinct.<sup>37</sup> It is, says Lester F. Ward, "part of the maternal instinct," being "a highly specialised development of a faculty of mind which originally had as its sole purpose the protection of the mother and offspring."<sup>38</sup> In this confined sphere it has somewhat of the quality of being "unerring"; which "is lost the moment the possessor of an instinct

<sup>31</sup> Ellis points out that among primitive peoples ornamentation was generally begun by the men, *op. cit.*, 6, 316.

<sup>32</sup> "Women are certainly more practical and careful of details than men are," says Mrs. Gallichan, *op. cit.*, 133n, cf. 209. While men excel in judgment, women excel in common sense, says W. K. Brooks, *The Law of Heredity*, 258. Similarly Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 105-7, cf. 136.

<sup>33</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, ii. 386.

<sup>34</sup> Quoted by Ellis, *Man and Woman*, 189. Already Hippel: "Sie [die Weiber] besitzen eine praktische, wir [Männer] eine theoretische Vernunft, *Ueber die Ehe*, 157.

<sup>35</sup> *Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works*, i. 78, 16-17. Women by themselves, rather, in their own occupations, have rarely risen above empiricism. Buckle also said: "Women have two sorts of inferiority: physical and mental, 383. For a similar opinion of Socrates, as reported by Xenophon, see above, i. 99n.

<sup>36</sup> *Subjection of Women*, 131-2, cf. 105-10. In his *Autobiography* he humbly tells us he assumed this position toward the woman who became his wife, 189, 242, 243, 247. In particular, her practicalness, he says, repressed his visionariness, 248, and his work thereby gained in practicality, 190. "Les grandes inspiratrices" some Frenchman has called women. Cf. Madame de Staél: "Les femmes n'ont point composé d'ouvrages véritablement supérieurs; mais elles n'en ont pas moins éminemment servi les progrès de la littérature par la foule de pensées qu'ont inspirées aux hommes les relations entretenues avec ces êtres mobiles et délicats," *De la Littérature considérée dans ses Rapports avec les Institutions sociales*, London, 1812, i. 198. Also Mrs. Gallichan is convinced of a "law" of "absorption by the male of female ideas," *The Position of Woman in Primitive Society*, 86.

<sup>37</sup> "Few will deny," says Mrs. Gallichan, "that women are more instinctive than logical, more intuitive than cerebral," *The Truth about Woman*, 296. An early feminist, Eliza W. Farnham, built upon this. "In its intellectual aspect," she wrote, "the Feminine Era will be characterised by a sacred respect for Truth in her broadest aspects, but especially for those self-evident Truths which it is the office of the intuitive, deductive power to see, and trust supremely," and which are "but slowly accepted by the masculine mind," *Woman and her Era*, ii. 447. For instance: "Fortunately I belong," said Elizabeth C. Stanton, "to that class endowed with mere intuitions, a kind of moral instinct, by which we feel out right and wrong. In presenting to you, therefore, my views of divorce, you will of course give them the weight only of the woman's intuitions. But inasmuch as that is all God saw fit to give us, it is evident we need nothing more. Hence, what we do perceive of truth must be as reliable as what man grinds out by the larger process of reason, authority, and speculation," in *History of Women Suffrage*, i. 722.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *The Psychic Factors of Civilisation*, 175.

is removed to a different environment from that in contact with which the instinct was developed," and then the slower reasoning process employed by men is required for the forming of sound judgments.<sup>39</sup> Advance, therefore, out into the unknown has been made mostly by men, with many aberrations at first, but with somewhat of approach toward the one right way.<sup>40</sup> Women, furthermore, are more emotional, irritable, or "affectable," more hypnotic, more subject to hysteria,<sup>41</sup> ecstasy, and suggestibility; more impulsive, more vindictive,<sup>42</sup> also more forgiving, and therefore, in the magnifying spectacles of men, more diabolic as well as more angelic;<sup>43</sup> in general, more subject to fanaticism, as Lecky admits.<sup>44</sup> As courageous, perhaps, as men, and more steadfast in adversity, they are less brave and bold in attack and counter-attack.<sup>45</sup> Less self-controlled, too, are they, and consequently less self-reliant,— more conservative,<sup>46</sup> therefore, their conservatism being exhibited even in their bodies, which, it has been maintained,

<sup>39</sup> *Genius and Woman's Intuition*, The Forum, June, 1890, pp. 401-3. Ward adds: "It must be admitted that the habit of forming instantaneous judgments is carried by many women into departments of life in which there is no store of registered experiences whereon such judgments can be correctly constructed, and, as a consequence, they are usually erroneous." Mason gives a slightly different explanation of this difference between men and women, which supplements Ward's position: "Very few men are doing what their fathers did, so their opinions have to be made up by study and precedents. Nearly all women, whether in savagery or in civilisation, are doing what their mothers and grandmothers did, and their opinions are therefore born in them or into them. . . . When a woman therefore expresses an opinion upon a subject whereupon she is entitled to speak at all—and this, as has been shown, covers a wide field—she utters the accumulated wisdom of ages, and this is called her instinct. With reference to a gun or an object out of this long concatenation, she would be only bewildered and say it is a horrid thing." *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, 275. Cf. already W. K. Brooks, *Law of Heredity*, 257-8, and in the Popular Science Monthly, 1879, pp. 154-5, 348.

<sup>40</sup> Even Mrs. Gallichan admits that man "constitutes the changing, the experimenting, sex," *op. cit.*, 292, cf. 293-4.

<sup>41</sup> The term itself comes from the Greek word for womb.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Juvenal, XIII. 191-2:—

Vindicta  
Nemo magis guadet, quam femina.

<sup>43</sup> So Tennyson:—

"For men at most differ as Heaven and Earth,  
But women, worst and best, as Heaven and Hell."

*Merlin and Vivien.*

An old opinion. Thus Goffridus, a French abbot of the twelfth century, in one of his letters (IV. ep. 43) says of women: "Sexus ille ubi bonus, nullus melior; sed ubi malus, nullus est peior," Bigne's *Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum*, xxi. 48. Akin, but not quite the same, with this is the ancient saying, that nothing is so good for a man as a good wife, and nothing so bad for him as a bad one: Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 702-3, Euripides and Sophocles in Stobaeus's *Florilegium*, LXIX. 11 and 14.

<sup>44</sup> *Democracy and Liberty*, ii. 556. He there also says they are "on the whole more impulsive and emotional than men; more easily induced to gratify an undisciplined or misplaced compassion, to the neglect of the larger and more permanent interests of society; more apt to dwell upon the proximate than the more distant results"; more apt too, he elsewhere says, "to overrate the curative powers of legislation," 557-8, 521; but, on the other hand, "more conscientious than men," 555, and also "much more likely to be governed by sacerdotal influences," 541.

<sup>45</sup> Forel even holds that they have stronger will-power, *The Sexual Question*, 69-70, 137.

<sup>46</sup> Lester F. Ward calls it "an obvious fact, patent to all observers, that the female is the conservative and the male the inventive sex," *Psychic Factors in Civilisation*, 194, cf. *Pure Sociology*, 295.

remain nearer to the type of the species,<sup>47</sup> and whose anatomy in many respects is closer to that of the child, or intermediate between the child's and man's;<sup>48</sup> as also their behaviour, witness their pouting, exclaiming, weeping;<sup>49</sup> and in their pathology, for they are more subject than men to the same diseases as children.<sup>50</sup> Men show in their minds, as in their bodies, a greater tendency to race-variation,<sup>51</sup> and to abnormalities both of genius and of idiocy;

<sup>47</sup> Cf. the old fantastic notion that woman is nearer to the world, according to Paracelsus; nearer to earth, according to Michelet; nearer to nature, still according to Mrs. Gallichan, *Truth about Woman*, 328, *cf.* 22, 267,—or nearer to animals, according to Möbius, *op. cit.*, 8, and nearer to plants, according to Thomas, *Sex and Society*, 4. Even the feminist leader, Ward, in his *Pure Sociology*, 414–15, quotes approvingly as follows from Victor Hugo's *Quatrevingt Treize*: "What makes a mother sublime is that she is a sort of beast. The maternal instinct is divinely animal. The mother is no longer a woman, she is simply female."

<sup>48</sup> Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 557 (following A. Ecker and H. Welcker); Topinard, *op. cit.*, 148; Letourneau, *La Biologie*, 71, 75; Ellis, *op. cit.*, 60, 89n., *cf.* 387; Ferri, *op. cit.*, 22; Möbius, both bodily and mentally, *op. cit.*, 4, *cf.* 14. Of course this opinion is rejected by most feminists; but it has never been disproved.

<sup>49</sup> A. Walker: "Woman remains almost always a child in regard to her organisation, which yields easily to every impulse," *Woman*, 138. Schopenhauer called them "large children," *Parerga und Paralipomena*, ii, § 377; *cf.* § 379; and Comte spoke of them as existing in "a state of continued childhood," *Cours de Philosophie positive*, iv. 405. Of old, the collocation was made by Seneca, who said that women's anger, as also that of children, is sharper, but less severe, than men's, *De Ira*, II. 19. As for the resemblance of women to children in form, that was noticed by Aristotle, *De Animalium Generatione*, I. xx, V. iii, *cf.* *Problemata*, IV. 4, X. 4, 37, XI. 16, 24, 34, 62.

<sup>50</sup> Ellis, *op. cit.*, 387–90. Mrs. Antoinette B. Blackwell would introduce a distinction: "The differentiation between woman and child is much greater *in kind* than between man and child; the difference *in quantity* remains with the man," *The Sexes throughout Nature*, 123, *cf.* 124, 128, 134; but she hardly bears it out, *cf.* 131–2 and 132–3.

<sup>51</sup> Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 560, *Animals and Plants under Domestication*, 2d ed., ii. 457; H. Campbell, *Differences in the Nervous Organisation of Man and Woman*, London, 1891, p. 133; Ellis, *op. cit.*, 358–71, 387, citing J. Hunter as an early holder of this view. Ellis himself holds the strange doctrine, entirely opposed to Haeckel's biogenetic theory, that the child is nearest to the ideal (future) type of the species, then the woman, and lastly the man, 21–5, 390–2. K. F. Burdach and J. F. Meckel nearly a hundred years ago held that women were the most variable. Pearson has urged against Ellis that anatomical measurements and medical statistics do not show greater variations in men than in women, *Variations in Man and Woman*, in the first volume of *Chances of Death*. "Every teacher or examiner," says he in his *Ethic of Freethought*, 425–6, "who has had to deal with women students, will admit their capacity to grasp the same intellectual training as men." But not in the same way, according to Forel, who, from his experience of mixed classes, affirms that "the women show a more equal level than the men. The most intelligent men reproduce better, and the most stupid men reproduce worse, than the corresponding female extremes." *The Sexual Question*, 68. Similarly Edward L. Thorndyke, *Sex in Education*, The Bookman, New York, April, 1906, p. 212. "A woman is never so stupid as a man can be," says Otto Weininger, *Sex and Character*, English trans., p. 253, *cf.* 316, who denies all genius to women, 113, 189. On this subject we may note, that the two sexes might be equally variable (potentially), or the female even more so, but if the male used his variations more, he would exhibit greater variability (actually). Also, if men show more variability than women, this, of course, is not a *virtus formativa*, but its occurrence, as with other secondary sexual differences, is in consequence of the primary sexual difference. If some men rise superior to any women in certain qualities, this is only an illustration of their greater variability, not a consequence of it; and it is counterbalanced if other men sink lower than any women, or if many men and only few women sink very low. The doctrine of the greater variability or variability of man (or of the male in general) is, therefore, wrongly used as an explanation of man's difference from woman,—as, for instance by W. K. Brooks in his *Law of Heredity*, as will be noted presently. Whether the physiological greater variability of man can be proved or not, is of little importance; but the evidence on a large scale for his greater variation is so demonstrative, that to seek for proof, and especially for disproof, in a few measurements and tests seems superfluous. While our minor feminists (which term does not include Pearson) are tirading against this doctrine (as seeming to show inferiority in woman), and the latest, Vance Thompson, simply asserts the opposite ("Women differ more widely than men do. They

for "genius," says Ellis, "is more common among men by virtue of the same general tendency by which idiocy is more common among men."<sup>52</sup> Genius, too, is incompatible with the intuitive, deductive, particularistic tendency of woman's mind.<sup>53</sup> Thus, on the whole, while woman is reposeful, passive, yielding, submissive, receptive, sedent, man is active, aggressive, wild, erratic, divergent, extravagant: leadership is his; he seeks expansion; and of rapidity of motion and transportation, so characteristic of civilisation, he has always been the inventor, and the improver of all else.<sup>54</sup>

The existence of secondary differences between the sexes is, of course, not confined to the human species. In describing animals a naturalist would do but half his job, unless he portrayed the female as well as the male. Some particular differences extend, apparently, throughout all, or nearly all, the animal kingdom, and some even into the vegetable. These are, in some cases, so plain that they attracted attention in antiquity, Aristotle, for instance, often alluding to many of them.<sup>55</sup> But they have not been spe-

break away further from type," *Women*, 106), it is curious to reflect that Ward rests on it his whole gynaecocentric theory about the superiority of woman (the more stable female), which is accepted by the feminist leaders: see his *Pure Sociology*, 322-3, 325, 335, 481, *cf.* 300, *Psychic Factors of Civilisation*, 178-90. Virgil's "varium et mutabile semper femina," he says, is "the precise reverse of the truth," *Pure Sociology*, 335n. Which opinion one adopts, seems to depend, as Ward himself says, on "differences in the constitution of individual minds," 332, or, more particularly, on whether one is progressive or conservative, and admires the one or the other quality in women,—hardly a solid basis for science to rest on.

<sup>52</sup> *Op. cit.*, 366. He here also remarks that the statement about the greater frequency of genius among men "has sometimes been regarded by women as a slur upon their sex; they have sought to explain it by lack of opportunity, education, etc. It does not appear that women have been equally anxious to find fallacies in the statement that idiocy is more common among men." But recently Leta Stetter Hollingworth has taken pleasure in pointing out a (possible) fallacy in this statement, as it is based on the statistics of public institutions, but to these, she asserts, it is more usual to send defective males than defective females, more boys being sent than girls, and of the remaining old ones, more women than men, *Variability as related to Sex Differences in Achievement*, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Jan., 1914, p. 515. She finds the cause of the greater variation (not variability, or at least not *inherent* variability) of men toward eminence, in the different sex-life of men and women (which of course is the right explanation), 523-4, 528, 529; but she thinks it desirable that women may find a way to vary "as men do," and yet perform their function of procreating, and prophesies that this problem will be solved "in another century," 529.

<sup>53</sup> "The fancied analogy between woman's intuition and the manifestations of genius," says Ward in the article first cited, "is an exact reversal of the true relations between these two things. . . . Women of real genius have very little intuitive power. They are usually rather indifferent to the affairs of the household—the true *locus* and *focus* of that faculty," 404, 406. Hence the absurdity of the pretension held by many "advanced" women to-day, and voiced in the following by Adeline E. Browning in *The New York Times*, Feb. 20, 1916: Women "know that placed and brought up under the same circumstances their intelligence matches well with man's, while their intuitiveness and clear-sightedness are much greater."

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Möbius: "As animals always from time immemorial do the same things, so the human species, had there been only women, would have remained in its pristine state. All progress derives from man," *op. cit.*, 8. Mason's book, with all its feminist praise of woman, virtually agrees with this. Other feminists will also be found practically acknowledging the same.

<sup>55</sup> *De Animalibus Historia*, II. xix. 4, III. xix. (or xiv. or xiii.) 4, IV. xi. 5-7, V. viii. 1, 2, xiv. 3-7, VI. xviii. 11, VII. 1. 3, iii. 5, VIII. xxx. (or xxix.) 2, IX. 1. 2-4, (ii.) 11, vii. (or viii.) 5, X. vi. 1; *De Animalium Generatione*, IV. i., vi., V. iii.; *De Partibus Animalium*, II. ii., ix., III. i.; *Problemata*, IV. 25, 28, X. 8, 36; *Problemata Inedita*, II. 148; *Physiognomonica*, v., and vi. near end. His only mistake of fact was

cially studied till recent times, since the development of comparative physiology or biology. Naturally the number of such differences common to all animals is not so large as the number of those which can be found in any one species, especially in the genus *homo*, where they are superlatively numerous. And as there is irregularity within any one species, there is irregularity in the whole series: we are not dealing with universal laws, but with more or less general rules, always admitting exceptions. A fairly complete list of the most important differences that prevail seems to be the following: Males are more mobile and active, females more quiescent and passive — more inclined, therefore, to parasitism, and more vegetative, while males illustrate better the distinctive animal quality of agility in the search for food. For males are less nutritive, consume more quickly what they take in, are hungrier therefore; while females are better nourished on the same supply, storing it up more, and therefore are more easily satisfied. For, again, in the internal metabolism of the tissues, which consists of the two processes of anabolism in building up and in storing energy, and of catabolism in tearing down and in expending energy, the latter process predominates in males, the former in females. This difference shows itself further in males, in their having a higher temperature, in females in their having a lower temperature. Males, too, are shorter-lived, females longer lived, because the males use themselves up quicker. Males are brighter-vested, accoutred with better weapons of attack, or more uselessly adorned, than the females, whose appearance is generally more sober. Males are more variable than females, and in the development of species males lead and females follow.<sup>56</sup> Males are generated under less favourable conditions, females under more favourable conditions. Some of these differences are also exhibited in the male and female germs, the spermatozoon of the one being more agile and hungrier, the ovum of the other more affluent and inert; the male element also seeks the female element, which is likewise an almost universal distinction between the male organism as a whole and the female organism;<sup>57</sup> and they univer-

in saying that males generally live longer than females, *De Animal. Hist.*, IX. vii. (or viii.) 5, cf. xlvi. (or xxxiii.), for which he gives foolish reasons, *Problempata*, X. 48, and *De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae*, v.; of opinion, that the male is the better, *Problempata*, XXIX. 11, cf. *De Animal. Gen.*, II. i., *Politica*, I. ii. (or iii) 12, v. (or xii.) 1 and 2, the female being considered a maimed or stunted male, *De Animal. Gen.*, II. iii., IV. vi. His account of the difference between men and women in *De Animal. Hist.*, IX. i. 4, might have been written to-day; but it would be considered misogynistic, — and especially so the account in the *Physiognomica*.

<sup>56</sup> Note that Pearson's method for disproving greater variability in women has no application here. "The amount of variation," says Brooks, "which any organism has lately undergone, may be learned in two ways — by a comparison of allied species, and by a comparison of the adult with the young," *The Law of Heredity*, 253. Statistics of measurements and laboratory tests are aside from the question.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Forel, *The Sexual Question*, 49, 155, 192-3; hence the stronger sexual appetite in the male, 77.

sally possess one more pronounced difference, the male germ being much smaller than the female. Also in the lower species male animals are usually smaller than the female, and sometimes in the higher, as in birds of prey; but in the higher species males generally surpass the females in this respect. But this is a more than usually variable quality, and here, too, the female apparently keeps more to the original type of the species, and where the tendency is to degeneration the males lead the way, degenerating more, and even, where the tendency is to parasitism, becoming, in some instances, parasitic upon their own females; and where the tendency is toward advance and increase in size, they become the larger. Males are more self-sustaining, more individualistic, more egoistic; females more species-maintaining, more reproductive, more altruistic—with exceptional absence of this distinction, or even reversal of it, in several species, however.

Some investigators have hit upon some one of these differences as the fundamental one, and others upon others. Thus W. K. Brooks, in his *Law of Heredity* (Baltimore, 1883), lays most stress on the greater variability of the males.<sup>58</sup> But this greater variability of the males must be an effect, rather than a cause, of the other secondary differences. W. H. Rolph rests on the hungrier condition of the male cells, as urging them to seek the well-nourished female cells, thus explaining love by hunger.<sup>59</sup> P. Geddes and J. A. Thomson, from whose work on *The Evolution of Sex* (London, 1889) most of these facts have been taken, recognise "the fundamental difference between male and female" in the contrast between the greater predominance of katabolism in the one and of anabolism in the other.<sup>60</sup> This theory has the merit of going even behind the primary sexual difference, as it explains why the female, because of her accumulation of energy, can expend it on reproduction, while the male has scattered his energy all along his path, and has less left for expenditure in reproduction. The male, however, in expending his energy less on reproduction, has more to spend in other ways, and other parts of him may develop more. Thus in birds this greater development of the males takes the form of more brilliant plumage, more tuneful voices, etc. In man it takes the form of stronger bodies and

<sup>58</sup> "The ovum is the material medium through which the law of heredity manifests itself, while the male element is the vehicle by which new variations are added. The ovum is the conservative and the male element the progressive or variable factor in the process of evolution of the race, as well as in the reproduction of the individual," 250-1. "The male is an organism specialised for the production of the variable element in the reproductive process, and the female an organism specialised for the production of the conservative element," 252.—It is Brooks whom Ward follows on this point: see above p. 46n.

<sup>59</sup> *Biologische Probleme*, Leipzig, 1884. The close relationship between nutrition and generation was recognised by Buffon, *Des Animaux*, ch. ii. end.

<sup>60</sup> Ch. II. 5, cf. VII. 4, X. 2, XVI. 5.

more capacious brains.<sup>61</sup> Female sexual selection of males may enhance this tendency—and so far Darwin was right. Also natural selection of sober-vested females, who escape capture by their enemies through less conspicuousness, enhances this difference from the other side, in the case of birds, while greater retirement has the same effect in women,—and so far Wallace also was right. But neither Darwin nor Wallace went deep enough. There must be something to start the tendencies, which selection of either kind can only increase. This fundamental something seems to be the difference emphasised by Geddes and Thomson, itself the explanation of the primary or most distinctive sex-difference, but itself unexplainable.<sup>62</sup>

It is, then, futile to say that the differences which exist between men and women have been imposed upon women by the way men have treated them. Mill, it is well known, went so far as to assert that "what is now called the nature of women is an eminently artificial thing—the result of forced repression in some directions, unnatural stimulation in others"; and he denied that "any one knows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes" so long as their present relation to one another lasts, although it did not prevent him from confidently maintaining that they are equal.<sup>63</sup> Mill was not the first to say this,<sup>64</sup> and he has had many

61 Cf. Elizabeth Blackwell: "The healthy limitation of sexual secretion in man sets free a vast store of nervous force for employment in intellectual pursuits," *The Human Element in Sex*, 29.

62 W. I. Thomas in his *Sex and Society* follows Geddes and Thomson in distinguishing men and women as more katabolic and anabolic respectively, and emphasises that animals in general are more katabolic and plants more anabolic, wherefore "woman stands nearer to the plant process than man," 4; and as the animal is more variable than the plant, so the male than the female, 13. He summarises as follows: "Man consumes energy more rapidly; woman is more conservative of it. The structural variability of man is mainly toward motion; woman's variational tendency is not toward motion, but toward reproduction. Man is fitted for feats of strength and bursts of energy; woman has more stability and endurance. While woman remains nearer to the infantile type, man approaches more to the senile. The extreme variational tendency of man expresses itself in a larger percentage of genius, insanity, and idiocy; woman remains more nearly normal," 51. The distinction between the tendency toward motion in man and toward stationariness in woman he treats as fundamentally important, deriving from it their respective life-habits and economic pursuits, 55-6, 67-8, 87, 92-3, 134-40, 149, 160, 196, 228, 291-2, 293-4.

63 *The Subjection of Women*, 38-9, also 104-5, 125, cf. 98-9. For a good criticism of Mill on this point see J. S. Stuart Glennie's *The Proposed Subjection of Man*, in *The Fortnightly Review*, April, 1889, pp. 571-2.

64 Thus Hippel had said that so long as women have only privileges and not rights, they will never fulfil their true vocation; but give them their rights, and we shall see what they are and can be, *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber*, Werke, vi. 42, cf. 151-2, 167, 186, 224, 226, 241-2. So also Condorcet had thought more experimentation was needed before one could pronounce upon the natural inequality of the sexes, *Fragment sur l'Atlantide*, Œuvres, 1804, viii. 562-9. And Wendell Phillips had claimed it would take twenty centuries of the new experiment before it could be proved that "there is some distinctive peculiarity in the intellects of the sexes," *Shall Women have the Right to Vote?* 12. Only just before, Emily Davies had written: "Until artificial appliances are removed, we cannot know anything certainly about the native distinctions," *The Higher Education of Women*, London, 1866, p. 167; and Gail Hamilton (in a slightly different application): "Certainly we shall never know what woman's natural sphere is, till she has an absolutely unrestricted power of choice," *Woman's Wrongs*, 85, cf. 162.

followers. Such a statement is itself an acknowledgment of some original difference between the sexes, by which men had greater power to mould women than women had to mould men. This is, then, admitted to be no more than greater physical force in men, perhaps very slightly in excess at first, perhaps existing only at certain periods (when women were pregnant), of which men took advantage. They are supposed to have enhanced the difference in size and strength, for their own selfish purposes, by selecting small and weak women for their wives, thereby diminishing the size and strength of their female offspring. "Man," says Mrs. Gilman, "deliberately bred the pretty, gentle little type of female in his choice of a mate, for her sex-qualities alone, because that timid type is the easiest to handle."<sup>65</sup> The theory was started, apparently, by Bellamy, who held that "at some point of the past" men and women were equal in strength and in the general run, but with the ordinary individual variations, and then it was to the interest of the stronger men to subdue the weaker women, whereas the stronger women had no reason for subduing the weaker men (because of the different conformation of their sex-organs); hence breeding was done predominantly by the strong men and the weak women, and this difference was perpetuated in their male and female progeny.<sup>66</sup>

There are some pretty difficulties here involved. When was the point of time in question? Bellamy placed it well back in prehistoric ages, supposing its effect to have been established "before the dawn of civilisation." But as a fact, there is a similar superiority of the males in size and strength over the females among apes; and if our ancestors descended from ape-like ancestors (why else talk evolution?), this difference between men and women began before they were men and women<sup>67</sup>—was original to our species. Or if our ancestors did not descend from ape-like ancestors, at all events how is Bellamy, and how are the aping feminists, to explain this difference in size and strength between the sexes in apes? In the same way? Indeed, if this explanation is necessary to account for the difference in mankind, it must be a universal explanation, accounting for it in all animals, or else the explanation good for some other species might also be good for the human species. But this explanation cannot be universal, as it is wholly inapplicable to some species, as for instance

<sup>65</sup> Report of a lecture in *The New York Times*, Feb. 26, 1914; cf. *Women and Economics*, 60. Ward also holds that men's selection caused degeneration in women's size and strength; but he ascribes to it also an efflorescence of beauty, *Pure Sociology*, 363, 372, 377; 364, 396, 399. Similarly, but with neglect of reference to beauty. Vance Thompson, *Woman*, 17-18.

<sup>66</sup> *Equality*, 151-2.

<sup>67</sup> So Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 558-9, 563.

to certain species of fishes, where the male is larger (and presumably stronger), but where there can be no question of the subjection of the female to the male. Also it cannot be general because in some species the females are larger and stronger than the males, as again in some other fishes, without any subjection of the male to the female. Also this theory supposes that subduing of the mate is necessary for procreation — that the primitive strong women avoided the sexual act; which is contrary to all the natural instinct of animals. Furthermore, if large and strong men mated only with small and weak women, why did this not produce only an intermediate size and strength in all their offspring, male and female alike, while the maximum would be kept up by the fortuitous matings of both large and strong parents, and the minimum by those of both small and weak parents? This would seem to be the natural result, if as is sought to be proved, size and strength were not natural sex-differentiæ. Here, to be sure, is a moot point in the science of biology and the theory of evolution, as to what qualities of the parents are inherited only, or chiefly, by the offspring of the same sex. "Heredity has no Salic law," Mrs. Gilman repeats; and she recognises that girls inherit from their fathers and boys from their mothers.<sup>68</sup> But she treats this "blessed power of heredity" as merely preserving our sexes from too great a divergence, such as has taken place in the gypsy moth and among bees,<sup>69</sup> although it has not preserved *them!* Whatever be our ignorance on this subject, it would nevertheless seem probable that if, in any species, a majority of female offspring take after their mothers in a certain characteristic, and a majority of male offspring take after their fathers in the opposite characteristic, these characteristics are sex-distinctions belonging to, proper to, natural to, that species, however they originated. Such seems to be the difference in size and strength between the male and the female in the higher animals, especially among the mammalia—and in the human species for the same reason as in the others. Of the most probable reasons yet obtainable an inkling has already been given.<sup>70</sup> An explanation,

<sup>68</sup> *Women and Economics*, 69–70, 334; cf. 46.

<sup>69</sup> *Ib.* 134; 70–72; cf. Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 565.

<sup>70</sup> Thus Ellis explains the larger size of men as due to the fact that the species has been increasing in size, and this variation has taken place more in men in accordance with the general tendency of males to greater variation, *Man and Woman*, 368. This, however, we have seen not to be altogether satisfactory. The general difference in many of the higher animals, and in some of the lower too, J. T. Cunningham would explain by saying that "the males gained their superior size and strength by fighting for the female with one another, and throughout their subsequent evolution the males have led the more active, energetic, and pugnacious existence," *Sexual Dimorphism in the Animal Kingdom*, London, 1900, p. 46. Their freedom from the gestation of their offspring, we have seen, permits their greater development in other respects. As for the production of the gentler qualities in the human females, already Geddes and Thomson

moreover, does not alter a fact. Even if it be admitted that the difference in size and strength between men and women has been at least enhanced by men's sexual selection acting in the way described, this sexual selection on the part of men has been natural, and its effect therefore is natural. Bellamy spoke of it as "a rather mean device on Nature's part," shrinking here from using the name of God. Whether God or Nature adopted the device, it was adopted, and it is good advice that we should not kick against the pricks. If men have, on Nature's dictation, preferred smaller and weaker mates in the past, they probably will in the future. And if they should change in their treatment of women, women's nature and stature would not so lightly change with them. By the feminists the conclusion is always implied, if not expressly stated, that when the old treatment of women by men is changed, the difference in the size and strength of men and women will soon disappear. Bellamy thinks women are already in the process of reconquering their pristine equality with men. Mrs. Gilman, though she asserts that "woman has been checked, starved, aborted in her growth," and "the male human being is thousands of years in advance of the female in economic status," yet says women "are not so far aborted that a few generations of freedom will not set them abreast of the age."<sup>71</sup> It is overlooked, be it said once more (for we have already come upon it),<sup>72</sup> that as tens of thousands of years must have been employed in producing and fixing such a result by sexual selection, to undo it at least thousands of years of a reverse process would be required. "To obliterate such differences," say Geddes and Thomson of allied results of evolution, "it would be necessary to have all the evolution over again on a new basis."<sup>73</sup>

What has been said of the single difference between man and woman in size and strength, applies also to the other broad and deep differences between them. For the feminists extend to all of them the same two mistakes just pointed out. They ascribe the inferiority of women in every character or quality, wherein it has manifested itself in the past, and still does so at present, so plainly that they cannot deny it, to the repression and suppression

had written: "The spasmodic bursts of activity characteristic of males contrast with the continuous patience of the females, which we [the authors] take to be an expression of constitutional contrast, and by no means, as some would have us believe, a mere product of masculine bullying," *The Evolution of Sex*, ch. xix, § 4. Cf. Brooks: "The difference . . . is not due to the subjection of one sex by the other, but is the means by which the progress of the race is to be accomplished," *The Law of Heredity*, 259.

<sup>71</sup> *Women and Economics*, 75; 9; 134. Similarly Higginson treated woman's as "a merely historical inferiority, which is steadily diminishing," *Common Sense about Women*, in *Works*, iv. 90. He even thought our public schools were fast "equalizing" the brains of men and women, 319.

<sup>72</sup> Above, p. 25.

<sup>73</sup> *The Evolution of Sex*, ch. XIX. § 4.

of women by men, which they additionally, as a rule, denounce as selfish and unjust. And they assert, with utter dogmatism, their belief that soon all this will be ended by a more just and less selfish treatment of women by men, especially if women take the matter in their own hands and see that they get equal treatment. As for the first, it is often amusing to note the shifts the feminists are put to in their explanations. They assert that women have always been repressed, kept in ignorance, never given a chance, never a square deal;<sup>74</sup> and express astonishment that under the circumstances they have done as well as they have.<sup>75</sup> But, as a fact, as we shall see, in primitive times women did take the lead in many occupations in which men now have the lead; they were the retailers of knowledge and the repositories of wisdom; they certainly were given a chance: men then competed with them; men then surpassed them; and afterward their relegation to certain occupations in which they did better or well enough, was confirmed by custom and by law. Why did men get ahead of them? This the feminists, with their belief in the equality of the sexes, cannot explain. Instead they comfort themselves with the idea that because women once showed themselves men's equals, perhaps even their superiors, therefore sometime again they may become their equals.<sup>76</sup> But after some initial successes to be beaten in innumerable races hardly provides good reason for believing in future retrievalment. "If women once held sway and lost it," very well remarks Mr. John Martin, "that is more damaging to their claim than if they had never possessed it."<sup>77</sup> Moreover, there are occupations and amusements in which intelligence is drawn upon, and in which women never have been repressed, yet in which they have always fallen short. Chess is a good example, which has rarely been forbidden to women; yet their inferiority with respect to it, wherein weakness of body plays no part, is remarkable. Some of the arts supply a still better; for instead of being repressed in these, girls have, in some countries, been

<sup>74</sup> Ritchie: "Women have never yet had a fair chance of showing their capacities on a sufficiently large scale," wherefore "we have really no right to make definite assertions on the subject," *loc. cit.* Mrs. Hale: "It has been the fashion to vote her [woman] impotent, she [sic] who has never yet been given freedom to try her strength!" *What Women Want*, 236.

<sup>75</sup> So Eliza B. Gamble, *The Evolution of Women*, 72-3; Lily Braun, *Die Frauenfrage*, 205; and Ward, though he knew what follows in the text, *Pure Sociology*, 371, cf. 372, *Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 616; also Thomas, *Sex and Society*, 312.

<sup>76</sup> Thus, on account of woman's one time physical equality and mental superiority, Pearson denies that there is any "rigid natural law of feminine inferiority," and, explaining their present inferiority in the familiar way as "largely the outcome of woman's physique and intellect being little trained at present and not severely selected in the immediate past," believes that "sex-equality will be really possible in the future," *Ethic of Freethought*, 425, cf. *Chances of Death*, ii. 49-50, 96. And Ward thinks "all signs are hopeful," *Pure Sociology*, 377, 373.

<sup>77</sup> *Feminism*, New York, 1916, p. 19.

trained much longer than boys in music, in drawing, and in painting, without producing equal capacity in women for these arts to what is exhibited by men.<sup>78</sup> Statesmanship, however, furnishes the feminists with their strongest hand; for here the so-called repression has been removed and women actually elevated to the position of queens and regents (for none ever attained it by her own efforts), and several have behaved acceptably. Thus Isabella, Elizabeth, Christina, Catherine, Maria Theresa, Victoria are cited; while Mary of England, Marie de' Medici, and many others are looked upon askance, Anne is overlooked, the Countess Matilda, who was entirely under the thumb of the priest Hildebrand (Gregory VII.), is ignored, and Pheretima, whose cruelty Herodotus describes, is forgotten. It is a wrong notion, inculcated by monarchists, that the prosperity of a country is due to the person sitting on the throne. A couple of the "good" queens were extraordinary women, the rest were ordinary ones, who profited by the prompting of the statesmen about them.<sup>79</sup> When women have prompted kings, very different results have generally appeared. No great policies have been due to women rulers. In invention in general, women have been wanting, since the primitive times, when it took them thousands of years to develop the elements of the arts, till men took them over and perfected them scientifically. "Their deficiency in invention in every department," says Whately, cannot be referred "to their not having been trained in that particular department; for it is remarkable that inventions have seldom come from those so trained. The stocking-frame was invented by an Oxford scholar,

<sup>78</sup> Thus, with regard to music, says Ellis: "Unless we include two or three women of our own day, whose reputation has perhaps been enhanced by the fact that they are women," *Man and Woman*, 319. He quotes G. P. Upton's explanation, that women are too emotional, and Rubinstein's, that they lack courage enough. The latter knew of no cradle song, even, composed by a woman; and he considered the increase of the feminine contingent in instrumental execution and in composition as "one of the signs of decadence." Already Hippel had ascribed women's failure in musical composition to lack of courage, *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber, Werke*, vi. 166. On this subject Mill was quite reckless. "Women," he says, "are taught music, but not for the purpose of composing, only of executing it; and accordingly it is only as composers, that men, in music, are superior to women," *Subjection of Women*, 134. Two facts are here distorted: men are superior to women also as executors of music, and composition is not taught to them alone. Charlotte Bremer, for instance, says in the *Life* of her sister Fredrika, quite currently, but speaking of Sweden, not of England: "We studied thorough-bass, . . . and now we were to try our skill at composition," p. 38 (New York ed., 1868). Did it never occur to Mill, that if women are not taught the science of musical composition so much as men are, it might be because of abundant experience of the futility of doing so?

<sup>79</sup> For an examination of the various queens usually brought forward see Goldwin Smith, *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 2d ed., 220-3. A female remonstrant who signed herself J. W. P., well asked: "Upon whom did Alexander lean, or Cæsar, Charlemagne, Frederick, or Napoleon? Who tutored Peter the Great, or Charles the Twelfth; or who maintained a perpetual struggle with William the Silent, to keep him true to the national policy, like that of Burleigh and Walsingham with the greatest of modern queens?" *A Remonstrant View of Woman Suffrage*, Cambridge, Mass., 1884, p. 25.

the spinning jenny by a barber, and the power-loom by a clergyman.”<sup>80</sup> And the sewing-machine, we may add, was invented by a man who wished to save his wife the drudgery of stitching. Men of genius, in fact, have not been kept down by the repression and the lack of opportunity so fatal to women. Neither “want of higher education” crushed the genius of Homer, Shakespeare, and Burns; nor “want of opportunity” condemned Franklin to obscurity, and the multitude of self-made men; nor did “adverse public opinion” silence Luther and the host of reformers. Citing these cases, a female remonstrant once wrote: “We do think it indicates some deeper reason than want of training, opportunity, or custom, that our sex must so often yield precedence, not only as cooks, but as laundresses and dressmakers.”<sup>81</sup> But even the few women known to history have not been kept down by the alleged cause. The only great poetess England has produced, Mrs. Browning, lived at a time when women are supposed to have been suppressed. Sappho flourished in Greece, where women were less free than at Rome, which produced no female poetess whatever beyond an uncertain Sulpicia. If, then, some differences between men and women are inherent (some general to all animals, some peculiar to our species, yet inherent now, however they originated), the conceit of the feminists that they can by a little change of treatment (little in idea, though really beyond their power to effectuate universally) alter the natures of men and women, or principally of women (for they seem to be content with men’s) and bring them up to men’s level (the expression is theirs), is an idle dream — a Utopian fantasy.

Altogether too much levity has been indulged in on this subject. Professor John Dewey has been reported as saying: “The woman’s brain and the man’s brain are both capable of equal achievement. The only reason for the apparent discrepancy between the work each has so far performed, is that one has deliberately handicapped the other with narrow opportunities and con-

<sup>80</sup> *Miscellaneous Remains*, 189–90.

<sup>81</sup> J. W. P., *op. cit.*, 26. It deserves to be noted, however, that at least two feminists, a woman and a scientist, have admitted the deep-seated and by us ineradicable difference in the nature of our sexes. Thus Ellen Key, in consequence of “the hundred thousand years at least,” that, as she holds, women have practised the maternal functions, rearing the children and creating the homes, believes in “a pronounced difference between the feminine and masculine soul,” *The Woman Movement*, 38–9, 46, 28–9, 222; cf. 186–7, 218–19. And Forel: “No doubt these phenomena [of more premature development on the part of the girl, and more arrested development later of the woman] are partly due to the defective mental education of women; but this explanation is insufficient. Here again we must distinguish the phylogenetic disposition of woman from the effects of education during her ontogenetic development,” *The Sexual Question*, 204. This may be added from Ward: “There has been no important organic change in man during the historic period. The trifling physical differences which we attribute to differences of environment acting on man during a century or two, would have no diagnostic value in biology,” *Pure Sociology*, 17. By “man” here he means men and women. But he seems to have forgotten this later, 372.

ventionally restrained outlook. If you take two equally healthy babies and tie the arms of one of them till both of them grow up, of course you'll have a weaker physical development in the case of the one who has been bound. For centuries men have been tying women's brains, and the result is a weaker mental development. That will all be remedied when the bandages are removed."<sup>82</sup> What proof has this professor that the reason assigned is "the only reason" for the *existing* discrepancy (for what everywhere generally appears, is), even if it be a reason at all—and has he any proof of this? Certainly the one proffered about the two babies is not worthy of a man who professes to be a scientist. If he means to account for the discrepancy between living men and women only by the discrepancy in their own upbringing,<sup>83</sup> he takes a position in which he will find little support.<sup>84</sup> But this is hardly his meaning, as is indicated by his reference to "centuries" of men's tying of women's brains. Here, however, the analogy no longer holds. For the babies referred to are two independent beings, and as such they can be compared only with two separate

<sup>82</sup> In *The Press*, New York, Nov. 10, 1909. So already, but with less absoluteness, Mrs. Antoinette B. Blackwell: "When you tie up your arm, it will become weak and feeble; and when you tie up woman, she will become weak and helpless," quoted in *The History of Woman Suffrage*, i. 729.

<sup>83</sup> As was carelessly done by Sydney Smith: see above, pp. 25-6n.

<sup>84</sup> This in a position different from, and surpassing, Mill's. Mill claimed that the appearance of male superiority is due to past as well as to present difference of treatment of the sexes; but this opinion is that this appearance is in every generation produced in individuals through development of their faculties in the males and non-development of them in the females. Of this position there are still some adherents. Thus Christine Ladd Franklin: "It is not true that men's minds and women's minds have different ways of working," or "that the Creator has made two separate kinds of mind for men and for women," but it is true that society has set them to work differently and in separate fields, causing them to acquire different development of their similar faculties, *Intuition and Reason*, *The Monist*, Jan., 1893. This overlooks the difference in size and conformation of the brain in the two sexes, which cannot possibly be produced in individuals merely by their different training and situations. Likewise ignoring this, Ritchie attempts argument: "Little girls are certainly not on the average stupider than little boys; and, if on the average men show [i.e., seem to have] more intellectual ability than women, this must be due to the way in which the two sexes are respectively treated in the interval"; and so "the greater average eminence (in the past) of men than of women in intellectual pursuits," he thinks we may fairly suspect, "is entirely due (as on any theory it must be mostly due) to the effect of institutions and customs and ideas operating within the lifetime of the individual, and not to differences physically inherited," *loc. cit.* But the fact of equal intelligence of the sexes in childhood is no better attested than the fact of their unequal intelligence in the adult stage; and there is no reason offered for the supposition that the change must be due to the different treatment the sexes have undergone in the interval. He might as well argue that because boys and girls are equally beardless, therefore the greater *show* of beardedness in men than in women must be due to the way the two sexes are respectively treated in the interval! (Cf. Maudsley above, p. 26n.). For we know no reason why sexual differences should not develop after birth as well as before birth. In fact, anthropologists have discovered that the maximum weight development of the brain is reached in females between the years 15 and 20, and in males between the years 20 and 30 or 35: Topinard, *Éléments d'Anthropologie générale*, 517-25, 557-8. Also according to Haeckel's biogenetic law (which is used in a similar connection by Pearson, *Chances of Death*, ii. 96-7), equality in intelligence of the two sexes, or even female superiority, is to be expected in children, if the two sexes ever were equal (or women superior) in intelligence in some primitive condition (cf. also Forel, above, p. 56n.). All, therefore, that the equality of intelligence in children today goes to prove is that men and women once were equal in intelligence (in the "mother-age"), not that they must be so still.

races. If, to be sure, (for here we all agree) you bound up the arms of the members of one of two races during many thousands of years, the present members of this race would undoubtedly be weaker than those of the other. But the two sexes are not independent, and their crosses would probably distribute the weakness — at least the opposite has never been proved, — unless it be a natural sex-distinction already existing, howsoever produced. Even as an illustration, moreover, the example does not lead to the conclusion desired. In the case described we should have good reason to believe that the weakness of the race held in subjection for thousands of years would by now be inherent and natural, and the removal of the bandages would not remedy it — not for several hundred years more. We have experience to the point; for the negroes have not become equal to the whites since the removal of their bandages. But the negroes, it may be replied, were weak and base in the beginning, which is the reason why they were bound in the first place; for their enslavement was not the original cause of their weakness and baseness, but these were what permitted the whites to enslave them, and slavery has only enhanced an already existing difference. Precisely this (apart from baseness, which is not in question between the sexes) may have been the case with the difference between men and women. Otherwise why should men ever have tied up the brains of women? And if women were equal to men, why did they ever permit it? This is not accounted for by the feminists; for the sole explanation offered by Bellamy we have seen to be a failure; but it, so far as it has taken place, is accounted for by the supposition of a natural divergence. And this natural divergence is not far to seek. It was nature which tied up the brains of women, and their bodies too, by tying them to their children. And it was nature which left men free.

The idea that men have bred certain qualities — qualities which they, men, desired — into women, and may breed them out again, now that they have become less selfish, has, of course, gained weight from men's successful breeding of animals and cultivation of plants. But analogy does not bear out the idea. For we can breed or cultivate certain desired qualities in animals and plants only in varieties of them, regardless of sex. It may be that a certain desired quality is produced only, or more luxuriantly, in one sex; but this is a pure matter of chance as far as the breeder is concerned, and the very fact that it occurs merely shows that he lighted upon a sex-distinction. And when such a fact does occur, the breeder who should deliberately go to work to breed the same quality, or the same amount of it, in the other sex, would

be regarded as a fool. Our feminists, therefore, are not really following the example of the breeders of animals or the horticulturists; for among these no such fools are found.

The reason offered by Professor Dewey and the rest of the feminists for the discrepancy between the sexes in the human species, as due to repression of the one by the other,—a reason never employed for explaining the discrepancies, often more marked, between the sexes in other species,—is a mere conjecture of a bare possibility, which has not even likelihood in its favour. No sound and conclusive argument has ever yet been adduced in support of it. Yet the feminists would proceed as if they had proved it—and as if they had proved the conclusion drawn from it about the reverse process. They assume this, and then leave to their opponents to disprove it. Thus, for an actual, which they call an apparent, difference, attested by all the ages, they would throw the burden of proof upon the side which holds that this is natural and will continue;<sup>85</sup> and any failure on the part of an opponent in some minor matter is taken as proof of their own infallibility.<sup>86</sup> Sometimes they affect frankness by admitting that women still have to prove by their accomplishment their equality with men; but then it is serenely assumed that they will do so, and the argument proceeds as if it were already done.<sup>87</sup> Thus the experience they rely on is not that of the past, but that of the future! Or they—the women among them—take refuge in saying that men cannot know woman's nature as well as women can, forgetting that the question is a comparison between the natures of men and women, in which men from the one side are as capable of judging as are women from the other. But generally opprobrium is resorted to, and whatever is advanced by their opponents is denounced as "old," "antiquated," "threadbare," "worn-out," "conventional," "prejudiced," or "supersti-

85 An example has already been presented by Wendell Phillips, above, p. 50n.

86 Curious logic of this sort is shown by Rheta Childe Dorr in an article in *The New York Times*, Sept. 19, 1915, in which Leta Stetter Hollingworth, whose investigations are under review, is described as "searching for an explanation of the inferior position of women" and for a "proof [rather a disproof] of their inferiority," and as concluding that no definitive explanation has been given, and because a prevalent theory [of the greater variability of the male] appears, in the case of man, not to have been by certain experiments proved, therefore "the superiority [of men] has not been proved"; whereupon all past experience is thrown to the winds, the opposite position (that women are equal to men) is treated as proved, and women are called upon to be "confident that nothing in nature stands in the way of the solution" of their problem of freeing "the latent genius," which lies in them "perhaps" as abundantly as in men, "without robbing the world of its mothers."

87 A good specimen of this may be seen exhibited in Gertrude S. Martin's article on *The Education of Women and Sex Equality* in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Nov., 1914, p. 43. Similarly Lily Braun says that women are eminently suited for social and charitable work, and if they have not yet taken the leadership therein, "it is for me beyond doubt" that they will, *Die Frauenfrage*, 207.

tious."<sup>88</sup> As a wise man has told us, when reason is lacking, there sticks itself in — an epithet.

What has been maintained applies to the cases where the discrepancy between the human sexes is general, being witnessed everywhere to-day, and testified to by all history, and accounted for by anatomical differences in the bodies, in spite of occasional exceptions. Yet, of course, it cannot be denied that want of opportunity, training, encouragement, or suppression, do have influence upon the matured characters of both men and women. A different method of rearing boys and girls, a preparation of them for different work, a different demand made upon men and women in the conduct of life, may accentuate the differences already existing in the two sexes, and a long continuance of such different treatment through tens or hundreds of generations, may even produce some minor and superficial differences of character, which seem natural, and may be, but yet are not thoroughly fixed and become irrevocable. In fact, unless the different treatment is kept up, these differences are likely to disappear of themselves, for it is well known that recently acquired qualities, such as certain excellences bred into plants and animals under domestication, (for the analogy here is applicable) quickly revert to their natural indifference, unless the same care be continually bestowed upon them. Such a one in the human species, for instance, seems to be refinement, which is hardly a sexual distinction, as no trace of such a difference is found in other animals and hardly even in primitive human beings; yet women in civilised countries are usually regarded as more refined than men. This seems to be a result of the special treatment to which they have been subjected; and a consequence is, that if this special treatment be abandoned, their superiority in this respect will vanish. It is, indeed, a common experience that it is easier to unrefine women than it is to refine men.<sup>89</sup> Also woman's superior chastity may have been of man's imposition (at least this, as we shall see, is one of the feminists' complaints, notwithstanding that the instruction to this effect is generally given by the mother); wherefore, if all difference between the moral standards for men and for women be

<sup>88</sup> For instances see above, p. 211.

<sup>89</sup> Hence the error of Henry Ward Beecher, when he said: "Since the world began, to refine society has been woman's function. She is God's vicegerent on earth for this work. You may be sure that she who has caused refinement to the household, to the church, to social life, to literature, to art, to every interest except government, will also carry it to legislation, and the whole of civil and public procedure, if it is to be carried there at all." Address on *Woman's Influence in Politics*, Boston, 1860, p. 9. Woman was not more refined than man since the world began. We have not even Biblical authority for such an opinion. But woman became so when in the upward course of civilisation man raised her above his cares and strifes. She has refined every interest wherein she has been protected from contamination with the sordid affairs of the world — and there only.

removed, women will be much more likely to revert to man's unchastity, than men rise to woman's chastity.<sup>90</sup> If the feminists expect to improve women in some respects by treating them like men, they should remember that they may distinctly lower them in other respects. "The social dependence," says Forel, "in which man has placed woman both from the legal and the educational point of view, tends to increase her failings,"<sup>91</sup>—increase, not produce them; yet the same treatment may have tended to increase her virtues. This last the feminists are apt to overlook, or they contemptuously disparage such virtues as hot-house products, as if, in truth, all virtues were not products of cultivation. Moreover, if the doctrine be true that the male is more variable than the female, which means that male acquirements are departures from the type, it follows that it will be easier, by a similar treatment of the two sexes, to make men more like women, than it will be to make women like men. We have, in fact, all along found that such is the result of ultra-civilisation, and that the condition of peoples in the declining state is effeminate.

Some modification, then, of the most superficial and last-developed differences between our sexes must be allowed as possible under an altered treatment of them. Thus it has happened that in the last fifty years some changes are noticeable in the characters of women—and of men too, for that matter. We have already seen, however, that this sudden "advance," as it is considered, though it has suggested, does not truly prognosticate its own further continuance, the pressed spring having already sprung its length.<sup>92</sup> Continuance of the process, as we have just observed, is much more likely to make the further modifications downwards in men than upwards in women. The reverse operation, such as, for instance, to produce a new political aptitude and power in women equal to that which exists in men, may not be absolutely impossible, but for it long time would be required and a procedure that is rarely contemplated. Listen to Darwin: "In order that woman should reach the same standard as man, she

<sup>90</sup> "It has been pointed out by more than one moralist," says W. R. Inge, "that in times of national corruption the women are generally more vicious even than the men," *Society in Rome under the Caesars*, 181, cf. 62. For one such moralist see the pseudo-Cyprian, who exclaimed: "Mirum negotium! mulieres ad omnia delictae, ad vitiorum sarcinas fortiores sunt viris," *De Disciplina et Bono Pudicitiae*, c. 12.

<sup>91</sup> *The Sexual Question*, 138.

<sup>92</sup> See above, pp. 27-8. Mrs. Gallichan in one passage speaks of a certain quality as "very deeply rooted" in woman's character, and as being such that women "will not easily be diverted" from its display, *The Truth about Woman*, 303. Then other characteristics may be more or less deeply rooted, and some perhaps ineradicably rooted. One might think that the recognition of a fact of so much suggestiveness would lead on to an investigation into this feature of various sex-differences. But far from it: Mrs. Gallichan does not even believe this quality (it is coquetry) to be very deeply rooted in woman's nature after all, and most others still less so—at least the reprehensible ones; for the good characteristics of women are always taken to be innate, inherent, and as strong as adamant.

ought, when nearly adult, to be trained to energy and perseverance, and to have her reason and imagination exercised to the highest point; and then she would probably transmit these qualities chiefly to her adult daughters. All women, however, could not be thus raised, unless during many generations those who excelled in the above robust virtues were married, and produced offspring in larger numbers than other women.”<sup>93</sup> This last is exactly what is never likely to take place. The most highly trained women, especially those whose education has been pursued with most intensity at the age of becoming adult, are the very ones who are least apt to marry and who bear the fewest children. Darwin’s views about the heredity of acquired characters are not now accepted. But the teaching of Weismann’s views results in the same conclusion. Education, says S. H. Halford, is not hereditary — only the capacity to be educated (a high mentality). Now, if the women thus endowed be highly educated (and they are the ones most likely to be selected for higher education), they are taken out of the marriageable and child-bearing list, and their natural endowment is not transmitted further, while the duty of procreation is delegated to their less highly endowed sisters.<sup>94</sup> Such is the conduct of these “advanced” women, as we shall see more fully later on. Perhaps if men and women only would bend all their energies to produce the equal standard desired: if they should forbid the weak and the less intelligent women to procreate, and if the strong and the intelligent women should take this duty upon themselves, then in the course of ages the object might be attained,— and it might possibly be hastened if only the weak and the less intelligent men were permitted to be the fathers. But women do not act in this way, although there seems to be some danger of men doing so; and there is no likelihood that women ever will. The very feminists themselves do not advise them so to act. On the contrary, as we shall see, feminists recommend small families, and even none at all; and of course if any women are to take their advice, it will be their own strong-bodied and strong-minded followers. And then these will disappear.<sup>95</sup>

<sup>93</sup> *Descent of Man*, 565.

<sup>94</sup> *A Criticism of the Woman Movement*, London, pp. 7-8. And even those who have a child or two, do not transmit to them a better nature on account of their own education. Rather the contrary. “There are reasons to believe,” says Mrs. John Martin, “that a suppressed talent is more surely transmitted than if it be fully expressed; for the very process of developing it in itself sometimes proves in women exhausting to the whole organism, and the power to transmit it is therefore impaired. If conserved, it may be handed on intact,” *Feminism*, 230.

<sup>95</sup> Mary Roberts Coolidge actually thinks “it will be several generations probably before the effects of domesticity upon the character and mentality of women will [by the doing away with domesticity] disappear,” *Why Women are So*, 86. It would take

No, this is not an artificial matter. Nature herself has had a hand in the affair in the past, and will continue to have in the future. In the past her operations began long before men had intelligence enough to interfere. The higher mammalia bring forth ordinarily but one offspring at a time, and not only the period of gestation is longer, but the offspring is less developed at birth and still needs suckling and tending. Hence, the higher the development of the species, the greater the burden upon the female,—and there is a long interval between the human species and the next: in women alone the catamenial phenomenon, for instance, is pronounced;<sup>96</sup> while the male is no more subject to this burden in the human than in the lowest species,—or even is less so, compared with the totality of his functions and activities. Thus the advance of the sexes has been the inverse of each other, the female becoming more burdened with the maternal function, and the male less burdened, physiologically speaking, with the paternal. Hence the man continues free to advance and to assume other functions, while the woman is held back by the child under her waist or at her bosom.<sup>97</sup> This difference appeared in the human species before men's conscious and rational activity had anything to do with it; and it has survived, and must survive, and has caused, and will cause, other differences, in body and mind, between men and women. Men have often taken undue advantage of their superior strength. But they have also allowed for women's handicap, and assisted them, herein acting very differently from all but a few other species of animals, and exceeding and excelling them all. Especially have men so acted near the culmination of the ascending periods of civilisation. Indeed, when their reasoning faculty has been applied to the subject, men have vainly tried to relieve their mates, at first in some cases only, by the help of other women (slaves, servants, nurses), and at last, and recently, in all cases, with the help of cows, by means of that

considerably longer than is supposed, even if the undomestic women continued to have as large progeny as other women; but as their progeny will be a continually decreasing quantity, we may be sure that the result supposed will never be accomplished.

<sup>96</sup> "Solum animal menstruale mulier est," wrote Pliny, *Naturalis Historia*, VII. 13 (or 15), wrongly. Aristotle had correctly stated that the discharge is most abundant in women of all (sanguine and viviparous) animals, *De Animalibus Historia*, III. xix. (or xiv. or xiii.) 4, VI. xviii. (or xvii.) 9, VII. ii. 4, *De Animalium Generatione*, I. xx., II. iv., IV. vi., vii., viii., *cf.* III. i. He also says that among the larger animals it is least in mares: in the first work cited VI. viii. (or vii.) 10, in the second II. viii., IV. v. Mares are, in fact, little more than neuters during ten months of the year, and no inference can be drawn from their equality with stallions.

<sup>97</sup> *Cf.* Möbius: "This [greater] helplessness of children makes necessary in the human species a greater differentiation of the sexes than in animals," *op. cit.*, 13. It may be added, in comparing the human species with other animals, that, as is well known, the erect attitude which we assume, puts strains upon certain of our organs, which, because of the new direction given to gravity, are not sufficiently supported or properly situated. In many cases this is the same in men and in women, but in some cases it makes more derangement and does more harm in women. This is another reason why women are weaker in comparison with men than other female animals are in comparison with their males.

"labor-saving device," a man's invention (perhaps the worst), the baby's rubber-nippled milk-bottle.

Some superficial modifications of the sexes being possible, as we have seen, by an altered treatment of women by men (at women's suggestion), and some deeper ones being ideally possible by a long-continued heroic conduct, which is not likely, and men's and women's natures being brought closer together, we may pause to inquire *cui bono?* Are not the differences between the sexes, as they exist, and even enhanced, better than would be their cancelling,—especially as the cancelling would more likely be of the more masculine attributes of men, under the reflex influence of women? Nature may have had her, or God his, purpose in establishing two sexes: two sexes are obviously more interesting than one; and in some better world than ours, for all we know, there may be three or more—in worlds, for instance, in four or more dimensioned space! To be sure, the dualism of sex is only in accordance with the polarisation that runs throughout nature. But, for all we know, nature in general might have been arranged on a triangular, or a quadrangular, scale.<sup>98</sup> Or, again, and even in our commonplace space, the distinction of sex-cells and of sex-organs might have been maintained without distinction of sex-individuals. For we might all have been made hermaphrodites, like the androgynes fabled of old,<sup>99</sup> or, to use a more actual example, like snails, which fecundate one another reciprocally. The equality of all snails seems, in fact, to be the ideal of the feminists (and the snail ought to be adopted as their symbol or totem); but without possibility of realisation, since nature has not built us on the same plan as the snails. In our world, not of snails, but of human beings, differently constructed, women have the function of doing most of the work of procreating and preserving the race, and of ministering to its commonest wants; while men labour for its advancement, and for imagining and satisfying wants never dreamt of by other animals.<sup>100</sup> Nor does woman go without reward for her part in the world's work, which, standing as she does half-way between child and man, she finds in the double joy of love both of her husband and of her children: she both is protected and protects, she both clings and is

<sup>98</sup> Of course, our biologists tell us the service performed by the dichotomy of sex is the blending of strains and the production of variations, thereby providing the possibility of improvement. But the question for us is whether some other means could not equally well have been employed, and even with better results. A blending of three parents, for instance, it would seem, might be still more effective.

<sup>99</sup> Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII. 2, Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XVI. 8; after Plato, *Symposium*, 189 E.

<sup>100</sup> In other words, "on the woman chiefly falls the burden of population, on the man chiefly that of civilization," so P. T. Forsyth, *Marriage—Its Ethic and Religion*, London, p. 91.

clung to; while man, standing at an extreme, has little more than the fleeting passion for woman and the egoistic exultation of surpassing, if he can, or in what he can, his rivals (and most often he must fail), his work being to support and to provide and, as long as others invade, to ward off and defend. "Pleasure is anabolic, pain is catabolic," says Ward.<sup>1</sup> If this be true, and if it be true that woman is more anabolic and man more catabolic, it follows that women must have more pleasure in life, and men more pain.<sup>2</sup> It shows, too, why too much pleasure effemинises. To mix up and confound these distinct duties of men and of women, either by abandoning them and devoting the energies of both to indulgence in pleasure, or by attempting to assign to women (or by women assuming to take over) all the duties already performed by men, can only have the effect of impairing women's performance of their own duties, in which men cannot take their place; and therefore it is to endanger the perpetuity of the race and of the civilisation which it carries. Our human species is not divided into two sections, of adults and children, but into three, of men, women, and children. It may not seem so difficult to get rid of the distinction between men and women, as it would be to get rid of the distinction between adults and children: the last is, in fact, too difficult even to attempt; but the alluring possibility of doing the former, when inducing the attempt to effectuate it, only leads to disastrous results to children and the coming generations.

The feminists' effort to minimise the distinction between the sexes<sup>3</sup> is sometimes performed for them by nature. The sexes are a development from primordial sexless protoplasm. The consequence is that the differentiation is perhaps never complete.

<sup>1</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 131.

<sup>2</sup> Ellis, when he concludes that "the world, as it is naturally made, is a better world for women than for men," *Man and Woman*, 394, agrees with A. Walker, who suspected that "after all, woman has the best of life," *Woman*, 67; (and we may remember that something of the sort was the opinion of Jupiter and Tiresias, according to Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, III. 320-1, 333). According to Ward, woman has a sexual feeling in giving suck, *Pure Sociology*, 413-14, and so is endowed with a source of pleasure denied to normal man. Madame de Staél's saying "Love is the history of woman's life; it is an episode in man's," and Byron's "Man's love is of man's life a thing apart, 'tis woman's whole existence," though intended, and in this sense frequently quoted, to disparage woman's condition, really extol it. Cf. R. v. Kraft-Ebing: "To woman love is life, to man it is the joy of life," *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Rebman's trans., New York, 1906, pp. 14-15, cf. 204. Similarly Elizabeth Blackwell: "All the relations of sex form a more important part of the woman's than of the man's life," *The Human Element in Sex*, 17, cf. 18; and she maintains that the sexual passion [not appetit] is profounder, in woman than in man, 45-52, 56. This difference rather accounts for, than is accounted for by, Forel's theory of the different seat of love in the brain in man and in woman.

<sup>3</sup> Perhaps attaining its limit in a statement by Miss Mabel Powers at a public meeting, where she said: "The best man is 49 per cent. feminine; the best woman 49 per cent. masculine," reported in *The New York Times*, April 13, 1914. Either this expresses exclusive admiration for the class of beings to be described presently, or it is entirely erroneous. Of course, too, it is wrong to suppose men and women composed of masculine and feminine qualities solely. They have a great deal in common, which is human, and then some differences, which are masculine and feminine, varying and admitting of many mixtures.

Darwin held that in every female male characters, and in every male female characters, exist in a latent state, because of the inheritance through each sex of characters of the other sex.<sup>4</sup> But these opposite characters often come to the surface, and appear, or exist in fact. It seems even to be true that always in the male appear some feminine attributes, and in the female some masculine ones. Indeed, it has been maintained, by Weininger, that the absolute male and the absolute female do not occur separately, but there are only intermediate stages between them.<sup>5</sup> The mixture is not only of the opposite primary sex-organs, as occasionally happens in hermaphrodites, but usually of the primary, more or less fully developed, of the one sex, with some of the secondary of the other. There may be all shades running between the extremes. Yet most individuals are predominantly of the one sex or the other, with few noticeable characteristics of the opposite sex. A small percentage, however, contain enough of the opposite sex to draw attention. Thus there have been women who approach in resemblance to men, and have generally abandoned women's function; and there have been men who approach in resemblance to women, and have generally slighted men's work. "Urnings," or "Uranians," these have been fancifully named by an early Austrian investigator;<sup>6</sup> and by others they have been variously called the "third sex,"<sup>7</sup> the "intermediate sex,"<sup>8</sup> and the "alternate sex."<sup>9</sup> They have not infrequently been described as persons having the body of the one sex and the mind, soul, or brain of the other.<sup>10</sup> A peculiarity of persons so endowed is their

<sup>4</sup> *Animals and Plants under Domestication*, ii. 26, 27.

<sup>5</sup> *Sex and Character*, 7.

<sup>6</sup> K. H. Ulrichs, himself one, who, in several publications in the sixties of the last century, under the *nom-de-plume* of "Numa Numantius," gave them this name, after allusions in Plato's *Symposium*, 180D-181C, because of his admiration, like Plato's, for such men. A little before, the Prussian J. L. Casper had written about them, and still earlier the Swiss H. Hössli. Since then many works have appeared on the subject, among which may be singled out Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis*, pp. 333-461.

<sup>7</sup> By E. v. Wolzogen in a novel under this title. He compared them to workers among ants and bees, which workers are, in fact, such beings systematically produced in those species,—and among bees, as Mrs. Gallichan notes (*The Truth about Woman*, 63), the female ovipositor, instead of laying ova, contains the sting (which is only a mass or mess of rotten eggs).

<sup>8</sup> By Edward Carpenter, *Love's Coming of Age*, 120-40. He indulges in a reverie about "a new sex" being possibly on the make, "like the feminine neuters of ants and bees, not adapted for child-bearing, but with a marvellous and perfect instinct of social service, indispensable for the maintenance of the common life," 73. But he says nothing about the development of a perfertile queen, or anything of the sort, to make up for their maternal deficiency.

<sup>9</sup> By C. G. Leland in a work under this title, London, 1904, in which he advanced the visionary theory that the subliminal self is the alternate sex in us, asserting itself as female in man and as male in woman, p. 38.

<sup>10</sup> The term "soul" is so used by Carpenter, *op. cit.*, 123, 131 and by Krafft-Ebing, *op. cit.*, 399. Ulrich is quoted as employing the formula: "anima muliebris in corpore virili inclusa." Krafft-Ebing ridicules Gley and Magnan for speaking of "a female brain" in a man's body, *op. cit.*, 342-3. He himself maintains it is "only a feminine psycho-sexual centre in a masculine brain, and vice versa," 348n.; and he permits Kiernan to speak of "a feminily functioning brain" in a male body, and *vice*

tendency to homosexuality, or to love members of their own sex, even to the extent of desiring to "marry" them, accompanied by a proclivity to seek friendship and to engage in emulation with members of the opposite sex.<sup>11</sup> If this antipathetic sexual instinct, as it has been called, does not go so far as to induce aversion from the opposite sex, it generally amounts to indifference (sexually) to the opposite sex. Therefore, even though not sterile, the persons so obsessed mostly hold back from having children,<sup>12</sup> and rarely propagate their kind, especially if left to themselves;<sup>13</sup> and not infrequently they are impotent.<sup>14</sup> Many of the renowned women of history seem to have possessed such masculine attributes—as, for instance, Queen Christina of Sweden; while even some great men, especially among artists, though hardly the greatest, have had feminine propensities.<sup>15</sup> They exist also among the lower races;<sup>16</sup> and of course they were known to the ancients.<sup>17</sup> Their analog is found among animals. Among mankind, their number has been estimated anywhere from one in five

*versa*, 344. "The cause," he says, must here, "as in all pathological perversions of the sexual life, be sought in the brain," 336-7. And Forel speaks of a person having the sexual organs of the one sex, "while the brain has, to a great extent, the characters of the other sex," *The Sexual Question*, 245.

11 This characteristic of Urnings is mostly ignored by fiction writers, who, to gain a contrast, start out their heroine as a man-like woman and end by making her most tenderly womanly. So Tennyson's Princess, Kingsley's Ayacanora (in *Westward Ho!*) and, recently, Mrs. Deland's Freddy (in *The Rising Tide*).

12 Cf. Plato: "They are not naturally inclined to marriage or child-bearing, though they may be forced to it by the law," *Symposium*, 192 A-B.

13 Wherefore some physicians have advised to alter the laws repressive of their unions, and even to allow their "marriages," as then they will die out the sooner: so, e.g., Forel, as above, ii. 43n. But it might be better to prevent their marrying at all.

14 Cf. Maudsley: "The forms and habits of mutilated men approach those of women; and women, whose ovaries and uterus remain from some cause in a state of complete inaction, approach the forms and habits of men. It is said, too, that, in hermaphrodites, the mental character, like the physical, participates equally in that of both sexes. While woman preserves her sex, she will necessarily be feebler than man, and, having her special bodily and mental characters, will have, to a certain extent, her own sphere of activity; where she has become thoroughly masculine in nature, or hermaphrodite in mind,—when, in fact, she has pretty well divested herself of her sex,—then she may take his ground, and do his work; she will have lost her feminine attractions, and probably also her chief feminine functions," *Body and Mind*, 35.

15 Cf. Ellen Key (a little too absolutely): "In the rank of talent, one may find feminine men and masculine women; in that of genius, never," *The Woman Movement*, 53. It is absurd to include, as some writers have done, Cesar and Napoleon. Yet Plato and Michel Angelo seem to have had a bent in that direction.

16 Mrs. Stevenson describes one (a man) whom she knew among the Zufis, *op. cit.*, 310-13. These Pueblo Indians produce them artificially—the so-called "mujerados": see an article by W. A. Hammond in *The American Journal of Neurology and Psychiatry*, August, 1882. (Cf. Hippocrates' account of the Scythians, *De Aere, Aquis, Locis*, cc. 28, 29.) Mason repeats a story of an Eskimo woman who set up as a man and took another woman to wife, till her establishment was broken up by a mob, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, 211.

17 See Plato, *Symposium*, 191E-192B, (who praised the males of this sort, but entirely misunderstood their nature, taking them to be completely virile); Aristotle, *De Animalium Generatione*, II. vii, cf. *De Animalibus Historia*, VIII. ii. 5. Valerius Maximus, VIII. iii. 1, says one Amæsia Sentia passed under the name of Androgyn. The Latin term "virago" was applied to such women. Cases of such persons changing their sex are reported by Phlegon, in Mueller's *Fragmenta Hist. Graec.*, iii. 618-20, as well as by Hippocrates, *Epidemiorum VI.* vii. 32. Hippocrates tried to explain the origin of such persons by various combinations of the male and female elements, *De Diaeta*, I. 28, 29. He seems also to refer to them in *De Morbis Mulierum*, I. 6.

hundred up to one in twenty-two. It undoubtedly varies much in time and place, being larger, probably, where nervous diseases abound, and smaller where people are healthy and sound.<sup>18</sup>

It has been suspected that many of the leaders of the feminist movement, both among women and their male abettors, have belonged to this class — naturally within a wide range of variety.<sup>19</sup> The movement itself really takes them for its model, and is an attempt to adapt civilised society to their needs. But they are exceptional, and to adapt a society to its exceptions would be its undoing, save for the fact that in this case the exceptions will soon eliminate themselves. All that is required by justice and philanthropy is that room be left in the social scheme for these unfortunates, especially as they are less likely to multiply their kind, if not interfered with and constrained to act like normal people. Let such women have freedom to be men, if they choose: the exceptional conduct of exceptional creatures can do little harm to the general run of things. And such freedom they now often have. Helene Weber, an agriculturist, Rosa Bonheur, a painter, and Mary Walker, a physician, have even been humoured with permission to wear masculine habiliments. These were matched, in anticipation, by the Chevalier d'Éon de Beaumont, who masqueraded in female attire, and whose sex was long in doubt. For ordinary pursuits there should be no necessity compelling such women to disguise themselves, like the women occasionally found in armies enrolled as soldiers; whose counterparts are the men dressed in petticoats that serve amidst women as waitresses, etc. Where decency and morality do not forbid, women might be permitted to act like men, as far as they can, and still be known to be women; and men might do the reverse. Of course, the equality of the sexes is not proved by the accomplishments of these invert. But while these epicene creatures should not be treated too

18 Möbius, *op. cit.*, 16, 44-5.

19 According to Weininger, "it is not the true woman who clamours for emancipation, but only the masculine type of woman," *op. cit.*, 72, cf. 56, 64, also Möbius, *op. cit.*, 70. Finck believed the movement would collapse if this were known, *Primitive Love and Love Stories*, 756n. But Carpenter is complacent over the thought that "the women of the new movement are naturally largely drawn from those in whom the maternal instinct is not especially strong; also from those in whom the sexual instinct is not preponderant. Such women do not altogether represent their sex; some are rather manly in temperament; some are 'homogenic,' that is, inclined to attachments to their own, rather than to the opposite, sex; some are ultra-rationalising and brain-cultured; to many, children are more or less a bore; to others, man's sex-passion is a mere impertinence, which they do not understand, and whose place they consequently misjudge. It would not do to say that the majority of the new movement are thus out of line, but there is no doubt that a large number are, and the course of their progress will be correspondingly curvilinear," *Love's Coming of Age*, 72. Similarly Mrs. Atherton, in her novel *Julia France*, already cited, speaks of the women in the suffrage movement as "desexed . . . a new sex," p. 340, again 349: many of them, she says, "look sexless, if you like," 375, cf. 300; and she makes one of them say: "We women want many things beside love . . . We want love, but as a man wants it: enough to make us comfortable and happy," 111. Yet at the end, like the Princess in Tennyson's *Medley*, the heroine gives in.

harshly, no encouragement should be given to promote their extension.<sup>20</sup> Especially they should not be set up as models, and their confused mode of life be treated as normal.<sup>21</sup> To do so cannot ruin the race at large, as the practice cannot be permanently established. But it may wreck a nation that experiments with such disregard of the normal course of nature.

Except in the case of Urnings, then, there is a well-marked distinction between men and women; and their differences, except, again, in superficial attributes, are natural, in the two senses of having been naturally produced and being naturally infix'd, or, humanly speaking, permanent. Nothing warrants the belief that they may be broken down and abrogated by an alteration in the treatment of women by men. An alteration in the treatment of women by men may modify some of the superficial characteristics of women, and of men, too, and may have many other effects, but not the effect of making women physically equal to men. The effort to produce equality, because doomed to failure, will be a waste and loss of energy, and in addition will have a deleterious influence on the march of civilisation.

Against this conception an inductive argument is urged of a very fallacious sort. It is maintained that the march of civilisation has been a progress in the approximation of the condition of women toward equality with men, and that this elevation of women, succeeding their debasement, may be taken as a test and measure of the advance made by civilisation up from barbarism; whence it is inferred, as a strong presumption, that the further goes the assimilation of the sexes, the better it will be for all concerned, until perfection be reached in complete equality. There is an ambiguity in the term "condition," which may refer to a state of the body and mind of women, or to the treatment women are subjected to. In the former sense, the statement is the exact reverse of the fact; for the fact is that men and women are more highly differentiated in the more highly civilised peoples than they are in the more barbarous. This ought to give pause to the employment of the argument in the other sense. Yet the social condition of women — the position they are relegated to by the men, whether more akin to that of beasts of burden, or of collaborators, companions, equals — has often been set up as a test or criterion of civilisation, and sometimes been looked upon as one

20 Cf. Möbius, *op. cit.*, 63, 70; Weininger, *op. cit.*, 70.

21 Kraft-Ebing wrote: "Uranism may nearly always be suspected in females wearing their hair short, or who dress in the fashion of men, or pursue the sports and pastimes of their male acquaintances," *op. cit.*, 398. But since these things have actually become fashionable, and women who are not Urnings imitate those who are, this test no longer holds.

of the surest and best.<sup>22</sup> And of course this test or criterion is not confined to the past, but it is launched forward into the future, and is used not only to prophesy, in the form that the highest civilisations will be those in which women are treated most liberally by men and most nearly as their equals, but to prescribe the course of conduct necessary for attaining higher civilisation, namely, by giving greater freedom to women and treating them more and more like men.

This test, however, in the past has by no means shown itself infallible. It is generally acknowledged that the civilisation of Athens was higher than that of Sparta, and yet the condition of women was less restrained in the latter state; also that the civilisation of Greece at large was higher than the Roman, and yet women had greater freedom at Rome.<sup>23</sup> The correct test would much rather seem to be the inverse: the stage of civilisation is the criterion of the proper relationship between men and women. In other words, that condition of women in society and before the law which exists in the higher civilisations is better than that which exists in the lower civilisations; and, furthermore, that which exists in the ascending periods of civilisations is better than that which exists in their descending periods. The reason for the inversion should be plain; for it is easier to recognise what is a high stage of civilisation, than to know what is the best condition of women. But even as it stands, the ordinary test does not bear out the feminist conclusion. Civilisations have, indeed, advanced toward the approximation of the condition of women to that of men; but they have advanced also toward their own decline, which has always been synchronous with an excessive amount of that approximation. We have seen this in Egypt, Greece, and Rome. Yet it is true, the commencement of that approximation always took place in the ascending periods of civilisations, and contributed to the ascent. The trouble with the feminists' argument is that it runs on too far — beyond the golden mean.<sup>23a</sup> The induction that an increment of factor always produces an increment of function, is wrong; the function often

<sup>22</sup> E.g., by Harriet Martineau, *Society in America*, 2d ed., London, 1839, iii. 105; H. H. Van Amringe at the Woman's Rights Convention at Worcester, 1850, *Proceedings*, 37; D. S. Whitney, in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1853, *Official Report*, ii. 737; G. W. Curtis, *Orations and Addresses*, i. 212; Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 37-8; Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, §324 (in a moderate form); Bebel, *Die Frau*, 86; Letourneau, *La Sociologie*, 160; Louis Frank, *Essai sur la condition politique de la Femme*, Paris, 1892, p. xxii; Eliza B. Gamble, *Evolution of Woman*, 75; T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 353; Ward, *Pure Sociology*, 366.

<sup>23</sup> It is recognised by Westermarck that at least as far as the earlier stages of culture are concerned, the so-called test is not supported by facts, *The Position of Women in Early Civilisation*, Sociological Papers of the London Sociological Society, 1904, p. 158.

<sup>23a</sup> Cf. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, §340. He recognised that the movement had already gone to an extreme, and expected a recoil; which has not yet come.

reaches a maximum when a certain mean condition of the factor is reached, and beyond that it descends. To take a homely illustration: if on a cold day you approach a fire, you feel a pleasanter and pleasanter sensation of warmth up to a certain point, after which (the equilibrium between the heat from the fire and the proper heat of the body being reached) if you approach still nearer, your sensation of heat will become more and more unpleasant, and a too close approach may lead you to disaster, like the stupid moths around the flame of a candle. So, undoubtedly, from a stage of barbarism in which women are treated somewhat like slaves, there is improvement of civilisation as the condition of women moves in the direction toward freedom and equality with men. But it may well happen that after a certain point is reached (where the amount of freedom given to women is that which is their due, and the amount of equality with men accorded them is the amount of equality with men they naturally possess), any further increment of freedom and equality will have a contrary effect. Undoubtedly, also, the perfect civilisation will be one in which the condition of women is the best possible, both for themselves and for everybody else; and this best condition of women is a necessary prerequisite of the perfect civilisation. But what the best condition or treatment of women is, is precisely the problem in sociology which is at issue between the feminists and others. The feminists adopt the cheap and lazy-man's solution of saying that the process of approximation of women to men shall go on indefinitely, and the best condition of women is where no distinction is made between them and men. This, however, means that women are to be treated more like men than they really are, the mean of equilibration between the treatment of women and the facts of their nature being passed; wherefore it cannot be the right solution, and the right solution is still to seek.

The inference, then, rightly inducible from history, is not the pleasant and promising one so commonly and so lightly drawn. History also supplies warning details of the process of decline. What happens is that as civilisations reach the culmination of their cycles women have become freer, have been allowed out of the home, have been emancipated from their husbands by receiving property from their fathers, and have been admitted to earn their own living. This last is thought a great gain, doing away with the waste of women either not working or working at home divided and inefficient. But the result has always been the same: women have rebelled not only against men, but against their own nature, and the freer and more independent they have become, the less willing both they and men are to marry and have chil-

dren, so that the class or the state or the race that encourages this tendency, has always died out, or when much reduced, has been overthrown or conquered by others, in whom this process has not begun or gone so far. There takes place what Ward, as a new name for the survival of the fittest, calls "the elimination of the wayward."<sup>24</sup> The wayward class or state that passes beyond and wanders from the mean of the proper treatment of women, succumbs to a people or peoples that are on the safe side of the mean and approaching toward it or have not strayed so far from it.

This process has already commenced in our civilisation — commenced naturally, unconsciously, an effect of circumstances, of inventions, of man's greed, of woman's desire. But it is the business of reason to become aware of what it is doing, and to look ahead in the direction it is going. Instead of calmly examining precedents, analysing relations, and leading out causes to their effects, sections of society are now agitated by a new enthusiasm and idealism, which fire the imagination, but warp the judgment. Men are expectant of, or intend by their own efforts to establish, the new Jerusalem, with the Jewish ideal of riches well distributed for blessedness. Women are not willing to wait: they too are to act, they are to work side by side with men (how their chests swell at the thought!), they are no longer to leave to poor men the burden of supporting them and civilisation, they are going to take part and do their share, no longer distinguishable from men's share. And no little pride is mixed in: women have so often been told they are better than men, that they have come to believe it.<sup>25</sup> They contest all the points on which men claim superiority, and accept all those which men concede to them, with

<sup>24</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 132, cf. 335.

<sup>25</sup> Even in this form: "We women are the practical working people, and you men are the sentimental talking part of humanity," Mrs. Pankhurst, at the Madison Square Garden, New York, Oct. 21, 1913 (reported in *The New York Times* of the next day). (And in this form she appears to be followed by a man, Vance Thompson, who says that woman is "methodic," but man "scatters spray and impulse" and "sputters," *Woman*, 10, cf. 122, 170, 171, 175, 205.) According to Mary Fels (wife of a successful soap-manufacturer and active philanthropist) woman is the patient and hard laborer and protector, while "man is, as always, the fighting, dominating drone," "inherently disinclined to work," *Joseph Fels, His Life-Work*, New York, 1916, pp. 209, 210, 213. The limit has been reached by Emerence M. Lemouche, who, in her *The New Era Woman's Era*, speaks of woman as "the noble creature whom Nature created superior to him [man]," p. 14; asking "wherein is to be found the justice in a Superior being ruled by an Inferior?" 10; arguing that "what would further prove the Superiority of Woman over Man is, that she was not, like him, created from clay," 101; and asserting that "the lowest prostitute is yet better than the best of men," 65. Perhaps she had been reading Frederic Harrison, who once wrote: "The most degraded woman is in this [devotion to her offspring] superior to the most heroic man (abnormal cases apart)," *Realities and Ideals*, 72, wherein he entered two modifications, which she omits. But the pseudo-scientific basis for these views about the superiority of the female sex we shall later see supplied by another man (Lester F. Ward).

the apparent result that superiority must lie with them.<sup>26</sup> Feminists incline to this belief, just as socialists hold that the lower classes are better than the upper classes. The future civilisation, in which women will take an equal part, is going to be better than the present, which has hitherto been conducted by men alone. The world so far is only a "man-made" world: it is to be a world made also by women; women are to be its saviours.<sup>27</sup> Alas, it may cease to be a world at all! Yet not so. Only the nations that adopt these aims will fall. Nature holds others in reserve. But her remedy is not a pleasant one for those who succumb.

26 For an instance see the quotation from Adeline E. Browning, above, p. 47n. And for an instance of men's one-sided statements, due to excessive gallantry, this may be cited from Ch. Kingsley: in intellect "the only important difference, I think, is that men are generally duller and more conceited than women," *Women and Politics*, Macmillan's Magazine, 1869, (p. 16 of the feminists' reprint).

27 Thus Mrs. Pankhurst: "They [men] stand self-confessed failures, because the problems that perplex civilisation are absolutely appalling to-day. Well, that is the function of women in life: it is our business to care for human beings, and we are determined that we must come without delay to the saving of the race. The race must be saved, and it can only be saved through the emancipation of women." Speech at Hartford, Conn., Nov. 13, 1913, *Verbatim Report*, p. 34. Mrs. Pankhurst, however, must have learnt by this time that her own race, in Great Britain, needs men to save it.

## CHAPTER IV.

### FEMINISM AND MARRIAGE

THE civilised world is a “man-made” world: for this statement we have the authority of the foremost American female feminist,<sup>1</sup> who ought to be on her guard lest women do not unmake it. There is some exaggeration in the statement, as woman has had a considerable share in making society what it is; but man alone has made government, and government alone has rendered civilisation possible. And man has created civilisation not for his own advantage solely, but for the benefit of woman and child. With this few feminists agree. In the abstract form in which the statement is generally put, it does seem contrary to natural self-seeking. But put it in the truer concrete form: Men have made the civilised world; and remember that men could not make it for themselves solely, but could make it mostly only for succeeding generations, and at once it is apparent that they had as much reason to desire the good of women as of other men, and not less the good of children as leading to the good both of men and of women. This assertion is well borne out by the history of marriage. To-day, as always, the men who make laws are mostly married men: they make the new regulations of marriage not for their own sakes, but for the sakes of their children and their children’s children, female as well as male; for every good man is as much interested in his daughters as in his sons, and any woman who is more interested in her daughters than in her sons is not a good woman.<sup>2</sup>

The uncivilised world of barbarism and savagery, through degradation, and of primitive times, through non-differentiation, is, and was, nearer to the nature of the brute, in which the secondary sexual differences are comparatively few and little marked.

<sup>1</sup> Mrs. Gilman, in *Women and Economics*; “Economic progress is almost exclusively masculine,” 8; “All this human progress has been accomplished by men,” 74; this is “a man’s world,” 96; “Women have hitherto had a most insignificant part in the world their sons have made,” 164. See also her *The Man-made World*. Similarly Rosa Mayreder: “Civilisation . . . almost entirely a product of man,” *Survey of the Woman Problem*, (English tr.) 51, cf. 94; and Mary Roberts Coolidge: “This is essentially a man’s world,” *Why Women are So*, New York, 1912, p. 238.

<sup>2</sup> Mrs. Schreiner says it is indifferent to woman whether her sons or her daughters excel, “so both attain their best,” *Woman and Labour*, 226. But she seems to overlook that the same impartiality belongs to man.

The human species evolved but slowly out of a species non-human, and probably the habit of pairing of the male and the female, with occasional polygamy on the part of the strongest males, came with them out of that prior state, especially as arboreal existence was conducive to family division. It was family life, rather than marriage, that was thus brought on; for the family is a natural product, but marriage is an artificial institution, possible only to mankind, and not invented even by mankind at the beginning of their career.<sup>8</sup> The men and the women were more or less ferocious, and probably more nearly on a par in ability to support themselves by seeking out fruit and chasing after game. The monogamous relations between them were, therefore, like those of animals, lightly formed, easily dissolved, and in all probability rarely lasting through life; and as mankind multiplied and became gregarious, living in hordes, their relations little differed, from our moral point of view, from promiscuity;<sup>4</sup> but from the natural point of view, there was some difference, since masculine jealousy would keep others away from the females with whom a male had formed an attachment, at least for a season one or more. In those early days men fought with one another for their mates, just as later they fought for other things which they claimed as their own. Society was almost as slow in admitting the right of one man to one woman as admitting the right of one family to one plot of ground. If women were ever man's possession, they were his first possession — and like others, communal first, and private afterward. At first too, they were a very insecure possession — one which could help dispose of itself. What permitted this relationship of the male to the female, rather than a reverse or a mutual one, was, of course, the greater desire and the greater activity of the male, and the greater weakness of the female. For already this first of the secondary sexual differentiæ was developing, in consequence of a change going on in a primary sexual differentia — to wit, the greater menstruosity and severer gestation of the human female, and especially the longer lactation. The overlapping of the latter with a new period of pregnancy

<sup>8</sup> Darwin noticed that promiscuity is not indicated as practised by the immediate predecessors of man, *Descent of Man*, 590. Westermarck, taking "marriage" in the sense of living together, maintains, rather extravagantly, that human marriage, with the father at the head of it, is "an inheritance from some ape-like progenitor," *History of Human Marriage*, 2d ed., 50, cf. 20, 43. Yet Westermarck says: "Marriage is rooted in family, rather than family in marriage," 22.

<sup>4</sup> Forel follows Westermarck in denying promiscuity in primitive men (finding it only in civilisation, in prostitution), *The Sexual Question*, 146, 148-53, 174; but he cites instances of the brevity and frequency of marriages (e.g., "among the Mantras there are men who have been married forty or fifty times"), 182, cf. 184, 188, which, if they do not constitute promiscuity of unregulated intercourse, yet constitute promiscuity of marriage itself.

would keep women in an almost continuous state of dependence, such as it was.<sup>5</sup> Also the prolongation of infancy, which means birth at an incomplete stage of development, permitted freer and fuller development of the child, while it increased maternal affection; and the subsequent helplessness of childhood, in the case of boys, who would need training in the ways of men, also appealed to the mate of the mother, and so helped to prolong the family life. A tendency in this direction is seen among apes. Among men it in time divided anything like a primitive promiscuous horde into family groups,<sup>6</sup> starting the clan system.

Although the earliest human males, like the males of some other animal species, notably among birds, may have helped their ailing mates, yet the earliest human females must have been thrown much on their own resources. Woman, more than man, needed things, and doubly so, both for herself and her babe. She needed shelter, clothing, finer diet. She therefore retired to some cave or den, which she swept and garnished, and to do so, invented the broom. Afterward she thatched together branches, and constructed a rude hut. She stitched together skins of animals, to make a covering for her own and her infant's hairless body. She sought more for fruits and for roots, and learnt the medicinal properties of plants. Seeds which she dropped near the offal from her abode, sprouted more luxuriantly, and so invited cultivation and suggested agriculture, and led to the selection and improvement of vegetables and cereals. The cat, and possibly the dog, she tamed, also some fowls, and the goat, and with the milk of the latter discovered the making of cheese, and the distilling of intoxicating liquors from rotting fruit. Also she tried to establish some order in the little community which gathered about her. Before this, fire had been brought under control—whether first by man or by woman is unknown;<sup>7</sup> but woman used it to cook her own and her child's food, and she guarded it zealously on the hearth, because of the difficulty of rekindling it. She learnt, too, to boil water by heated stones. Clay, smeared over the inside of a gourd to make it withstand the heat of the stone, was hardened, and as the gourd fell away, held the water by itself, and was able to withstand the fire directly. Thus pottery was discovered. Baskets were plaited of rushes or osiers, and mats woven of straw, and finer ones of hair, and in time cloth of wool,

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Locke, *Of Civil Government*, § 80.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Boston, 1875, ii. 342-5, 360-3, 369; *Studies in Darwinism*, 43-8; followed by Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, § 277n.

<sup>7</sup> The ancients ascribed the discovery of fire to men—to Prometheus, in the well-known myth, or to Hephaestus, according to Diodorus, I. xiii. 3. According to this writer, Isis and Demeter (women) were the first to give laws, xiv. 3-4, and to discover medicinal herbs, xxv. 2.

of flax, and of cotton. Thus woman's ingenuity was turned toward production, and she became the first producer.<sup>8</sup>

Man, meanwhile, remained the finder, the chooser, the appropriator: his ingenuity was turned toward acquisition. He, too, invented: he invented weapons of attack and defence—clubs, spears, sharpened flintstones, slings, the bow and arrow, the shield, and at a later date the knife and sword, and possibly the hook for catching fish, and various other snares.<sup>9</sup> Thus armed, men were becoming the most predatory and pugnacious of all animals, while women became even less combative than the females of other carnivorous species, their greater occupation with children and the home holding them back from such pursuits. In spite of their agriculture and their domestication of animals, which they never carried very far, they became more and more dependent on men both for support of themselves and their children, and for protection against the depredations not only of wild animals but of other men. Their very productivity attracted men's acquisitiveness. Naturally the men had followed them to their lairs, and after the first generation sons were born and bred there. As the sons grew up, some went off and joined the hunting and marauding bands. Others were detained by the comforts of the home, and stayed with their mothers, as of course did the daughters.<sup>10</sup> The latter set of men formed sexual unions with their sisters, the former with daughters of other women, either going to their homes, where they were welcome for their protection against others, or stealing them away. They got their wives to make portable huts or tents,<sup>11</sup> so that they could move about where game was plentiful. They were depredators upon women, until settling, while the others were from the beginning defenders of women.

Population increasing and spreading over the continents, new hordes were formed, which, when they again met and could not understand one another's language, looked upon one another as other species, and fit game. Then, under the spur of great need, organisation was effected, ranks were formed, leaders offered themselves and were recognised, or were chosen from many competitors, all this forming the beginning of government, and all performed by men. The hordes thus became tribes; and where

<sup>8</sup> So Pearson places the origin of improvements "in the attempts of the woman at self-preservation during the times of pregnancy and child-rearing," *Ethic of Freethought*, 384, cf. *Chances of Death*, ii. 3, 48. On woman's primitive industries see also Mason's work already cited, the first chapter of Ellis's *Man and Woman*, and W. I. Thomas's *Sex and Society*, 123-46.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Pearson, *loc. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> On these two classes of primitive men see Pearson, *Ethic of Freethought*, 388, 389, *Chances of Death*, ii. 103.

<sup>11</sup> Among the Arabs the women owned the tents, as being made by them.

this was not done, the hordes were destroyed. For the struggle was to the death. Cannibalism was indulged in, until it was found that, probably first, the women and children of other tribes could be better used for slaves, and at last the men too. Men slaves were then put to manual labour with the women, and thereby men also in time acquired the habit of that kind of work.<sup>12</sup> When warfare became common between tribes, the danger of quarrelling within the tribe was perceived, and not only punitive measures were taken to suppress them, but endeavours were made to remove the causes. Woman-stealing from other tribes continued, but within the tribe it was discountenanced, and purchase, in kind or by service, came to be substituted; for the daughters were valuable at home for their labour. The tribes which adopted such measures prospered, and those which did not, suffered and were destroyed, unless they dwelt in or retired to secluded nooks. In the tribes that prospered the women of the tribe were far from being treated like the slaves; for the women were the head of the home, and to them at all events everything had to be entrusted when the men were off on military expeditions. The women, too, did the cooking, and could not easily be underfed.<sup>13</sup> Where they were maltreated, the men too would suffer, and that tribe would go to the wall.<sup>14</sup> This was a rude and barbarous age, in which life was hard for both men and women.<sup>15</sup> If the women did more work, more drudgery, while the men in the intervals of their hunting and military expeditions were unoccupied, the women's work was self-imposed,<sup>16</sup> or imposed more by nature than by men.<sup>17</sup> The first division of labour was that be-

12 Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, 270-2. He thus traces back the foundation of industrialism to militarism.

13 Cf. Mason, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, 236.

14 Cf. Mason, *op. cit.*, 6-7, 275, 276.

15 But cf. Thomas: "Their life was hard, as we look back at it, not as they looked at it. They could not compare themselves with the future, and comparisons with the past were doubtless in their favour," *Sex and Society*, 128.

16 Cf. Mason, *op. cit.*, 284, cf. 8.

17 So Goldwin Smith: "The lot of woman has not been determined by the will of man, at least not in any considerable degree. The lot both of the man and the woman has been determined from age to age by circumstances over which the will of neither of them had much control, and which neither could be blamed for accepting or failing to reverse. . . . The hunter . . . would have been spoiled . . . by heavy domestic labour," *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 2d ed., 224, 228. Giddings: "Savage life is a series of petty wars; at all times the community must be ready to meet its foes. During the best years of life, women are by child-bearing unfitted for fighting and hunting. As these activities must be undertaken by the men, the women must do the drudgery, as far as their strength permits. Not only must they attend to domestic duties, keep the fire, do the cooking, and provide such simple manufactured articles as mats and fishing-nets; but they must also actively assist in procuring any food that is within their reach, and on the march they must become beasts of burden, lugging, beside their babies, the utensils and supplies. This latter practice is universal among savages, and the necessity of it is so obvious that the women themselves defend it. The men must be free to fight at any instant or to meet any surprise. To load themselves with any other burdens than their weapons might be to sacrifice the lives of all. It therefore seems quite wrong to conclude that women in savage life are always slaves, and men their tyrannical masters. Certainly their con-

tween man's and woman's, in which, to be sure, the woman took the larger share.<sup>18</sup> But this, if anything, increased her importance.<sup>19</sup> Probably the man's attitude was: 'If you care to do all these things, you may; if not, I can get along without them better than you can.' Yet he liked her products, and encouraged her in her work, and in return assisted her with his. Also those tribes prospered most, wherein the men more and more aided the women, especially in the training of children. Conjugal and parental affections are useful dispositions that have been augmented through the natural selection and survival of those who developed them.<sup>20</sup> The persistence to-day of a few degraded savages in out-of-the-way spots on the globe, as of semi-civilised peoples elsewhere, does not disprove this. On the contrary, it proves it. They have been able to survive only because of their removal from the struggle. They are remnants, not beginnings.<sup>21</sup>

In the beginning, when some animal, developing intelligence, became man, no man knew that he was a father, and no woman knew why she was a mother.<sup>22</sup> This knowledge no animals possess. There is required much ratiocination — by generalisation, elimination of negative cases, explanation of incongruities, — before this knowledge can be acquired; and at first it would appear only as a suggestion, then as a belief, then as a general doctrine, but still admitting exceptions, and only in a high stage of mental development and of civilisation has the universal necessity of fecundation in the higher animals been recognised. For at first, when all men and women had sexual intercourse by instinct or for pleasure, and when only women occasionally brought forth young, no connection between these facts was apparent; and the peculiar behaviour of the women seemed mysterious. It en-

dition is wretched, but at the outset it is made so more by social conditions than by masculine will and power," *Principles of Sociology*, 266-7. Thomas: "The primitive division of labour among the sexes was not in any sense an arrangement dictated by men, but a habit into which both men and women fell, to begin with, through their difference of organisation," *Sex and Society*, 140. "The real master of both man and woman is Necessity," says Edward S. Martin, *Much Ado about Women*, *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan., 1914, p. 11. Cf. also Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, § 326 (quoting Dobrizhoffer).

18 According to T. Veblen, the primitive lot of woman was drudgery, that of man exploit, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 13.

19 Westermarck: "As a matter of fact, the strong differentiation of work, however burdensome to the woman, is itself a source of rights. It gives her authority within the circle which is exclusively hers. In the house she is very commonly an autocrat," *The Position of Woman in Early Civilisation*, *Sociological Papers*, 1914, pp. 150-1.

20 Cf. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 20-1.

21 Their continued existence in remote regions really proves that their imperfect and weakening social relations (especially their lax sexual morality) were the original condition, which was mostly destroyed by the tribes that improved their morality; whereas, had the better condition been first prevalent, the degraded tribes would have had no chance to have once extended over the world to the extent that archaeology shows them to have done: cf. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, 122-4.

22 Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, 200, 340, 341-2, 376.

dowed them with an awe-inspiring power; and led on to the ascription to them of other powers, of magic and the like, which stood them in good stead as a defence against the physically stronger men.<sup>23</sup> It was likened to the fertility of the earth, which brought forth vegetation, as at first appeared, in a similarly haphazard way. The mysterious powers of production of nature were therefore made into female divinities,—and these seem to have been the earliest of the beings worshipped by mankind. When at length, after the need of seeds for plants had been noticed, the truth dawned upon them. It must have appeared a wonderful discovery, and it in all probability greatly exercised the minds of both men and women. Very likely it was then that phallic-worship was instituted; which lasted till the wonder wore off. It must have greatly elevated the importance of men in their own eyes and in the eyes of women, and it gave them a claim to the children. It is believed that then the men who claimed to be fathers imitated women in child-birth by that curious custom, called the *couvade*, of pretending to be sick when the wife bore a child. Yet for a long time continued the belief in a possible human parthenogenesis — now at the instigation of some other cause, as by something unusual eaten or touched, or even by things less substantial, as a sudden breath of air (or spirit), a startling shadow, a phantom whether seen awake or in a dream, or any other unusual occurrence, often suggesting the presence of a god. Of these there are indications in the myths and legends of many peoples.<sup>24</sup> Even when this belief was nearly extinct, advantage was taken of it; for, as men in high position were proud of their ancestry, new men who rose from the common herd to high estate, and perhaps had no knowledge of their real father, found it convenient to ascribe their paternity to some god, or this was done for them by their flatterers, unless they could be linked to some line with an early hero or deity for its founder.<sup>25</sup> But in this we are anticipating.

For at first the new discovery could not have had much effect

<sup>23</sup> For the service rendered them by this fear which they inspired, cf. Mason, *op. cit.*, 256, Westermarck, *op. cit.*, in *Sociological Papers*, 159–60.

<sup>24</sup> E. S. Hartland has collected much evidence on this subject in his *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1909.

<sup>25</sup> Even Christianity conformed to both these methods, Jesus being elevated to be the son of God and to be descended in the male line from David. Alexander the Great, as is well known, was tempted to look upon himself as the son of Zeus. Caesar made no such pretension; but for Augustus it was made by the poets, in the form that his line was descended from a goddess. This — the idea that a goddess could be fecundated by a man and bring forth a human child, which is ridiculed in the fable of Ixion — was a wholly poetical and later opinion, when the original belief was no longer understood. Even Homer could treat Achilles as goddess-born. At the border-line between myth and written history, another scheme was hit upon: to find something miraculous in their early bringing-up, as that they were foundlings and cared for by the elements, as by a river (Sargon, Moses), or by animals (Cyrus, How-tseih, Romulus).

on social conditions, because of the practical promiscuity, which made it difficult for a man, however temperate, to know his own children, while a woman, however much indulging, always knew hers. Relationship, therefore, which had begun to be reckoned on account of the practice of cohabitation, was still for a long while traced through the mother only. The only surely knowable relationships still were those of mother and child, uterine brothers and sisters, cousins among the children of such sisters, maternal uncle or aunt and sororal nephew or niece. On this basis the family and the clan were formed, and the descent of position and of the few articles that were owned was regulated. A woman's property naturally went to her children. For a man's property no heirs were known but his sisters' children. If he were a chieftain, and this position had become quasi-hereditary, it was a sister's son who would be chosen. Names, too, went in the same way, men adding to their own name that of their mother. Of primitive peoples in this state there is frequent mention in the writings of the ancients,<sup>26</sup> and of early modern explorers;<sup>27</sup> and there are some such peoples still existing to-day.<sup>28</sup> There are traces of it also left in the customs, myths, tales, and languages of ancient and of modern races. The first investigator of this matter was the Swiss Bachofen, who gave to it the name of "mother-right."<sup>29</sup> Independently it was discovered and described by J. F. McLennan.<sup>30</sup> Karl Pearson, who has done good work in digging out the "fossils" of it retained by the Germans, prefers to call it the "mother-age." Others have called it the "matriarchate," or

<sup>26</sup> So the well-known account of the Lycians by Herodotus, I. 173, supported by Heracleides, in Müller's *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, II. 217, Nicolaus Damascenus, *ib.* III. 461 (similarly of the Ethiopians, 463), and Nymphis (of the Xanthians in particular) *ib.* 15. The Lycians, according to Herodotus, had some connection with Crete, whose people spoke of their "motherland" and where the Spartans also got some of their ideas of government; which no doubt helped to maintain a more prominent part for women among them. Plato likewise drew from that source. Again according to Herodotus, I. 216, the cannibalistic Massagetes had wives, but used them in common. Athenaeus says of the Tyrrhenians (or Etruscans) that the women were common, and the children brought up without regard to their fathers. *Deipnosophistae*, XII. 14; *cf.* Heraclides, *loc. cit.* Somewhat similarly of the Libyrii, Nicolaus, in Müller's *Fragmenta*, III. 458, *cf.* 460. Strabo describes a kind of "gynæcocracy," as he calls it, among the Cantabrians in Spain — the women working in the fields, giving birth without trouble and putting their husbands to bed (*the couvade*), taking part in war, inheriting, and portioning off their brothers, III. p. 165.

<sup>27</sup> *E.g.*, about the Guanches on the Canary Islands.

<sup>28</sup> The best specimens are the Nairs of India, the Menangkabau of Sumatra, and the Tuaregs of North Africa.

<sup>29</sup> In his work *Das Mutterrecht*, 1861 (2d ed. 1897). He rested especially upon three old legends — Varro's account of the contest between Poseidon and Athena at Athens (which will be noticed presently), Ephorus's narrative of the Boeotians' treatment of the prophetess of Dodona and their trial before a jury composed half of women and half of men (given by Strabo, IX. p. 402), and the Orestes myth (his pursuit by the Erinnies and acquittal by Apollo) as related by Æschylus (and to be noticed later): §§ xxiii., xxiv., xxv.

<sup>30</sup> In his *Primitive Marriage*, London, 1865, which was included in his later *Studies in Ancient History*, 1876. See in the latter p. 411.

the "matronymic period."<sup>31</sup> The idea suggested especially by the term "matriarchate," or "matriarchy," of mother-rule, is unobjectionable if confined strictly to the rule of mothers over their children; but extended as it generally is, in parallelism with "patriarchy," to mean the rule of women over men (more definitely expressed by "gynæcocracy"), the implication is false; for there is no evidence,<sup>32</sup> not even in Egypt, that women ever ruled over anything but children.<sup>33</sup> There are some legends of amazons, or breastless women (like our female acrobats), who controlled their own affairs, got themselves fecundated by their male neighbours, reared only their female children, and waged war with men; but the one thing uniform about all such legends is that the women were beaten and their congregations destroyed.<sup>33a</sup> If in some tribes wives have been superior in their households over their husbands, it was because they were among their own kinsmen and had their uncles and brothers to side with them in their disputes, while the husbands were away from their own kindred and without backing;<sup>34</sup> but then the uncles and brothers took the position which the husbands take elsewhere,—there was andriarchy, if not yet patriarchy. It was a period not so much of mother right as of father indifference. Yet it is probable that in those primitive days women were on a considerably greater equality with men than they have been since. Men as yet practically had no fathers, they knew only their mothers, were brought up by and were for long attached to their mothers; and the emancipation of sons from their mothers' rule must have been later performed, if not less complete, than when fathers also had a hand in their training. Moreover, the women's productivity was even greater than the men's though it is difficult to compare the value of their contribution, since that of the men was often essential to their safety. Also the communal gatherings were for the mixed purposes, not only of settling disputes and fixing the common policy,

<sup>31</sup> There is no more reason for using the form "metronymic" than for writing "metriarchate." *Mater* is the Greek word for mother, *meter* being only an Attic variation. "Metronymic" is too suggestive of "metronomics." The proper form was used by McLennan in his *Studies in Ancient History*, p. 289. "Matrilineal" and "matriherital" are further terms that have been used in this connection.

<sup>32</sup> Except Strabo's; but his account does not bear out the term he employed.

<sup>33</sup> This is why Pearson prefers "mother-age," *Chances of Death*, II. 2. But Mrs. Galliehan, though she "concedes" this, still uses "matriarchy," *The Truth about Woman*, 143. Also W. I. Thomas follows L. von Dargun in rejecting Bachofen's conception of it as a political system, *Sex and Society*, 70, cf. 93. It is rejected also by Vance Thompson, *Woman*, 25-7.

<sup>33a</sup> Some communities of women may have actually existed, who tried to maintain themselves. The explanation is the condition obtaining in some regions compelling the men to go away at a certain season of the year in quest of food or employment, leaving the women at home to manage things; and then if the men happened to be cut off, the women would be left permanently alone and might set up some military defense. See G. C. Rothery's *The Amazons in Antiquity and Modern Times*, London, 1910, pp. 178-81, 210-11.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Giddings, *op. cit.*, 268.

but of worshipping, dancing, feasting, and pairing; and in these women took a leading part.<sup>35</sup> Witches, indeed, were always more important, in this way, than wizards. It is known that in some of the most warlike American Indian tribes, such as the Iroquois, the women voted in the assembly.<sup>36</sup> Similarly among the Basques, who are a survived primitive people,<sup>37</sup> down till the French revolution the women heads of households voted with the men.<sup>38</sup> In antiquity Herodotus (IV. 26) mentions that among the Issedonians, who (like the Massagetes) ate their fathers, the women had equal power with the men. Among the Lycians and some of their neighbours in Asia Minor, women held public offices, political as well as religious, one being known to have been a gymnasiarach.<sup>39</sup> Another legend hands down the tradition of such a state in a prehistoric period of Greece itself, and narrates in a mythical form the transition to the later stage. This is a legend preserved by Varro and Augustine, telling how the Athenian women in the days of Cecrops lost the right to vote, at the same time they lost the right to have their children named after them.<sup>40</sup> We are told also that under Cecrops monogamy was established,<sup>41</sup> that is, marriage was regulated.

For this stage of matronymy and of recognition only of female relationship and of descent of property and position only through females, could not last. It was a state of unstable equilibrium, since it was not based on the true nature of things. It was based on ignorance. When knowledge came about, it had to cease. Almost all animals have fathers physiologically, but as they do not know it, they practically have no fathers — none socially; and no animal fathers know their offspring.<sup>42</sup> So the matronymic age always was a half-way stage between an animal state and the fully human. For when men recognised that their contribution was as essential for the production of children as was the women's, that if women were mothers they were fathers, and that the children belonged to them as well, then men became interested in their children, and the one-sided matronymic condition had to come to

<sup>35</sup> See Pearson, *Chances of Death*, ii. 9-10, 104-6, 109-10, 136-7n., cf. 145-51.

<sup>36</sup> Morgan, *Ancient Society*, 72, 85, cf. 82n., 117.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Strabo's account of the Cantabri, above given.

<sup>38</sup> Cordier, *Coutumes anciennes et nouvelles de Barège*, p. 378, quoted by Bachofen,

§ 164.

<sup>39</sup> E. Simcox, *Primitive Civilisations*, i. 432.

<sup>40</sup> Augustine, quoting Varro, *Civ. Dei*, XVIII. 9.

<sup>41</sup> Athenaeus, XIII. 2; Justin, II. 6.

<sup>42</sup> In birds and some other animals, when the father tends the young, he does so rather as the mother's mate, without knowing his parental relationship. Yet his solicitude for the young, without regard to their being his own, may be explained also by partial inheritance from his female ancestors: cf. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, 107. Even the mothers, in the case of oviparous animals, cannot be sure of their offspring, and hens take as good care of chicks from supposititious eggs as from their own, and many small birds cannot tell from their own a cuckoo fledgling.

an end. Still, for a time, men could not be sure of their own children, and so the old condition was allowed to continue.<sup>43</sup> But the old conditions became more and more irksome; for a man had to leave his property and his position in the tribe to his sister's son, though he might suspect that the son of the woman he cohabited with was his own. Every man of property and position then began to keep still closer guard over the woman he claimed for wife, and so increased his confidence in the belief that her children were his children. Men, then, were no longer willing that their inheritance should go to their nephews and nieces. To obviate this, two devices were at first tried. The one was for a man to marry his uterine sister (whether by the same father or not), so that his nephews and nieces should be his children. But this practice was discountenanced by nature. Long before this, probably through an instinctive lack or erotic feeling caused by early familiarity, brother-and-sister marriages had been little indulged in; moreover, where it was indulged in most, the race, through inbreeding, decayed and perished, and only those tribes prospered where it was little practised, in whom the contrary instinct became fixed.<sup>44</sup> During matronymy, however, the relationship between half-brother and half-sister by the same father was either unknown or unrecognised, and nothing prevented such unions; but now they did not serve the purpose of the father mindful of his children, and therefore, with increasing knowledge of the injuriousness of incest, even these marriages had to be shunned, and equally so the marriage of a brother with a sister from the same mother, whoever were the father or fathers. The other device was for the father to make over his property to his wife during his life-time, so that her, and his, children might inherit it from her. But this had the inconvenience of weakening the man's position in society, and putting him in a dangerous dependence on his wife. A tribe which adopted such a practice as a custom, could not thrive in competition with tribes in which men retained their own property. There was only one other solution: the father's position must be recognised as such, his own children must be his heirs, their name, too, must be traced from him, relationship must run rather in the male line. Of

<sup>43</sup> Rather strangely, Hartland, whose work above referred to on *Primitive Paternity* gives such an accumulation of evidence about primitive ignorance of paternity, denies that mother-right was connected with uncertainty of paternity, i. 300-325, ii. 2, 283, 287. His reason is that in some peoples mother-right continues in cases where fatherhood is certain, and in others father-right (in the husband) is observed in cases where another person is known to be the father. He overlooks that the former is a survival, and the latter a substitute, or else a matter (proving degeneracy) either of indifference or of cupidity, the children being claimed merely as property, like the children of slave-women.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 319, 320-34; 352, 545.

course the mother's property continued to go to her own children: then why did not the so-called matriarchy give way to a double-headed matro-patriarchy, instead of to the other-sided patriarchy which actually did follow? This is because such a double-headed rule is impossible in the nature of things, no equilibrium between two would-be equals being maintainable;<sup>45</sup> and because, even before, the man had been the ruler, and the only change now was that the man-rule became a father-rule — andriarchy was specialised into patriarchy. There were also religious and economic reasons.

At first, as we have seen, men had no knowledge that they had anything to do with the procreation of children: women seemed to produce them spontaneously, like the earth producing plants. Then it was found that for the earth to produce plants, seeds had to be sown. When, then, it was perceived that a transmission from a man into a woman was necessary for procreation, it was confused with the sowing of seed in the ground. But the seed is what carries on the nature of the plant, and the ground only nourishes it into growth. So now the belief became prevalent that it was the man's seed which transmitted human life, and women merely provided the garden where it could grow.<sup>46</sup> This view also, of course, was wrong, and its error ought to have been plain, since in that case it would have been indifferent into what female the male planted his seed, provided the species were structurally alike, and the hinny, for instance, would be a horse and the mule an ass. Also there would be no reason for children, even girls, and especially boys, resembling their mothers; inheritance could be only from the male ancestry, perhaps modified, at most, for better or for worse, by a strong or by a feeble mother,

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Locke: "The husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination, i.e. the rule, should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler and the stronger," *Of Civil Government*, § 82.

<sup>46</sup> Such was the belief of the Jews: the man's emission was "seed," cf. *Gen.* XXXVIII, 19, *Levit.*, XV. 16, 17, 18, 32; and the woman impregnated was "sown," *Numbers*, V. 28, cf. *Levit.*, XII. 2. The *Laws of Manu* treat woman as the earth in which man plants his seed, IX. 32-55 (inversely "the earth the primeval womb," 37, cf. 44). Similarly the Egyptians, according to Diodorus, I. 80, § 4. In the Greek language the part assigned to the female was to take together or gather in (*συλλαβεῖν*, whence the Latin *concipere*, and our "conceive") the seed (sperm) of the male. In Greek tradition the transition from the primal to this developed (and seemingly scientific) belief is shown in the Orestes myth: see Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 628-31 (or 658-61), Euripides, *Orestes*, 552-3. The metaphor from tillage was frequently employed by the dramatists and poets, and even by Plato (*Cratylus*, 406B, *Laws*, VIII. 838E-839A). Such was the doctrine of Anaxagoras and other "physiologists," according to Aristotle, *De Anim.* *Gen.*, IV. 1, (who himself compared the womb with the earth, *Problematika*, X. 9, and cf. *Politics*, VII. xiv. or xvi. 9); and of Chrysippus, according to Plutarch *De Stoicorum Repugnantibus*, 41. The Latin word for seed (*semen*) has become our technical term for the male element. It was this belief which permitted the minority at the Council of Macon to hold that woman had no soul. For references concerning this belief among barbarians, see Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 106.

as plants by rich or poor soil. Observations of this kind led some of the Greek philosophers and physicians to amend that opinion. Thus we are told by Plutarch that Pythagoras, Epicurus, and Democritus held that the female also emits sperm; and he further specifies that the Stoics so believed on account of the resemblance of children to their mothers, which they accounted for thereby.<sup>47</sup> That Hippocrates, or at least some early writers of his school, held this revised opinion, we know from his (or their) own works. Thus the work *De Genitura* (cc. 7-8) ascribes a generative fluid to women, not only because of the resemblance of children to their mothers, but because some women are found to have only male children from one man and only female children from another man, her fluid being supposed the weaker in the one case and the stronger in the other. Impregnation, then, this school regarded as the mixing of the two fluids, the male and the female;<sup>48</sup> and they accounted for the sex of the offspring, and its different intensities, by the several possible combinations of these fluids.<sup>49</sup> Observation of wind-eggs laid by hens, and of certain facts in connection with women, led Aristotle to modify this new doctrine in the direction of his own philosophy, by saying that the female provided the matter *whence*, and the male the life-giving agent *whereby*, the embryo is formed.<sup>50</sup> Neither of these views really went very far in correcting the old view, the principal element in the seed being still derived from the male; and the former view continued to hold sway, unaffected by the fact that throughout the middle ages the doctrine of Hippocrates was held by the physicians and the doctrine of Aristotle was held by the philosophers. It was, indeed, only a little over two hundred and fifty years ago that it was discovered, and well within a hundred years that it was proved, that every female plant and animal produces spores or ova, and that, in the higher types, the homolog of the seed developed from an ovule fertilised by a grain

<sup>47</sup> *De Placitis Philosophorum*, V. 5 and 11. That Epicurus employed the same reasoning, is probable from Lucretius, IV. 1211, 1229.

<sup>48</sup> *Ib.* c. 5, also *De Natura Pueri*, c. 1, *De Morbis Mulierum*, I. 24.

<sup>49</sup> *De Genitura*, c. 6; *De Diaeta*, I. 28-9, already referred to, above, p. 67n. A further reference to the subject may be found in *De Morbis*, IV. I.

<sup>50</sup> Aristotle discovered the difference between potentiality (connected with passivity) and actuality (connected with activity or energy), and was fond of employing it whenever occasion offered. So here he represented the passive female as providing the matter which has the potentiality of becoming this or that, and the active male as providing the soul-bearing energising principle which makes it become this or that. The embryo he therefore represented as the product of these two elements, and no longer as either the female's or the male's single-handed product. See his *De Animal. Hist.*, X. ii. 1, v. 1, 7, 9, vi. 2-3, and his *De Animal. Gen.*, I. ii., xvii-xxii., II. i. iii. near end, iv. v., IV. i. end. Rather curiously, the North American Naudawessies had a similar notion, that offspring were indebted to their fathers for their souls and to their mothers for their bodies: Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 105-6.

of pollen is the embryo developed from an ovum fertilised by a spermatozoon.<sup>51</sup>

That quasi-scientific doctrine, originating near the beginning of civilisation, and so long prevalent — the new view at the time we are speaking of — represents the swing of the pendulum from the one side of the truth to the other, and in place of the mother being considered the creator of the child without any father, the father became, in the common opinion, the child's creator, with the mother's help, but with her acting a very indifferent part. Then the father's action was likened also to that of rain, which the earth absorbs: he indeed acts, he covers, as the sky covers and fertilises the earth; and as woman had previously been assimilated to the earth, and her internal powers, spontaneous and uncontrolled, to the hidden powers under the earth — to goddesses of darkness, — so now man was assimilated to meteorological phenomena, with powers aerial and spiritual, volitionally active and regulated by intelligence, and he, the first star-gazer, became the worshipper of the gods of light, with whom he claimed kinship. In fact, a totally new mythology now came into existence, and Zeus, with his dependent sister-wife, succeeded the nearly equal Kronos and Rhea, and Wodin supplanted Freya or Frau Gude, and the more prominent gods now were males, whereas female goddesses had previously been more important.<sup>52</sup> a few of whom continued in honour (such as Vesta, or the fire on the hearth), or were superseded by new minor goddesses of the air or the sea (such as Venus). Men now, at least the eminent men in every country, came to be looked up to, themselves, as gods, especially when dead, and their *manes* had to be appeased by worship and nourished by offerings, their continued existence depending thereon; and the worship and offerings could be rendered only by sons and their sons, brought up and trained thereto, at the family tomb on festal occasions, and on ordinary occasions at the family hearth. Hence every man of such station needed, for the continuance of his happiness after death, the perpetuation of his own line on earth; and, to begin with, as also for his support in old age, he needed a recognisable son, who could only be a legitimate son, from a legitimate and recognised and home-kept wife. Such a son, too, would perpetuate his name, — and in early

<sup>51</sup> Still, however, though the mother contributes equally with the father to the formation of the embryo, she is otherwise but its nurse before as after giving birth; for it develops itself, forming for instance its own blood, which comes to it no more from its mother than from its father. What the mother does is to provide it housing and warmth, and to bring to it nourishment, which it absorbs and assimilates.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Pearson, *Ethic of Freethought*, 393.

lore a close connection was made between a name and the thing named, or its substance, in the case of man his life; so that the possession of a never-ending line of descent was a means, and the only means, of obtaining immortality of a sort.<sup>53</sup> This, indeed, is another line of thought; but it was confounded with the preceding.

As a result of all this, the new view about the transmission of life, and the new interest which every man consequently took in his own offspring, required a stricter regulation of marriage. The man had to be more particular about the woman who was to be the mother of *his* children; and because he wished to keep his children with him always, he had to keep his children's mother also. Previously, as he did not recognise his children, he let them go with their mother or mothers. And the woman, who always knew her own children, kept them, whether she remained with their father, or fathers, or not; and she had no concern for marriage regulations. Thus the so-called mother-age was an age of sexual irregularity and laxness and license.<sup>54</sup> Man could still permit the license to continue for pleasure; but for procreation he must regulate his connection with woman. Real marriage, human marriage, life-long cohabitation for the sake of the children, dates from this period. Chance-begotten and hapless bastards continued to be named after their mother, and received their position from her, without reference to their father; or if any man took an interest in them, it would be their mother's brother. They commonly are called "natural children," to indicate their birth in the natural state, outside the artificial institution made by man. This institution is needed for purposed procreation. And for it man must take the lead.<sup>55</sup>

And men were taking the lead also for an economic reason. We have seen that in the pristine mother-age women were the first cooks, architects, weavers, dressers of skins, agriculturists, domesticators of the smaller animals, potters, physicians,—inventors of the peaceful arts. They made the first steps toward civilisation, but they never entered civilisation itself. At best

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Plato, *Laws*, IV. 721 B-C.

<sup>54</sup> It is so recognised by Pearson, *Ethic of Freethought*, 394, followed by Mrs. Gallichan, *Truth about Woman*, 143; *Chances of Death*, ii. 96, 105, 244; but unknown to Eliza B. Gamble, who holds that when women ruled, everything was modest, and licentiousness has developed since, *Evolution of Woman*, 301. The great outbreak of license in the olden time took place in May, as will be noted later. Since then May has been the month avoided for regular marriage.

<sup>55</sup> The fact that marriage is man-made is in no wise derogatory to woman. Woman has no need of marriage to know her own children; man has, to know his. This is the bottom of the whole matter. It also supports the thesis that marriage is man's affair, proper for man to regulate, rather than for woman to regulate.

they made the advance from savagery to barbarism.<sup>56</sup> The further step into civilisation was made by men. Men domesticated the larger animals<sup>57</sup>—the cow and ox, the horse, the camel, the elephant; or if women had first domesticated any of these, men took over the charge of them as exceeding women's strength, and men either themselves domesticated or assumed charge of sheep in large flocks.<sup>58</sup> Men worked up the minerals of copper and gold, and discovered the metallurgy of silver and iron, becoming the first smiths;<sup>59</sup> and now in possession of the knife, the shears, the axe, the spade, the hoe, and the saw, (for it is but a step from weapons to tools)<sup>60</sup> they launched forth in a career of improvement. They invented the plough, and applied animals, especially oxen, to haul it,<sup>61</sup> and gradually took over agriculture, or husbandry, in distinction from kitchen-gardening, from the women. They cleared forests, filled in swamps, made roads, cut staves and boards, built houses, hewed stone and erected permanent buildings, surrounded them with palisades first and then with walls, constructed boats, using oars and sails, and navigated the rivers and the seas, coasting along the shore; for they did not yet have the keel and the compass. They invented also the wheel, applying it to land-carriage, and afterward to machines for use in industry,—and it may be noted that all our higher material civilisation, resting as it does on machinery, is based on the wheel, which is not known in nature. The first industrial application of it seems to have been to pottery, in the shape of the potter's wheel,<sup>62</sup> after which men took over from women this industry, to which they added, as their own discovery, glass-making. They ornamented all these things, and took over the

<sup>56</sup> This is not recognised by Pearson, who treats women's early inventions as not only the basis of our civilisation, "but a good part of the superstructure," *Chances of Death*, ii. 48, cf. 6, and *Ethic of Freethought*, 384. So also his follower, Mrs. Galliechan, *The Truth about Woman*, 21, 139–40. But she does not hesitate, on occasion, to treat the mother-age as an age of barbarism, 143. Elie Reclus, however, states the case correctly when he says "woman was the creator of the primordial elements of civilisation," *Primitive Folk*, 58.

<sup>57</sup> So Pearson, *Ethic of Freethought*, 391, following Lippert, *Die Geschichte der Familie*, 41.

<sup>58</sup> Women are treated as the first domesticators, simply, of animals, by Reclus, *loc. cit.* Woman "domesticated man, and assisted him in domesticating the animals," according to Thomas, *Sex and Society*, 228, cf. 137. Already Hippel, who knew also that women started the industries, *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber, Werke*, vi. 55–9, held that women were the first to tame animals and set them to work, whereby, he lamented, they first gave to men the idea of slavery, and were, in consequence, themselves made the first slaves, 57.

<sup>59</sup> Tubal Cain, Hephaestus, etc.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, 145, 293.

<sup>61</sup> The ancients ascribed this invention to a man—Buzyges (Hercules or Epimenedes), or Triptolemus, according to Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII. 57 (or 56), Suidas, Hesychius.

<sup>62</sup> Posidonius wrongly ascribed the invention of the potter's wheel to Anacharsis, according to Seneca, *Ep. XC.* 30–1; and Pliny committed the same error, *loc. cit.* But the consensus of opinion is that it was men who invented it. Pliny, in the same place, assigns the use of the wheel in carriages to the Phrygians.

arts proper. Astronomy was the first science they cultivated, and by it they guided their actions in agriculture, and later in navigation. They commenced, too, to make a science of medicine, practised anatomy, and invented surgery.<sup>63</sup> The men who took the lead in all this movement, did not always apply themselves to the manual labour, but they used their ingenuity for directing, and employed male slaves in the labour which was beyond the strength of women. Women retained some of their original industries long undisturbed; in others they were relegated to smaller parts; still others were taken from them entirely.<sup>64</sup> Fighting and looting remained the occupation of free men, who thereby procured slaves, whom they superintended in the intervals; and as these intervals augmented through extinction of game and subjugation of their neighbours, they found a substitute more and more in the supervision of industry. Property was now accumulating, and it was mostly men's property, being mostly their products. Women had capital in the shape of pots and pans and other simple implements. Men alone acquired capital in the larger forms, and produced so much as to have a surplus. They established exchange, therefore, which, especially in the form of commerce between nations and over seas, was from its invention wholly their affair. Commercial expeditions took the place of marauding, from which, in fact, they but slowly became distinguished.<sup>65</sup>

To prevent disputes within the tribes, laws of property had to be instituted,—and they were made by men. Thus marriage and property became the two great fields of men's legislation, without which no civilisation could grow. The territory, too, over which men hunted, or roamed with their herds and flocks, or which they cleared and tilled, and where they established their abode, dug wells, built cities, and buried their dead, was theirs; and it was they who defended it from others, and among themselves they had to institute agrarian laws, first for sharing and distributing their common land, and then, after its division, for owning it separately. Peoples occupying rich lands became the first confirmed agriculturists, and soonest adopted the ways of peace;

<sup>63</sup> Chiron, *Æsculapius*, etc.

<sup>64</sup> Lucretius drew upon his imagination when he wrote that the working-up of wool was first done by men, because of their superiority in every art, and that they afterward turned it over to women, *De Rerum Natura*, V. 1354-8; but he would have been right, had he foreseen that if ever it was to be much improved, it would, on this account, have to be done by men. But Pliny was writing history when he said that at Rome women first baked bread, and that it was not till late (about 174 B.C.) that men became bakers, XVIII. 28. Among the Jews women were still cooks and bakers even in the king's household, *I. Sam.*, VIII. 13.

<sup>65</sup> Nestor asked his visitors, Telemachus and Mentor, whether they were merchants or pirates, *Odyssey*, III. 72-3; cf. Thucydides, I. 5.

and among them women retained their prominence longest, or regained it. Such were the early inhabitants of Mesopotamia, such the Egyptians, such the primitive Hindoos and Chinese. They were cultivators of river-valleys. Peoples occupying infertile regions — barren mountains and arid plains — remained hunters or at most herdsmen. They retained their warlike disposition, and regarded the agriculturists as their natural prey. Among them women lost their prominence soonest. These, however, sometimes moved bodily over into the fertile regions, conquering them and subduing the people there to be their slaves, over whom they became the ruling class. In this ruling class, father-right was consolidated, with strict regulation of marriage; while among the ruled people something like mother-right subsisted, with laxness of marriage ties. Descent of the mother's status has always prevailed in downright slavery;<sup>66</sup> and in quasi slavery, or subjection, traces of it continued longest. The rulers were the men whose ancestors were deified; which was never done in the case of the ruled, whose ancestral tombs were despoiled and destroyed. But in time there was mingling of these races, especially by the upper-class males mating with the lower-class females;<sup>67</sup> and a middle class was formed, who in time became the principal part of the state. The truth has become apparent, in fact, that such unions of conquering and of conquered peoples served the same purpose of improving the racial stock, as is served in individuals by the cross-fertilisation of the male and the female.<sup>68</sup> The huntsmen or the nomads, especially if they approach the sea, like the ancient Phoenicians, were the first to devote themselves to commerce as a specialty, intermediating between other peoples. But they have been surpassed by semi-hunters and semi-agriculturists who occupied mountainous regions with much indented sea-coast, such as the Greeks of old, the Normans in the middle ages, and the Europeans in general of modern times. Such nations, in which men undeniably ruled, spread more and more over the world, and those peoples among

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *Exodus*, XXI. 4.

<sup>67</sup> For the man acts, the woman suffers; the man takes the superior position, the woman the inferior: if, then, the man is superior and the woman inferior, there is no incongruity; but if the woman is (or regards herself as) the superior, there is incongruity. Furthermore, in such cases the children go with the woman, and are not a concern for the man, if they are inferior to him,— and as they are likely to be superior to what they would be if obtained from a man on the woman's own level, there is a gain, to which the woman is reconciled; but the woman fears to be encumbered with an inferior offspring from an inferior man. Proof of this is the fact that men are just as fastidious with regard to legitimate unions. Ward, in treating of this subject (*Pure Sociology*, 359–60), does not perceive these simple explanations.

<sup>68</sup> Lilienfeld, referred to by Ward, *op. cit.*, 205, cf. 235. The trouble with India has been that such mingling of races was never permitted. There, to be sure, men of the upper classes may have intercourse with women of the lower (in what has been called hypergamy, the reverse not being allowed), but, whether they be married or not, the children go with the mother and remain in her caste.

whom women still retained their ancient lead through the backwardness of the men, were subdued or driven to the wall, in inaccessible regions, where the others found it not worth while to pursue them.<sup>69</sup> The transition from matronymy to patronymy and patriarchy was mostly slow and prolonged. So probably it was in Greece, as later in Germany. But in Italy all of a sudden Rome was founded by unattached men, who adopted the patriarchal system at one stroke, and in the midst of peoples still more or less controlled by women, they were easy victors, having to fight with hen-pecked husbands. Likewise the Jews had become thoroughly patriarchal when they left Egypt (perhaps by antiperistasis, in putting off the ways of the Egyptians), and there is evidence that the Caananites, who, though numerically superior, gradually fell before them, were still in the matronymic state, with all the licentiousness of the mother-age, wherefore they likewise supplied a warning.<sup>70</sup>

The regulation of marriage and the regulation of property were, in all probability, performed synchronously. Men were now becoming both, in their own estimation, the principal owners of the life-stream, and, in reality, the principal owners of property. Every man needed a son for the purpose both of transmitting through him his life and of transmitting through him his property. Every man was buried on his own land, and his future life (connected with his tomb) and his estate went together. The estate, in fact, belonged to the family in a continuous line of descent; and the individual was only a temporary occupant.<sup>71</sup> Hence the repugnance, among primitive peoples, to alienate real estate — the inheritance of their fathers;<sup>72</sup> which generally passed into law in some form, many Greek states forbidding the sale of land,<sup>73</sup> and the Jews requiring its restoration after fifty years. What is here said refers to the men (*vires, barones*) of the ruling classes, the only citizens of the state. To be a citizen the ownership of property was necessary — primitively to have a share in the communal lands, later to have a lot of one's own in the country. But not only this: to be a citizen one had to have ancestors who had

<sup>69</sup> The superiority of patriachism over the mother-age is admitted by Pearson, *Chances of Death*, II. 4, 96, cf. I. 239n.

<sup>70</sup> *Leviticus*, XVIII, 24-30, XX, 23-4, cf. *Esra*, IX, 1. For the few traces of matronymy in the Old Testament, principally in *Genesis*, see H. Schaeffer, *The Social Legislation of the Primitive Semites*, 1-3.—On the Jews and the Romans as the two pre-eminently patriarchal peoples of antiquity, cf. Pearson, *Chances of Death*, II. 4n., 95-6, 99.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Plato, *Laws*, XI. 923A, also V. 741 C-D.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. the story of Ahab and Naboth, *1. Kings*, XXI, 3.

<sup>73</sup> Fustel de Coulanges cites many references from Aristotle, *La Cité antique*, 73-4. When mortgaged land was foreclosed, the owner and his family, not being separable from it, went with it into the possession of the creditor: so in Attica till Solon's reform, H. E. Seebohm, *The Structure of Greek Tribal Society*, 127.

been citizens before him. And furthermore, one was not regarded as a dutiful citizen, unless he had a son to become a citizen after him. A son became a necessity; and to have a son a wife also became a necessity<sup>74</sup>—in addition to the need of her to take care of the household.<sup>75</sup> Celibacy was everywhere forbidden<sup>76</sup>—that is, to citizens, of course. A daughter was not enough. For, under the view of the transmission of life only by and through the seed of the male, a woman could not carry on her own family, but could only help her husband carry on his. As regarded her own, she was an end of the family—a twig without bud: *mulier est finis familiae*, said the Roman law. She also could not, as we have seen, own the kind of property in question—real estate. A son was needed to inherit both the estate and the name of his fathers. If, then, a man died without a son, but left a widow and also a brother from his own family (on his father's side), it was incumbent upon the brother to raise up from her a son to the deceased, and if he married her, the first son born to him had to be treated as the son of the deceased, that his name might not be cut off from among the living<sup>77</sup> and his estate be divided and merged into others. Another device, if he had a daughter, was for him to marry her off with the condition that he might adopt her eldest son.<sup>78</sup> Or if he were without hope of any children, he might adopt a son outright, preferably one of his near kindred. Fictions of this sort were an early invention. In some peoples, if the childlessness was due to the husband's impotence, even during his lifetime his brother, or another kinsman, was to beget a son for him from his wife.<sup>79</sup> If the impotence was his wife's, she was to be divorced, and the husband marry another. Divorce for adultery had a similar reason, because a wife so acting might impose on her husband a son not

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Seehoem, *op. cit.*, 109.

<sup>75</sup> Marriage was recognised by Aristotle not to be solely for child-rearing, but also for comfort, with division of labour, *Nich. Eth.*, VIII. xi. (or xiii.) 7; the husband being the provider (from without), the wife the conserver (within), *Polit.*, II. ii. (or iv.) 10, *Oeconom.*, I. iii. 4, cf. *Fragmenta* (Didot's ed.) no. 218, and Plato, *Meno*, 71E, 73A (giving the common view). More at length Xenophon *Oeconomicus*, s. 7, who also said that the husband was the earner and the wife the spender, c. 3.

<sup>76</sup> Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, 51. In India a son is called *putra* “because he delivers (*trayete*) his father from the hell called *Put*,” *Laws of Manu*, IX. 138, cf. 161. There “he only is a perfect man who consists (of three persons united), his wife, himself, and his offspring,” *ib.* 45. The Chinese also retain somewhat similar ideas still.

<sup>77</sup> E.g., *Deut.*, XXV. 5, cf. *Gen.*, XXXVIII: *Laws of Manu*, IX. 59, cf. 146, 190; also Gautama, *Institutes of the Sacred Law*, XVIII. 4-10. The principle was that the owner of the field in which another man plants his seed, owns the resultant fruit: *Laws of Manu*, IX. 41-4, 48-55. The widow was regarded as still belonging to the deceased husband till she released herself by performing this duty.

<sup>78</sup> In India the sonless father simply made his daughter “an appointed daughter” by saying to her husband “The male child born of her shall perform my funeral rites,” *Laws of Manu*, IX. 127; cf. Gautama, XXVIII. 18.

<sup>79</sup> Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, 53.

his own.<sup>80</sup> The device of adoption was sparingly used at first: but in time it came to be used also when only the wife was sterile and the husband was not willing to put her away, and at last when neither were, but when the wife did not desire the travail, or even when they already had a child, for some fraudulent purpose, the original reason of the institution being forgotten.<sup>81</sup> Like all human institutions, like marriage itself, it came to be abused.

In the long, early stages of this change from barbarism, in which women were the chief industrial factor, toward civilisation, in which men took the leadership, women, both for ensuring the perpetuation of male lines of descent, and for their domestic labours under male supervision, became more valuable to men; while, with advancing civilisation, when walled cities were founded, especially if of stone, by the labour of slaves, life becoming securer, the value of individual men to women diminished. Polygamy now came in; but as this could be practised only by the richest, and left the poorest unprovided for, wherever the spirit of democracy at all asserted itself, it was forbidden, and elsewhere it was but casually indulged in. The rising value of females attached also to daughters, and parents became unwilling to part with them without compensation. Thus the purchase of brides from the parents, as already remarked, became more or less prevalent; for the people were now too civilised to tolerate the stealing of them, and marriage with aliens was generally prohibited, although aliens might still be stolen for concubinage. The old stealing, it must be remembered, was of daughters from their male kindred. It is absurd to suppose, as is often done, that it was ever a practice among primitive peoples, and consequently of all our ancestors at some time, for men to knock women down and drag them off to their dens. Among no animals is there need for the male to apply force to the female, their attraction being mutual, and the only fighting being between the male rivals. If men ever stole women, they did not steal them from themselves,<sup>82</sup> but from other men. There are some degenerate and brutal tribes of savages to-day (near the end, rather than at the beginning, of any line of descent), among whom, women being scarce through maltreatment, unprovided bachelors or widowers, not being mean-spirited enough to put up with polyandry, have sometimes thus ravished them from their parents or husbands. But there is no

<sup>80</sup> The husband's intercourse with another (unmarried) woman was not adultery, and no corresponding reason existed why it should be complained of, provided he did not neglect his wife.

<sup>81</sup> As in the case of Clodius: cf. Cicero, *De Domo Sua*, XIII-XIV. 34-7.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Mrs. Gallichan, *The Position of Woman in Primitive Society*, 72, 84-5, 98; Mary Austin, *Love and the Soul Maker*, p. 90.

evidence for believing the practice ever to have been prevalent. Isolated instances of newly formed bands of men, like the early Romans, or men in peculiar circumstances, like the defeated Benjamites,<sup>83</sup> who lacked wives, raiding other tribes to appropriate theirs, prove nothing. The stealing of wives must have been either a temporary stage between the original promiscuity, or the laxness of the mother-age, and the regular institution of marriage, or an aberration from the latter, which it seems to presuppose, but in either case somewhat wide-spread, in some period of lawlessness, since traces of it are common in some atrophied ceremony of pretended seizure and resistance.<sup>84</sup> It and the system of purchase may have helped the comparison of women with chattels or with slaves. But even where the whip is introduced among the paraphernalia of the marriage ceremony, this may be the symbol, not so much of mastership, as of love, because of its use in sexual flagellation.<sup>85</sup> In all places and in all ages a clear distinction has been drawn between wives and slaves,<sup>86</sup> and where slavery existed the wives had their own hand-maidens.<sup>87</sup> Roman wives were in the legal status of daughters;<sup>88</sup> and Roman sons, during their father's lifetime, were in the same sort of subjection, all being in the power of the house-fathers — of the men who made Rome.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>83</sup> *Judges*, XXI. 6-14 and 15-23.

<sup>84</sup> Hence Grant Allen, though a scientist, showed himself only a fiction-writer when, in his novel *The Woman Who Did*, he treated marriage as "an ugly and barbaric form of serfdom," "based upon the primitive habit of felling the woman with a blow, stunning her by repeated strokes of the club or spear, and dragging her off by the hair of her head as a slave to her captor's hut or rock-shelter," p. 211. He apparently took for gospel truth Lubbock's generalisation of Oldfield's and Collins's accounts of the doings of some of the most degraded tribesmen in Australia: Lubbock's *Origin of Civilisation*, 73-4. Or he himself generalised the quotations from Turnbull and Grey about the same Australians, in McLennan's *Studies in Ancient History*, 58-60. Even about these McLennan says: "As an Australian woman is always betrothed after birth to some man of a different tribe or family stock from her own, a stolen or captured wife is always stolen or taken from a prior husband," 60. Or had he (Allen) been reading Vico, who in his *Scienza Nuova* generalised Homer's account of the Cyclopes (Milan ed., 1853, pp. 253, 256, 259, 268, cf. 132)? While he was about it, he might have cited the terrible plight of reluctant youths among the Ahitas, in the Philippines, where courting damsels are said to seize them by the hair and run away with them, according to J. W. Wheeler, *Primitive Marriage*, in Progress, 1885, p. 128.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Kraft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis*, 36, 197, 211. Among the Tartars whipping seems to have been regarded by the women themselves as a token of love, cf. Mrs. Atkinson's *Recollections of the Tartar Steppes*, p. 220.

<sup>86</sup> As e.g., by Aristotle, *Polit.* I. v. (or xii), I. Cf. Goldwin Smith, *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 226.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Sarah and Hagar.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. O. W. Holmes: "The woman a man loves is always his own daughter, far more his daughter than the female children born to him by the common law of life," *Elsie Venner*, ch. XX., vol. ii, p. 65.

<sup>89</sup> The term *pater* (father), common to Aryan languages, seems at one time to have had no sexual significance, but to have been a term of dominion. (See Fustel de Coulanges, *Cité antique*, 97-8. Others have connected it with *feeder* and *pastor*, and Pearson suggests its ultimate root to have been the idea of filling, which accounts for both senses, *Chances of Death*, ii. 204-8.) A man's wife was never called his daughter, though he was called her father: she was merely in the same position to him as were his daughters, that is, under his *manus* or dominion, as were his slaves, of whom he was the father, though they were not his children. A childless boy, at the death of his father, became the family-father, because he was then the family-master.

The power of the patriarch over his sons and daughters and wives was, in some places, nearly the same as over his slaves; but his exercise of it was everywhere different. He could not treat his wife as harshly as his slaves, because she had a family of male relatives, to whom she could on occasion appeal, and who would avenge any injury.<sup>90</sup> They would interest themselves also in her daughters if she did. If a wife was obtained by capture, she was little more than a slave; but she was a slave made into a wife, instead of a wife made into a slave. The purchase of a wife nominally gave the husband the same right over her her father had, but actually diminished by the father's and his brothers' or sons' continuing interest in her. Custom and law also protected her, giving her rights over against him, and often practically the rule in the household.<sup>91</sup> As for the sons, a punishment of a rebellious son was sometimes to sell him into slavery, and then he became a slave indeed.<sup>92</sup>

We see, then, that if men ever appropriated women and women's products, and oppressed them, as in fact men treated other men, yet, in the case of women, men also stood up as the defenders of their female relatives — first the maternal uncles and the brothers, then the fathers, and lastly the husbands. Upon the husbands the rights and duties ultimately devolved, the brothers having their own wives to protect, and these being the only contemporaries of the women who could completely execute the charge. It may be said there were two movements — an early one for men to appropriate women, and a later one for men to look after their welfare. Rather curiously, the time when men were hardest upon women, was the very age called "matriarchal"; and only under patriarchy did men become considerate. Reversely, however, it must be added, women were better able to defend themselves in the early period, and less so in the later. They were less able in the later, because they were oustripped in the industrialism which they had started. They remained so, till the industrialism ultimately weakened the men.<sup>92a</sup> Then, too,

<sup>90</sup> In return a woman might prefer her brother to her husband. Note the story of Intaphernes' wife, told by Herodotus, III. 119. She said she might get another husband (and other children too), but, her parents being dead, she could not get another brother. Cf. Sophocles, *Antigone*, 905-13.

<sup>91</sup> In fact, men have frequently complained that in marrying they gave up their liberty: e.g., in antiquity Anaxandrides, Alexis, and Hippothous, in Stobaeus, LXVIII.; cf. Menander, *ib.* LXX. 5.

<sup>92</sup> Among the Jews the father could not kill his rebellious son himself, but could get him executed by the judges, *Deut.* XXI. 18-21, cf. *Exod.* XXI. 15. But for killing one's slave, if an alien, the punishment was different from that for killing a free man, *Exod.* XXI. 20-1 and 12; and it was, probably, more so in practice than in precept. Elsewhere also a father had to give reason, and act formally, when he dis-inherited a son: cf. Plato, *Laws*, XI. 928D-929D.

<sup>92a</sup> This weakening and effeminating influence of industrialism was perceived by the

ultimately, the state came to the rescue of the women, freeing them from the protection of individual men, and making all individuals, nominally at least, independent. It is difficult, however, to straighten out this matter, because in a general survey of the ages we are dealing with an advance from cycle to cycle, and at the same time with advance from period to period within a cycle. From now on, we are to deal only with the latter changes within historic cycles. In these something like patriachism always exists in the ascending periods and always begins to break down in the culminating periods, to be followed by individualism and collectivism.

When, in a primitive stage of a healthy people, private property in land became established, most likely by the parcelling out of conquered territory among the victors,<sup>93</sup> it was given in succession only to sons. A very good and sufficient reason why it was not given to daughters, was that it was originally appropriated by men,<sup>94</sup> and still needed to be defended by men; wherefore women simply could not own because they could not possess land — that was altogether out of the question.<sup>95</sup> Thus among the ancient Arabs, for instance, land could be legally inherited only by warriors.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, the daughters would themselves marry and become mistresses of their husbands' households, and lieutenants in their absence; and therefore the daughters did not need real estate of their own. Religious ideas and the reformed clan-system added further reasons; for whereas formerly the man either joined the clan of his wife or remained outside, and in either case

Greeks, and was the reason why they disparaged it. See Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, c. 4. Cf. above, p. 34n.

<sup>93</sup> Prominent fighters would get domains of their own, while the people around them were still in the communal stage. Or the people would give them such a cut-off piece of land (*τέμενος*, cf. *Iliad*, VI. 194, IX. 578, XX. 184) as a reward for services and in expectation of protection; and such land became hereditary (*Iliad*, XX. 391). Just so, too, they gave plots in perpetuity to gods, on which their temples were built and of which the priests were the trustees and beneficiaries. The warriors thus endowed were the kinglets (*reguli*, *smaakonge*), about whom more will be said in a subsequent note. They would be the first to become patriarchal, and the people — the freemen among them — would only slowly follow suit, and never completely. There were innumerable such kinglets in Attica before Theseus united them: Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, 146, 147, quoting Pausanias, I. 31. These were the ancestors of the *eupatrids* (or *patricians*) who afterward congregated at Athens. So also in Latium and at Rome, where certain families preserved the tradition in the surname of Regulus. The barons of mediæval times were the corresponding phenomena in the modern cycle, on a larger scale, with more gradations of ranks. So also the country gentry in their manors; and even in some countries the yeomanry held their estates in the same way. *Smaakonge* of the older sort existed even recently in Norway: Pearson, *Chances of Death*, ii. 66.

<sup>94</sup> E.g., when the Jews divided the land of Canaan, which they had conquered, they distributed it to the men (really to the families, but to the men as at the head of these): *Numbers*, XXVI. 53ff., cf. I. 2.

<sup>95</sup> That the wife was skipped was merely the reverse of the earlier custom when the husband was skipped and the mother's property went to her children, and, in all probability, principally to her daughters. In fact, the mother's acquisitions are most suitable for her daughters, and the father's for his sons.

<sup>96</sup> "None can be heirs, who do not take part in battle, drive booty, and protect property," *Sura*, IV. viii, 26; quoted by Schaeffer, *op. cit.*, 28.

the children belonged to the clan of their mother, now the wife was taken into the husband's clan, or *gens*, and the children belonged to the father's clan and family. But the man's property, for military as well as for religious reasons, had to remain in the clan and in the family, and therefore it could not go to women, who left them. When there was no son, but only a daughter or daughters, special arrangements had to be made. At first the male next of kin seized the property, against whom then the daughter had only the rights of a sister. Later more consideration was shown to the daughter, provided she would marry one of her own family or clan, for then the whole property might go to her husband without alienating it from the clan. This made an exception to the rule of marrying outside the clan, or exogamy, and may have been a survival, or revival, of what perhaps was a more ancient custom of endogamy or marrying within the clan, or, at all events, of what took place under matronymy, when clanship went in the female line. This exception, however, was tolerated, and even enjoined, for this special purpose.<sup>97</sup> The property, it must be noted, went not so much to the daughter, as through her, and to her husband, or through her and her husband as guardians to her son, the father's grandson, who became his true successor.<sup>98</sup> The marriage of such an heiress with one of her father's kindred was not everywhere required; but generally marriage into another propertied family, in which the property of the deceased would be merged and lost, was shunned. Many a young man, either an uninheriting younger brother or of humble origin, or a stranger, acquired wealth (at least the disposal of it) and high position, by marrying an only daughter of a prominent man or chieftain.<sup>99</sup> Historical and individual instances are best known, in the middle ages, among royalty and the nobility, among whom the custom

97 *E.g.*, *Numbers*, XXXVI. 6-9, *cf.* XXVII. 8-11.

98 See Seeböhm, *op. cit.*, 23-7, using mostly the authority of Isaeus. A daughter married out of the clan even had to be divorced, to permit the marriage required. The daughter was not properly heiress, but *ἐπικληπός*, "one going with the estate."

99 See Pearson's interesting essay on *Ashiepattle: or Hans seeks his Luck*, in *Chances of Death*, ii. 50-91. The nursery tales therein reviewed certainly lead back to early conditions, but not necessarily, all of them, to the mother-age, because the princesses, by marrying whom the yokels gain their fortunes, often are brotherless. For an ancient tale of a similar sort, about the succession of a *smaakonig*, but with the marriage left out, see the story of Perdiccas in Macedonia, told by Herodotus, VIII. 137-8. More historical is his account of Gyges, who became king of Sardis, after murdering the king, upon marrying the king's widow, the queen, I. 7-13 (*cf.* Hamlet's uncle), and of Cyrus's father, who married the king's daughter, I. 91, 107; *cf.* also 109, 120. Yet, of course, this practice occurred also among matronymic peoples, as among the Lycians, whose king gave to Bellerophon his (the queen's) daughter in marriage and half his kingdom, *Iliad*, VI. 192-3. So Tydeus gained the king's daughter at Argos, XIV. 121. The Greek founder of Marseilles was chosen in marriage by the daughter of the king of the Sigobriges, who occupied the region, Justin, XLIII. 3. Aeneas won the daughter of king Latinus. Later at Rome Ancus Marcus was the son of a prior king's daughter, and Servius Tullius married the king's daughter, Livy, I. 32, 39.

has come down even into modern times ;<sup>1</sup> but it was prevalent also among the humbler classes, and many an apprentice succeeded to a mastership by marrying the master's brotherless daughter, this, in fact, being a guild regulation for the succession of the estate of a sonless master.

Such is the necessary system in the early days of civilisation — in the ascending period of a cycle, — necessitated by the roughness of men and the weakness of women. And it was a perfectly just state ; for the men had a right to give their own to whom they chose, and to regulate among themselves to whom alone they should give it. In some states they decided that they should give the real estate only to the eldest son, to prevent indefinite division, providing for the younger sons in other ways, though generally not so well as for the eldest, yet permitting them more liberty of self-determination. In others, as the Jews, they ordered that the eldest should get twice as large a share as the other sons.<sup>2</sup> Among Mohammedans, it is ordained that the sons get twice as much as the daughters.<sup>3</sup> Always it was taken for granted that the sons would have wives to support, and the daughters would marry and be supported. The women were supported by their husbands, who were required to keep their wives for life, or to return them to their male relatives. Concern was shown for the women in various ways, and customs and laws were established to protect them.<sup>4</sup> As for widows, if they did not inherit the property, those men who did had to provide for them<sup>5</sup> — of course not in idleness, for the women had to continue their household labours.

<sup>1</sup> E.g., William and Mary. Unfortunately there was in this period no sentiment in royalty and nobility against an heiress marrying an heir and the two fusing their estates in a common jointure upon their son. Sometimes this had good effect in uniting provinces that belonged together, as in the case of Castile and Aragon, of Brittany and France, of Scotland and England (all which, however, might have been effected otherwise); but it caused great and useless evil in uniting distant and unrelated countries, as in the case of Aquitaine and England, Flanders and Burgundy and ultimately Spain, etc.

<sup>2</sup> *Deuteronomy*, XXI. 27.

<sup>3</sup> *Koran*, IV. 10 (or 12), cf. 175. (Now the Young Turks are trying to abrogate it.) Before Mohammed, among the Arabs, women, as we have seen, could not inherit; but already that was being circumvented by donations in the father's or husband's lifetime. This law of descent had anciently been in force in the laws of Gortyn (in Crete); cf. *Strabo*, X. 482.

<sup>4</sup> E.g., in Thurius, in Magna Graecia, when the law permitting those who divorced, whether man or woman, to marry whomsoever they pleased, was altered at the instance of a man, so that a woman should not be permitted to marry a man younger than the husband she had divorced, the same rule was made that a man should not be permitted to marry a younger woman than the wife he had divorced, obviously to guard a worn-out wife from being supplanted by a fresher beauty (*Diodorus*, XII. 18, 1-2). In India an invalid wife who had been virtuous in her conduct could not be superseded without her own consent, *Laws of Manu*, IX. 82. The Chinese forbid a man on becoming rich to divorce a wife married when he was poor. In view of some notorious cases among our own *nouveaux riches*, it might not be amiss to enact such a law in our country.

<sup>5</sup> In early Greek the same word (*χηρωταί*) was used for guardians of a widow and her husband's kindred.

All these institutions are to be judged by whether they work well or ill. Yet the women could by no means be left entirely out of the economic scheme. They had their own personal property, and besides it still remained that when the men were away on military expeditions, or repelling attacks on the borders, the women had to be left in control of the homesteads. In some places, through polygamy, the women could not be so trusted, and the duty had to be confided to some male head-slaves or stewards. This only weakened the tribe or nation where it occurred. Those tribes or nations were strongest where women could be trusted. But the trust was only temporary, and under supervision upon the husband's return. At all events, it was only the civilisations in which the males inherited the real estate, that have grown up to maturity.<sup>6</sup> Then, on their reaching a stage of security in property-ownership, guaranteed by the well-ordered state, and well measured by the money-system, women could possess and own land safely and satisfactorily to themselves. Thereupon they have generally very soon got it; and not very long thereafter the civilisations have found themselves on the road to decline; for the countries in which much of the property is given over into the hands of women are universally weakened thereby.<sup>7</sup> There are tribes in Polynesia and on the coast of Malabar where the father's property is even turned over to the infant son immediately upon birth, thereafter the father being only trustee of it for his son.<sup>8</sup> Such an arrangement is perfectly feasible, but only in a small society; for if it were introduced in a large nation, that nation would soon become a small one. There are societies, too, in which the father takes the name of his first child. But these are petty tribes hidden away in the hills of India. It is evident that

<sup>6</sup> Rome, in its historical period, seems an exception; for we are told that in its jurisprudence property was divided equally between all the children without regard to age or sex. But the daughters (and even to some extent the younger sons) remained under the tutelage of their (elder brother or) brothers, the *patria potestas* descending only to males. This power over their actions was a power also over their property. Estates therefore often remained undivided. The daughters who were married off in the lifetime of their father, under the old religious ceremony, received a dower and passed into the family of the husband and out of the family of the father, and at his death received no further share in his family estate. (*Cf.* Fustel de Coulanges, *Cité antique*, 78-81.) Probably the sisters who were married off by their brother, also could not take anything but personal property with them, at least in early times. Perhaps among the plebes equal division had always been the practice. But it was only gradually that it became the practice among the patricians, along with their adoption of the plebeian form of marriage. Yet, as this process was completed before the Roman law was codified, the rule of equal division shows in the Roman code.

<sup>7</sup> If Egypt lasted long with a semi mother-right system, suppressed and re-arising, it was, as we have seen, because of its isolation. But when distant nations, with father-right, grew strong enough to reach it, it fell almost at once, and forever, into subjection.

<sup>8</sup> It is supposed to have originated as a device to get around a primitive custom of a man's property being divided, at his death, among his fellow clansmen: R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, 63; W. Logan, *Malabar*, i. 154.

no peoples could amount to much in which the men so effaced themselves.<sup>9</sup>

During the rising periods of civilisation, men guiding its advance, as a consequence of the ever increasing prominence of men even in the industrial domain, men-slaves becoming freemen and continuing their industrial habits, and forming a growing middle class, the value of women to men decreased, and men ceased to purchase them, more refined ideas also contributing to this result. Or the purchase-money was still given, but was demanded back in the form of a dower to the bride, or it was given to her directly by the groom, who gave it sometimes only after proof of her virginity, hence on the morning after the wedding; whence in German the name of "Morgengabe."<sup>10</sup> The depreciation continuing, women becoming less useful, and especially the young ones being a drag upon the father of the family, the practice went over for the father himself to give the dower, as an inducement to a young man to take his daughter off his hands. To place her in marriage was the one way of providing for her. At first the dower went practically into the hands of the husband. But as security became better, and the daughter could be protected also by the state, the father demanded that the dower should at least be preserved for his daughter's benefit. The husband might have the usufruct of it, provided he kept the capital intact. The wife virtually remained the owner; or if he was regarded as the owner, she had a mortgage on it. Then at his death it reverted to her, as also in case of divorce; and if she died without offspring, it reverted to her family. But the rest of the man's property was his own, to do with as he pleased within the range the law or custom of his country allowed.<sup>11</sup> Throughout these periods of developing, but not yet fully developed, civilisation, the lot of woman was hard unless she had an individual male protector — a father while young, a husband in middle age, a son when old. It was her father's duty, therefore, before he died, and his son's afterward, to provide her with a protector, in a husband, who would be preferable to any other kind of guardian. Thus,

<sup>9</sup> Sometimes, however, even in patriarchal peoples a man would call himself the father of a son to indicate that he had established his line of descent. So Odysseus twice in the *Iliad* (II. 260, IV. 354) refers to himself as the father of Telemachus. "Immediately after the birth of his first-born son," says one of the *Laws of Manu* (IX. 106), "a man is [called] the father of a son, and is freed from the debt to the *manes* [of his ancestors]."

<sup>10</sup> To guard against the bridegroom making a pretext of the bride's condition to avoid payment, the Jewish parents preserved "tokens of virginity" (or tokens at least of the daughter's not being pregnant); otherwise the bridegroom's assertion would pass: *Deuteronomy*, XXII. 13-21.

<sup>11</sup> Generally his patrimonial estate had to go according to law; but in every people, probably, what he himself acquired he could dispose of at pleasure: so, for instance, the *Laws of Manu*, IX. 209.

in addition to the economic reasons already noticed, the father's growing recognition of this duty contributed to the change from his retaining his daughters unless bought, to his providing them with dowers. He still stipulated, and the law and custom required, that the husband should support and protect the wife, to the best of his ability, to the end of her days; for which, in return, allegiance and obedience were promised. In peoples struggling for their existence amidst other peoples, it would have gone hard with any one people if it had permitted the internal disorders which would have ensued if husbands and wives had been allowed to discard each other at will, and the consequent want of training and discipline on the part of the children. Every people that has risen to any great prominence has, while rising, guarded the family and the home, generally throwing over them a religious sanction. Men married for the perpetuation of the race, and put a yoke upon their shoulders for their country's sake. Marriage was no longer a matter of feeling: it had a more important purpose than to give pleasure. It was the institution by which the family (*oikia, domus*) was held together and perpetuated.<sup>12</sup> It became formal, and was well regulated by tribal custom, and later by state law. Registry of births was kept, and kinship was traced to the eighth degree (or up and down through four generations), and for some purposes descent was observed even to the ninth generation.<sup>13</sup> At birth, sons, to be recognised, had to be ceremoniously accepted by the father; and, on coming of age, they were ceremoniously introduced to their fellow clansmen and tribesmen, and then became citizens, warriors, and heirs of the family property, and assumed the family duties — to marry, to avenge injury to their fellows, and after their father's death to portion off their unmarried sisters.<sup>14</sup> Illegitimate sons did not count, because their mother had not been received into the father's family,<sup>15</sup> nor could the man be sure of their paternity. They took no part in the worship of the ancestors, and had no right of inheritance. They belonged to the mother only: for them "mother-right" continued. In default of a legitimate son, if there was a daughter, a kinsman, probably one who did not inherit a hearth of his own, chosen as son-in-law, was to take the son's place, till a grandson was reared up. In default of a legitimate child, either the other devices were resorted to, or the family became extinct,

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, 52.

<sup>13</sup> Seeböhm, *op. cit.*, 48–55, 67–70.

<sup>14</sup> At Athens a son could marry his half-sister by a different mother, so that both might enjoy the father's estate fully: McLennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, 275–6, from the *Leges Atticae*. This was probably a survival from matronymy, when they were not regarded as related.

<sup>15</sup> Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, 51–2.

and its property went to collateral heirs, to the great grief of the last of the line.<sup>16</sup>

These were the customs of the patriarchal conquering races. The matronymical conquered races were allowed to continue their old laxness.<sup>17</sup> The lower classes could marry for pleasure: the upper classes had to observe considerations of duty. The patriarchal system is, in fact, an oligarchical one, unworkable throughout the mass of the people, at all events after society has developed beyond the simplicity of the pastoral or early communal agricultural stage. In itself it contains an inherent flaw. For it implies that every father of a family shall have one son to continue his name and inherit his estate, and one daughter to be married off to a neighbour's son, in return for a daughter received from a neighbour in marriage to the son. In the male line, one son is enough, all others are a superfluity. The eldest is begotten to fulfil a duty, the rest for love.<sup>18</sup> To divide the estate among them would soon dissipate it, and impair the power of defence. Moreover, the homestead, with the tombs of the ancestors, did not admit of division. For these reasons the eldest son was given all the property, or at least all the authority; and to him came the family seat. In fact, many ancient states were ordered on the principle that they were composed of a fixed number of families, each with its own indivisible and inalienable landed estate, which was handed on from generation to generation.<sup>19</sup> Consequently all other sons and daughters but the eldest constituted a problem. Yet other sons and daughters are a necessity; for nature is not kind enough to furnish every married couple with just one son and one daughter, and if every couple contented themselves with two children, one might die. Before a son is born, several daughters may come; before a daughter, several sons. Nor would it be safe to employ infanticide and to stop at a first son and daughter, for the same reason that one of them might die. For security several are needed. But these, if they survive, are in the way; for if they receive a share in the landed estate, this must ultimately dwindle to practically nothing, and if they do not, how are they to be provided for? In the rising period, if there are conquests of other countries, they may be married and sent off to settle there, receiving lots in the new territory. But when conquests come to

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Iliad*, V. 152-8.

<sup>17</sup> Note to-day in our southern States, how negroes and negresses are allowed frequently to remarry without the formality of divorce, the whites not bothering to enforce with regard to them the laws against bigamy.

<sup>18</sup> So said one of the *Laws of Manu*, IX. 107.

<sup>19</sup> So in Greece, Fustel de Coulanges, 73. Plato wished to establish, in his ideal state, a fixed number of propertied citizens (not inhabitants), which number was never to be augmented by division or diminished by amalgamation, *Laws*, V. 740 B, XI. 929 A, cf. *Republic*, IV. 423 C and V. 460 A.

an end, they must, if they are to remain patricians, remain unmarried (and have intercourse with women only for pleasure); or if they want to marry, they must go into trade, and cease to be patricians. Such difficulties have confronted all patriarchal peoples, and have been variously met, but never with complete success.<sup>20</sup> Without primogeniture of some sort the system must come to an end, and with primogeniture of any sort the lot of the younger sons and daughters is put in invidious comparison with that of the eldest. For a time the younger sons may be willing to put up with their subordinate position; but in time, as the number of them and their descendants grow large, they will no longer consent, and will demand equality with their elders. Patriarchal marriage thus always in the course of time comes to require, if it had not in the beginning, other forms of marriage to accompany it, and it must ultimately give way to them; for, as the younger sons cannot be elevated to the position of the eldest, the eldest must be pulled down to theirs. By now mobile wealth is becoming as important as the immobile, and also the eldest sons desire to participate in it. Patriarchal marriage is aristocratic: the plutocratic period has always destroyed it.

And there is another reason why the eldest sons should be willing. Patriarchal marriage, as we have seen, is rigorous, and its yoke upon the upper classes becomes irksome. For a time, however, it would be continued, with a growing consciousness of rebellion. The sentiment of a people at this stage of development was voiced by Metellus, when, in trying to pass a law, for backing up a decaying custom, to compel all men to marry (for he lived near the end of Rome's ascending period, and was himself a bit old-fashioned), he said: "If we could exist without a wife, we all would dispense with this inconvenience; but as nature has so ordained that it is impossible to live comfortably with one, and without one not at all, we must consult the perpetual safety rather than our brief pleasure."<sup>21</sup> So already in Greece Philemon

<sup>20</sup> The Tibetans let the younger brothers become sub-husbands of the elder brother's wife, and practised infanticide upon the surplus daughters. The Hindoo eldest son, who inherited, was enjoined by Manu (IX, 108) to behave as a father to his younger brothers. In England, where the economic principle has come to prevail over the religious, the younger sons are "placed" in the church and in the army, or are married to rich heiresses, or else are frankly permitted to go into business themselves and sink into the middle class. Among the Basques there is a mixture of patriarchy with a feature survived from the matronymic stage. For among them the indivisible and inalienable estate goes to the eldest child of either sex, and an eldest son inheriting an estate has to marry a younger daughter from some other family, and an eldest daughter inheriting an estate has to marry a younger son from some other family. But all the other children are supposed to remain unmarried, unless an eldest one dies childless, or unless there is room for them as labourers, or unless they emigrate. See Simcox, *Primitive Civilisations*, i. 213, 461. In fact, an outside region is necessary as a safety-valve for such well-knit arrangements. Truly patriarchal peoples have always been the greatest colonisers.

<sup>21</sup> In Aulus Gellius's *Noctes Atticae*, I. 6.

and Menander had called marriage "a necessary evil."<sup>22</sup> There would be hankering after the freedom and individualism of the lower classes. The duty of looking after the interests of the race would gradually be superseded by a new kind of duty, taught in a new morality, a morality of sentiment, not to impede the happiness of others. If one still thought it a duty to conduct his life in the old way, one might doubt his duty to prevent others from seeking their happiness in the new way; and so one might let his sons marry or not as they pleased and whom they selected; and a father's affection for his daughters would lead to the giving to them of their share of his property outright, to do with as they pleased, just as in the case of the sons, so that they too might marry or not as they pleased and whom they selected; for by now the perfectionment of the state gives sufficient protection to women, and they no longer need individual male protectors.<sup>22a</sup> And so in time it comes about that the sons take to themselves wives or not as their fathers had taken to themselves concubines or not — for pleasure, and with little view to procreation, which becomes secondary and is often omitted altogether; while the daughters dispose of themselves, and like their fathers' concubines have other lovers. Marriage reverts from a human institution toward an animal state, or from a man's institution toward a woman's want of institution. Marrying, divorcing, and remarrying, with the aid of free love thrown in, degenerates almost into promiscuity. And rich men seeking rich women to consort with, and rich women rich men, property accumulates; and through their having few children to divide it among, frequently only one, it is concentrated still more into fewer and fewer hands. Individualism with regard to property runs with individualism with regard to marriage. Both old families and old estates are disintegrated; the state becomes a mass of individuals equal before the law, and freed from custom, some of whom amass fortunes, which pass from men to women and from women to men according to erotic or emotional attachments.

Such was the course of things in Greece, when the old order came to its close at the time of the repulse of the Persian invasion.<sup>23</sup> Not only the old religious regulative ideas gradually fell into disrepute, under the questioning of the philosophers, but the physiological theory at their base, about the supremacy of the male in the transmission of life, began to be doubted, and we have for

<sup>22</sup> In Stobæus's *Florilegium*, LXVIII. 3, LXIX. 10. With Metellus, *cf.* also Sussario, *ib.* LXIX. 2.

<sup>22a</sup> *Cf.* above, i. pp. 23-4.

<sup>23</sup> The significance of Callias's conduct, noted above, i. p. 112n., may now be understood.

a beginning the philosophers' and the physicians' modified theories on the subject. The old families dying out, the new men who came to the front, having no record of their ancestry, cared little for their line of descent, and left their property to their daughters as well as to their sons, or, having none, to others. The families ceased to be the units in the state, and individuals, indifferently male or female, took their place.<sup>24</sup> Property went to individuals; duties did not, which were replaced by humanitarian promptings, as sentiment happened to suggest. In Rome the course of the change was better prepared. There, as is well known, existed from of old three kinds of marriage:—a venerable religious one, irrevocable, practised by the patricians; a mere purchase of the wife, easily rescinded, though at a loss, practised by the rich; and among the poor a mere cohabitation (probably a survival of the primitive promiscuity), which, when not broken within the year, gave marital rights to the husband, but, when broken by the wife absenting herself for three nights, left both parties free. When it is said it was several hundred years after the founding of Rome before any Roman divorced his wife, the first case being that of Spurius Carvilius Ruga about 231 B. C.,<sup>25</sup> this can properly refer only to the patricians. Upon the extinction of the republic, the old ideas of duty and obligation being worn out and the common yoke (*conjugium*) repellent, only companionship of bed and board was desired—only voluntary friendship between the parties; and the last-mentioned of the three became the form of marriage employed by almost everybody but certain priests, and the breaking of it was so common that the formality of doing so became superfluous. The old view of relationship by agnation (on the father's side only) was slowly abandoned, and relationship by cognation (on the mother's side as well) came to be recognised prevalently, as had also been the case in Greece.<sup>26</sup> Toward the end of Rome's ascending period, the Voconian law had been passed to stem the growing practise, unknown to the old custom, of men giving real estate to women; but it was incomplete and was easily circumvented. Then the husband and wife became independent of each other, and if she had inherited property from her family, she retained full possession of it (under a lenient

<sup>24</sup> Plato's attitude is significant. Within little over a century after Callias he would have liked to revive some of the earlier customs which looked to the interest of the state rather than to the comfort and convenience of individuals; but on proposing them in his *Laws* (in which he gave up the new communism of his *Republic*, and reverted to the old communism of the communes), he had to be apologetic toward individuals, and temper the harshness of the old laws by providing means for discriminating in particular cases, XI. 923 B, 924 D, 925 D-926 D.

<sup>25</sup> Aulus Gellius, IV. 3, XVII. 21 (44); Valerius Maximus, II. i. § 4.

<sup>26</sup> Note that Plato admitted the wife's relatives, and females as well as males, into the family council, *Laws*, XI. 929 B-C.

guardian from her own family), as he of his, with only this restriction, that neither could make a donation to the other; and divorce was easy at the desire of either. This freedom produced so many irregularities of conduct, destroying domesticity, and impeding the procreation of children, that, although the Roman empire was too large and strong to be immediately deranged, it contributed powerfully, as we have seen, to the gradual decay of society.<sup>27</sup> Against it the Christians revolted, and when the empire was overthrown by the Germans, and its highly developed government destroyed, they reverted to the primitive religious institutions of those semi-barbarians, which agreed with many of the marriage customs and laws of the ancient Jews that were preserved in the Old Testament and repeated in the New, but were stricter with regard to divorce,<sup>28</sup> though not yet quite so patriarchal.<sup>29</sup> With these more primitive and healthier ideas prevailing, the religious treatment of marriage extending even to the lower classes, the modern cycle began. In the disturbed state of the times women again could hardly own land, although brotherless daughters could again, as before, be the "conduit"<sup>30</sup> of it; and all daughters were in the power, or under the tutelage, of their male relatives and husbands, and under their protection, needing it, as there was no state organisation with power sufficient to protest them. The old course of things was again to be run through.

In the Latin lands, however, some traces of the late Roman

<sup>27</sup> Our feminists must of course deny this. Accordingly Ellis in his *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, approvingly quoted in W. E. Carson's *The Marriage Revolt*, 269, writes that the contractual nature of late Roman marriage and its easy dissolution had not "any evil effects either on the happiness or the morals of Roman women"—a bold and bald dogmatic asseveration, going against all the evidence. He continues: "Such a system is obviously more in harmony with modern civilised feeling [he means present-day feminist feeling!] than any system that has been set up in Christendom. It is interesting to note that this enlightened [= feminist] conception of marriage prevailed in the greatest and most masterful empire which has ever dominated the world, at the period of its fullest development"—of its culminating and declining periods, he should have said. That Christendom is now running the same course, does not augur any too well for Christendom.

<sup>28</sup> It may be noted that in *Genesis* the matriarchal precept given to man (in II. 24) that he should leave his father and mother and cleave unto his wife, becoming with her one flesh, is reported as the status of things in Eden, and precedes the patriarchal injunction (in III. 16) to woman as a penalty, upon the expulsion from Eden, that her desire should be unto her husband, and he should rule over his wife. Jesus reverted to the first of these, and took their becoming one flesh as if it meant that God had united them, although this is not apparent, and is no more applicable to marriage than to other sexual unions, (cf. *I. Cor.*, VI. 16), nor to mankind than to animals; therefore, contrary to Moses, he forbade divorce (*Matt.*, XIX. 5-6, *Mark*, X. 7-9). Paul also quoted it, but drew from it rather the injunction that a man should love his wife as himself (*Ephes.*, V. 28-33); and elsewhere (as here also in vv. 22 and 24) he gives the patriarchal precept that the wife should be subject to her husband (*Colossians*, III. 18).

<sup>29</sup> The Germans still had some traces of the mother-age, which were crushed out not many centuries ago in the crushing out of witchcraft: see Pearson, *Ethic of Free-thought*, 395, *Chances of Death*, ii. 15-18.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Pearson, *Chances of Death*, ii. 8, 52.

laws remained,<sup>31</sup> and upon the fuller revival of those laws in the twelfth and succeeding centuries, wives there early, and almost prematurely, acquired the right of owning property independent of their husbands,— and in some countries, as we have seen, were allowed to vote vicariously through their husbands or other male relatives whom they designated. Yet even so, it was mostly merely through the brotherless daughter that the property went, first to her husband, and then to her son, although generally her father's position, at least if a high one, would go through her only to her son.<sup>32</sup> Still to-day such are the conditions obtaining in the families of royalty, and in gradually lessening degree down through the successive ranks of the nobility. Among these, marriage is still something else besides a matter of pleasure; and pleasure, if not incidentally attained in it, has to be sought outside. In Germany, in many parts, even the better class of peasants had their family and their property organised on the primogeniture plan, which preserved continuity in a single line of descent; but French ideas since the revolution, and under the extension of industrialism, have been making inroads in the old customs,<sup>33</sup> while the burgher class is fast abandoning the old traditions. In England the civil law penetrated least, and in her common law the old Germanic (and Jewish) traditions were retained the longest, while her statute law permitting entail has preserved the continuity of estates in families. Nowhere else has the problem of the younger sons and the daughters been so well managed by the aristocracy as in England; but there, too, the indissoluble marriage tie of the patriarchal *paterfamilias* system has had to give way somewhat to the bourgeois demand of the plutocrats for a laxer system. The Roman civil laws penetrated even there, to a small extent at least, though mostly in the earlier form and spirit. Thus even there, and by transmission to us in

<sup>31</sup> There, where the old *patria potestas* was decayed, the Christians had no experience of the continual submission of a woman to some man. Parental authority they confined to young children, and left the unmarried adult woman, especially if her father were dead, as free as they knew her in the late Roman jurisprudence, while they to some extent re-subjected her, when married, to her husband's dominion. This produced a discrepancy in the relations of women to men (one which the Christians did not mind because of their preference for celibacy) which could finally (when that preference died out) be got rid of only by bringing the married woman out into the same freedom with the unmarried. In the north, especially in Scandinavia, this discrepancy did not exist (probably because of the survival there of the pristine condition), and there all women remained in a perpetual minority — in Sweden till within a few decades ago.

<sup>32</sup> Thus Albert did not become king of England, but received only the honorary title of Prince Consort.

<sup>33</sup> W. H. Riehl in his work *Die Familie* (pp. 231-4 of the 12th ed.), describing this state of family unity and continuity, obtained by primogeniture, as it still existed in Northwestern Germany, treated it as typically "German," and contrasted it with the new "French" conditions in Westphalia, where property was divided equally among all the children, and the family broken up, only individuals being considered. The distinction, of course, is the old and general one between a less advanced and a more (often too) advanced social condition.

America, some compensating privileges were accorded to the wives, such as exemption from responsibility for certain acts, and possession of a claim upon the husband for support, even after divorce, if for his fault, in the shape of alimony. Some absurdities, however, occurred through misunderstanding the old principles. Thus we have seen that the property passed through the daughter and also through her husband to the grandson, and to a different grandson from the one to whom the daughter's husband's property, if he had any, descended. The daughter's husband did not own it outright: he could not, for instance, sell it. But in the modern cycle such limited ownership was discarded. The daughter's father's property (save real estate, or unless an ante-nuptial arrangement was agreed upon) passed in full ownership to his son-in-law, who could sell it and thus disinherit the grandson, thereby defeating the whole purpose of the regulation; or if he preserved it, he combined it with his own, and the whole went to his heir. Also, if the daughter did not marry, the property remained hers; but in the ancient system the daughter had to marry in order that she might have a wife's and mother's interest in it. The modern system put a premium on the unmarried state for the woman, making the unmarried woman almost independent, but subjecting her when married. It also gave the idea that *her* property was forcibly taken from her and handed over to her husband; which did not exist in the original system, in which the property never was hers and never was fully her husband's. No wonder the modern system has gone by the boards more completely than did the ancient.

Now in all civilised countries the present age has reached the position where woman's function is recognised. The true doctrine that the mother performs equally with the father the transmission of life, is now firmly established.<sup>34</sup> Relationship by cognation has definitively supplanted the confinement of relationship to agnation. For it is known that, physiologically, the female inherits, and transmits the inheritance of, qualities as well as does the male. Economically, now too, in most countries, at least for the mass of the people, the female is permitted to inherit, and to transmit the inheritance of, property. The family can no more be a single line continuing on in agnatic succession from father to son: it is only a temporary state, like the natural, of our animal forebears, bifurcated above, and with indefinite division and cross-unions below. Patriarchy in its old extrav-

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Mrs. Jacobi, "Common Sense" applied to Woman Suffrage, 33. Harvey's *omne animal ex ovo* dates only from 1651, and Loewenhoek discovered spermatozoa in 1677; but it was really not till 1827 that the full theory was established by Von Baer.

gant form is dead — at least for the remainder of our cycle. Yet patriarchy did not rest only on the old wrong physiological theory: on that rested its extravagance. It rested also on actual physiological conditions that render the economic conditions different. Men and women can no more be made absolutely equal in the married state, than they can be in any other state. Yet this is now the feminist ideal, with inclination, when equilibrium cannot be maintained, in favour of the women.

Our modern cycle has gone so far as even, in some regions, to make this inclination already. The state has been so perfected that women are protected by it rather than by their male relatives; wherefore they no longer need male guardians, apart from their husbands at least, and this institution, for all but infants, has been abolished.<sup>35</sup> Also they can now support themselves, with the necessaries at least; wherefore it has become less necessary for fathers to provide for their daughters. Consequently, in the most advanced countries, fathers have begun to lessen and even to decline the dowering of their daughters at marriage, though instead they generally bequeath them property equally with their sons and whether they be married or not. Economic conditions are concurrently becoming easier for men: men can support a wife more easily. Hence they are willing to take a wife without dowry, content if there be prospect of an inheritance. In this change the Americans have been pioneers; for conditions here were so favourable both to men and to women, and the latter were so much less numerous, which made them yet more valuable, that very early, in the colonial stage, men, needing help-mates, took wives gratuitously, without thought of dowry or of bequest,<sup>36</sup> to share their fortunes with them, the need for them being both for their work in the home and for their production of children, who were also needed.<sup>37</sup> To-day, how-

<sup>35</sup> In every country before it was abolished for grown-up unmarried women (this was done only recently in Sweden) it was an irksome institution, restraining the woman's liberty, and serving no purpose. But in denouncing it, agitators often committed the mistake of supposing it had always been a hardship — an instance of man's intentional oppression of woman. Originally, however, it had been designed for the protection of women. The same course was run in antiquity; for, although guardianship of women was not actually abolished, it came before the end to be merely nominal.

<sup>36</sup> They sometimes even bought them, from those who had been to the expense of importing indentured female servants.

<sup>37</sup> Our feminists now often say that our forefathers worked their wives to death. This idea is based on the fact that in some New England churchyards old gravestones are found on which is recorded that the deceased had two, three, or four wives. It is overlooked that that condition could have been common only if there were more women than men, whereas it is known that there were fewer women than men. It is overlooked, further, that the widowers might have married widows, and that as many women, if they had recorded their husbands on their gravestones, might have recorded as many; which they did not commonly do, because it was commonly the man, or his estate, that provided the grave. In those days few women remained long unmarried, nor did any men if they could help themselves — such as clergymen especially, who then were the cocks of the walk.

ever, even here, under the stress of a rapidly rising standard of living, attention is reverting, if not to the dowry, at least to the prospective or accomplished inheritance, while economy is effected in children. But meanwhile, so anxious were the law-makers, not so much for husbands for their daughters, as for wives for their sons, that they extended the right which wives previously had over their dowry (the right which forbade the husband to alienate it) even to the husband's real estate, voluntarily restricting his right to alienate it without his wife's consent, although they put no such restriction upon the wife's power of alienating her own property; continued to give the wife a lien upon one-third of her husband's real property at his death, without putting any corresponding lien upon the wife's property in the husband's behalf;<sup>38</sup> and freed her from all prior legal disabilities, and practically disallowed the duty of obedience, in return for support, except at her convenience. For a husband is still under obligation to support his wife, even though the wife be richer than the husband, and his property can be seized to pay her debts, while hers must be left untouched even to pay her own debts, much less to pay his, even though she be rich and healthy and he be poor and sickly, and if he be dying, she need not come to his assistance. Even after divorce she may marry a richer man than her former husband, and yet she retains her annual alimony from him, thus being supported by two husbands in addition to what she may have inherited from her father. During marriage, the husband cannot compel his wife to follow him if his business requires change of residence; and while she absents herself from him against his will, thus breaking her vow (if she made it) of obedience, he must observe his vow of fidelity (even if he did not make one) or incur the risk of being divorced for neglect and charged with alimony. Here, too, in practise, divorce is obtained more readily by the woman than by the man, — and in fact is more sought by women than by men, two divorces being initiated by the wife to one by the husband. For breach of promise, also, a woman may get damages from a man, but it is impossible for a man to get damages from a woman — and no man wants to. On the other hand, dishonest men find some compensation in these arrangements; for if such a one can trust his wife as an accomplice, he may make over to her (for our law is different from the Roman) his property, and thereby escape all claims of his creditors. The practise has been extend-

<sup>38</sup> The widower's right of courtesy to his deceased wife's property during the remainder of his life is contingent upon the birth of a child and the wife's intestacy.

ing, and wives are becoming more and more like safety-vaults for the custody of stolen goods.

England has lagged behind somewhat in this "progress," though not very far,<sup>39</sup> and rather in the denunciations indulged in by the suffragettes, who, impatient of a few instances of abuse, overlook the recent changes. There the husband still has the right to chastise his wife moderately, with a switch. Some other laws and customs, until modified of late, were unduly harsh, such as the giving sole ownership of the children to the husband, even though he were not their sole supporter, or even not their supporter at all. One, altered in 1870, though not always observed, is especially inconsistent with the first principle of marriage. This was the law giving a husband control of his wife's earnings. The husband owes support, in return for which he has a right to demand his wife's care of the children and of the home. But if he cannot support her, he has failed to do his share of the bargain, and if she is called upon to help him out, she is entitled to his position of mastership to the extent that she does so. In Burmah a woman can get a divorce if her husband does not support her properly. This is the true position, because he has failed to come up to his part in the marital relationship, just as among all peoples, in the early stage of civilisation, the husband could divorce his wife if she did not bear him a son; which is the correlative of that. If we do not go so far, we ought at least to let the woman be emancipated from the man's rule to the extent that she plays the man's part; as also the man should be freed from his obligation to his wife if she does not perform the wife's part. She, therefore, has as good a right to her earnings as he has to his—in fact, a better, as hers are unpledged, while his are pledged. It is a wrong condition, also, but not confined to England to-day, when the women work in the mills all day with the men and then in addition have to do alone all the housework at home.<sup>40</sup> Women should do the housework, unaided, only if they do not do, or not do as much, outside work.<sup>41</sup>

Our country has not these defects, except the last (which is a matter of custom, not of law),—at least, most of our States have abolished them. Here, on the contrary, women have the most privileged position the world has ever seen. In view of this fact it can hardly be seriously maintained that our marriage

<sup>39</sup> For the legal privileges of Englishwomen, see Bax's works, especially the second, cited above, p. 3n.

<sup>40</sup> As objected to by Annie Kenney; see E. S. Pankhurst's *The Suffragette*, 22.

<sup>41</sup> But for the difficulty of remedying this evil under present conditions see John Martin, *Feminism*, New York, 1916, pp. 50-1. The old preventive would be to keep the wife working at home. The new remedy is for the couple to board out or live in a co-operative caravansary.

laws are made by men for men's own selfish purposes. Such an accusation is not true even of marriage laws anywhere on the whole, although it may lie against some details; and yet even these, in most cases, are merely laws which, adapted to one set of conditions, have remained after the conditions have changed. For the institution of marriage, as we have seen, was originally made by men for the benefit of the race, when men found themselves in the spiritual and economic lead. Then they organised themselves as protectors of their children, including their daughters, and of their wives, even of their mothers.<sup>42</sup> It may be that originally, under a mistaken theory of generation, the institution of marriage was bent too much in favour of men; but that is not a reason why now it should be bent too much in favour of women or be unbent altogether. Physiological and economic facts of nature still remain, which require men to keep the leadership.

Yet even in America our women are not content, nor would the English feminists be with our laws. They complain that in spite of laws respecting their equal rights, they still are in a subordinate position, in subjection, in dependence. Sentiment is involved: they resent being owned, although ownership has many degrees, and they in return own their husbands — either being "the other's mine";<sup>43</sup> and even a benefit such as the husband's liability to pay damages for their trespasses, they treat as if it still put them on the level of "his slaves or his cattle."<sup>44</sup> The comparison with slavery would seem to be too far-fetched; yet it is frequently indulged in.<sup>45</sup> From subjection, they allege, the only

<sup>42</sup> "It was," says Mrs. H. B. Stowe, "because woman is helpless and weak, and because Christ was her great Protector, that he made the law of marriage irrevocable," *Pink and White Tyranny*, 320. This is true of legislators in general. Mrs. Stowe herself says "men were born and organised by nature to be the protectors of women," 295. "Marriage," says Goldwin Smith, "may be described, from one point of view, as a restraint imposed upon the passions of the man for the benefit of the woman," *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 108. "Matrimony, in all ages," says Mason, "is an effort to secure to the child the authenticity of the father," *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, 213, cf. 282. "Marriage," says Saleeby, "is of value because it supports motherhood by fatherhood," *Parenthood and Race Culture*, 187. Similarly Thomas, *Sex and Society*, 193, cf. 226-7. Hence "to tamper with it [marriage] is to unroot of the fabric in which maternity has its shelter," P. T. Forsyth, *Marriage — Its Ethic and Religion*, 92.

<sup>43</sup> To own property (which is defined as a power to do with the thing owned what one pleases, under suitable limitations) and to own a good name are very different things. If there is any evil in being owned, it is in the way one is owned. To be owned as a slave is bad; to be owned as a friend, not; to be owned as wife (or as a husband), whether good or bad, depends on the facts in the case. "We have heard much talk, of late," wrote Mrs. Stowe in 1871, "concerning the husband's ownership of the wife. But, dear ladies, is that any more pronounced than every wife's ownership of her husband? — an ownership so intense and pervading, that it may be said to be the controlling nerve of womanhood," *op. cit.*, 66, cf. 209.

<sup>44</sup> At least so the male feminists, Mill (probably at the suggestion of his wife), *Subjection of Women*, 56, and Bebel, *Die Frau*, 212.

<sup>45</sup> E.g.: Women, becoming thinkers, "are at last beginning to realise that they are slaves, and that it is not a necessary condition; just as the working class is beginning to see that wage-slavery is not necessary," Jennie Ashley, in *The Progressive Woman*, April, 1913. On the other hand, in 1871, Catherine E. Beecher wrote: "Our good friends of the woman suffrage cause often liken their agitation to that which ended the slavery of a whole race doomed to unrequited toil for selfish, cruel masters."

escape is by equality.<sup>46</sup> If nature does not make them equal, men must. But that nature does make them equal, is their perpetual refrain; although the truth is, as we have seen, that as nature has not made them equal, men cannot. Yet it is on this ground they take their stand: women must be men's equal not only in the state, but in the home—not only politically, but domestically—not only as citizens, but as conjoints and as parents.

Every country in the world has marriage laws and customs different from its neighbours', and it is impossible they should all be good, and unlikely that any of them should be perfect. Conditions change, and laws and customs need to adapt themselves thereto. Reforms are as necessary in the relations between men and women as in the relations between men and men. Many reforms can be suggested for us in America. Fifty years ago there was a most stupid state of things in this country of ours. Man had put woman on a pedestal, and bowed down before her, and tried to keep all toil and defilement from her. This was due to a scarcity-value set upon women in a new country. Such conditions still subsist somewhat in the West: hence the coddling of the women with the vote there the moment they asked for it; but such conditions have ceased in the East. Women must work, as well as men. But the married woman's work is in a transition state, due to the facility with which she can accomplish what is left of domestic labours. "Our men," says Mrs. John Martin, "materially have done too much for their women, but spiritually too little."<sup>47</sup> There is too much division of labour between husband and wife, and separation of the one from the other. Mrs. Wharton, in her novel *The Custom of the Country*, rightly complains that the custom of our country is for the men to interest the women too little in their work (p. 206): the wife has no part in her husband's business, even where she might be of assistance, as is shown by the assistance given to husbands by their wives in Europe, especially in France. She might have added, that our men do not interest themselves enough in their wives' work at home, especially in the care of the children. Certainly the boys after the age of puberty should be the concern principally of the father; but in our country fathers still leave the

When so many men are toiling to keep daughters, wives, and mothers from any kind of toil, it is difficult to trace the resemblance," *Woman Suffrage and Woman's Profession*, 57-8, cf. 53.

<sup>46</sup> Mary Wollstonecraft: "Women will be either the friend or slave of man," *Vindication*, 50. Higginson: "Woman must be a subject or an equal: there is no middle ground," *Ought Women to learn the Alphabet?* 137-8, 148, *Common Sense about Women*, in *Works*, iv. 338. This is like the Stoic doctrine that there is no middle ground between being a saint and a villain.

<sup>47</sup> *Feminism*, 301.

education of their sons to the mother and to other women. Because of old revolutionary talk about "freedom" and "independence," our parents, extending this to children, give too much license to their sons and daughters, and do not guide them sufficiently, do not help them to establish themselves, do not try to find mates for them, but leave the determination of their future lives to their inexperience. Accordingly, too, our laws and customs make marriage too easy,—and our clergymen and justices marry parties whom they have never seen before, and without inquiring whether there are any impediments. On the other hand, as is well known, divorce, while still too difficult in some of our States (as in New York), is too easy in some others (as notably Nevada), and as the acts of one State must be respected in the others, levity in one State amounts to the same thing, at least for the rich, as levity in all. Because of the ease of communication now prevailing, marriage and all that goes with it should be made a federal concern, by an amendment to the Constitution, mere agreement of the States, as has been attempted, not being enough. Then marriage should be regulated, instead of being left haphazard. The impediments should be prescribed, such as hereditary and transmissible defects, and venereal diseases. Some of these can be reached before marriage, and should prevent it. Some can be reached only after marriage, and should be punished as a warning to others. Annulment should be allowed if marriage has been entered unwittingly (by one party) contrary to law and to principle, and no result has come from it; and in that case, divorce. Annulment and divorce, like all civil proceedings, should be cheap, so as to give no advantage to the rich over the poor, and to keep the latter from acting outside the law. There is, for instance, no reason why a lawyer should be any more necessary for obtaining a divorce than for contracting a marriage. Much better would it be to invoke, for divorce, the same clergyman who tied the nuptial knot.

Marital relations by no means exhaust the sexual relations. In our country, as in England too, there is the Puritanic inheritance of prudery, or the affectation of innocence, which is apt to produce actual ignorance in some and in others hypocrisy. Better education is needed—physiological, medical, legal, and moral. "White slavery" in its true sense, the slavery of women (whether white or coloured) in brothels under duress, and the reduction of women to that condition by rape or seduction, should be ferreted out and punished with a severity little short of that which murder is dealt with; while, on the other hand, voluntary prostitution should be legally hindered only to prevent lewdness and obscenity.

in public and to segregate a nuisance. Acts that are not crimes should not be made into crimes by law. What is not a crime in crossing a county line, is certainly not a crime in crossing a State line; and the Mann Act is not only contrary to principle, as also an abuse of a constitutional permission to Congress, but it leads only to blackmail, and ought to be repealed immediately. Acts undoing a mistake, an accident, or a crime, certainly are not themselves criminal. Abortion, at all events on the part of raped or deceived women, should not be penalised,<sup>48</sup> especially as it can be punished only fitfully, and mostly as the alternative of blackmail. Perhaps the fooliest law we have in this matter is the one forbidding contraception. Our federal government here strains its power over the post-office, and our States directly violate the constitutional rights of free speech and free press, which naturally include the right of free science. To identify it with obscenity is a subterfuge; for then obstetrics would have to be forbidden. Knowledge of contraception is only an extension of our knowledge of conception. Knowledge of conception, we have seen, is one of the things which distinguish men from brutes. It was a distinct advance when men reached that knowledge. Some ancient moralists may, perhaps, have inveighed against its introduction. If so, they acted like some of our moralists. Diffusion of the knowledge and means of contraception, like diffusion of the knowledge and means of preventing and curing infection, may facilitate immoral acts; but that is a condition which must be faced by moralists: they ought not to turn their backs on it. Even from the moral standpoint, it has the advantage, often recommend for it, of permitting young people to marry early, and so of removing a cause for young men to patronise prostitution and for young women to suffer nervous restlessness. Its employment, also, is a positive moral injunction upon all married people afflicted with hereditary defects. Moralists, moreover, cannot shut the door on it altogether. In spite of the law (which is abrogated in almost every country except ours) such knowledge now does extend throughout our upper classes:<sup>49</sup> the law keeps it only from the lower classes. The lower classes, therefore, go on breeding more or less lavishly, while the upper classes have curtailed their breeding. Here is the harm done by our law: it unbalances Malthusianism, permitting it above, and preventing it below; which is just the reverse of what should be. The abolition of the law cannot, unfortunately, bring about the reversal of this sea-saw; but it may at least help toward a levelling

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Forel, *The Sexual Question*, 402, 409, 416.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Lydia K. Commander, *The American Idea*, New York, 1907, pp. 44, 90, 92.

on the two sides.<sup>50</sup> The supporters of the law are capitalists, who wish to keep up a crowded labour market, Catholic priests, who wish their sect to spread and swallow up the rest, and that class of moralists who invoke the law to inculcate morality — like the prohibitionists, who would punish men by law for drinking, instead of merely punishing them for the misdemeanours committed when they are drunk, or like the pacifists, who would keep arms out of people's hands for fear of the harm they might do therewith. Curiously, the feminists incline to be prohibitionists and pacifists, at the same time that they all are opposed to laws repressing contraception. They recognise, with the eugenists, that to some persons contraception should be actually recommended.

But it is not the purpose of this work to advocate positive measures of reform. Its object is the humbler one of warning against ill-advised and dangerous reforms. Such are the reforms specially recommended by the feminists. None of those above suggested are specifically feminist. They interest men as much as they interest women, and do not need the women's vote for their adoption, most of them existing in many countries where men rule. Or take another instance: in some of our States the "age of consent" is too low, being considerably under that at which girls are first allowed to dispose of their property. It has been retained from primitive times when marriage was permitted to children on reaching puberty, or has been only too slightly extended since. Fathers are now just as much interested in raising it for their daughters' sakes, as are mothers. Feminists, of course, have not the monopoly of seeking reforms in such important matters as the sexual and marital relations. For instance, again, sterilisation of the unfit is another eugenist recommendation. But eugenics (a "man-made" science) is one thing, and feminism another. In all these matters every country in the world needs reforms, and every country its own peculiar reforms. And many countries do not need the reforms which we need for the simple reason that they already have them — without feminism. Improvement in them ought to be sought everywhere rationally, with recognition not only of the peculiar conditions of the country, but of natural conditions that exist universally in mankind. What is peculiar to the feminists is the advocacy of alleged reforms that spring from the idea of the sexes being equal. Or if any reform is recommended on the ground that women are superior to men, this *a fortiori* is feminist. We have seen that the feminists recognise in physiology only the primary sex-differences. So in sociology they would admit no difference of

<sup>50</sup> See W. J. Robinson, *The Limitation of Offspring*, 52-5.

function beyond that of child-bearing<sup>51</sup>—and in that they would assign superiority to women. Especially feminist, furthermore, are reforms in these matters that would be possible only under socialism, or an equal economic status of the two sexes artificially produced. Then the economic dependence of women on the state would permit their independence on fathers and husbands, and would assimilate them to men, who individually would have the same dependence and independence (independence on wives). Of course the state's ability to support and defend all its members would still be principally the work of the men; but the collective dependence of the women on the men would be kept out of sight—gallantly denied by the men, and ungratefully unrecognised by the women. Such at least would be the feminist contribution to socialism. As far as, and as long as, socialism is possible, men and women may be economically equal. On this possibility—and some of them think it possible even without reference to socialism—the feminists build; to this end they direct their efforts. To their recommendations we must now turn our attention.

51 Cf. Pearson, *Ethic of Freethought*, 421.

## CHAPTER V.

### FEMINIST DEMANDS

THE demands of the feminists go against the very essence of marriage. For marriage, as distinguished from mere pairing or mating, like that performed by many species of animals, having been instituted either by custom or by law, is, when once entered upon, an obligatory and as far as possible permanent association, forming the smallest society of only two, with prospect of more, who are bound together by mutual rights and duties. The parties who contract it lose certain rights and gain others, as in the case of men entering civil society out of a state of nature. There seems to be a difference, in that on entering civil society all men are said to lose and gain the same rights, but on entering marriage the man and the woman lose and gain different rights: the man loses his right to spend all his income on himself and gains rights (now almost reduced, before the law, to nothing) over his wife and his children, while the woman loses certain rights over herself, her property, and her children (or rather lost them, for now it is difficult to say what she loses, except her father's name), and gains rights over her husband and his property. Yet this difference is more apparent than real, since in forming the large society of the state the strong and the weak really lose and gain differently; for in it when formed there is immediately a cleavage between the rulers and the ruled, who thus suffer or enjoy different losses and gains. In all association there is a differentiation between a superior and an inferior — between employers and employés, between teachers and scholars, between priests and communicants, between directors and mere subscribers, etc., etc. Only in business partnerships can there be an approach to equality, and they generally succeed best in which a senior or a richer party has the leadership. So in marriage the one party must preferably be superior, since otherwise it would rarely be lasting, and as by nature the man generally is, in the relevant respects, the superior, he is almost everywhere so recognised by law. And usually by religion too, as by our prevalent religion, in which husband and wife

are said to be one flesh<sup>1</sup> or body,<sup>1a</sup> of which the husband is the head.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, Blackstone played into the hands of the feminists here, by saying that according to the common law "the husband and wife are one person," and treating the husband as that one person, into whose being the legal existence of the wife is "incorporated"; which is nonsense.<sup>3</sup> The husband and wife together form one legal body or corporation,<sup>4</sup> which the feminists would leave headless, but which everybody else recognises as needing a head; which head the husband naturally is, so that the law must accept him as such. Against this natural condition of inequality within the body marital, especially against the requirement of obedience on the part of the wife, objections are now being raised by our advanced women, to whom marriage as a "man-made" institution no longer appears worthy of respect, and to whose contemplated reforms, even if they be Christians, Christianity offers little hindrance, and none of course if they be not Christians, since Christianity itself was "man-made."<sup>5</sup> But as it is impossible for marriage to be otherwise, these women and their male abettors practically wish to make marriage over into something which is no longer marriage at all.

The ideal is one of friendship or comradeship — that marriage is to be a union of friends. Women as wives are to be, not the consorts of men for the perpetuation of the family and the race, but their companions, or *hetairae*, for the pleasure of close association and sexual intercourse.<sup>6</sup> It was Mary Wollstone-

<sup>1</sup> *Gen.* II. 24, *Matt.* XIX. 5, *Mark* X. 8, *Ephes.* V. 31. Somewhat similarly *The Laws of Manu*, IX. 45.

<sup>1a</sup> Lactantius, *Div. Instit.*, VI. 23.

<sup>2</sup> *I. Cor.* XI. 3, *Ephes.* V. 23; cf. *The Apostolic Constitutions*, I. 8, VI. 29, pseudo-Cyprian, *De Disciplina et Bono Castitatis*, c. 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Commentaries*, i. 442. Of course the husband and wife may form one "person" in the legal sense of a corporation; but then the husband is incorporated into its being just as much as the wife is, and not she into his.

<sup>4</sup> Or it is rather the family that is the corporation, since the children also enter into it. So in the Roman law: see Maine, *Ancient Law*, 184.

<sup>5</sup> Thus the suffragist leader, the Rev. Miss Anna Howard Shaw, is reported as saying, she thinks it "positively wicked to use this word [obey] in the marriage contract," in *The New York Times*, June 15, 1914. (This word "obey," once dropped from the marriage service by some sects in our country at the time of the revolution — see above, pp. 6-7 — has recently been dropped in Denmark.) Usually Paul is the butt. Thus Edna Kenton: "It was St. Paul who laid down the Christian ideal for women. Nothing invented of man has ever had a more stultifying effect upon the character and morals of women and of men," *The Militant Women* — and *Women*, The Century, Nov., 1913, p. 19. And Mrs. Gallichan speaks of "St. Paul's grandmotherly old Tory dogma, making man the head of the woman," *The Truth about Woman*, 257; cf. 235. Mrs. Matilda J. Gage in her *Woman's National Liberal Union*, Syracuse, N. Y., 1890, says that that society (which she founded because she became "convinced that the teaching of the Church was the great obstacle to woman's freedom") had for its purpose to prepare the way for woman suffrage by weakening the hold of the Christian religion on the people. Christian virtues, of course, are rejected at the same time. "There is no more dangerous virtue than self-sacrifice," writes Mary R. Coolidge, *Why Women are So*, 178, although she will allow "a normal minimum" of it, to keep women from being spoiled, when (which will be soon) "nothing will be too good" for them, 335. Cf. Mill, *Subjection of Women*, 77.

<sup>6</sup> The relation of the Greeks to their *hetairae*, or courtesans, is praised as superior to their relation to their wives, for instance, by Eliza B. Gamble, *The Evolution of*

craft's idea, which she seems to have got from Hume and Rousseau, that love is transient,<sup>7</sup> and in happy marriage should be succeeded by friendship.<sup>8</sup> She and her authorities misused terms; for it is passionate love that is evanescent, and the permanent love it calms down into is not friendship, but affection. The present intention, however, seems to be, that the parties contracting marriage should be mere friends from the beginning.<sup>9</sup> This term is well chosen, as it is only friendship that exists between equals. Love, indeed, as also the affection in which it terminates, is a relation between unequal, as is illustrated in its three typical cases, between parents and children, between men and women, between grown-up persons and their aged parents;<sup>10</sup> to which may be added the actual cases of love (not friendship) between masters and servants, and the imaginary case of love between human beings and God,<sup>11</sup> since no one can aspire to friendship with God.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, the opinion of the feminists being that men and women are equal, it is right for them to set up friendship as

*Woman*, 317-18. That it contributed to the decline of Greek civilisation, does not matter. Of course our women have heard of Greek *hetairism* only in its sublimated cases. They do not know, for instance, that any Greek man with money could purchase a *hetaira* (cf. Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, c. 1). Yet any one who admires Aspasia and her relation to society, should have the same regard for Ninon de Lenclos and the like.

<sup>7</sup> Or in the florid words of Hippel, "hard by the temple of Hymen lies the graveyard of Love," *Ueber die Ehe*, 160.

<sup>8</sup> *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, 44, 45, 86, 113, 127; 46, 47, 64, 128. She prefers friendship, 45, 86, 114. Quotes Rousseau, 101, cf. 64n. Hume had written: "The happiest marriages are found where love, by long acquaintance, is consolidated into friendship," *Essays*, I. xix.

<sup>9</sup> E.g., G. B. Shaw maintains that "healthy marriages are partnerships of companionable and affectionate friends," Preface to *Getting Married*, 192. Princess Troubetzkoy (Amélie Rives) thinks this not a new idea, but something found recommended by Solomon in his *Song of Songs*, V. 16, (in The New York Times, April 19, 1914), in ignorance that that song was not addressed to his (chief) wife, and that the Hebrew word translated "friend" has a very different meaning, the same term being translated "lovers" in *Jeremiah*, III. 1, where the sense is plain. In the Vulgate the lover is made frequently to address his beloved as "amica mea," just as the French often call their mistresses "mon amie." The idea, however, of course is not a new one, since the distinction between wife and mistress always has broken down in degenerate periods.

<sup>10</sup> Coventry Patmore: "All joy worth the name is in equal love between unequal," *Religio Poetæ*, London, 1907, p. 151. Hence he calls "damnable" the heresy of the equality of men and women, because "it strikes at the root of the emotional and spiritual prosperity and felicity of both, and vitiates the whole life of society in its source," 153. Cf. Weininger, *Sex and Character*, 245. The Greeks did not bring this out clearly on account of the ambiguity of their term *φίλα* which meant both friendship and love. Thus Aristotle in the *Eth. Nich.* treats first of *φίλα* between equals and then of *φίλα* between unequal, VIII. iii-vi, and vii. (or viii.), xi. (or xiii.), xii. (or xiv.), xiii. (or xv.); cf. *Eth. Eudem.*, VII. iii., iv., x., *Magna Mor.*, II. xi. 51-2, and Andronicus's *Paraphrase of Eth. Nich.*, VIII. ix., xv., xvi., xvii. Among moderns, however, Bacon was of the opinion that the little friendship there is in the world is mostly between superior and inferior, *Essay XLVIII*,—unless he, too, used "friendship" in the sense of love, which was not uncommon in his day. Otherwise it is hardly consistent with *Essay XXVII*.

<sup>11</sup> Patmore: "In the infinite distance between God and man, theologians find the secret of the infinite felicity of divine love; and the incomparable happiness of love between the sexes is similarly founded upon their inequality," *op. cit.*, 156.

<sup>12</sup> The Greeks spoke of having *φίλα* with their gods, as, e.g., Hermogenes in Xenophon's *Banquet*, c. 4; but again on account of the ambiguity of their term, and also on account of the smallness of their gods. An exception, however, in modern times, is that wishy-washy creature, Goethe's "Schoene Seele."

their ideal.<sup>13</sup> Already the performance by the state of the individual man's function of protecting his woman has effaced somewhat the political inequality, and to that extent justified the new theory. But the effacement is desired to be carried further: all dependence on either side must be banished, and the present conditions in which women still as a rule have an economic motive for entering marriage is looked upon as base and impure.<sup>14</sup> The love desired, then, is merely the unaccountable attraction preferably of two souls (for these materialists are fond of speaking of the soul), although it would in practice be mostly of bodies, which they hardly distinguish;<sup>15</sup> and after all the idea of inter-sexual friendship degenerates into simple eroticism, under a thin veneer of fine words to the contrary. We are reminded of the decision gravely rendered by the Provençal dames in one of their Courts of Love, that love cannot have place between married people, because its favours must be granted freely;<sup>16</sup> for they referred to marriage as it always has been, with the obligation of loving service on both sides.<sup>17</sup> Agreeing with them, but carrying out the idea more logically, our feminists are going to get rid of such marriage, and substitute for its denial of pure voluntary love the pure love of free lovers or friends. Yet the old conjugal love is really the highest, all love being ennobled by mutual service; and on the man's part one of the services that intensify not only the wife's love of the husband but his love of her, is the big one of protecting and supporting her, for which in return she can render him little services innumerable—the more, the better for herself as well as for him. Without an

13 Cf. Mill: "The highest order of durable and happy attachments would be a hundred times more frequent than they are, if the affection which the two sexes sought from one another were the genuine friendship which only exists between equals in privilege and faculties," *Subjection of Women*, 123. But cf. his "ideal of marriage" as a union of "two persons of cultivated faculties, identical in opinions and purposes, between whom there exists that best kind of equality, similarity of powers and capacities, with reciprocal superiority in them," 177. But if a masculine man should marry a feminine woman, would not the condition be satisfied? Is it necessary that the one should be a sculptor and the other a painter, or the like, and both money-makers? In admitting any superiority on one side Mill has opened the door to superiority in earning-capacity—economic superiority, also political superiority—on the one side and on the other, dependence.

14 Ellen Key: "No woman will [in the new dispensation] give or receive love for any extraneous benefit whatever," *The Woman Movement*, 213; cf. 149. Mrs. Gilman: "Love never went with self-interest," *Women and Economics*, 97. (She might have added that this is truest of the most sensual love, which often goes directly against self-interest.) Pearson: "The economic independence of women will for the first time render it possible for the highest human relationship to become again [sic] a matter of pure affection, raised above every suspicion of constraint and every taint of commercialism," *Ethic of Freethought*, 422. Yet he had said: "Those marriages which arise purely from instinctive impulse are notoriously the least stable," 241.

15 Thus Floyd Dell (Miss Dora Marsden) in her *Women as World Builders* says "the body is no longer to be separated in the thought of women from the soul," 49; and "in any case, it is to the body that one looks for the Magna Charta of feminism," 45.

16 It may be found in full in Stendhal's *De l'Amour*, 307.

17 As re-enjoined, for instance, by Paul, *I. Cor.*, VII. 3-5.

interchange of services—and of real and substantial ones,—love is idle and vain, and soon to end when the physical attraction wears away; for the merely intellectual is satisfied without propinquity.<sup>18</sup> If the new, and the Provençal, idea of love were correct, it would apply likewise to love between parents and children: that, too, should be kept free from defilement by dependence and benefit, and the child should be served by some one else, under the state's supervision, in order that parental and filial love might be solely that of congenial personalities. This conclusion is not shrunk from; and yet it is evident that little love of parents and children would survive.

Friendship, moreover, is not exclusive; wherein, again, it is clearly distinguished from true love, which is exclusive. True friendship may be enjoyed with an indefinite number at once, and it may be stronger to-day with one and to-morrow with another. The more exclusive it becomes, the more it approximates to love, and when this takes place between members of the same sex, to the extent that jealousy is displayed, and they consider themselves married to each other, it is an erotic perversion. On the other hand, when love between members of the opposite sexes is assimilated to friendship, the demand is advanced that it must be subject to the same vicissitudes and numerosities. Marriage must last only as long as the unique friendship lasts. Both parties must be free to make new friendships, and therefore new marriages, as they please, without the rest of the world concerning itself about their doings. The evils to society consequent upon such an arrangement need not detain us. We may only express no wonder that the Provençal civilisation came to a speedy end, its men being incapable of defending against a harder race the women who entertained the opinion recited; for men will fight for their true wives and children, but not for their mistresses and their bastards. Rather are we concerned with the wrongness of this theory of marriage, which is belied by several facts. One is that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the husband and wife are not equal, so that the relationship between them is not, and cannot be, that of friendship. Another, that the relation of comradeship to be established between them is not, in the theory itself, and cannot be, that between ordinary friends. Ordinary friends, as equals, are also independent, live apart, and are completely unattached both in

<sup>18</sup> Patmore is not quite exact when he says "the felicity of friendship consists in a mutual interchange of benefits, . . . that of love in giving on one part and receiving on the other," *op. cit.*, 150. In friendship there is equality and sameness in kind in the mutual benefits; in love there is difference in kind, amounting almost to incommensurability, being bulky and solid on the one side, and refined and tender on the other.

their own estimation and in that of others. The disgrace of the one, for instance, does not affect the other, except sentimentally; nor is honour shown to the one cast over the other. Not so in marriage, as it exists,—and probably few female feminists desire that the wife should not share in at least the honours of her husband. Friends, also, do not usually share their goods with one another, *pace* the old Greek philosophers, who constantly asserted this; but husband and wife must do so regularly, or else their marriage would be a very strange affair. It can hardly be expected that if the husband earns twice as much as the wife, he will go to a fine restaurant and pay a dollar for his dinner, while she goes to a cheaper one and dines for fifty cents. Yet unless this is to be the rule, the woman that earns little will gain by marrying a man that earns much; and all the fine-spun declamation about independence vanishes. The full ideal can be carried into execution only if they are to continue to live apart and merely visit each other and invite each other out, more or less often, like friends. One male feminist has harboured such a plan, as we shall see, and another has practised it; but in all probability few will ever entertain it.<sup>19</sup> Else the socialist scheme of equal incomes for all must be adopted; but that we have seen to be impracticable. Friends, lastly, are not bothered, or blessed, by any such issue of their friendship as children. And we may be sure that marriages of men and women friends will not be much interfered with in this way, either. Marriage, the feminists tell us, is not for the sake of the children, but for the sake of the partners.<sup>20</sup> Consequently the children that do occur will be relegated to others, preferably to the state. Such childless, or almost childless, marriages—pleasure unions, human matings<sup>21</sup>—will be feasible for a time,—but only for a time.

“Feminists believe in divorce,” says one of them,”<sup>22</sup> Freedom

<sup>19</sup> Yet already some rich idlers in New York have married with the understanding that they were to keep separate establishments around the corner from each other. There is, of course, nothing new in all this. Juvenal described the Roman wife as “her husband’s neighbour,” *Sat.*, VI. 509.

<sup>20</sup> Thus Pearson: “I think the sex-relationship of the future will not be regarded as in the first place a union for the birth of children, but as the closest form of friendship, between man and woman. . . . Sex-friendship will mean infinitely more than a union for reproducing mankind,” *Ethic of Freethought*, 424.

<sup>21</sup> Back in 1843 John A. Collins, an abolitionist, anarchist, communist, vegetarian, and woman suffragist, founded a community at Skaneateles, N. Y., based on, among others, the tenet “that marriage is designed for the happiness of the parties, . . . and when such parties have outlived their affections and can no longer contribute to each other’s happiness, the sooner the separation takes place the better; and such separation shall not be a barrier to the parties in again uniting with any one when they consider their happiness can be promoted thereby,” (from J. H. Noyes’s *History of American Socialisms*, pp. 165–6. Cf. above, ii. 42. So of late Mrs. Elsie Clews Parsons, in several articles in *The International Journal of Ethics*, Oct., 1915, Jan., and July, 1916, has tried to set up “its own standards” for mating, among which “permanence will cease to be the final criterion of virtue,” last article, p. 464.

<sup>22</sup> Mrs. Hale, *What Women Want*, 267–8.

of divorce is the cardinal principle of the new theory of marriage. Anything like an unconditional binding together now seems like bondage or slavery. "To me," says a leading woman-suffragist (so do they misuse religious terms), "marriage is too sacred an institution to permit any allotted promise."<sup>23</sup> Marriage is to be entered into, only in case it can be got out of. Indeed, divorce is to become a new duty, as we have seen it taught by the socialist Bebel.<sup>24</sup> Of course, in this new era of equality, men are to have the same freedom as women, and so they will not have to pay alimony, since women do not. The dangerous position of a wife who has no property of her own, who has given up her profession (if she had one) too long to be able to resume it, and who has lost her attractiveness for another match, they do not seem to consider.<sup>24a</sup> They look forward to the promised state in which women shall be actually as capable of taking care of themselves as men are,—or if not, at all events the state shall take care of them. Till then, probably, they expect alimony to continue to be paid by the divorced husbands. And thinking only of women who have property of their own or a profession or prospect of alimony or of another match, they revel in the idea of women, and even of men, no longer having to remain in an uncongenial partnership. Mankind are to be free from this as from any other constraint.

It will be but a step to "trial marriages"<sup>25</sup>—for a short period, to see if the parties really are congenial, to be followed by renewal or separation. Already a bill to legalise such marriages has been proposed in one of our woman-suffrage States.<sup>26</sup> Such marriages are well known to sociologists. They have been practised for one day and night among the Todas of the Neilgherries, like the "bundling" in some of our backward districts, for three nights among some Arab tribes, for a few days among the Wyandotts and the Hurons, for a fortnight in Ceylon. Longer trials, as for three or six months among the Jews

<sup>23</sup> Again the Rev. Anna H. Shaw, as reported above.

<sup>24</sup> Above, ii. 42. So the feminist Jane Olcott, one-time Secretary of the New York State Suffrage Association, as reported in *The New York Times*, May 25, 1914: "A man or woman should be free to give love whenever it is natural. Love is volatile, and when it goes I believe it is unmoral [the latest substitute for immoral] for man and wife even to appear to live together, except for the sake of their children. In that case each should be free to bestow love elsewhere by mutual agreement."—the husband to have his mistress, and the wife her cecisbeo, as among the degenerate Venetians!

<sup>24a</sup> At least one, however, Elizabeth S. Chesser, protests, recognising that women would be the chief sufferers, *Woman, Motherhood and Marriage*, 85–6.

<sup>25</sup> They are recommended by Forel, *The Sexual Question*, 387, 431–2; by the novelist George Meredith; by Mrs. Elsie Clews Parsons in her book *The Family*, New York, 1906, p. 349 *cf.* p. xii.; and by so great an authority as Sarah Bernhardt.

<sup>26</sup> In Colorado in 1905 by Representative Townsend. Marriages were to be allowed by contract for terms between six months and ten years with privilege of conversion at any time into ordinary marriage. The proposal was opposed by women; but it is significant that it was offered in a woman's State.

of Morocco, for six months in Greenland, for a year among the Greeks, and the Celtic "handfasting" for a year and a day, were to see whether the union was fruitful. The thoroughgoing feminist would allow any couple freedom to contract marriage for any period they please, as was done by the Saracens.<sup>27</sup> All these practices, not excepting the last, which was abandoned before the Saracens rose in the world, were indulged in by small, primitive, or savage peoples; and it is plain that none could advance far in civilisation with such customs. Among the Egyptians, however, there were marriages for a year, and easy divorce, at least in late periods; but the Egyptians lost their independence for ever, as soon as other peoples became civilised. The traveller's tale used to be told, since refuted by a resident, that the barbarous Min-copies of the Andaman Islands had the custom of the husband and wife remaining together till the child was weaned, after which they were free to form other unions.<sup>27a</sup> Even that is more than would be necessary now-a-days. And if marriage is only a private contract, what (by still greater freedom) is to prevent such marriages as obtain among the Hassaniyeh Arabs of Nubia, among whom the married women have free disposal of themselves every fourth day, or three days every week?<sup>28</sup> Ever since Mona Caird in 1888 started the question, "Is marriage a failure?" marriage seems to have been in the melting pot. And here, contrary to the spirit of modern medicine, more attention is paid to cure than to prevention. Feminists, according to one of them, "incline rather to repair the effects of bad marriages, than to prevent their occurrence."<sup>29</sup>

There will be so many marriages and re-marriages that it will be difficult to keep track of a woman through the many changes of her name. Already a demand is raised that women shall keep their own (that is, their father's!) surname throughout life, as the man keeps his, married or single; and as there is no law enforcing the prevalent custom, some women have adopted the

<sup>27</sup> According to Ammianus Marcellinus XIV, 4.

<sup>27a</sup> With somewhat the same idea Mrs. "Rose Marie" has advocated "a trial expiration clause" (which she calls "an American clause, since it would give freedom to the oppressed") to be inserted in marriage contracts, permitting separation, if desired by either party, after four or five years of married life, *How to Enjoy Matrimony*, New York, 1900, pp. 13, 29, etc.

<sup>28</sup> In an anonymous article (written by a woman?) in *The Forum*, Dec., 1915, under the curious title (misapplying something from Westermarck) of *Our Incestuous Marriage*, something like this is actually recommended: "An established system, in the social life, which will guarantee to the wedlocked couple a certain amount of statutory holidays from the common home and common life, compulsory separations in public, prohibitions upon all open performances of togetherness, conventional self-exhibitions *minus* ring and other insignia of the conjugal state, and in the domestic interior itself an established etiquette of taboos, and suspension of conjugal rights"—all in imitation of savages, and to the end that marriage shall be "undertaken and borne as lightly and gracefully as a secret sin," p. 660.

<sup>29</sup> W. L. George, *Feminist Intentions*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, Dec., 1913, p. 727.

new idea.<sup>30</sup> More commonly the woman keeps her own baptismal name or names, instead of using her husband's, after the title of "Mrs." This is done especially by women who have won some notoriety by advocating the various fads of feminism; but the women whose husbands have gained some prominence, may be counted upon to stick to the old custom; for women are adepts at the game of "Heads, I win; tails, you lose." Also it is demanded that the status of matrimony shall no more be indicated in the case of the woman, by the change of her title from "Miss" to "Mrs.," than it is in the case of the man. In Germany, where there is another reason for it, an association has been formed for the propaganda of this "reform."<sup>31</sup> In our country only idle sentiment is invoked: why, it is asked, are women to be treated differently from men?<sup>32</sup> And if women are the same as men, the question is unanswerable. It would seem, however, preferable for the men here to follow the practice of the women, and to distinguish the married from the single, as boys are distinguished from men by the title of "Master," there being a good social reason for this, as society is interested in the marital status of all its members.<sup>33</sup> As for the children, consistency will require them to be named after the mother as well as after the father;<sup>34</sup> for why should the woman's family name cease any more than the man's, the patriarchal reason for this being no longer allowed? Here, however, would arise a difficulty, after the first generation that adopts the custom; for the hyphenated names would go on doubling *in infinitum*. In Spain children take the paternal name of the father and the paternal name of the mother, all maternal names

<sup>30</sup> One of the first was Lucy Stone, on marrying Henry B. Blackwell. But the daughter received the father's family name as hers, and the mother's family name only as a middle name.

<sup>31</sup> The Propaganda Bund für den Einheits-Titel. In the German language the term for "Miss" (Fräulein), as also in the Scandinavian languages (Fröken), is a neuter diminutive. There may be something derogatory in this, now that grown-up women remain unmarried; for it had its origin at a time when only girls were unmarried. But in English there is nothing to object to in our terms; and "Mrs." (mistress) still is appropriate, in most cases, only for married women.

<sup>32</sup> In the symposium of the six feminists at New York in 1914 already referred to, Fola La Follette spoke on "the right of woman to keep her own name." "Should a man keep his own name?" she asked, adding that "the question was no more absurd than the one which formed her subject. If a woman is to change her name simply as an acknowledgment that she loves a man and has married him, why should not the same sacrifice be made by him toward her?" She urged also the abandonment of the title "Mrs.", saying "it was unnecessary to label spinster and matron; that if a woman was single or married, or had children or none, was her concern and no one else's. Society didn't ask a man first of all whether he was married and had children or not; and what was good for the gander was good for the goose." As reported in The New York Times, Feb. 21, 1914.

<sup>33</sup> Forel calls the prevalent custom "absurd," and says "it would be quite as just to apply the term 'damoiseau' to celibate men as 'mademoiselle' to non-married girls," *The Sexual Question*, 378. Well, while one is advocating innovations, why not recommend the right rather than the wrong one?

<sup>34</sup> "Let them combine the name of their father and their mother, thus linking them more closely to each other, or let that matter be settled by each individual father and mother," Fola La Follette, as above. Also Vance Thompson, *Woman*, 224-5.

being thrown out except the one of the immediate mother. This would advance the feminists but a short way. For perfect equality it might be established that the sons should take the father's paternal name, and the daughters the mother's maternal name, as in Austria is determined the religion of children in mixed marriages; or they should combine the two, the boys putting their father's last and the girls the mother's.<sup>35</sup> The two sexes will then each run its own course, side by side with the other, but separate. And in a democracy sunk into utter individualism, why not?<sup>36</sup> unless the woman is again to be exalted above the man.<sup>37</sup> Or would it not be still simpler to adopt Godwin's advice and abolish surnames altogether?<sup>38</sup> Under socialism there will be no sense in keeping track of family descent; and here, too, feminism joins hands with socialism. It is impossible to keep track, in names, of both the families long: it must be the one or the other, or neither. Then why not let the family go? say the feminists. And if any of their suggestions be adopted, the family will go.

Somewhat analogous to this tempest in a tea-pot is an objection raised to the general practice among nations for the woman's nationality, in cases of international marriages, to follow that of the husband. As the loss of our women who marry foreigners is made up by the gain of women who marry our citizens, the matter seems to be as broad as it is long. But it hurts the feelings of the new women that they are treated differently from men. If men keep their nationality after marrying, so ought women, since women are their equals. Otherwise, women complain, women have a less hold on their nationality.<sup>39</sup> Of course, if marriage is nothing but a living together of friends, there would be no

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Bellamy, *Equality*, 139. Or if there is any truth in Janke's alleged law of heredity, it might be better for the daughters to take the father's name (from his mother), and the sons the mother's (from her father). This is said to have been the custom in ancient Egypt, and among the Hottentots at present. These are good precedents for the feminists.

<sup>36</sup> For in an aristocratic country like England, an ordinary woman would lose her one chance of becoming a lady, or rising to a higher rank, if she did not accept her husband's name also. There, in fact, as throughout Europe, a wife receives her husband's rank and title, but not the husband his wife's. This is an inequality which European feminists ought to take in hand. But which way will they reform it?

<sup>37</sup> One feminist at least, a chivalrous man, Forel, would readopt "matriarchism" and have all the children take the name of their mother, *The Sexual Question*, 379, 379-80, 522-3. He would also have the wife and mother own the house, 523, though he does not explain how she is to get this proprietorship. In civilised communities women do not usually build the dwellings. He was probably influenced by Westermarck's account of the habits and habitations of certain low races, *History of Human Marriage*, 107-8.

<sup>38</sup> *Political Justice*, VIII. viii. And why distinguish the sexes by different sets of first names? Why not christen your son Jane and your daughter John? This used to be done in Europe, and still in France. Consistency is a jewel.

<sup>39</sup> They say even that they have no country: so Katherine Anthony in her *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, 216, referring to a novel by Ilse Frapan entitled *Die Frauen haben kein Vaterland*. We have seen a similar statement made concerning workingmen by the socialists, with the difference, however, that to the feminists it is a complaint, with the socialists an injunction.

need of either party going over to the other's nation, unless voluntarily; and the children might belong where they were born or brought up, or the sons follow the father's and the daughters the mother's nationality, or all have the choice. But while marriage is a closer union than that, the present practice will have to continue; for else a single entity, a family, would be under two jurisdictions. The subject causes some trouble, however, in the event of woman suffrage, since an American woman might lose the right to vote, on marrying a foreigner, though still residing in America; while a foreign woman married to an American could vote immediately upon arriving in the country. This trouble only shows the total inconsistency of woman suffrage, as a part of feminism, with the present social as well as political order,—and the inconsistency also of those suffragists who think they can adopt their own measure without leading on to the whole perverse system of the feminists.

These are trivial details. Another, even pettier, may be expected. Will women continue to be led in the dance? Will they not, for the sake of equality, have to lead as often as be led? "So long as a lady shall deem herself in need of some gentleman's arm to conduct her properly out of a dining room," wrote Horace Greeley many years ago, "so long as she shall consider it dangerous or unbecoming to walk half a mile alone by night, I cannot see how the Woman's Rights theory is ever to be anything else than a logically defensible abstraction."<sup>40</sup> Somewhat more important is the right, if women be in every thing equal to men, of women to woo men, as well as to be wooed by men. Already the socialists have claimed this, because of the economic equality their system will provide for all.<sup>41</sup> But as the feminists expect women to earn as much as men, or at least enough to support themselves, they follow suit, notwithstanding that a woman with small earning power will always gain by marrying a man who earns more. Some of the naturalising ones also advocate it—the woman's, the female's selection of the father (or fathers) of her children—for the improvement of the breed, and putting this first, desire the economic independence of women in order to permit and foster it.<sup>42</sup> But nature is against it, and in addition to economic inequality, physical unlikeness comes into play. It is the male who seeks, the female who is sought; the male embraces, the female is embraced; the male imparts, the female re-

<sup>40</sup> Elsie Clews Parsons, from whom this quotation is taken, admits inconsistency here on the part of many suffragists, *Feminism and Conventionality*, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Nov., 1914, p. 48.

<sup>41</sup> Bebel, *Die Frau*, 342; Bellamy, *Looking Backward*, 266-7. Long before it had been suggested by the eighteenth-century pre-feminist Hippel, in his *Ueber die Ehe*, 69.

<sup>42</sup> As we shall see in the next chapter.

ceives; in short, the male is active, the female passive. So is it, in varying extent, throughout both the vegetable and animal kingdoms, with the fewest exceptions among the latter.<sup>43</sup> So is it likewise in the human species,<sup>44</sup> also with but few exceptions from among backward peoples left behind in out-of-the-way corners of the earth,<sup>45</sup>—not to forget some worn-out peoples, degraded from their days of greatness.<sup>46</sup> Always is it such peoples, and in nature the exceptions, our feminists set up as their models. Among all great peoples it is otherwise. They follow the dictates of nature. The man takes, the woman gives herself.<sup>47</sup> The key seeks the lock, not the lock the key. Wherefore it is better for this custom to continue, and for women to wait till they are asked. There is some truth in the old-fashioned statement of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe, when she wrote of "the disgust which man feels when she, whom God made to be sought, degrades herself to seek."<sup>48</sup>

A still more important consideration is it, that when these conditions are brought about, it will hardly be necessary for the woman who wants a child—for few are supposed to want more than one in this way—to marry at all; or if she does, she can so quickly get rid of her husband that it would be a matter of indifference whether she went through the ceremony or not. Children may be as "natural" as they were in the primitive times, when human beings approximated to brutes, and with as little need of artificial legitimation as they were among the polygamous Egyptians;<sup>49</sup> for if a man's children by other women are on the same footing with those by his wife, are not those women as good as his wives? Legitimacy, indeed, is hardly more an object of solicitude for the feminists than for the socialists, of the thorough-going type. The stigma of illegitimacy seems to their tender sensibilities an injustice to the innocent offspring,<sup>50</sup> not

<sup>43</sup> Among some birds (the turnix, phaleropus, cassowary, emeu) the females, larger and stronger than the males, are said to pursue the males, fight with one another for them, and then leave to them the incubation.

<sup>44</sup> "To man," said Clement of Alexandria, "has been assigned activity, to woman passivity," *Paedagogus*, III. 3. This is "the normal condition," according to Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 609. Similarly W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, 17, 28, 55, 229.

<sup>45</sup> Such as the Garos of Assam, the Kasis of Bengal, the Kafirs of Natal, the Ainos of Japan, the Tarrahumi Indians of northern Mexico, the Moquis of New Mexico, some tribes in Oregon, the Paraguayans, and in the Torres Islands and New Guinea.

<sup>46</sup> Yet it is probably not desired that our women should ever reach the degree of immodesty attained by the Roman women under the empire, denounced by Seneca: "Libidine nec maribus quidem cedunt, pati natae. Dii illas deaeque male perdant! adeo perversum commentae genus impudicitiae, viros ineunt," *Epist.* 95 § 21. In the degenerate days of Greece, Plutarch describes the courtship and final seizure of a youth by a rich widow, *Anatorius*, cc. 2, 10.

<sup>47</sup> Even Grant Allen's heroine, to be described in the next chapter, did so, *The Woman Who Did*, 56, 72, cf. 46.

<sup>48</sup> *Pink and White Tyranny*, 269.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Diodorus, I. 80, § 3. See also Montesquieu, *Esprit des Lois*, XXIII. v. and vi., about the absence of bastardy among polygamous peoples.

<sup>50</sup> See, e.g., Carpenter, *Love's Coming of Age*, 116.

withstanding that many innocent children, though legitimate, naturally and socially suffer from the sins of their parents. It is only a paralogism to speak of these poor things as being "punished," though innocent, implying that they are treated with injustice; for suffering is not necessarily punishment.<sup>50a</sup> Deceived by this illusion, a Society in New York, full of compassionate feelings, recently brought out a French "problem" play in advocacy of abolishing illegitimacy, because illegitimate children suffer some indirect disabilities in France! Accordingly, the status of children born out of wedlock must be equalised as far as possible with that of legitimate children — especially they must inherit equally from the father and take his name, when he can be found out.<sup>50b</sup> This destroys the main purpose of marriage. Illegitimate children should, as human beings, have the same rights as legitimate children,— and in most countries they have. But that they should have the same claims upon the father as legitimate children have, is quite another matter, to grant which annihilates the distinction not only between the children themselves, but also between their mothers and between the acts by which they were begotten, practically doing away with all legitimation, and rendering all things permissible. To keep disgrace from the innocent child, it must also be taken from the erring mother, and all the more so, in the opinion of the feminists, because the father, whose paternity cannot always be proved, is less exposed thereto. Nature's "unfair" distinction can no longer be tolerated: it must be corrected: the woman is to follow the man, and because the man cannot always be disgraced, the woman is never to be! And so a great deterrent obstacle to promiscuous intercourse is to be removed. Recently in the discussion, in the State of New York, about the pensioning of widowed and abandoned mothers, the voice of a woman was heard in favour of granting the same pensions to unmarried mothers — to women who never went through the proper form for binding their child's father to support them.<sup>51</sup> That it would be of benefit to unmarried women who contemplated the chance of becoming mothers, seems to have been overlooked. We shall later see more about the alleged right of

<sup>50a</sup> Or a play is made upon the terms used. It is said that not the child but the parents are "illegitimate."

<sup>50b</sup> E.g., Elizabeth S. Chesser, *op. cit.*, 70-1; Vance Thompson, *Woman*, 221-5. March 14, 1914. "As for unmarried mothers," says a French feminist, "you can never do too much for them," Madame Avril de Saint-Croix, quoted by N. Conlon and R. de Chavagnes in their *Le Mariage et le Divorce de Demain*, 199.

<sup>51</sup> "Unmarried women should receive the pensions as well. . . . The granting of pensions to unmarried mothers would be of benefit both to the mothers and the children," Mrs. W. G. Brown, one-time President of the Federation of Women's Clubs of New York City, before a public commission, reported in *The New York Times*, March 4, 1914. "As for unmarried mothers," says a French feminist, "you can never do too much for them," Madame Avril de Saint-Croix, quoted by N. Coulon and R. de Chavagnes in their *Le Mariage et le Divorce de Demain*, 199.

women to have a child without a husband — and without a father for the child, thus infringing the child's right to have a father, which would seem as strong.<sup>52</sup> The beauty of illegitimate motherhood is so much admired, that the wish has been expressed that illegitimacy should go on increasing, in order to advance the time when it shall be legitimatised.<sup>53</sup> In Germany this is an avowed demand of the feminists, and there has been founded (in 1904, by Ruth Bré, herself an illegitimate child) a "Bund für Mutterchutz," principally for the protection of unmarried mothers. Norway, however, has gone furthest. There, March 7, 1916, was passed a law (promoted by the feminists) granting state aid to unmarried mothers during the periods briefly anterior and subsequent to giving birth, and to the children, where paternity can be established, the right to the father's name and to inherit on equality with the legitimate children.<sup>53a</sup> An authorisation of polygamy would only be a little more consistent. But this has the advantage that when the mother does not care to recognise her child's father, she need not. Subservient to this alleged right of unmarried mothers to suffer no disgrace, is the demand, already noticed, for women to give up the distinction between Miss and Mrs., and for all above a certain age to take the latter designation; for the additional purpose that, till the right be fully established, the mother's unmarried status shall not be so apparent. And better still, if the custom be introduced of all children, and not only illegitimate children, taking the name of their mother, as of old; for then the distinction will be still more obliterated, and all the laxness and indifference to paternity of the mother-age may be restored.<sup>54</sup> Spinsters having this right of matronhood, to preserve equality, it would seem that bachelors ought also be allowed to be fathers, and to enter good society accompanied by their bastards, like Wilhelm Meister in Goethe's romance. It will, on the whole, again become as difficult for men to know their children as it was in primitive times, and the matronymic

52 Here may be quoted Mrs. Florence Wise, Secretary of the Woman's Trade Union League of New York: "I believe only in voluntary motherhood, any way. There are many persons, men as well as women, who are better off without children. Many unmarried women, on the other hand, want children and there ought to be an opportunity for the expression of their innate mother-love," quoted in *The New York Times*, May 25, 1914. Even the opponent of feminism, Möbius, has stumbled into this pitfall: see his *op. cit.*, 54; and he was welcomed to their ranks by one of the German feminists, *ib.* 156.

53 Quoted from some one (approvingly?) by Katherine Anthony, *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, 137-8.

53a A law similar to this, known as the Castberg law, has been proposed in Illinois. It is advocated by Vance Thompson, *Woman*, 223.

54 Even the half-way practice in Spain of the children receiving also the mother's name, is considered by Mrs. Gallichan "significant" when it is coupled with the fact that "in no country" within her knowledge "does less social stigma fall on a child out of wedlock," or on its mother (or father) either, *The Position of Woman in Primitive Society*, 291.

system, if it has not been introduced on purpose, will come back of itself, and the only heirs a man will be able to have will be those of his uterine sisters, as still is the case among some backward peoples, such as the Nairs of Malabar. The women will then be owned by nobody, and will own their own children alone: how delightful! Yet by too much imitation of the primitives, we may again become primitive ourselves.<sup>55</sup>

These extravagant views are held as yet only by a few extremists. But already an opinion equally wanton is becoming widely advocated, and accepted as if it were self-evident. This is the demand for the same standard of morality in sexual matters for both the sexes.<sup>56</sup> On this subject there has been much loose thought, even on the part of persons not otherwise feminists. For example, Malthus, though condoning the difference of morals, wrote: "That a woman should at present be almost driven from society for an offence which men commit nearly with impunity, seems undoubtedly to be a breach of natural justice."<sup>57</sup> This is an error which underlies most of the talk of the sort. The fact is, that some women are almost driven from society for committing an act which no man can commit — that of bearing a child without a recognised father; while other women are kept beyond the pale for pursuing a profession (of prostitution) which comparatively few men pursue and which when a man pursues, he is condemned still more fiercely.<sup>58</sup> Men and women can no

55 "In the perfect comradeship of the future," says Miss Mabel Powers, "men and women will return to the Garden of Eden, which they left hand in hand," reported in *The New York Times*, April 13, 1914. There is no authority but Milton's for their having left Paradise hand in hand; and that which they are bound for together seems to be only Rousseau's state of nature, without civilisation.

56 We have seen this idea sprouting up in late antiquity. In modern times the beginnings of it may be found in Mary Wollstonecraft and her husband William Godwin. The former in her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, after denying "the existence of sexual virtues, not excepting modesty,"<sup>65</sup> affirmed that "till men are more chaste, women will be immodest," and maintained that "modesty must be equally cultivated by both sexes, or it will ever remain a sickly hot-house plant,"<sup>135</sup> The latter wrote: "When just notions upon this subject [of infidelity and divorce] shall be formed, the inconstancy of either sex would be estimated at precisely the same value," *Political Justice*, VIII. viii. In 1838 Sarah Moore Grimké wrote: "To me it is perfectly clear, that whatsoever is morally right for a man to do, it is morally right for a woman to do," adding that women should not only claim the same rights, but should recognise as devolving upon them "the same duties," *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes*, Boston, 1838, p. 122. Ten years later the women assembled at Seneca Falls objected to "the different code of morals for men and women," which men had given to the world, and "by which moral delinquencies that exclude women from society are not only tolerated, but deemed of little account in man," this being one of the grievances in their *Declaration of Sentiments* (*The History of Woman Suffrage*, i. 71). The idea was brought into prominence in England by Josephine E. Butler, who published her *Woman's Work and Woman's Culture* in 1869. She made a great outcry against the Contagious Diseases Act because it aimed mostly at protecting the health of men (soldiers): see her pamphlet *The New Era*, Liverpool, 1872, pp. 7-9. She was followed in America by the Clafin sisters.

57 *Essay*, 279.

58 There is, of course, a reason for the difference of treatment. "Male prostitution," says Kraft-Ebing, "is certainly much more dangerous to society than that of females: it is the darkest stain on the history of humanity," *Psychopathia Sexualis*, 593. But those who believe in the equality of the sexes cannot admit this. Forel does not: see above, ii. 43n.

more perform the same sexual act, than a gun and ramrod can perform the same act. When that "new thing in the earth" shall come to pass, of a woman encompassing a man,<sup>59</sup> it will be time enough to talk of their acting alike in the matter wherein nature has made them act differently. Nature having made the difference, rather strange is the notion that it violates "natural justice" for men and women to be treated differently for doing different acts — and committing different offences.<sup>60</sup> Men and women may perform corresponding actions, and when this is the case, the world is usually less severe on the woman than on the man. A well-known literateur was not long ago ruined for engaging in a practice which, *mutatis mutandis*, women are permitted to enjoy with impunity. Habitually women indulge in sensual closeness of intercourse with one another such as is not tolerated between men. Which is it, then, that the egalitarians desire to have altered — that women shall give up hugging and kissing one another, or that men shall take it up? So again a man who should say he loved another man would be shunned; but nobody thinks anything of it when two women are in love with each other.<sup>61</sup> In which way, again, is the change to be made? The true feminist is the Greek who, in Plutarch's *Amatorius* (c. 21) says that sex is a matter of indifference in love — as now it is said to be in politics. But it is precisely in sexual matters, which are different in the two sexes, that a natural difference does, and must, exist in their morality. Other matters are common to men and women as human beings, and with reference to them their morality is the same. It is the same crime for a woman as for a man to lie, to cheat, to rob, to murder. Curiously, however, it is in these matters — so perverted are our modern ideas — that a distinction is not infrequently made: the man who murders his wife or sweetheart is hanged, the woman who murders her husband or lover is acquitted.

Economic conditions, of course, are intimately bound up with the sexual conditions, being a consequence of them. In the marital relation the position of the wife is not only physiologically, but also economically, different from that of the husband. Physiological and economic responsibilities and duties are differently distributed, in a way to counterbalance each other.<sup>62</sup> Conse-

<sup>59</sup> *Jer.*, XXXI. 22.

<sup>60</sup> The true analog of the kept woman is, of course, not the man who keeps her, but the man kept by a woman. The payee and the payer are, naturally, not in the same class. Where there is no payment, and the woman does not bear a child, already society does not seem to place much difference between them.

<sup>61</sup> And yet the latter is apt to be the more serious case: see Forel, *The Sexual Question*, 252-4.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. W. G. Sumner: "Woman bears an unequal share of the responsibilities and duties of sex and reproduction just as certainly and justly as man bears an un-

quently their rights also being different, the law ought to treat husband and wife differently in those respects. And divorce, the breaking of marriage, likewise affects the woman differently from the man, and its natural causes are different; which should be recognised and followed by the law, as is generally the case. But when, as in socialism, the economic condition of men and women is to be rendered the same, or when the feminists expect that even without socialism women are going to prove themselves as economically effective as are men, and this is taken as if it already were a fact, then at least one reason for treating men and women in their sexual relations differently, is removed. For instance, because wives are no longer to be dependent on their husbands, either they will no longer be so indulgent as in the past, or they must themselves be indulged. "Only when the duty of support on the part of the man ceases," says Ellen Key, "will woman be able to demand the same chastity and fidelity from him as he demands from her."<sup>63</sup> Rather, when women become independent and self-supporting, they will have no more interest than men in a reputation for chastity, the lack of which will have no effect upon their success in business.<sup>64</sup> The physiological fact, however, will remain that, if men are to continue to be interested in their own children, women, because of their superiority in knowledge of their own children, have not such urgent need of fidelity on the part of their husbands, as their husbands have on their part. Never yet, therefore, have women made this demand so insistently as have men; and now the feminists are making it for them only from a prudential point of view, to safeguard their health.<sup>65</sup>—a reason as applicable to men, leaving them with the other reason still unbalanced on their side. This difference between the sexes is a little matter which nature will never be so obliging as to alter. Yet art and science are doing something to obviate some other phases of the distinction, since the use of preventive measures may make infidelity on the part of the wife as little a real concern (apart from sentiment) as is the husband's, especially when neither desire to have children; while the newly invented cures for venereal diseases may go far to render such conduct equally indifferent to both from the medical point

equal share of the responsibilities and duties of property, war, and politics," *Folkways*, 2d ed., 362.

<sup>63</sup> *The Woman Movement*, 148-9.

<sup>64</sup> In time, too, our men may become so humble and our women so overbearing, that the condition may be reached which is said to exist among a small tribe in India, the Kandhs, among whom constancy is not required in the wife, while infidelity on the part of the married man is held highly dishonourable; which no doubt many feminists would think as reasonable as the condition which elsewhere universally prevails.

<sup>65</sup> So, e.g., Christabel Pankhurst in her *Plain Facts about a Great Evil*, the suggestion of which seems to have been given by Brieux in his *Avariés*.

of view. Hitherto men have always taken the lead in requiring chastity in their wives and in the class of women from whom they take their wives; whereupon the reflex action of the women has helped to improve the morality also of men. The very statement, however, of this fact is now resented.<sup>66</sup> Men, it is exclaimed, moulded women for their own convenience, into what they did not themselves wish to be!<sup>67</sup> At once resistance is aroused. Henceforth women will be the makers of their own morality. And they will see to it that men behave themselves. But they will not go so far as men did: they will demand only that all morality shall be the same for both the sexes, because both are human beings. It shall be the same whether they be married or single; and between the unmarried, whether in youth or middle age, no difference is to be allowed, in spite of the different needs of the two sexes, which is denied,<sup>68</sup> and in spite of the difference in the possible consequences to them, although, again, these are to be obviated by contraceptive methods. It takes little knowledge of the world to foresee which way the assimilation will be made.<sup>69</sup> "We have no intention of interfering with men," says a female feminist, in another connection it is true, but with equal application here; "we do not put any fence around them, but we insist they shall not put any fence around us, either."<sup>70</sup> And open advocacy of such fencelessness of the female sex will be reviewed in the next chapter. But the very way the equalisation is generally stated shows the tendency. For example, Henrietta Rodman in *The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1915, says: "I would put no heavier penalty upon the girl who blunders, than I would on the man. Society has no right to treat the girl who blunders more brutally than the man." That society is only following nature, is of course, overlooked. Nature, it is thought, has here made a mistake. Women are to be like men, and therefore their actions are to be like men's. If women

<sup>66</sup> We shall hear more of this in the next chapter, from the leaders, especially Mrs. Gallichan. Already, however, Eliza B. Gamble had resented, not the implication, but the assertion itself, and denied it, calling it "as absurd as it is arrogant and false," *Evolution of Woman*, 230-1. She apparently thought women were created more chaste than men in the beginning. As their sexual appetite is less, perhaps they were; but the other fact has contributed to increase the difference, or rather the advance; for, after all, the difference is not a deep one.

<sup>67</sup> So Mary R. Coolidge, *Why Women Are So*, 91, cf. 175, 179-80.

<sup>68</sup> E.g., by Mary R. Coolidge, *op. cit.*, 330. This authoress is one of those who hold that men cannot know about women, 308, 312. But apparently she can know about men. Similarly Christabel Pankhurst, *op. cit.*, 126. On pp. 58-64 she makes many quotations from medical men, mostly not to the point, and, being negative evidence, worthless against the positive testimony of other doctors — e.g., W. J. Robinson, *Sexual Impotence*, 314-15, cf. 144-6.

<sup>69</sup> Even in Bellamy's socialism the single morality was not to be that of women — "the slave-code imposed upon them by their necessities," *Equality*, 141-2.

<sup>70</sup> Marie Jenney Howe, at the symposium over which she presided, as reported in *The New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1914.

are not so already, still their actions can be, and must be. But women are to be made so. Women's entrance into industry will make them economically equal. Contraceptive methods will make them physiologically equal.<sup>71</sup> Consequently their morality will be as free as men's; wherein a great gain is found,<sup>72</sup> notwithstanding the descent to man's level. The adoption by women of men's custom of having only one title for the married and unmarried will, as we have seen, aid the assimilation.<sup>73</sup> There is to be a single standard of morals as there is a single standard of money,—and it is to be man's silver rather than woman's gold. And even worse, it will be the baser primitive copper; for, on account of blessed equality, men are to be freed from the rules of chivalrous conduct which are peculiar to them. A eugenic mandate has, in some of our States, been enacted into law, that the groom before marrying shall get a doctor's certificate of his health, inversely as in several African tribes a jury of matrons was called in to pass upon the virginity of the bride. The latter's virtue is now taken for granted, or is regarded as a matter of equally small importance; but with perfect equality the law of health certification must be applied to the female also. The spirit of the socialists we have seen to be one of indifference to the welfare of the upper classes: if the lower classes can be elevated, good; if not, there is no reason why the others should longer be allowed to float over them. So the spirit of the feminists seems, while avowedly aiming at bringing men up to the moral elevation they prescribe for women, to be one of indifference in case this aim cannot be reached: at least there is no reason why the women's level should continue above the men's.<sup>74</sup> Women,

<sup>71</sup> Thus Dr. L. Jacobi, an advocate of "prophylaxis of conception," writes of it: "By conferring upon the woman immunity from the most dreaded sequel of illicit indulgence, it will undoubtedly tend to equalise the conduct of both sexes when confronted by temptation," quoted in Robinson's *Limitation of Offspring*, 243.

<sup>72</sup> Thus Clara G. Stillman welcomes the change. "Undoubtedly," she says, "absolute chastity in women will not be reckoned as high in the future as in the past. The ideal will be increasingly that of temperance rather than that of complete abstinence. But this change, which is already beginning to be noticeable, will not depend [only] on the prevention of conception, but mainly on women's changed economic status, and our increased understanding of sexual problems. Furthermore, a chastity that depends for its existence on fear alone is hardly a valuable asset," quoted *ib.* 185-6. Similarly, in speaking of preventive arts that make woman's indulgence almost as safe as man's, Mrs. Hale says: "The result is that in future we shall have for women not an enforced but a spontaneous morality, which cannot fail to be of special benefit to the race," *What Women Want*, 271.

<sup>73</sup> "The separate title custom," says Katherine Anthony, "is intimately bound up with the double standard of morals," *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, 110. Name women like men, and their morals may be like men's!

<sup>74</sup> So Elsie Clews Parsons, in her book on *The Family*, 348-9, says we should have either monogamy with chastity of men as well as of women outside marriage, or promiscuity as allowable in women as in men. Of course she recommends the former, but in default of it is willing to put up with the latter. And Vance Thompson simply declares that woman "is not going to stand up there [on the high, cold code of sex fidelity] alone any longer," *Woman*, 198.

on taking the prescription of their conduct into their own hands, will see to it that no more be required of them than of men.<sup>75</sup>

The spirit of comradeship, which we have seen demanded for marriage, is to extend over all human relations. Not only in work, as we shall see presently, but in play, men and women, married or unmarried, are to be companions. What is proper for men to do and enjoy, it is proper for women to do and enjoy. The sexes are never to be separated: women are to be admitted everywhere men are, and men everywhere women are, except only where decency forbids. And how will that hold out against perfect equality? Already it is proclaimed that the sexes should bathe together unclothed and unabashed.<sup>76</sup> Morality, it is affirmed, will be promoted thereby.<sup>77</sup> "When we get the vote," a female suffragist is reported to have said to a Congressional Committee, "there will be no signs before places of amusement in Washington, 'open only to men.'" Men, apparently, are not to be allowed to amuse themselves by themselves: the eternal feminine is to be everywhere, oversee everything, take part in everything. Women are to "see life," and "do things," just as men do. Already women attend prize-fights, and witness the brutalities of nearly naked negroes. Women have complained that in certain restaurants and other places of refection and recreation they are not allowed to enter unescorted, although there is the best of reasons for the regulation, for the sake of respectable women themselves. Now the tables are being turned, and in New York a year or two ago entrance to "afternoon tea" places, where there was "trotting," was not permitted to a man unless

<sup>75</sup> Among the feminists, however, Pearson sees danger in the choice of this side of the alternative, *Ethic of Freethought*, 378, *Chances of Death*, i. 239n. Christabel Pankhurst, who ascribes the recommendation of it to men, simply denies that women, under the lead of the suffragettes, will adopt it, *op. cit.*, 133, *cf.* 125, 135.

<sup>76</sup> This crops out every now and then, and here and there. Thus, *e.g.*, Miss Jessie Ph——s (her name may be spared), a professoress of physiology in a State normal college, asserts that "children of both sexes, and adults as well, should bathe and dress together freely and frankly, openly, and without prudish apology." She does not seem to be aware that this sort of thing has been tried over and over again, and has never worked, except among anaemic or cold-blooded peoples, like the Esquimaux, whose passionlessness is not conducive to high development. Even the Japanese are now giving up this custom, and it certainly must go, along with the geishas, when they become thoroughly sophisticated with western civilisation. Let the lady reformers read the Christian Fathers, who had experience of such things among the heathen. In the *Apostolic Constitutions* it is well said that women should avoid "many-eyed curiosity," I. 9. Cyprian expresses himself still more vigorously: "You may behold no one immodestly, but you yourself are gazed upon immodestly; you may not pollute your eyes with disgraceful delight, but in delighting others, you yourself are polluted," *On the Dress of Virgins*, c. 19. Precisely as just and quiet persons have to be inconvenienced by government (always exacting and interfering) because of the misdoings of unjust and turbulent persons, so the pure have to be put to inconvenience by the impure.

<sup>77</sup> L. A. Hine, to the Worcester Convention in 1850: "I believe that much of the immorality that now desolates society is due to the exclusion of woman from a free and full companionship with man. Let it be impressed upon all, that she has a right to accompany man wherever he may rightfully go, and I apprehend that the haunts of vice and shame, now sustained by the 'sterner sex,' would soon be broken up," *Proceedings*, 57.

accompanied by a woman. Even clubs are expected in the future to be common to both sexes.<sup>78</sup> Already in our country women go into camp, and are drilled, to encourage our poor men, playing at warfare, and thereby setting an example to our men to play likewise. It has recently been proposed to send them all into training together, because the male soldiers feel so lonely by themselves! The distinction between male and female is to be done away with to the minutest detail, and nature's great blunder in making it is to be thoroughly rectified. They are not to differ in appearance. Men are to shave their faces smooth, and women are to cut their hair short.<sup>79</sup> Of course their clothes must not be suffered to remain different. Here again it is what belongs to men that is coveted. In the middle of the last century this was a burning question in America and elsewhere, and many leaders of the woman's rights movement experienced agony in wearing "bloomers" before a scoffing public: underwent martyrdom, in their own estimation, for the cause—and all in vain.<sup>80</sup> Then it fell into abeyance, to be revived of late in theory<sup>81</sup> and put into practice for horse-back riding men's fashion, and urged for all the new women under the elegant sobriquet of "leg-emancipation."<sup>82</sup> The behaviour of all humans, above all things, must be the same—and always it is man's that is to be followed, copied, duplicated.<sup>83</sup> Women will drink, smoke, bet, swear, gamble, just as men do. Whether they like it or not, does not matter: men do these things, therefore women must, to show that they are as good

<sup>78</sup> At a public meeting, "as forces hostile to this perfect comradeship that is to be, Miss Mabel Powers attacked vigorously the segregation of the sexes—particularly that which men set up in their stag dinners and clubs! 'You never hear of a stag dinner among stags,' said the speaker. 'They say there are things talked about at stag dinners that women should not hear: but there is nothing women should not hear if it is worth talking about at all. The club of the future will be not a man's club or a woman's club, but a club for both. . . . All this is going to be changed, and in the future we shall see real sex companionship—real human companionship,'" *The New York Times*, April 13, 1914. Are women, then, to give up their "dove" lunches? Elsie Clews Parsons also, but more moderately, objects to the "exclusiveness" of men, which "increases the difference between them and women," which again stimulates to greater exclusiveness, forming "a closed circle," *Feminism and Conventionality*, *Annals*, 50.

<sup>79</sup> The last is a recent recommendation by Mrs. Gilman, according to the newspapers in March, 1916.

<sup>80</sup> Helene Marie Weber, a young German agriculturist who wore trousers, wrote to the women at the Worcester Convention in 1850: "It can serve no useful purpose to keep this question in the background; it must come forward eventually. Those who suppose that woman can be 'the political, social, pecuniary, and religious equal of man,' without conforming to his dress, deceive themselves and mislead others," *Proceedings*, 78. She predicted that "in ten years time male attire will be generally worn by the women of most civilised countries, and that it will precede the consummation of many great measures which are deemed to be of paramount importance," 78-9.

<sup>81</sup> By Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, i, 650. And now by Vance Thompson, who thinks that skirts are indecent and not a human costume, though they were the first (but women must "chuck" them, because men have done so), *Woman*, 108-16, 129-39, 164.

<sup>82</sup> So Miss Rose O'Neil is sure that "the ideal costume for women must release the legs," *The New York Times*, April 12, 1915. This feature of feminism, at all events, cannot be adopted by pious Jewesses, as it is divinely forbidden them, in *Deut.*, XXII, 5.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Mrs. John Martin, in her work against *Feminism*, 326.

as men.<sup>84</sup> What is not saucy in the gander, shall no more be saucy in the goose. There will be one dead level—at best of mediocrity. For, of course, none of these feminists know, or care to know, that dissipation in women is worse than in men for the children to be born—that is, for the next generation.

The next generation, indeed, is poorly provided for. For, while man is freeing himself from the primal curse of eating his bread in the sweat of his brow, woman is also seeking deliverance from her primal curse of pain in travail—not only by means of "twilight sleep," but by avoiding it altogether, or reducing it to the minimum. With the loosening of the marriage tie, there is coming on an indifference to the possession of children. A man or woman who may be abandoned any day by his or her mate, does not care to be so burdened, not contemplating with pleasure either to resign the children altogether to the other, or to keep them half-orphaned of the other parent, or to share them alternately. And if there are not to be children, why marry at all—at least till perfect facility of divorce be attained? So celibacy, too, is becoming popular. Or it may be because children are not wanted in the first place, for selfish economic or other reasons, that the marriage bond is breaking and celibacy increasing. At all events, these things hang together, associated with a determination that sensual pleasure shall be none the less. Whatever the cause, these things make their appearance at the culmination of civilisation; for a civilisation cannot long outlive them. And they have begun to appear to-day, in the most advanced nations and classes, where the marriage-rate and the birth-rate are falling, and where there is disinclination to rehabilitate them—where, for instance, young women will discuss with young men the great social evil of prostitution, but will not discuss even with old women the great social good of maternity.<sup>85</sup> Maternity, indeed, is becoming an object of indifference, compared with such important matters as business and athletics.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Yet, says Mrs. Martin: "The woman who insists upon being herself does not experience the slightest desire to do things merely because men do them," *Feminism*, 327.

<sup>85</sup> "If one attempts to discuss this vastly important theme," said the aged Mrs. Simon Baruch in *The New York Times*, July 12, 1914, "one is dismayed by the disinclination, if we may not call it horror, too frequently aroused in otherwise admirably womanly young modern women by the mere mention of the subject. . . . These young pleasure-seekers are quickly found to have given little thought, indeed to be unwilling to give any thought, to that phase of their existence for which Nature has specifically endowed them. Many openly resent such discussion, with shrugs of disdain."

<sup>86</sup> About a quarter of a century ago it became "the thing" among the fashionable set for women to ride horse-back astride. But a whisper from physicians, that it would impair their prospects of maternity, put a stop to it. Within the last few years this method of riding like men has again become the fashion among women. Probably the doctors have given the same warning; but it is no longer heeded.

Nor do the feminist reformers try to stem the evil tendency of the times: on the contrary, they row with the current, in company with the socialists. The most advanced ones even urge on the descent. They teach the right of celibacy. Marriage, for them, is merely a private affair, to be entered or left as one's pleasure dictates. The state has nothing to do with it. "If," says one of them, "it be the choice of certain people to remain unmarried, it is an affair which rests entirely with themselves."<sup>87</sup> And women must not be at a disadvantage here. They must be able to get along without marrying, if they choose, just as well as men can. The spinster must be in as enjoyable a position as the bachelor, even if she has to be helped thereto by the state: she is, indeed, to be a "bachelor girl," as the phrase now runs; for "old maid" she sees no need of remaining. Spinsterhood is even set up by some as the highest state, insuring honour and independence,<sup>88</sup> and freeing the woman to "serve humanity," and, like a man, to "have a life full of joy and interest"<sup>89</sup>—making money! A large family is their bugaboo, because it deprives the mother of the higher things of life, those in which men are interested ("seeing" it, for instance), and ties her down to the nursery and domesticity. Small families may be tolerated, as not wholly excluding from those other things. And the smaller, the better. A British militant, who has adopted politics as her life-work, declares that "one child is enough," since a woman ought to "help fill the family purse," and "of course this cannot be done by a woman who has an abundance of children."<sup>90</sup> One child, in

<sup>87</sup> Letter of a "Bachelor Girl" in *The New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1913. She adds a common sentiment: "It is far better to look out for those who already exist than to bring others into existence that cannot be cared for," according to the ever advancing standard of living. Cf. Gladys Jones: "It is more profitable to care for the welfare of one's living sister than to sacrifice her soul [!] to a grandchild who may never appear; it is a safer speculation," *The Rights of the Living*, Westminster Review, June, 1909, p. 650. Even material comfort now is taken for one's soul!

<sup>88</sup> So Mrs. Celia Burleigh, in Brooklyn, said: "I honour the single women, and predict that the time is not distant when they, rather than the married women, will be the distinguished and honoured," quoted by J. M. Buckley, *The Wrong and Peril of Woman Suffrage*, New York, 1909, p. 110. So the French "integral" feminist, Mlle. Goudon, who writes over the pseudonym of Arria Ly, proclaims "perpetual spinsterhood," "virtuous" withal, to be "the most dignified and most desirable state for women, and the only one that will assure them true independence," as reported in *The New York Sun*, March 16, 1913.

<sup>89</sup> Christabel Pankhurst, *op. cit.*, 135. This suffragette has discovered a new reason for the recommendation of celibacy. She urges women to be chary about marrying on account of the liability to infection from husbands, 103-5, cf. 55.

<sup>90</sup> Mrs. Dorothy Maloney Lancaster, as reported in the *New York Thrice-a-week World*, Dec. 9, 1912. She says she was the tenth in a family of sixteen. From one extreme to the other. Also Ch. V. Drysdale, in his *The Small Family System*, London, 1913, does not seem to object even to "the single child system." W. J. Robinson, however, takes credit to himself because "We have never advocated the one child system. We have always stated that in our opinion the proper number [of children] is two or three," *The Limitation of Offspring*, 84. So in general, but "a workingman," he also says, "should not have more than two children," "too many children in other than well-to-do families" being "a crime," because they cannot then live well and comfortably, 33-5. This subject has been investigated by Lydia K. Commander, who

fact, converts a woman into a mother, and so seems to satisfy her physiological function. But it does not (nor would two) satisfy the physiological purpose, which is to perpetuate the race. To this the feminists show the supremest indifference. The birth-rate of one's own country, of one's own class, may fall still lower, and they care not.<sup>91</sup> "Whether one has children or not is a purely personal matter."<sup>92</sup> There is no longer any duty in it, except the duty of making no demand upon anybody to do anything he or she does not want to do. If the reproduction of the race, or of any valuable part of it, be dangerously reduced through observance of this great new duty, then "it can only be replied that such reduction would be proved thereby to be desirable."<sup>93</sup>

In excuse really, but brazenly in advocacy, of small families is offered the plea that thereby, instead of quantity, the quality of the future generations may be improved.<sup>94</sup> This idea is in harmony with the ease-loving tendencies of a luxurious age. From the thoughtless it has been taken up by many well-meaning persons, and advanced in all seriousness and sincerity. But it deserves little respect on the latter account, and none on the former. Physiologically there is not an atom of reason to suppose that quality can be improved by restriction of numbers. On the contrary, all probability is for improvement with practice, and good combinations of hereditary qualities are more likely to be produced—short of excess—in the later than in the earlier

concludes that "the prevailing American ideal, among rich and poor, educated and uneducated, women and men,"—and one which even foreign immigrants soon learn to adopt,—"is two children," preferably a boy and a girl, *The American Idea*, 45, cf. 12-19; examples, 26-9; so among physicians, 44; landlords do not want tenants who have many children, or who have any at all, 10-11.

91 Cf. Christabel Pankhurst, who seems to contemplate this possibility with a grim satisfaction, *op. cit.*, 104.

92 Clara G. Stillman, quoted by Robinson, *The Limitation of Offspring*, 193.

93 "Candida," in *The New Statesmen*, June 20, 1914, p. 335. Cf. an editorial in *The Nation*, New York, May 21, 1891, p. 418: "We are very much of the opinion that the most likely way for any nation to be happy is for all the individuals in it to be happy; and that the most likely way for an individual to be happy is to have his own way in life, as far as compatible with the right of every other man to have his way. This rule is as applicable to the matter of marrying and raising children as to any other concern of life, and every ordinarily intelligent man will be better able to judge of what it behoves him to do in that regard than any college professor or member of a legislature or newspaper editor can do for him. Neither need any citizen feel bound to postpone his own present happiness to any consideration of what may become of his country a hundred or two hundred years hence. He can neither foresee nor avert the future; and if he could it would be futile to do so. As long as a nation is fit to exist it will continue to exist; if it is not fit, the sooner it makes room for one that is, the better. If the French or any other people are doomed to extinction, it must be for deep-seated organic reasons, which no legislation or rhetoric can reach." In other words, we need make no effort to make any people more "fit to exist," or to keep it from becoming less so.

94 Thus in an article on *The Decline of the Birth-rate* in the *Westminster Review*, Sept., 1908, pp. 268-73, J. Fizelle attributes the decline to women's greater knowledge of the sexual relations, revolt at its inequality, and consideration for the welfare of the children, who may be better if they be fewer, the preference being for quality before quantity. This last may be found *passim* in feminist literature.

children. Reliance, of course, is put upon education; but it is a false notion that education can make up for the want of innate excellence.<sup>95</sup> The claim is that education may itself be given in better doses if there be only a couple of children, since very few parents are well enough off to give a good education to four or five children. But even this notion is false. If restriction were taught to the very poor, and confined to them, it would be a good thing — and principally because the very poor are so because of their incompetency. The majority of persons in the middle classes, and all in the upper, are well enough off actually to give a *better* education to four or five children than to only one or two. In the first place, many children in a family educate one another. In the second place, with but one, or even two, the tendency is to pamper and coddle them, and spoil them, rendering them timid by keeping them from all danger. The opportunities recommended as attainable only in small families are generally opportunities for pleasure — for having a good time, with fine things and expensive recreations. In large families there is more occasion for work — for hard study and to learn to pass time without expenditure of money. In brief, a single child is taken care of; many children have to take care of themselves, and of one another. This last is the better education of the two. Small families directly contribute to the degeneration of the race through bad gestation, bad rearing, bad education, bad training, and bad discipline.<sup>96</sup>

The tendency to small families is furthered by the fact that all the feminist views lead up to the culminating one, that women are to have control of the number of their children. The unmarried woman, we have seen, may have a child, if she wants one. And now the married woman need not have a child, unless she wants one, and no more than she wants. "Motherhood," it is said in the new morality, "can be sacred only when it is voluntary."<sup>97</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Cf. Möbius, *op. cit.*, 53.

<sup>96</sup> There is only one way to improve quality rather than quantity in a race. This is to breed much from the better quality already existing and to breed little or nothing from the poorer quality already existing. In default of this, the next best thing is to do everything to save and preserve the offspring of the better quality and to do little or nothing to preserve the offspring of the poorer quality. In our country, however, there is need of increasing the quantity also. And this need exists in England and France also, because of their colonies. In an article on *Quality, not Quantity* in The Eugenics Review, Jan., 1917, Major Leonard Darwin advocates "an increase in some types and a decrease in others," and because these are taken to counterbalance each other, he considers himself as "boldly striving for quality and not quantity," p. 315. The boldness seems to consist in the novelty for a eugenist to advocate any increase of numbers. Thus he adds that "the fears" as to continued suffering "must not prevent us from advocating an increase in the rate of production among all the sections of the community which are above the average in inborn qualities," 318. Yet, if one belongs to a race or nation which he considers above the average, why should he not advocate an increase of the upper strata more than counterbalancing the decrease advocated in the lower strata, thus combining advocacy of quality and quantity? But this article is a good sign of a returning wave (let us hope it is not a mere ripple) of sanity, occasioned by the war.

<sup>97</sup> Cicely Hamilton, *Marriage as a Trade*, 255.

According to another advocate of this doctrine, "it has come to be recognised as a matter of elementary justice that, since the woman has to bear the child, the final decision should lie in her hands."<sup>98</sup> The elementariness of the justice is apparent if marriage is only a pleasure partnership, especially if the wife is economically independent of her husband.<sup>99</sup> It is by no means apparent, because it is not a fact, if the man married with the hope of raising a family, and supports his wife for this purpose. Then motherhood is sacred only if it is dutiful. The state also should have a hand in the matter, as the state needs children for its own perpetuation. Law, however, can accomplish but little here. It is an affair, rather, of public sentiment, which the state can foster by instruction. Law can help by giving the husband cause for divorce if his wife will not bear him a respectable number of children (at least three or four); and the wife also, of course, should have the same cause for divorce, if her husband refuse her children.<sup>1</sup> The instruction should be a supplementation of ordinary Malthusianism. It should continue to teach the thriftless and incompetent their duty to avoid having children (and permit them the means of doing so); and additionally it should teach the thrifty and competent their duty to have children — and enough to fill the places left vacant by the others. Yet the state can hardly prevent it, if the people, or the upper class among the people, are bent upon devoting their line to extinction.

It is true enough that in this matter of propagating the species the lot of women, with its attendant disqualifications, when the compensating joys of motherhood are overlooked, seems much harder than that of men; and so striking has the difference always appeared, that the Jews of old tried to account for it by a fable, and so difficult is it to account for that that fable would

<sup>98</sup> "Candida," *loc. cit.*, cf. Christabel Pankhurst, *op. cit.*, 102. The former is in an article on *The Refusal of Maternity* on the part of the married woman. In the next number, June 27, it was followed up with an article on *The Right of Motherhood* belonging to the unmarried woman: see p. 365; although the authoress admits she cannot give an answer to the objection which arises from "the child's right to a father," 367. Cf. above, p. 132 and note. The right of "volitional motherhood," including both the right of the unmarried woman to motherhood and the right of the married woman to limit her family, appears to Katherine Anthony "so manifest" as not to need defence; and to her it is clear "that the existence of these two demands side by side is evidence of a natural and healthy revolt of the child-bearing sex" against "sex slavery" to "the wombless sex," *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, 97-9.

<sup>99</sup> "Under a voluntary system of marriage (woman being economically independent) . . . a woman would hardly bear a child unless she desired to bear it," Cicely Hamilton, *op. cit.*, 256. Marriage, according to W. Lyon Blease in his *The Emancipation of English Women*, London, 1913, pp. 224-5, must "become a partnership," in which the wife has both personal and economic independence, and for her both the birth and care of children is voluntary.

<sup>1</sup> At present in some countries a marriage may be annulled if the husband is impotent. Surely, then, if a woman may be freed because of the man's inability to give her pleasure, she, and he, ought to have the right of divorce if the other cannot, or will not, beget or bear children.

not succeed even if it were true. But the fault is not man's, and it is his duty to see to it that the woman perform her task. Somebody has said that, if husband and wife conceived alternately, there would never be a third child. But then the race would have soon become extinct. Against that, nature has guarded by exempting one sex from the pain. The pain waxes greater and the strength to endure it wanes smaller with the advance of civilisation into luxury. Then it becomes the desire of women to take into their own hands the determination of the number of their children; and if the men, in any nation, resign the headship of the family or concede this right to the women, it means the approaching end of that nation. It is, of course, a sign of weakness already developed, when the persons who have to suffer a necessary pain, shrink from it. And it is a sign of still greater weakness and degeneracy, when those who only have to inflict it on others, likewise shrink from it.

And as women are the bearers of the children, women should be their guardians. So say the extreme feminists. The more moderate content themselves with claiming that the mother must be guardian equally, and jointly, with the father. This is now set up as natural and self-evident.<sup>2</sup> How little nature determines the question, may be seen from the facts that in some species of animals the mother alone takes care of the offspring, in others the father, in some both and in others neither, they being left to their own devices, or being taken care of (among bees) by their elder maiden sisters or aunts; and that among mankind in the primitive mother-age the mothers alone did, and in the father-age which succeeded, the fathers have been the supporters both of the mothers and of the children. If it was natural in the primæval ages for the mothers to be the guardians, it is natural in civilised times for the fathers to be the guardians.<sup>3</sup> Should it ever happen that the mothers equally provide for the children (as the feminists expect them to do), then it may be natural, and self-evidently just, that the mother should be joint guardian with the father of the children she consents to bear; but it is not natural or self-evidently just as yet, but much rather the reverse. In saying this, the fact is not forgotten that the mother does most of the work of procreation and early rearing; for that has its own compensation. As long as the father is practically the protector

<sup>2</sup> Alice S. Blackwell: "The suffragists have been trying to secure legislation making the father and mother joint guardians of their children by law, as they are by nature. . . . This self-evidently just measure," etc., *Objections Answered*, 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> "Man is the only animal who denies to the mother the supreme control of the young," complains Laura Aberconway, *The Other Side*, *The Nation*, London, May 31, 1913, forgetting that man is the only animal who takes care not only of the child but of the mother, and the only animal who has made civilisation.

and supporter of the mother, he should be recognised at least as guardian of the children.<sup>4</sup> In case of divorce, some feminists would give the first right to the children to the mother. This would be natural if marriage were instituted in the way they desire it to be. But with marriage as it is, it would not be natural or just. If any division of the children is to be made, it would seem best that the mother should have more control over the daughters, and the father over the sons. Every fatherless son should be provided with a male guardian. Those who talk so glibly about rights, should admit the right of the boy to have a substitute for his father—a position which his mother cannot take, since she has her own position to fill. The state needs this to prevent effeminisation of such boys.<sup>5</sup> Also, to compel widowed mothers to be the sole guardians of all their children helps to disincline married women from having many. This demand of the feminists is one more of their weakening measures.

There are, and have been, two theories of marriage. The one is, that it is primarily for the sake of the children (unions for pleasure being otherwise formed), and is a matter of duty (not always pleasurable), and is permanent, unless its purpose is violated or it becomes utterly unendurable. The other is, that it is primarily for the sake of the marrying partners, and is a matter of pleasure, children being only incidental, and it is no more permanent than the pleasure found therein. The latter is the animal kind of marriage, or pairing, and was the first to be enjoyed by human beings, when men and women mated while they liked each other's company, and women were left in charge of the children borne by them, in the mother-age. It is again the feminist theory of marriage, and would again leave the children principally to the mother. The former is the human kind of marriage proper (no longer mere pairing), and it is man's invention. In it men take charge of the children whom they have reason to believe they begot, as they do of the mother too. The father also regulates their number, in consultation with his wife. Christianity, for a time, produced a diversion. It taught that neither husband nor wife should refuse each other's embraces,<sup>6</sup> and

<sup>4</sup> Of course, then, even in the present system the father who shirks this duty and abandons his wife or children, or is incompetent to protect them, should forfeit his guardianship—and forfeit it to the wife and mother if she assumes that duty in his place. The law ought to recognise such cases.

<sup>5</sup> The appointed male guardian, however, should be only co-guardian. The trouble with the old common law is not that it permits the husband to appoint a guardian to succeed him after his death, but that it grants too much power to that guardian. He should not have power to take the child from the mother, except by order of a court, on proof of the mother's unfitness. And proof of his own unfitness should disqualify him.

<sup>6</sup> Remigius, a mediæval bishop or monk, thus interprets *I. Cor. VII. 3* in his *Explanatio, ad loc.*: “*Uxor vir debitum reddat, et uxor viro: id est, non se subtrahant ab invicem a coitu,*” in Bigne's *Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum*, viii. 959.

should accept all the children the Lord sent them. This view, of course, is no longer tenable. Parents know how to determine, within certain bounds, whether they shall have children or not. The state needs to see to it that at least the better element in its people determine to have children rather than not. For this purpose it should leave the decision rather with the husband, who does not suffer, than with the wife, who does. The woman's kind of marriage, associated with woman's industry, continued for thousands of years through the mother-age, and never raised mankind out of barbarism. Then the man's kind of marriage, consequent also upon the development of man's industry, began civilisation, and it has always existed among peoples who were rising in civilisation; while the woman's kind of marriage, the theory of which is now evolved, has always re-appeared at a high stage of over-ripe civilisation and has conducted to its decay. We to-day, who are hanging half-way between these two theories, the old practice having already begun to break down, now have our choice between them. Shall we go ahead in the downward course, and adopt the feminist theory wholly? Or shall we go back to the man's theory and practice? If we have not strength enough for the latter, shall we not at least resist going further into the abyss?

Too little is recognised the danger that arises from disregarding the propagation of children, making it an incidental accompaniment of marriage, secondary thereto, and preferably to be undertaken on a small scale. The case is often misstated, by universalisation, and then is easily denied.<sup>7</sup> Or it is denied on the ground that nature stands in the way. "Feminism," says one of its devotees, "has little need to persuade women of the desirability of marriage and maternity,—among normal women nature takes care of that."<sup>8</sup> Among normal women who follow their instinct, nature takes care of that; but not such are the wrongly rationalising feminist women, and their dupes, who have given ample testimony that among them nature does not take care of that, their selfish intelligence controlling their self-neglecting instinct. Then reliance is placed on the fact that the matter must ultimately right itself, through the extinction of the people who have none or too few children. "The evidence" of the decreasing birth-rate, says Grant Allen, "of course is destined by natural means to cure itself with time. . . . In a hundred years

<sup>7</sup> E.g., "As for the idea that the birth rate will decrease until mankind dies out — this danger is a purely imaginary one," Clara G. Stillman, in Robinson's *Limitation of Offspring*, 186.

<sup>8</sup> Mrs. Hale, *What Women Want*, 181. According to Blease, "Nature can no more be expelled with a ballot paper than with a pitchfork," *op. cit.*, 225.

things will have righted themselves.”<sup>9</sup> This is the first error over again; for it is true of the world at large, in which this matter will always right itself after periods of aberration among certain peoples or classes of society; but it may mean, meanwhile, the wiping out of those peoples or classes.<sup>10</sup> Grant Allen probably had his own country in mind; but England might be ruined by the dying out of its better elements, although the world would go on its way rejoicing. Already many empires have fallen and various races decayed. The time to apply the remedy for a foreseeable evil is the present, not the future after its occurrence.<sup>11</sup> “It is no use relying on Nature to correct our mistakes,” well says Harold Owen; for her correction is through suffering. “The thing to do is to look where we are going, and not to make the mistake to begin with.”<sup>12</sup> Misplaced optimism of this hindsight sort has been tolerated even by anti-feminists. Ideas disparaging matrimony, said Goldwin Smith, “are not likely to spread widely, or they would threaten the life of the race.”<sup>13</sup> Unfortunately the truth is, that such ideas may spread widely, and do threaten that portion of the race which entertains them. The mere existence of the race at large is safe. But the existence of its best parts, when such ideas spread among them, is doomed.

<sup>9</sup> *Plain Words on the Woman Question*, The Fortnightly Review, October, 1889.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Möbius, *op. cit.*, 29-30.

<sup>11</sup> Hence the absurdity of this by Mrs. Hale: “In all that Feminism claims, it never forgets the ends of the race [!]. If its demands were derogatory to the species, they would have to be denied; and if man did not deny them, nature would. If the generations to come were to suffer from the activities of woman to-day, these activities would have to cease [then], at whatever cost to her,” *What Women Want*, 165.

<sup>12</sup> *Woman Adrift*, London, 1912, p. 226.

<sup>13</sup> *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 201.

## CHAPTER VI.

### VIEWS OF LEADING FEMINISTS

WE may further examine these new demands at their fountain-heads, whence they well forth in fuller and more constant streams. Not those who pick out this or that point in a series at their pleasure or according to their taste, but those who consistently and systematically grasp the whole sequence of the things that naturally depend on or give rise to one another, are the typical representatives of a movement. Mrs. Gilman and Mrs. Schreiner are the foremost living leaders in English-speaking lands, outdone by the Scandinavian Ellen Key, who has found a disciple in George Bernard Shaw. Grant Allen, the naturalist, was a forerunner, preceded by Lester F. Ward, who was accompanied by Eliza Burt Gamble. Such historians of the subject as Bachofen, Ellis, and Pearson may be omitted—the first not a friend of feminism, the last a feminist as well as a socialist, and Ellis so fair a collector of facts that the feminist conclusions at the end of his book are mostly belied in the body of it.<sup>1</sup> We may begin with Ward as the founder of the prevalent naturalising school of fem-

<sup>1</sup> Thus Ellis objects to "maternity under certain conditions" being "practically counted as a criminal act," *Man and Woman*, 396. Yet he must know that the vast majority of single women cannot rear a child (much less several of them) well under such conditions, and therefore society has a right to object to this becoming a practice. "We are not at liberty to introduce any artificial sexual barriers into social concerns," 397. Here appears the cloven hoof of opposition to constraint. "Artificial" in the sense of contrary to nature and as leading to bad results, no; but "artificial" in the sense of improving upon nature, in accordance with nature ("art is man's nature," said Burke, *Works*, iv. 176), yes. Without some artificial barriers we should be as promiscuous as the cats in our backyards o' nights. Then, like Mill, he desires further experimentation to ascertain "the respective fitness of men and women for any kind of work," and continual experimentation; for he adds that no permanent solution can be obtained, "as the conditions for such experiment are never twice the same." This is dogmatic exaggeration on an important point. "When such experiment is unsuccessful, the minority who have broken natural law alone suffer." This is not true: the whole nation may suffer. "An exaggerated anxiety lest natural law be overthrown, is misplaced. The world is not so insecurely poised." The world is not, but a nation is. This is the error just pointed out at the end of the last chapter. All these things are excrescences upon a very sound and accurate investigation of the differences between the sexes.—Somewhat the same inconsistency between the conclusions and their bases may be found in the work of W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, whose feminism, however, is not so prominent. It appears perhaps most strongly on p. 94, where he says "each class [of women and of negroes] is regaining its freedom because the race is substituting other forms of decision for violence." But for the latter assertion he offers no better reason than his opinion, expressed on p. 314, that "in all our relations there is too much of primitive man's fighting instinct and technique," and his hope that "the participation of woman and the lower races will . . . result in the reconstruction of our habits on more sympathetic and equitable principles." Thus women are to participate because our civilisation is becoming more equitable, and our civilisation will become more equitable because women are to participate!

inists, and after reviewing his disciples, and Ellen Key and hers, and briefly glancing at the recommendations of the physiologist Forel, we may end with the most recent and extreme advocate of the new ideas, Mrs. Gallichan.

The late Lester F. Ward, a naturalist, who turned to sociology, advanced in 1888, in an article on *Our Better Halves* in The Forum of November of that year (pp. 266-75), a theory which he afterward denominated the gynæcocentric,<sup>2</sup> but which, as he universalised it of all animate nature, he should have named the thelyocentric.<sup>3</sup> This is that nature began with the female, "the insignificant male appearing to be an afterthought" for the sole purpose of impregnating the female (like a Prince Consort!); for the male exhibits such superfluousness for any other purpose in certain of what are called "the lowest forms of life," as among the cirripeds or barnacles, in some of which Darwin discovered a female with "two little husbands" packed away in a pocket on her back;<sup>4</sup> and an account is quoted of a female spider of a certain variety devouring her tiny mate during his very act of impregnating her, and reference is further made to hemp and some other plants, the males in which are by the females crowded out of existence after they have performed their office of fertilisation.<sup>5</sup> Higher up, after the males have been raised by female sexual selection, the males, among animals, fight amongst themselves for the females, but do not protect them, they protecting themselves and their offspring.<sup>6</sup> "The females of all wild animals," he asserts, "are more dangerous to encounter than the males, especially when angry,"<sup>7</sup> thus originating Kipling's *Female of the Species*. In the human species, however, the males have inverted the usual practice, and select the females (for he thinks the female animals select their victorious suitors!<sup>8</sup>), and the ornamentation of the male animals has accordingly been transferred to the female (at least in her clothes!)<sup>9</sup> As the female among the

<sup>2</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 297ff.

<sup>3</sup> In opposition to a possible arrhenocentric theory, or universalisation (cf. Buffon: "The male is the true model of the species," *Histoire naturelle*, art. du Serin) of the old androcentric theory (the *locus classicus* of which is *I. Cor.* XI. 8-9, cf. *I. Tim.* II. 13; cf. also Aristotle and Schopenhauer, quoted above, pp. 48n. and 31).

<sup>4</sup> The reference given is to Darwin's letter to Lyell of Sept. 14, 1849. More information on the subject may be obtained from Darwin's *Monograph on Cirripedia*, London, 1854, pp. 23-4, 27-30.

<sup>5</sup> All these examples are repeated with increasing gusto and enlargement in *Dynamic Sociology*, 2d ed., i. 659-60, *Pure Sociology*, 2d ed., 314-16, 320-1, and a few in *The Psychic Factors of Civilisation*, 2d ed., 87.

<sup>6</sup> This, too, is repeated in *Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 617, *Pure Sociology*, 330-1. It is, of course, a gross exaggeration.

<sup>7</sup> Again overstated in *Pure Sociology*, 331: "She alone is dangerous."

<sup>8</sup> "The female simply looks on [at the males fighting for her] and admires the victorious rival, and selects [!] him to continue the species," *Pure Sociology*, 331.

<sup>9</sup> Ward was here preceded by an anonymous writer on *The Changing Status of Women* in The Westminster Review, Sept. 1887, p. 826. The new status is expected to restore to women their due weight in sexual selection.

lower species, so still "woman is the race;"<sup>10</sup> and as the human species is at the top, "the grandest fact in nature is woman."<sup>11</sup> Yet so plastic does he consider the human female that he maintains that "under the power of this comparatively modern male selection woman may become whatever man shall desire her to be." Accordingly, "the way to civilise the race is to civilise woman," (which apparently must be done by men!<sup>12</sup>), and "the elevation of woman is the only road to the evolution of man."

This little *jeu d'esprit*, originally intended to please the ladies,<sup>13</sup> might be passed by without comment, but for the fact that it attracted much attention and that its author, pleased at the invention of a novelty, afterward elaborated it with all seriousness and incorporated it in his sociological system. The fullest treatment of it is made in his *Pure Sociology*, where it occupies eighty closely printed pages, and clearly reveals its inherent absurdities. Here Ward starts out again with the assertion that "life begins as female" (p. 313), which is as false as it is old; for it was enunciated over two thousand years ago by Aristotle,<sup>14</sup> and is logical nonsense, since male and female are correlative terms and the one cannot exist without the other, what existed in nature before the appearance of this distinction being neither female nor male. But, holding that all the lowest forms of life, in which no male appears, are females, and projecting this condition into the past, were no doubt it lasted for a long period,<sup>15</sup> he renews the assertion that "the male is therefore, as it were, a mere afterthought of nature."<sup>16</sup> At best he had a right to say that sexual, in distinction from other kinds of, reproduction, as a later development, was an afterthought of Nature. But even this is not tenable. If Nature thinks, we may well accredit her with forethought enough to have planned her later products from the beginning; and if she does not think, nothing can be an afterthought of hers. To vary the words and call the male sex, as he sometimes does, "only an adjunct or incident,"<sup>17</sup> does not improve matters. Especially in

<sup>10</sup> Repeated in *Pure Sociology*, 322, 372; or put in the past tense, 415. *Psychic Factors*, 93, cf. 87: "the female is the organism."

<sup>11</sup> Already in 1864 a woman, Eliza W. Farnham, had written: "Woman's organism is more complex and her totality of function larger than those of any other being inhabiting our earth; therefore her position in the scale of life is the most exalted — the sovereign one," *Woman and her Era*, vol. i, ch. i.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. George Meredith's Pilgrim Script: "I expect that Woman will be the last thing civilised by Man," *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel*, 1 (1859).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Pure Sociology*, 297, where the history of the theory is given.

<sup>14</sup> *De Animal. Gener.*, IV. iii.

<sup>15</sup> 312, 313, 328, 375.

<sup>16</sup> 314, again 323. In a similar strain Grant Allen wrote of plants: "The leaf is after all the real plant, and the flower is but a sort of afterthought," *The Evolutionist at Large*, ch. iv. Ward is followed by Thomas, who also holds that the development of the human hand and brain is such an "afterthought," *Sex and Society*, 225, 253.

<sup>17</sup> *Psychic Factors*, 87.

an evolutionist is it absurd to belittle anything because it is a late product in the evolution of the cosmos.<sup>18</sup> He now finds in the animal kingdom, and even in the vegetable, many instances, among what he calls "the lowest species," where the male is a "minute and inconspicuous fertiliser," solely devoted to this purpose, and perishing when it is accomplished,—in some species even they are little more than sacs, like testicles, containing spermatozoa; while in plants (besides again referring to hemp and the like) he treats the pistils and stamens as the true individuals, and refers to the fact that the stamens wither after shedding their pollen, whereas the pistils go on developing their ovules (320). This last, of course, is purely fanciful, while as for the former cases (except that of hemp, which, however, is not a low species, and is itself entirely exceptional) their peculiarity is that all of them are specimens of degeneration. Cirripeds, though resembling mollusks, are by their embryology proved to be degenerate crustaceans.<sup>19</sup> It is true that female spiders are not degenerate animals, but the male spiders are, they (like the drones of bees) never having found anything to do but to impregnate their females. So also degenerate are all the males (*e.g.*, those of mosquitoes) which live ephemerally, having lost even the organ for taking in food.<sup>20</sup> To speak of these animals as among the lowest forms of life may mislead (and Ward was misled), because it suggests that they are near the beginning of their development, and are among (or like) the ancestry of the human species. They are, instead, at the end of an offspring branch or twig, and have nothing to do with our line of development, any more than has hemp. Reference to them, therefore, is utterly worthless in the study of human sociology. All parasites are degenerate,<sup>21</sup> and the males, having still less to do than the females, have generally degenerated more. The cirripeds are not the only example. In the bopyrus (a parasite in prawns and other isopoda) the male is a parasite upon the female, and carried on her abdomen. In a marine worm, the bonella (of the gepyrea) the

<sup>18</sup> Ward in his *Psychic Factors*, 61, 89, *cf.* 209, actually imitates here the pre-evolutionist Schopenhauer, who thus belittled intellect, treating it as "merely an accident"; *cf.* also *Pure Sociology*, 476.

<sup>19</sup> So E. Ray Lankester, *Degeneration: a Chapter in Darwinism*, republished in *The Advancement of Science*, 29-30. Ward's ignorance, or oversight, of this is shown by his speaking of the female cirriped's development being "normal" and of the male's "enormous" difference from her as "perfectly natural and normal," *Pure Sociology*, 314, 315.

<sup>20</sup> In the ephemeridae both the sexes are ephemeral, but of course only in the imago state, as in all the other instances. In no animal is its whole existence confined to a day.

<sup>21</sup> Grant Allen remarks very à propos: "Parasites, whether animal or vegetable, always end by becoming mere reproductive sacs, mechanisms for the simple elaboration of eggs or seeds," *The Evolutionist at Large*, ch. xiii. On the degeneracy of parasites see E. S. Talbot's *Degeneracy*, 12-13.

male is only a hundredth the size of the female, and lives in her oviduct.<sup>22</sup> In still more extreme cases, like the cestodes or tape-worms, the male disappears from existence, the species being hermaphrodite. In the cirripedia themselves, many are hermaphrodite, and Darwin therefore called the remaining males merely "complemental." Almost anything imaginable can be found in the range of natural history. Ward and his followers never cite the not infrequent cases of lower animals in which the males are larger than the females. They overlook such opposite cases as the bitharzia parasite, in which "the male carries the female about with him in a 'gynaecophoric canal,' formed of folds of the skin";<sup>23</sup> also an amphipod crustacean, of which the male, twice the size of a female, carries her about between his legs; also certain beetles in India, of which the male, after combat with others, carries off the female triumphantly on his back<sup>24</sup>—whether in a position of dignity or indignity, it is hardly possible to tell.

Still, it is true, there are species in which the male has degenerated into inconspicuousness, performing no other function than that of fertilising the female. But the ridiculousness of Ward's theory is, that he treats what happens at the end of certain lines of one-sided and abnormal development as the normal condition in the beginning! "The male element," he says, "began as a simple fertiliser,"<sup>25</sup> and "for a long period," about which he offers not a word of proof, it remained and "still" is "throughout many of the lower orders of beings" (rather, has become in certain degenerate beings) only such (314, *cf.* 322); and in comparison with the female was (and as he conceives it "still" to be among the spiders) very diminutive in size, and frail, and ephemeral (375, *cf.* 328). This last he carries to such an extreme as to speak of "the primordial fertilising agent" as a "miniature speck of existence."<sup>26</sup> This, of course, is true, still, throughout even all the higher animals (and plants), of the male spermatozoon (or pollen) compared with the female ovum (or ovule), as Ward himself adduces (324). He actually confounds the male and female animals, in the primitive state, with their own sperms

<sup>22</sup> Cunningham, *Sexual Dimorphism*, 278–80, 307.

<sup>23</sup> Geddes and Thomson, *Evolution of Sex*, ch. VI. § 3.

<sup>24</sup> Cunningham, *op. cit.*, 271, 254–5.

<sup>25</sup> 322. So in *Psychic Factors*: "The earliest form of distinct bisexuality consisted of a fertile individual [the female] supplemented by an accessory fertilising agent or adjunct," 86. Here and on the next page is a summary of the doctrine.

<sup>26</sup> 326. Already in 1875 Antoinette Brown Blackwell, drawing from the same source, had written: "The male of the cirriped, without a mouth or nutritive organs, is a mere speck in comparison with the larger organism of the female," *The Sexes throughout Nature*, 52. This may have been a hint to Ward, as also p. 144. But Mrs. Blackwell did not generalise it.

and germs!<sup>27</sup> And then again it is only the male animal which is thus confounded with its own sperm,<sup>28</sup> while the female animal is treated as a fully formed organism, already developed or evolved.<sup>29</sup> The female animal (or vegetable) he treats as the "main trunk" (314), "descending unchanged from the asexual, or presexual, condition," to which the male is added as a miniature "organ" or "organism," at first attached to her, and when detached (*cf.* 323, 373), "wholly unlike the primary [the female] one," the change being "wholly in the male," "the female remaining unchanged."<sup>30</sup>

For all this there is not a particle of evidence. It is pure imagination on Ward's part, obtained by hasty induction from what has been observed in certain low forms of life, the degeneracy of which he has overlooked. But he holds it; and he of course knows that in the higher species the males are not only like the females, but in many cases are superior to them. This shows that the males have changed more than the females. Hence Ward's acceptance of Brooks's theory, which he quotes (322, *cf.* 309), that the male is the variable and the female the conservative sex. The fact is, all that is true in Ward's theory was already expressed by Brooks.<sup>31</sup> Yet of course the female had to develop and change first, in order to differentiate into specific trunks, distinguished from the original amoebic form in which all life began. Her variation at that time, however, preceded the appearance of the male, and cannot be compared with his subsequent variation. When the inferior male appeared on the scene and was detached from her (like Eve from Adam, reversed), then—so Ward must hold, though he neglects to state it<sup>32</sup>—she went on developing

<sup>27</sup> Thus he speaks of his having shown us "the birth of the male being, long subsequent to that of the true organism [the female], in the form of a minute sperm-plasm, to supplement the much older germ-plasm," 328.

<sup>28</sup> At first the male had the "character of a formless mass of sperm cells," 375.

<sup>29</sup> This "miniature organism [the male] . . . was at first parasitic upon the primary organism [the female], then complementary [remember Darwin's term, confined to the cirripeds] to it and carried about in a sac provided for the purpose [on the female]. Its simplest form was [itself] a sac filled with spermatozoa. . . . This fertilising organ or miniature sperm sac was the primitive form of what subsequently developed into the male sex," 373-4.

<sup>30</sup> 322, 373. Further: "The female is the balance wheel of the whole machinery. As the primal, ancestral trunk, she stands unchanged," 325, *cf.* 322 *bot.*; "the female sex being the organism proper, which remained practically unchanged," 374.

<sup>31</sup> Brooks: "The male element is the originating and the female the perpetuating factor; the ovum is conservative, the male cell progressive. Heredity, or adherence to type, is brought about by the ovum; variation and adaptation, through the male element; and the ovum is the essential, the male cell the secondary factor in heredity," *The Law of Heredity* 84-5. Ward himself falls back upon this, and belies his whole theory in the following passage: In the higher animals "the branch" is twofold, representable as double, "consisting of two approximate or contiguous complementary trunks, an active, positive, and progressive male trunk, representing biological variation and adaptation, and a passive, negative, and conservative female trunk, representing heredity," *Psychic Factors*, 208, *cf.* 179-80.

<sup>32</sup> We must assume that when he says the female trunk remained unchanged, he means merely that it remained so during the process of projecting and ejecting the male, although, again, how it could remain unchanged while performing such a remarkable change, we cannot understand so readily as Ward thought he did.

into higher and higher species, but the male developed faster, as is proved by the fact that he finally overtook and passed her. For this "anomalous" proceeding an explanation is demanded.<sup>33</sup> Why did the male so behave? His ability to do so was dependent upon his having the more variable nature. But the fact of his doing so must have another cause. For this Ward returns to the female, and finds it in Darwin's doctrine of sexual selection, which he carries far beyond Darwin's intent. The "biological imperative," he says, is for the male to fecundate whatever comes to hand, but for the female it is to discriminate.<sup>34</sup> There are many more males than females in the lower orders of life (325 — and in the higher many more spermatozoa than ova!), and this provides room for the discrimination, since among them "there are always differences" (325). From the beginning the female was "ashamed of her puny and diminutive suitors," and always chose "the largest and finest specimens among them" (327). Her "preferences," also, were "likely" to be for "a form similar" to her own (374). The larger size and more similar form being inherited, the males under this feminine influence gradually grew and "slowly rose in form and volume" (328), "approaching the stature and form of the female,"<sup>35</sup> till at last "from a shapeless sac" they have come to assume "a definite form agreeing in general characteristics with that of the original organism [the female]" (374), "actually reaching, in a few instances, the status of the original specific trunk [the female]" (326). Thus it is "this selection of the best examples and rejection of the inferior ones" that has "caused the male to rise in the scale and resemble more and more the primary organism, or female"; and as the female further selected "other qualities than those" she herself "possessed," the male rose even higher (375). "There is," Ward has the face to assert, "no other reason why the male should in the least resemble the female" (374). The female he therefore actually treats as the "creator" of the male (328) — at first in the form of a tiny sperm sac in no respect resembling herself, and then through her continual selection "raising" him (326) and "creating" him further (360), "evolving" him and "carrying him up to giddy heights" (334), "lifting" him "from nothing to his present estate" (331), till at last she "literally creates the male in" her "own image."<sup>36</sup> But for her, all males, "including man" (360), would still be nothing but testi-

<sup>33</sup> 323, *Psychic Factors*, 87-8.

<sup>34</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 325, cf. 302-4, 324, 359, also 323.

<sup>35</sup> 375; similarly 323, 322.

<sup>36</sup> 374. Through her action there was "assimilation" of his form to hers, 335.

cles containing spermatozoa!<sup>37</sup> or not even that much, but absolutely "nothing"! God's creation did not stop when these male sperm sacs were made, it stopped when he made the female, and then the female's creation of the male began, differing from God's only in being slow. And when the female's creation of the male stopped, as finally in the case of man, man, Ward must say, and does say, "could develop no further" (370), although this is directly contrary to other statements of his, as, for instance, the statement that "battles among the males," that is, their own activity, "further developed" their size and strength (375) beyond that of their creator!<sup>38</sup> Also their addiction to the chase, for which women were less fit, he cites as (another) cause of their acquiring superiority of physical strength.<sup>39</sup>

Yet why, if the female could develop without the male's aid, the male could not develop without the female's aid (especially if the male were the more variable, and since various methods for the operation have been pointed to), Ward does not tell us. He overlooks the development, or evolution, of the female altogether: in fact, his words at times seem to imply that all the present species were created as such without any males, that then, after a long wait, minikin males were detached from the females (who were the trunk of the species), and under the influence of the female selection developed, or evolved, to become like the respective females of their species.<sup>40</sup> Of course this is too ludicrous for him to have maintained. But what his real view was, it might have been difficult for himself to describe.<sup>41</sup> At all events he drove sexual selection into the ground. Darwin used natural selection to account for the development or evolution of both the males and females of all species, mostly along parallel lines, with some differences due to their different behaviour, such as the greater strength of the males in some species, which is explained, *inter alia*, by their greater addiction to the chase and to war-

<sup>37</sup> Thus he speaks of "the development of a male organism out of this formless sperm sac, or testicle," 374,—of an organism out of an organ!

<sup>38</sup> Cf. 336, also *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 613.

<sup>39</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 352, following Lippert.

<sup>40</sup> "The female sex, which existed from the beginning, continues unchanged; but the male sex, which did not exist at the beginning, makes its appearance at a certain stage, and has a certain history and development," 314.

<sup>41</sup> Especially is this difficult because of his speaking on p. 319 of a "law that the longer a type has lived, the wider is the separation of the sexes," since his whole theory seems to be that they were widely separated in the beginning and that the longer the types live, the more time the male has for becoming like the female, and therefore the more closely he may resemble her, cf. 328. But perhaps this refers to what happens *after* the male has overtaken the female; for then the male goes on, in one set of Ward's statements, to surpass her and to depart from her: cf. 369, where he says that in the human species "the difference between the sexes has been widening during the past ages and is greater in civilised than in savage peoples."

fare;<sup>42</sup> and he used sexual selection by the female to account for those differences which could not, in his opinion, otherwise be accounted for. But Ward uses natural selection, at times, not at all, or only in the case of the females (for if he used it of the males, would it not be enough in most cases?); and sexual selection by the female (under which he includes the battling of the males!) he uses to account for the resemblances of the males with their respective females, where no such explanation is needed. Darwin used sexual selection with the moderation befitting a scientist; and if he devoted to it a large portion of his work, this was not because of its great importance, but because of the great difficulty in proving it. Ward universalised it, notwithstanding that the continued existence of under-sized male spiders, and of males of a similar sort in several other species, shows that the females do not always prefer and select and elevate and create males equal and similar to themselves — a fact for which Ward cannot account, except by saying that "there are of course exceptions" to his rule (328). This fact, indeed, which disproves his theory, is used as its very base, being treated as an occasional survival from, and proof of, the primitive condition of universal female superiority, although not one word is offered to prove that it is a survival and not a case of degeneracy.

Yet Ward has also another rule, likewise with exceptions, but with exceptions for which explanations are offered, among them this very explanation by means of sexual selection. For Ward once refers to the fact that "as the male fertiliser [*i.e.*, simply the male] is a product of reproduction by the organism [the female], it naturally inherits the general qualities of the organism"—*i.e.*, of his mother! (374). What more, then, is needed? The very second male would resemble the female in all but his distinctive masculine characters, or at least the males would come thus to resemble their mothers through this law of heredity alone; or still more quickly would they come to resemble their sisters, since by this same law their sisters also inherit from their fathers!<sup>43</sup> Now then, if the males in some species are inferior to their females, *this* needs to be accounted for by something stronger than

<sup>42</sup> Also by their combats for the females. This is sexual selection, and was so treated by Darwin; but it is not sexual selection by the female, and never was so treated by Darwin.

<sup>43</sup> Thus he speaks of two facts, "that the offspring inherits its qualities from both parents alike," and "that when only one parent has acquired such [*i.e.*, acquired!] qualities, the offspring will only inherit half of them," *Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 615; and this he calls a "universal law of nature," i. 612, as also in *Pure Sociology*, 326. Then, from the very first, the sons would inherit half of the greatness of their mothers, and the daughters would inherit half of the diminutiveness of their fathers, and the two sexes would immediately be more or less equal in size!

the law of heredity, which is not absolute (as by a theory of degeneration through easy feeding, etc.), precisely as their superiority in other species needs to be accounted for (by Darwin's theory of sexual selection on the female's part, or by Wallace's theory of the natural selection of smaller and less obtrusive females, or by Brooks's theory of the inherent greater variability of the male, etc, etc.), or as their other differences need to be accounted for (as by Geddes's and Thomson's theory of female anabolism and male katabolism). Ward, however, starts by positing an "enormous" difference between the males and the females of the same species as the primary fact, for which explanation is not needed; and then explains their present close resemblance in most species by means of the theory which Darwin used to explain their differences! As he has no evidence for his alleged primary fact, except the present existence of comparatively very few specimens of male inferiority, all of which are sufficiently accounted for by degeneration, and as there is thousandfold more evidence for the inheritance of many qualities from both the father and the mother, which sufficiently accounts for the resemblances between the sexes, the utter preposterousness of Ward's theory is apparent.

This idea of sexual selection *by the females* makes a strong appeal to the feminists; and it may be said that Darwin was the originator of modern feminism, and Ward is his prophet. Whatever superiority man may now have, he owes it to woman! Woman is his creator! Therefore woman is really his superior;<sup>44</sup> for the creature cannot be superior to its creator.<sup>45</sup> Accordingly Ward always treats the original condition as that of female superiority over the male; which he calls "the long prevailing gynæcarchy (or gynæcocracy) of the animal world,"<sup>46</sup> though he means its "thelyarchy" or "thelyocracy." The female, even woman at the beginning of her career, was "the ruling sex" (337), although he points to nothing as indicating this but her selection of her mates (her dictation of who should be fathers), and her guardianship of her young (353—her "mother-rule," 340, or "matriarchy," 339). These were matters to which the male showed indifference, and therefore left to the female—the former innately, and the latter because of his ignorance of his connection with the young. But Ward takes the former as indicating that the female governed "the life of the horde" (370); and the latter he without proof extended to the assertions that she "meted out justice to the men" (347), and

<sup>44</sup> Cf. the implication against Compte in *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 131.

<sup>45</sup> We shall presently see this stated by Eliza B. Gamble.

<sup>46</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 328, 336.

that she "held the rein, and held the male aspirants to a strict accountability" (335) — without saying for what.<sup>47</sup> This original "superiority" of the female sex in general, and even in the human species, he everywhere treats as the "perfectly natural condition";<sup>48</sup> while he cannot allude to the existing male superiority in the human species without characterising it as "abnormal" (322), or "at least extra-normal,<sup>49</sup> ultra-normal, and supra-normal" (334), or treating it merely as "apparent" (296) and "so-called," and therefore denying it altogether as a mere "phenomenon," bearing "the stamp of spuriousness and sham" — "a sort of make-believe, play, or sport of nature of an airy unsubstantial character" (331). He hardly even admits sex-equality as anywhere obtaining, referring to it only as "partial" (326), and speaking of "something like sex equality" (327). Yet he will tolerate "the usual expression of 'male superiority,'" if confined to certain acquired secondary sexual qualities such as superior ornamentation in birds and superior strength of body and intellect in men, which, he does not fail to add, the males owe to the females.<sup>50</sup> This limited male superiority, however, he treats as an "over-development,"<sup>51</sup> because the amount of ornamentation or of strength possessed by the female is the "normal" amount belonging to the species, and the male's extra amount is due simply to "his greater power of variability" (322), and is a mere "male efflorescence" produced by the female's aesthetic taste — "certainly not male supremacy" (331) — and, where it exists, "unintended" by Nature.<sup>52</sup> As he started out with the notion that the male sex in general is an "afterthought" of Nature, so now he concludes that male superiority, where it exists, was never

47 The first statement was, in fact, that woman originally was "in this most vital respect" — of choosing and rejecting her mates — "the ruling sex." But there is no sense in saying that the choosing sex is the ruling sex unless this sex rules; which is the implication, and is elsewhere explicitly expressed. ("As the female sex had thus far always exercised supremacy in the most vital matters [why the plural?], it might be supposed that woman would prove the dominant sex in primitive hordes," 338. "Throughout the animal world below man, in all the serious and essential affairs of life, the female is still supreme," 331.) This is an underhand method of establishing what cannot be otherwise established. "Female rule" is used without any reservation on p. 336.

48 315, 323, cf. 364; or he talks simply of "female superiority," 317. "The female is really the favourite and inherently superior sex," and in the human species not "naturally inferior," *Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 616.

49 *Psychic Factors*, 88.

50 330. He somehow seems to think there is something disparaging in saying of any male superiority that it is "simply a secondary sexual character," as in *Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 617, cf. i. 613, 649; *Psychic Factors*, 89, 150; *Pure Sociology*, 335-6, 493. For him, female superiority in strength, etc., was a *primary* sexual character, because it had priority in time, according to his unproved theory. He thus uses "primary" and "secondary," with reference to sexual differences, in a novel manner.

51 331, 375, cf. 320. As Ward says that in our race the male is "over-developed," we shall find one of his disciples, Mrs. Gilman, supplementing this by maintaining that woman is "over-sexed."

52 334. Again: "It cannot in any sense be said to have been 'intended' by Nature," *Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 617.

"intended" by Nature, and so is not even a reality. Yet to this unreality he allows an important effect; for he agrees with Darwin that this advance of the male beyond the female has re-acted on the female, and through the partial inheritance by her of his qualities helped to raise her also (331-2), the creature thus helping to re-create its creator!

Still, Ward recognises that this much of "male superiority" was evolved in our ancestors before they became human, and so already existed in the earliest specimens of our race (332-4, 338, 375-6); only then it was not so great as it has since become, woman then being "nearly equal in strength to man,"<sup>53</sup> and they retained in their own hands the selection of their mates.<sup>54</sup> This was the "matriarchate" which Bachofen and McLennan discovered from its remnants in archaeology and among savages (338-9), and which was "probably" a "very long stage in the history of man and society" (340). It lasted as long as men did not know that they were fathers, and it was "the only condition possible" during the continuance of that ignorance (344, cf. 340), as men were then indifferent to offspring they did not know to be theirs. When it was learnt that the children are "a joint product of the man and the woman,"—whereupon the male's long indifference ceased,—then "it is easy to see the important results that would naturally follow" (344). It "literally reversed the whole social system" (341), "producing a profound social revolution" (376); for it substituted androcracy for the preceding gynæcocracy. "Paternity implied power over the child,"—first of all implying interest in the child;—and "equal authority with the mother led to a comparison of physical strength between the sexes": "in discovering his paternity and accompanying authority, man also discovered his power, which at that stage meant simply physical strength [cf. 336]. He began to learn the economic value of woman and to exert his superior power in the direction of exacting not only favours but services from her" (345). Hence the subjection of women; for men now fought among themselves not only for women's momentary favours, but for permanent possession of the women themselves (351), and then, to obviate this turbulence, they bought and sold the women, and instituted marriage, which recognises the ownership of women just as agrarian laws recognise the ownership of land.<sup>55</sup> Enslaving women (351, 352, 376), they stole away from them the right of sexual selection—that "ægis and palladium of the female sex" (336), and, alone among

<sup>53</sup> 370, although on p. 338 the statement is that the human males then "were considerably larger and stronger than the females"!

<sup>54</sup> 337, 338, 370, 376.

<sup>55</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 617, 618, 630, 637, cf. 649; also cf. *Pure Sociology*, 355, 376.

all the animals, began to exercise it themselves, thereby bringing about "a complete revolution in all the sexual relations,"<sup>56</sup> and "subverting nature's method, in which the mother is the queen."<sup>57</sup> For man's selection is different from woman's. Woman's (the female's in general) was of the larger and stronger and more intelligent males. But men choose smaller and weaker women, and in place of intelligence prefer beauty of form.<sup>58</sup> In this last respect they have produced some improvement in women (and reflexly in men themselves, *cf.* 364), in some female secondary characters; which, however, on the whole, have the same "unreality, artificiality, and spuriousness," that male secondary sexual characters have (363) — a mere "female efflorescence" (364). Thus Ward returns to Darwin's use of sexual selection for the explanation of differences between the sexes, but now it is sexual selection by the male, and in the human species only. And all the superiority of man over woman, even the greater size of his brain, Ward holds to be amply accounted for by man's treatment of woman,<sup>59</sup> wherefore he holds that their present differences cannot be taken "as a criterion of their true relative merits,"<sup>60</sup> here agreeing with the pre-evolutionist Mill,<sup>61</sup> notwithstanding he admits the labours of gestation are "at the expense, to some extent, of the intellectual, as they certainly are of the physical, strength of women," and their weak physical condition in that period has done "much to give the advantage to the males."<sup>62</sup> But man's superiority is due, not to his advance (for we have seen Ward assert that the male could not improve without the female's sexual selection, which in our species has been withdrawn), but to woman's degeneration in all but aesthetic qualities under man's sexual selection and abuse.<sup>63</sup> It is a pity Ward did not make use of this idea of degeneration earlier, to account for the male inferiority where he found it in low species. He even tells us that if among us the process were to continue long enough, women might ultimately be reduced to the position of parasites and become "complemental females corresponding to Darwin's complemental males in the cirripeds" (363). This of course is an absurdity, since such midgets of women could not bear full-sized male children. Great relative inferiority in size of the female is possible only where there is an intervening larval stage; and therefore it could never exist in any viviparous ani-

<sup>56</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 615.

<sup>57</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 353.

<sup>58</sup> 363, 372, 376-7, 396, 399.

<sup>59</sup> 371-2, *Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 616.

<sup>60</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 646, *cf.* 653, ii. 616; *Applied Sociology*, 232.

<sup>61</sup> *Above*, p. 50.

<sup>62</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 646, 649.

<sup>63</sup> *Ib.*, i. 646, *Pure Sociology*, 370, 372, 377.

mal. But Ward's statement of this absurdity ought to have opened his eyes to the fact that the small size of the male cirripeds can be accounted for by such a process of degeneration as is here imagined for the future human female.

If, then, the greater degeneration of the male cirripeds beyond the female cirripeds proves the natural superiority of the female among the cirripeds (and who can doubt it?), the greater degeneration (if it exists) of woman (or rather man's greater advance) can equally prove the natural superiority (in some respects) of man. The use of denunciatory terms is unscientific. If men *are* in any way superior to women, nothing can be gained by denouncing the fact as "unnatural." If it is a product of evolution, it cannot be otherwise than natural. Ward himself seems to make this admission at times—at least that the patriarchate was "the natural sequence of the process that had begun" in the discovery of paternity (345). If the discovery of paternity were a mistake, Ward would be justified. As he believes it to be a true discovery, it is difficult to see how he can find fault with the conduct of the beings who made the use of it to which it "naturally" led. The fault should lie with the animals that have not made the discovery and that consequently act with disregard of it, being imperfect through ignorance. Again bordering upon making this admission, Ward adds: man's dominion over woman "is one of the few instances where nature seems to have overshot its mark."<sup>64</sup> The idea is again of nature having some unnatural "afterthought," and doing something unnaturally which it or she had not "intended." And at the bottom of this is an idea that what Nature does first, is more peculiarly her action, and what she does last, she may have done waywardly or under some unforeseen duress. But this is absurd, especially (to repeat) in the mouth of an evolutionist. What comes later in evolution, is just as natural as what went before. Nor is the less common in nature any less natural than the common. It cannot be seriously maintained that what naturally holds in many species ought naturally to hold in some other species, and that it is unnatural if it does not. What goes on among bees, for instance, or among ants, is not unnatural because it is unique. And so there may be thelyocracy in most species, if you like, and arrhenocracy in a few, or even in only one, and there be as natural as the other. And in some species the one state may naturally exist at one stage of its development, and the other at another: in the human species androcracy may naturally follow gynæcocracy (if the latter ever existed). What is, is, and its nature is not changed by something else being otherwise, or by

<sup>64</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 648.

itself (or its predecessors) having at a previous period been different. Ward proves no universal thelyocracy at present, or always, existing. At best, even if the beginning of his theory were correct, he would not at the end have proved anything else than that arrhenocracy in the human species, or androcracy, is a natural product of nature. As the beginning of his theory was not proved, he *a fortiori* offers us nothing to disprove that androcracy is a natural product of evolution. Nor need we be frightened at our unique position in animate nature, as the one and only species in which the male has dominion over the female. We, as Ward himself has pointed out, are the only animals who know what we are doing; so that it is only natural we should act differently from all the rest, which do not know what they are doing. Moreover, we are the sole species that has produced civilisation; wherefore it is only natural that the disposition of things in our civilised species should be different from the disposition of things in all other animals. But if, for the sake of distinctness, what is common to all animals (being produced genetically) be called "natural" and what is peculiar to mankind (being made over by our intelligence) be called "artificial," then we need not be impressed by any one who makes this distinction, as Ward does,<sup>65</sup> telling us that what now exists in our midst is "unnatural." Least of all need we be impressed by this from Ward, who further holds that "the artificial is infinitely superior to the natural,"<sup>66</sup> and that "all civilisation is artificial,"<sup>67</sup> as also is "all true progress."<sup>68</sup> As, also, he knows that art rests on science (*ib.*, i. 59), or knowledge, we may wonder at his objecting to marriage, which rests on the scientific discovery made by man alone that man is the father as woman is the mother of children.

Yet Ward does object to marriage as a part of man's domination over woman. All his gynæcocratic theory converges upon showing up the meanness of man in his domineering behaviour. Man owes his superiority over woman to woman herself, and yet he uses it to subjugate "the innocent authoress of this gift"!<sup>69</sup> The creature has turned against his creator! The idolatrous savage has whipped his god! Or the two sexes are treated like two races, each with separate sets of ancestors; and the complaint is much like that of the modern Poles, whose ancestors once saved the Austrians from destruction, but who themselves are now held (some of them) in subjection by the descendants of those Aus-

<sup>65</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 103, 105, *Pure Sociology*, 17, 465-6, *Psychic Factors*, 135.

<sup>66</sup> *Psychic Factors*, 286, similarly 200 and p. viii.; *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 71, ii. 203; *Pure Sociology*, 511; *Applied Sociology*, 11.

<sup>67</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, ii. 538; similarly 302, *cf.* 205.

<sup>68</sup> *Ib.*, i. 662, *cf.* 71.

<sup>69</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 360, *cf.* 349, 351, 376.

trians. Ward, however, allows that men have thus acted in ignorance of what they were doing — of the great sin of ingratitude they were committing,— until he informed them of it. He admits that men (in their ignorance) could not have acted otherwise: they are not to blame — and least of all present men, who suffer from it as much, he says, as women do.<sup>70</sup> But he implies that unless men now make a change, they will be to blame — those of them who, having been enlightened by him, do not follow his advice. For our whole social system, because produced under the "unnatural" androcentric system, is wrong. "Under the régime of gynæcocracy," he tells us, "there could be no proper family" (351); and "the primitive family was an unnatural androcentric excrescence upon society."<sup>71</sup> Marriage he treats as mere pairing, "as applicable to any other animal as to man,"<sup>72</sup> and prostitution, which "becomes natural and harmless in proportion as it is more fully tolerated and recognised," is one "form" of it.<sup>73</sup> Our human marriage, distinguished as "formal marriage,"<sup>74</sup> in all its various kinds, consists in "the proprietorship of the husband in the wife."<sup>75</sup> Hence Ward looks upon it as essentially a selfish male institution; for he forgets altogether about the children, who are its primary object, but whom he rarely mentions.<sup>76</sup> Man has, according to Ward, "shaped all the facts relating to the sexes pretty much after his own mind."<sup>77</sup> He has imposed upon woman inequality of dress, inequality of duties, inequality of education, and inequality of rights. All these things must be changed: women must dress like men, act like men, be educated like men, and have the same rights as men (*ib.*, 642-55). Even "modesty," a purely human quality, has "outlived much of its usefulness," and "this mass of absurdities and irrationalities" is now "a serious obstacle

<sup>70</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 656-7.

<sup>71</sup> 353. Yet he here compares early polygamy with "a harem of seals on a rookery under the dominion of an old bull." This seems to admit patriachism even among some animals, and hence its naturalness! But he tones down the admission by denying tyrannical treatment of the females by the male seal; "for, although we are told that the bull does sometimes gently [!] bite his refractory cows, he never abuses or injures them," the so-called "brutal" treatment of females being reserved for men, 347. Apparently only "brutal" is the female maltreatment of the male, as in the case of spiders, where the male "often sacrifices his life and perishes at his post," 323, naturally! as women sometimes do — unnaturally.

<sup>72</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 617-18.

<sup>73</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 357-8. In *Dynamic Sociology*, it is treated as a form of the kind of marriage known as polyandry, i. 622-4, 628-9.

<sup>74</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 617. Ward was one of those who cannot see any proper difference in the relationship between a man and a woman the day before and the day after their wedding, *Pure Sociology*, 397.

<sup>75</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 356, *cf.* *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 633.

<sup>76</sup> He does once, in this connection, allude to them, in *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 604. Elsewhere he objects to exaggerated instruction of filial piety, *ib.*, ii. 443-4. In *Applied Sociology*, 324, "the diminished birth-rate" is treated as "no cause for alarm," it being "the surest possible mark of increasing intelligence," whereby man-kind "emancipate themselves from the tyranny of the biologic law."

<sup>77</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, i. 616.

to the progress of rational development" (*ib.*, 639). Here, however, Ward makes a distinction. Primitive men made the women do all the work. Modern men, at least in theory, do all the work themselves, and "support" the women (*ib.*, ii 618). This last does not execute itself successfully, and cannot, and must be abandoned. But we must not go back to the primitive human state, when men compelled the women to work for them. We must go back to a still earlier stage, that of all animals, among whom "the labour of procuring subsistence is performed for the most part by each individual for itself, the male and the female doing an equal share of the labour of life." Thus "the true progress of society must naturally complete the cycle of changes, and again make both sexes producers, as in the animal and presocial stages."<sup>78</sup> It is strange for us now at the end to find that at the beginning, among the lower animals, equality was the rule! It is still stranger to find this modelling upon the lower animals recommended by an admirer of artificiality, and especially by one who a few pages further on objurgates the admirers of nature and asserts that "it is positively shameful for scientific men to go back to brute creation for standards of human excellence and models of social institutions" (*ib.*, 662-3). But in a false theory we cannot expect consistency. However this be, it is Ward's recommendation. In the future the sexes must be free and equal.<sup>79</sup> Therefore they must both support themselves and do all other things alike. And differently (as conceived by him) from animals and from our own progenitors, both the human sexes must in the future be selectors of each other: there must be "amphiclexis," the beginning of which he finds in romantic love,<sup>80</sup> in place of both the earlier "gyneclexis" and the later and present "androclesis" (361); and consequently gynaeocracy is not to be revived and to oust the prevailing androcracy, but both are to give way to a compound and hermaphroditic "gynandrocratic" stage, in which "both man and woman shall be free to rule themselves," of course "on a higher plane" (373), though it is, really, the plane of the lower animals.

This, perhaps the most remarkable theory in the philosophy of history ever invented by a sane man, has probably by no one been accepted in its entirety. Rather, certain parts of it, as advanced in the first brief exposition in *The Forum*, where its absurdities were not revealed, have been unquestioningly accepted by the fem-

<sup>78</sup> *Ib.*, i. 652, cf. 661. This, apparently, is "the normal condition," from which our society has made a "wide departure," 655.

<sup>79</sup> "The freedom of woman will be the ennoblement of man. The equality of the sexes will be the regeneration of humanity. Civilisation demands this revolution," *ib.*, 657.

<sup>80</sup> *Pure Sociology*, 396, 401-2, 406. The modernness of this love he claims as a discovery of his own, 392, ignoring Finck's first work (though noticing his second!) and also Pearson's *Ethic of Freethought* (p. 401).

inists — such as the primacy and superiority and all-inclusiveness of the female sex, her creatorship of the male through her sexual selection, the unnaturalness and ingratitude of the latter's present dominancy in the human species, and its unnatural uniqueness here.<sup>81</sup> But it happened that almost contemporaneously with Ward, and perhaps independently, Eliza Burt Gamble evolved a somewhat similar theory, differing rather in placing female supremacy at the end instead of at the beginning of the cosmic process.

Miss Gamble published her book, *The Evolution of Woman*, in New York in 1893,<sup>81a</sup> but says in the Preface that so early as the year 1886 [prior to any of Ward's publications on this subject] she became impressed with the belief that the theory of evolution furnishes much evidence going to show that "the female among all the orders of life, man included, represents a higher stage of development than the male" (pp. v.-vi.). She never mentions Ward, who returns the compliment by never mentioning her, although it is unlikely they should have been ignorant of each other's works. Instead, she takes Darwin, Geddes and Thomson, Wallace, and others, for her "guides," as she calls them; but treats them peculiarly. For whatever they say which she can utilize in her theory, she takes for gospel truth; but whatever disagrees with her theory, she sets down to "prejudice." She accepts the doctrine of the greater variability of man, but deduces from it that man does not represent a higher development, but the contrary, because of greater reversion to lower types (37-9, 42). She harps much on "the imperfections of man's organisation" (177), such as his greater liability to colour-blindness (46-9), and on woman's "finer and more complex organisation, comparatively free from imperfections" (68, *cf.* 66), such as her "greater powers of endurance, keener insight" (66), and other "higher faculties" (77, 80) — her "finer intuition" (67-8) and her "finer sensibilities";<sup>82</sup> and especially does she contrast her altruism with his ego-

<sup>81</sup> Thus, for instance, Frances Swiney in an article on *The Evolution of the Male* in The Westminster Review, March and April, 1905, follows Ward in asserting that "life begins as female," 276; that "there is sex differentiation, but only one sex, the female," 278, and that woman "is and remains the human race," 454. — Perhaps independently (at least he makes no mention of Ward) Th. H. Montgomery, in an article on *The Morphological Superiority of the Female Sex*, in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1904, vol. 43, pp. 365-80, reached the conclusion that "the female is clearly the superior, from the standpoint of morphological advancement, in the invertebrates and the lower vertebrates, and still superior, but in a less degree, in the higher vertebrates," because he "was inclined to judge the greater embryological advancement of the reproductive organs to be a condition of more morphological importance than greater bodily size."

<sup>81a</sup> A second edition, with the title *The Sexes in Science and History*, has been published recently, too late to be used here.

<sup>82</sup> 76. Woman's "finer" sensibility is a greater insensibility to pain, and this and her greater power of endurance under hardships are characteristics — Miss Gamble does not seem to know — of lower races and of lower organisms.

ism,<sup>83</sup> wherefore she claims that also sociology provides evidence "that the female organisation is superior to that of the male" (87). The female in general, because doing most of the procreative function, possesses the more highly specialised organisation and "represents the higher stage of development."<sup>84</sup> Even "the progressive principle is confided to the female organisation" (170) through her selection of the males. Because of sexual selection, as "proved" by Darwin, the female is "the primary cause of the very characters through which man's superiority over woman has been gained; . . . and as the creature may not surpass its creator in excellence, it is difficult to understand the process by which man through sexual selection has become superior to woman" (29). The difficulty, which should have led her to doubt the process, is enhanced for her by the belief that all the male's secondary sexual characters are developed by the female's sexual selection of them — such as his courage, energy, altruism (whatever of it he has), etc.; all which she further believes to be still dependent on the will or desire of the female (65, *cf.* 62). Rather she concludes that her "guides" show "that the female is the primary unit of creation, and that the male functions are simply supplementary or complementary" (31) — in mankind the same as in cirripeds! Man's peculiar reversal of this relationship needs itself to be reversed. A beginning is *again* being made; for now as in Greece under Pericles and the later philosophers altruistic principles are once more coming to the fore, along with *hetairism* (349). The dawn of "the intellectual and moral age" is breaking (68). Women have been debased by marriage (171), than which no slavery is more degrading (174), they being reduced thereby to "sexual slaves" (264); and if civilisation has advanced, it has been "in spite of it" (176). "In the present intense struggle for freedom and equality, an attempt to *return* to the earlier and more natural principles of justice and liberty, and so to *advance*," must be made (75). "Wives and mothers must be absolutely free, and wholly independent of the opposite sex for the means of support" (171). This is the great complaint, that women are supported. The demand is, that they shall support themselves; for only then can they be free in marriage. But how they are to support themselves, this authoress does not tell. She seems to think it sufficient if men but permit them to do so. Yet of course permitting them to do so, with her as with the rest of the feminists, means helping them to do so — without acknowledgement.

<sup>83</sup> 12-13, 57-62, 74, 92, 107-8, 121, 131, 135, 167-8, 175, 209, 271, 332, 342, 348.  
<sup>84</sup> 11, *cf.* 35. So already, as we have seen, Mrs. Farnham.

Upon the publication of Ward's article in *The Forum*, Grant Allen saw the absurdity of the inferences from the natural history relied on, and wrote an answer, *Woman's Place in Nature*, which was published in the same magazine for May, 1889 (pp. 258-63). Here, for a moment running into the other extreme, he maintained that "in man the males are the race," the females being "merely the sex told off to recruit and reproduce it." "There are women, to be sure," he admits "who inherit much of male faculty, and some of these prefer to follow male avocations; but in so doing they for the most part unsex themselves; they fail to perform satisfactorily their maternal functions." He followed this up in *The Fortnightly Review* of the next October in an article of *Plain Words on the Woman Question*, in which he protested that as "we [men] hold it a slight not to be borne that any one should impugn our essential manhood," so "women ought equally to glory in their femininity." Yet only four years afterward, in 1893, Grant Allen wrote a novel, *The Woman Who Did*, in which he went back on these views, and denounced human marriage as an "assertion of man's supremacy over woman."<sup>85</sup> In this romance, however, the heroine was not allowed to unsex herself; but she gloried in her feminine duty of motherhood, and, in fact, the want of success of her maternal functioning, under present conditions, is the theme of the fiction — or satire, if it be such. Claiming equality with men, she was willing to sacrifice herself in behalf of her sisters by making way, like Winkelried, for liberty.<sup>86</sup> She would not subject herself to slavery to man in marriage, and yet, recognising the function of maternity to be "the best privilege of her sex" (p. 165), she would enter into "a free union on philosophical and ethical principles" (91, for she was "one of the intellectual type" of women, 139) with the man of her choice. To such a reformer of the world, whose soul at her death would "cease to exist for ever" (269), and whose God was a "dumb, blind Caprice, governing the universe" (157, 193), it was shameful to live with a man a moment longer than she loved him (53), or to expect other conduct of him toward herself, since each should "embrace and follow every instinct of pure love," which is "the voice" of that dumb God! and "never strive" for the other's sake "to deny any love, to strangle any impulse," that panted for birth in them.<sup>87</sup> She was resolved, therefore, to be independent and to

<sup>85</sup> P. 53, of the Tauchnitz edition.

<sup>86</sup> Forel also recommends such pioneering, which he admits "would require much courage," *The Sexual Question*, 525.

<sup>87</sup> 206, cf. 74. The author, in this connection, treats marriage as a "monopoly" of a woman by a man, 207, 211-12, cf. 80. This is an entire misuse of the term. "Monopoly," is possession of all, or most, of the individuals of a class or kind. To own, or to have sole use of, a single article is not to monopolise it. Only a polygamous Sultan may be said to monopolise the women of his domain.

support herself; for "if women are to be free, they must first of all be independent," since "it is the dependence of women that has allowed men to make laws for them, socially and ethically";<sup>88</sup> and she would continue thus to do after her marriage-replacing union, living on by herself, receiving visits from her lover, who should likewise live by himself, each and every one in his or her own house, without a servant (83-4). Such wastefulness is curious in a socialist, although such had been the doctrine and the practice of one of the earliest, Godwin, who and his wife, Mary Wollstonecraft, for a time kept separate domiciles, cohabitation having been one of his pet aversions and therefore contrary to his principles.<sup>89</sup> Yet each is to be the other's (77, *cf.* 82), the children to belong to both, and their support to be shared equally (91). But how, in general, the male mate, thus separated from his female friend, was to know that the children he had to share in supporting were begotten by him, is not stated; although in this case, of course, the woman was "stainless," and her union with a man was, like Tobias's with his wife, not for lust, but for companionship and procreation.<sup>90</sup> Still, the union for this purpose, like Bebel's account of unions for gratification, is treated as purely a private affair.<sup>91</sup> When, however, the child was about to arrive, the woman had to cease her work, and her male companion had to step in, take charge, and support her.<sup>92</sup> We learn now that the woman's self-support was only a temporary subservience to present conditions, since as yet "no other way existed for women to be free except the wasteful way of each earning her own livelihood." As "an intermediate condition," before reaching the final stage, "it might perhaps happen that the women of certain classes would for the most part be made independent at maturity each by her father," such "a first step" being "the endowment of the daughter." But "in the end, no doubt, complete independence would be secured for each woman by the civilised state, or, in other

<sup>88</sup> 19. Marriage and its annexes are "man-made institutions," 165, *cf.* 58, 84, 220.

<sup>89</sup> Separate living is, of course, one of the innumerable customs found among primitive peoples. Thus a South Malabar husband and wife do not live together, but the husband visits his wife at her family home. So also among the Syntongs in Assam, and among some early Arabs: *cf.* Samson and his wife at Timnah. Instead of advancing, our reformers always go backward.

<sup>90</sup> *T'ebit*, VIII. 7.

<sup>91</sup> It was proposed simply that they "should be friends like any others — very dear, dear friends, with the only kind of friendship that nature makes possible between men and women," 48. "Here was a personal matter of the utmost privacy; a matter which concerned nobody on earth save herself and Alan; a matter on which it was the greatest impertinence for any one else to make any inquiry or hold any opinion. They two chose to be friends; and there, so far as the rest of the world was concerned, the whole thing ended. What took place between them was wholly a subject for their own consideration," 87. For Bebel see above, ii. 43.

<sup>92</sup> The author here admits a "prime antithesis — the male, active and aggressive; the female, sedentary, and passive, and receptive," 98-9. Yet the whole plot of his story disregards this prime antithesis!

words, by the whole body of men who do the hard work of the world, and who would collectively guarantee every necessary and luxury to every woman of the community equally. In that way alone could perfect liberty of choice and action be secured for women ; and she [the heroine] held it just that women should so be provided for, because the mothers of the community fulfil in the state as important and necessary a function as the men themselves do. It would be well, too, that the mothers should be free to perform that function without pre-occupation of any sort. So a free world would order things " (88-90). A world free to women, yes, but hardly so to men, who would have to support the women, and yet would have no more say in the matter than those whom they supported. The impracticability of the whole scheme thus comes out at the end, since, after all, the women are to be supported by the men, " who do the hard work of the world," and their dependence would again put into the hands of men the power, which they would rightly grasp, of " making laws for them, socially and ethically." <sup>93</sup> The doorway has been enlarged by the dependence of one woman on one man being replaced by the dependence of all women on all men ; and with this irrelevant difference, we come out where in we went.<sup>94</sup>

Mrs. Gilman, in her work on *Women and Economics*,<sup>95</sup> is more abstruse and theoretical. She, too, has a *penchant* for natural history, and seems to look upon other animals as our superiors, perhaps impressed by their greater numbers ; for she often takes them for models, although to the rest of us the more we differ from brutes, the greater would seem to be our progress in evolution. In human physiology we have already noticed her error in denying sexual difference to the brains of men and

<sup>93</sup> But the feminists have no idea of reciprocity. Emerence M. Lemonche (Virginia Lebllick), who cannot see " by what right man assumes his authority over woman," says " Nature has given to man greater physical strength in order that he shall make use of it . . . to protect the companion [woman] which [sic] she has destined for him," but requires no other return but the service (which we shall see Mrs. Gilman saying woman has already performed) of using her high moral sentiments and virtue " to raise man to her level "; *The New Era Woman's Era*, 8.

<sup>94</sup> Yet to a socialist this is an essential difference, on account of the new altruism of the strong and of men to share power with the weak and with women. So Pearson, while he would leave the childless women to support themselves, would have the child-bearing women independent of father or husband (of the individual) and to be supported by (and be dependent on) the state, *Ethic of Freethought*, 418, 428-9, *Chances of Death*, i. 242, 244, 251. But he expects that " the hard work of the world " will not necessarily " be left to the men " alone, ii. 50, apparently the childless women taking part in it, but the child-bearing women being exempted, 251, and insured by the state against motherhood, 252-3, although the former are not likely to be many, 239; wherefore the main support of the (independent!) child-bearing women will fall upon men. So again Charles Zueblin would get " economic independence " for married women by having the state require that " upon marriage, and subsequently on the birth of each child, the father " should " take out an insurance policy [and pay the premiums] providing annuities for wife and children," *The Effect on Women of Economic Independence*, *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1909.

<sup>95</sup> Boston, 1898, 5th ed., 1911.

women, and generally in unduly minimising sex-differentiation in our species.<sup>96</sup> That error, not entertained by Ward, she has almost succeeded in making the starting point of contemporary feminism. There are two great subjects of her discourse — the sex-relation and the economic relation, so intimately connected that she frequently compounds them into one "sexuo-economic" relation, since ours is "the only animal species in which the sex-relation is also an economic relation" (p. 5). Our economic relation is different from that among animals, and therefore, in her opinion, wrong. For among animals, with few exceptions, and then only at certain periods, the female is independent of the male, but in the human species the female is dependent on the male (5-6, 18, 22, 95). Woman is reduced to the state of a domestic animal, like the horse, as in both cases there is no relation between the work they do and the support they receive (7, 12-13, cf. 118). Here Mrs. Gilman seems to overlook that horses receive only the minimum, but women often the maximum, of what men can give them, and that no horse at the head of a stable or barn has ever yet been seen. Mothers, she complains, work hard enough to provide themselves with an independent living, and yet they get only a dependent living (21); in which she cheats herself and would cheat her readers with a couple of words, since by "independent" she here means wage-earning and by "dependent living" donational support, notwithstanding that these terms might just as well be inverted, and yet, as used, the terms are intended to recommend the former way of getting a living, although ninety-nine women out of a hundred get a better living the latter way than they could any other. Now, further, this "abnormal" economic relation in the human species has produced another difference, likewise abnormal, between us and other animals, in the sexual relation (33, 39). Among animals the similar occupations of the sexes have kept them alike, with differences little more than the primary and those secondary ones which are directly necessary for mating, although she notices cases in which the male and the female are so divergent that naturalists have taken them for different species (41); but in our species the dependence of women has exaggerated the sex-distinction, since the female's aim is not only to get a mate, but to get a livelihood (37-9), wherefore she is "over-sexed," like milch cows, whose over-sexedness has likewise been produced by man for economic uses;<sup>96a</sup> and the distinc-

96 Above, p. 42.

96a 43-4.—Here Vance Thompson has gone her one better, saying that man has shut woman up in a coop, gorged and fattened her, and made her into a Strasbourg goose—"all female" or "all sex," as that fowl is "all liver," *Woman*, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 31, 32, 38, 109, 114, 126, 144, 150, 157, 161, 191. He, too, follows Ward in maintaining that "biologically she [woman] is the race," 24, although he rejects Ward's theory of the male being an "afterthought," 11.

tion has been carried to an excessive degree, disadvantageous to the race (32, 33, 37), though no proof is offered of this except the effeteness of certain upper-class ladies and oriental odalesques (*cf.* 45-6). To the rest of us the true sequence would seem to be that among the lower animals, where the sexes engage in the same occupations, they do so because they are alike; and so far as in mankind their occupations have become different (a secondary, if not a tertiary, sexual difference), it is because their primary sexual natures have become different (through the prolongation of gestation and lactation and the development of the menses). But Mrs. Gilman furthermore — and in this, too, following Ward<sup>97</sup> finds a reversal of what is said to be very common among animals, that among animals the female selects and the male is decked out in ornamental colours and tail-feathers, for attractive purposes, while with us the female is over-adorned and the male does the selecting; all which is treated as "peculiar" and "strange."<sup>98</sup> That this reversal of ornamentation should itself be reversed, Mrs. Gilman does not go so far as to recommend; but she wishes the "selective power" to be restored to women, expecting all sorts of benefits therefrom.<sup>99</sup> There is little basis for anything here. Among animals, when two lions fight and the lioness goes off with the victor, she is hardly the selector: she could perforce do nothing else. The cows in a herd of ruminants have nothing to do with choosing the bull, who is determined in the combats between the males. When a partridge drums and several females answer the call, it is he who picks out the ones in the lot he likes best. Nor does the queen bee select the drone that flies highest and alone overtakes her.<sup>1</sup> We need not bother ourselves, therefore, about the reversal of sex-selection. Men by courting and women by consenting (or their parents courting or consenting for them) select, within the circles open to them, those who on various accounts they admire most among those who most admire them. Economic motives naturally

<sup>97</sup> She refers to his *Forum* article, "in which," she says, "was clearly shown the biological supremacy of the female sex," 171.

<sup>98</sup> 54-5, 95; 140. Also Rosa Mayreder considers the evolution of woman into "a type of the beautiful" to be "a subversion of the natural order of things," *A Survey of the Woman Problem*, 126.

<sup>99</sup> 92. One reason is peculiar. "Men," she says, "who are not equal to good fatherhood under such conditions, will have no chance to become fathers, and will die with general pity instead of living with general condemnation," 186. The new conditions are that the father must contribute half to the support of the children and not at all to the support of the mother: he must merely be equal to her in earning capacity. As the test is to be much less severe than it is under present conditions, it would seem that fatherhood would only be eased under the new.

<sup>1</sup> Mrs. Gilman knows all this: see 110-11. Yet the "competition" of the males in combat or in other activities, there spoken of, is very different from the competition "in ornament" spoken of on p. 55. Darwin, of course, used female sexual selection only where he had reason to suppose it was exerted.

come into play in an economic age; and these can be eliminated, while the economic régime continues, only by reducing all incomes to a level and abolishing all classes, by doing which the gain, as we have seen, would be small compared with the harm done by such socialism. But Mrs. Gilman is a socialist, and has no fear. According to her, the economic difference has been carried furthest by man (8, 74), and the sex-distinction has gone furthest in woman (43). As a creature of sex, woman is superior, because in our species "the female has been left to be female and nothing else";<sup>2</sup> but man is more human, since he alone can engage in all "human" work, which Mrs. Gilman considers to be all work, except child-bearing; wherefore much of it has come to be wrongly considered "masculine," though it is just as much feminine.<sup>3</sup> The two differentiations served their purpose in their day. The sex-difference demanding care of the children first produced love and altruism in the female, and made her superior to the male.<sup>4</sup> But then her economic dependence on the male produced altruism also in him, and raised him again to her level (124-30, 131-5). This work is now done, and the differences are no longer needed (122, 136); wherefore the human species should abolish them and return to "the healthful equality of pre-human creatures" (72), growing "natural again" (306), especially the women becoming more human, by engaging in all "human" activities.<sup>5</sup> This, in fact, is being done: the woman's movement has set in" (122), along with "the labour movement" (138). The process begins with the economic relation, by "the restoration of economic freedom to the female" (173). This is possible because the economic difference was not natural, or due to any "lack of faculty" in women or "inherent disability of sex" (9), young women having "the same energies and ambition" as young men (71), the same desire "to have a career of their own, at least for a while"! (152); but it is due to the selfishness of men, who have kept women back (*cf.* 262), not allowing them to do what themselves did.<sup>6</sup> Now that

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Mrs. Jacobi had written of men being "accustomed to think of women as having sex, and nothing else," "*Common Sense*" applied to *Woman Suffrage*, 99.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. "There is nothing a he-bear can do as a bear which Mrs. Bear cannot do as well or better. In human society alone the he can do anything and the she nothing": report of a lecture in *The New York Times*, Feb. 26, 1914. For the error see above, p. 29.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Pearson: "That the past subjection of woman has tended largely to expand man's selfish instincts, I cannot deny; but may it not be that this very subjection has in itself so chastened woman, so trained her to think rather of others than of herself, that after all it may have acted more as a blessing than a curse to the world," *Ethic of Freethought*, 378.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Mrs. Jacobi, *op. cit.*, 100.

<sup>6</sup> Man enslaved the female, 60; restricted her range, 64; forbade specialisation, 67; smothered her desire to expand, 70; denied her free productive expression, 117, 118, and "the enlarged activities which have developed intelligence" in him, 195. Most human attributes, indeed, "were allowed to men and forbidden to women," 51, only "the same old channels" being still allowed to women as to their "primitive ancestors," 120.

men are no longer selfish, they will allow women to come forward: all activities, crafts, and trades, "all growth in science, discovery, government, religion," will be opened to women, as "should be" (62); and "a few generations will set them abreast of the age."<sup>7</sup> The excess of the sexual difference will cease with the economic. And then woman, raised to man's level on the economic line, after having drawn him up to her level on the sexual, will bear no grudge for her long but temporary subjection, possessing full knowledge of its "sociological necessity" (129, cf. 134-7).

Here we have a woman-made philosophy of history — perhaps the first (for Eliza W. Farnham's is not worth considering), — and it is interesting. It is mainly inductive, going from the past trend of alleged events to the future. Mrs. Gilman admits that the primitive ages in which men and women roamed the woods in comparative equality and independence, after a little progress up from utter brutishness into mere savagery or barbarism, formed an almost stationary period of incalculable duration; that the progress which rose into civilisation, began when men subjected women, as she conceives it; and that civilisation has been made by men. Women, indeed, started the industries, for the sake of their children (126), but men perfected them. Her explanation is that women liked work and therefore remained content with it, but men disliked work and therefore invented labour-saving improvements (132); adding that men needed the spur of their passion for women, with consequent willingness to work for them and through them for their children: love, she quotes, makes the world go round, or, as she amends, has made men go round the world (133). The explanation is curious when we remember that the labour-disliking members of the species are represented as keeping the labour-loving members from labouring at the most productive jobs, notwithstanding that, according to Mrs. Gilman, women might just as well have laboured at them all along; wherein she really makes out the male members to be not so much selfish as stupid. However this be, why should there be a change now? Have men reached the end of their inventions? or become less stupid as well as less selfish? or have women changed their nature and begun to dislike work? Mrs. Gilman says "we know that it is time to change, principally because we are changing" (137). Then, recovering from this ineptitude, she says "the period of women's economic dependence is drawing to a close, because its racial usefulness is wearing out" (137-8). She thus attributes the need of a change to the process having gone too far: the dif-

<sup>7</sup> 134; cf. above, p. 53, and for its error see pp. 27-8

ferentiation of the sexes has become excessive, wherefore it must be exchanged for another relation, of equality and independence, or the race will end. Other civilisations, she notes, have thus come to an end, through not adapting themselves; but ours, she opines, will not, but will go on much further, because it will make the change (140-4). "The time has come," she repeats, "when it is better for the world that women be economically independent, and therefore they are becoming so" (316). Yet she has said that such times arrived before, and women did not become so; then what guarantee is there that at present the movement of change, though entered upon, will be carried through? As a fact, such movements of change were commenced in the past and proceeded certain lengths, and only stopped because the civilisations went backward. Now, if the differentiation of the sexes, larger in the human species than in other animals, and necessary for lifting mankind into its position of superiority over other animals, has at times become excessive and consequently injurious, the correction would seem to be to lessen that excess and bring it back to a useful degree, not to abolish the difference altogether, which would bring mankind back to the condition of the other animals. Mrs. Gilman confuses us. She treats all the human differentiation of the sexes, so different from their status in other animals, as peculiar, abnormal, and excessive, merely in comparison with other animals, in spite of its serviceability in lifting the human species above other animals; and then again she finds an excessive, because injurious, amount of it in comparing mankind at one time and in one place with mankind at other times or in other places. This last excess is the only one that, according to her own principles, would need to be corrected, since it alone has done harm; whereas the other, which has raised mankind above the brutes, has done good, and therefore would seem to call for preservation.

There is another wider basis of induction, employed by Mrs. Gilman, which leads to the same conclusion. She notes that among the lowest animals, such as "rotifers, insects, and crustaceans," but illustrated most familiarly to us by the spiders and bees, the female is superior to the male, the males among them being much worse and more ignominiously treated (she also quotes the cirriped and spider stories) than human females have ever been (130-1, 134-5). Against this brutal treatment of the poor males by their superior females she makes no protest, probably because it is "natural." By the way, if the females of these species formed a commonwealth, would Mrs. Gilman and other naturalising suffragists maintain that they ought to admit the males, because of their being cirripedian or arachnidan beings, to

equality in the vote? Then come the higher animals, especially the birds and mammalia, among which the two sexes, she alleges, are equal and treat each other as such. In general, she says, "the female has been dominant for the main duration of life on earth. She has been easily equal [to the male] always up to our own race."<sup>8</sup> Lastly in the upward sequence comes the human species, in which, after it left the condition of brutes living in hordes, the male became, and still is, superior to the female.<sup>9</sup> What, then, is to produce a reversal of this progression, and bring back equality of the sexes? or could this be done without reducing the race to the primitive condition, destroying civilisation? This is the necessary inference at least if men are to give up their higher industries and sink back to the level of women; but not so, it may be said, if women are to show the same capacity for work and to level themselves up to men. The latter is Mrs. Gilman's claim, wherefore she speaks of the new relation between men and women as "a higher relation" than the old sexuo-economic one (142). The restrictions being taken off, women are to fly up like a released spring (*cf.* 317). This might happen if the restrictions were merely man-made and recently imposed, and women really, underneath a thin veneer of disuse, had the same capacity as men. That the subjection of women is only recent, is sometimes implied by Mrs. Gilman, as when she speaks of the women in the early German tribes within two thousand years, and even of our immediate ancestors in colonial days within two hundred years, as "comparatively free" and "in comparative equality" (46, 147); although her whole philosophy is that it began in primeval ages. Its root, the mother's care of her offspring, is said to date back, among our progenitors, perhaps to "the later reptiles";<sup>10</sup> and in our species man's enslaving and feeding of the female is carried back to "the earliest beginnings" (64) in prehistoric times (60), since which, though "all astray," they have "laboured up together" through "slow and awful ages."<sup>11</sup> Not a word is offered in proof that Nature has not created the occasion for the economic relation peculiar to the human species,—perhaps, if she be providential, for the very benefit which Mrs. Gilman points out as produced thereby.<sup>12</sup> All that Mrs. Gilman does is to laugh at

<sup>8</sup> 135; *cf.* Ward's Forum article, 171.

<sup>9</sup> The falsity of her explanation of this we have already seen, above, pp. 51, 52.

<sup>10</sup> 175. The later reptiles would seem to be those now living!

<sup>11</sup> See the preom, p. iv.

<sup>12</sup> "This," the slavery of women throughout the past ages, "was nature's plan for preserving and humanising and civilising the [human] race," says a follower, Gertrude S. Martin, in an article on *The Education of Women and Sex Equality*, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Nov., 1914, p. 45. Nature may, of course, discard at one time what has been serviceable at another. But we need proof when a biological change is supposed. The enslavement of one race by another

the position (for she calls it "amusing") that "the function of maternity unfits a woman for economic production" (17). Of course nobody has said this thus absolutely, but only that that function does at certain times unfit her, and in general lessens her capacity, compared with man's, for economic production, especially of the strenuous nerve-racking kind required by modern methods.<sup>13</sup> Mrs. Gilman would only kick against the pricks, if she should deny this. Therefore she says nothing further on the subject, except occasionally referring to the arduous labours of women in the past in those restricted spheres which some of them are now trying to leave.

Nor is Mrs. Gilman's statement about the excessiveness of the differentiation between men and women either accurate or borne out by facts. She treats all women since the dawn of history as parasitic, because dependent (62, *cf.* 118), notwithstanding that in spite of their "dependence" they are "overworked" (169-70); and yet in proof of such extreme parasitism, treated as general (141), she can cite only the cases of idle daughters and wives among the rich (170), among whom male parasites may also be found. The term "dependent" is used, as already hinted, in two senses—the literal of being supported by another without any work of one's own, and a metaphorical, of not receiving wages or a fixed price for the work one does or the articles one produces; and the disrepute properly attaching to the former is falsely cast over the latter. Parasitism is undoubtedly on the increase, due to expanding wealth; and it is increasing more among women, due to the growing kindness of men for women. And this growing kindness is indicative of exactly the opposite of an excessive differentiation going on between the sexes, indicating instead a *rapprochement*, which is taking place now as it took place in other civilisations when they reached their climax. Mrs. Gilman very curiously refers to the Persian civilisation, which was older than the Greek, as having a more "highly differentiated sexuality," and yet speaks of the Persian men as having "womanly feebleness" (72-3). The Greeks under Alexander did, in fact, liken the Persian men to women.<sup>14</sup> Yet precisely this movement of assimilation, which has led other civilisations into decline, is what Mrs. Gilman is recommending for us. This movement in our day has already been followed by a falling off of the birth-rate among those peoples and classes who have carried it furthest.

is no longer useful, and civilised peoples have given it up. Still, nature has not yet made the negroes equal to the whites.

<sup>13</sup> Wherefore all sorts of laws are enacted, often at the behest of women, to regulate the labour of women and children (note the connection), different from the case of men.

<sup>14</sup> Quintus Curtius, III. 25. Even earlier: see Xenophon, *Hellenica*, III. iv. 19.

Yet Mrs. Gilman has the face to say it is the economic dependence of women on men (which has existed since civilisation began) that "is the steadily acting cause of a pathological maternity and a decreasing birth-rate."<sup>15</sup> In detail she notes such factors as the excessive delicacy of some women produced by idleness, which renders child-bearing dangerous — the detraction from the charms of society-women caused by child-bearing, wherefore it is avoided<sup>16</sup> — the increasing weight of care upon men, which leads them to defer marriage and to dread the burden of children, especially in cities;<sup>17</sup> all which are developments of advanced civilisation, but are no more essential to the economic relation between men and women than were the earlier conditions when the women worked hard at home, were strong, and bore children easily, who were a help rather than a burden to their parents. "The more freely the human mother mingles in the natural industries of a human creature," says Mrs. Gilman, "as in the case of the savage woman, the peasant woman, the working-woman everywhere who is not overworked, the more rightly she fulfils these functions" (182). Her examples are good, but they are all the industries of "dependent" women under the direction and care of fathers or husbands, and not the "independent" or wage-earning labours now recommended. She cites the goodness of women's work clearly marked off from man's work, as a reason why women's work should no longer be distinguished from man's work! To some recent fads and fancies, found only in certain circles in very small parts of the world (compared with the whole), she attaches quite undue importance. The objection of some women to asking for money, and the custom of some fathers and husbands [in parts of our country] giving their daughters and wives "a definite allowance, a separate bank account, something which they can play is all their own," is cited as exhibiting "the spirit of personal independence [save the mark!] in women to-day," and as "sure proof that a change has come" (152). Further proof is found in the "new women of to-day," the "Gibson girls" for instance, who are declared far superior to "the Evelinas and Arabellas of the last century" (148-9), although it was those women "of earlier times" who reared large families and permitted civilised races to expand and to colonise distant regions, while our gorgeously developed athletic women are almost like

<sup>15</sup> 169. Here she is followed by Mrs. Hale, who makes the strange statement that feminism "points to the utter stagnation that has overtaken every civilisation that has so limited [to child-bearing and household labours] the activities of women, whether the Greek or Roman, Oriental or Mohammedan," *What Women Want*, 166, as if those civilisations did not advance when they did so, and decline when they no longer did so!

<sup>16</sup> "It takes a year, a whole year, out of life," Mrs. Wharton represents her heroine as lachrimosely lamenting, in *The Custom of the Country*, 184.

<sup>17</sup> 45-6, 169, 192-3; 92-3, 169.

American beauty roses in their barrenness. But this is no matter. The idea of "the scientific dictator, in all sobriety" prescribing "that the average married pair should have four children merely to preserve our present population," she smilingly scoffs at, finding in it no meaning except that two of the children are supposed to perish (160). She forgets that allowance must be made for those who do not marry as well as for some unavoidable deaths and deficiencies. *A foriori* the idea that, to outstrip the uncivilised, the civilised peoples need to do more than merely keep up their present numbers, receives no attention. Americans apparently are to leave the peopling of this hemisphere to foreigners; and if England wishes to fill up South Africa with white people, she must leave the job to the Boers—or to Germans!

There is still to notice Mrs. Gilman's account of the future. We have seen that the sexuo-economic relation is to be replaced by a "higher" one, which is, first of all, the economic independence of women. Women are to be dependent on their parents only as men are, but they are to be independent of their husbands either by their inheritance or by their own efforts. They are to support themselves by earning wages or by conducting business on their own account. They will, however, Mrs. Gilman believes, "naturally choose those professions which are compatible with motherhood" (245-6). The only reason given for this sweeping statement is, that "if women did choose professions unsuited to maternity, Nature would quietly extinguish them by her unvarying process" (246); which, as we have already noted, is true on the stage of the world at large, but might be calamitous to a nation that carried the experiment too far. And Mrs. Gilman quietly ignores the fact that if there are professions which women cannot engage in without coming to an end, women are not economically equal to men, and that the inequality with men depends on the number of such professions, into which she does not inquire; for if they are many, it is nonsense to talk, in the way she does, of "the workshops of mankind" being woman's sphere as well as man's" (313). All the same, as "economically free agents," independent of their husbands, they are expected to do "half duty in providing" for their children (186). Perhaps this is meant only in a general way, and, too, on the supposition that women turn out capable of winning or "making" just, or nearly, as much money as men. For if a woman who earns little marries a man who earns much, and if men generally do earn more, it would not seem just to demand an equal contribution from her for the support of her and his children. Under social-

ism, of course, this difficulty would not occur, since the incomes of husband and wife would be the same without regard to what they really earned. But without unduly putting her socialism forward, Mrs. Gilman describes the future households as conducted on the same scientific principles as industries now are, being enlarged and systematized. Cooking, for instance, is no more a family function than weaving or spinning, and like them will be banished from the home, and be conducted on a large scale, either on the ground floor of immense apartment houses, or in a central building in the midst of cottages.<sup>18</sup> All house-work will be specialised, other women being set free to do other work, thus increasing the productive power of the world (245); for, she says elsewhere, "a house does not need a wife any more than it does a husband."<sup>19</sup> So, too, the upbringing of babies and the education of children — this will be done collectively, socially, by specialists, with great gain, since some women are capable of bringing forth fine children, but not of educating them properly, which can be better done by other women (283), whose work, like other original labour, is a higher function, being collective, social, human, while child-bearing is merely an individual, personal, animal function (74, 194, 183, *cf.* 105). "Even kittens may be mothers," says Mrs. Gilman.<sup>20</sup> Women, as human beings, it is implied, have wider functions.<sup>21</sup> All this is but extending the principle of large public schools to the care of infants (286), ousting the mother, and giving her an opportunity to do something else. But whether men and women will desire to have children

<sup>18</sup> 240-2, 207. Similarly Lily Braun, *Die Frauenfrage*, 196-8. So Bebel, above, ii. 41. Mrs. Gallichan points out the prior existence of such abodes among the Pueblo and Creek Indians in America — primitive peoples living under mother-right; and thinks it noteworthy that it is women who are now again desiring such a way of living: *The Condition of Women in Primitive Society*, 143. She overlooks that the idea was originated by male socialists.

<sup>19</sup> *The Home*, New York, 1903, p. 101.

<sup>20</sup> In a lecture, reported in the papers, February, 1914. Cf. Weininger: "Mother love is an instinctive and natural impulse, and animals possess it in a degree as high as that of human beings," *Sex and Character*, 226, — higher, he might have said, than some women, the very ones Mrs. Gilman is extolling. And yet, of course, true maternal affection no animal mother has as the human mother has (or can have, and ought to have). "Before all other things in life," wrote an anonymous author on *Modern Women* in the London Saturday Review (p. 303 of the New York reprint, 1868), "maternity demands unselfishness in women; and this is just the one virtue of which women have least at the present time." Accordingly the tendency among feminists is to rank maternal love (which ever gives, and asks "nothing in return") below marital love (which is reciprocal) — of "two pure souls fused into one by an impassioned love": see a quotation in Mrs. Johnson's *Woman and the Republic*, 312. In which they were preceded by the communist Noyes, who got it from the Bible, because maternity came only after the fall: repeated in his *History of American Socialisms*, 633. Also Mill, or his wife, spoke derogatively of maternity as an "animal function," *Dissertations*, iii. 109.

<sup>21</sup> It is of these women with wider functions, "to be found in certain classes to-day," that Saleeby says, when they become "imitation mothers (no longer mammalia)" — or half mothers, as Favorinus implied (see above, i. 110n.), who is here quoted by Saleeby, — they "should be ashamed to look a tabby-cat in the face," *Parenthood and Race Culture*, 313-14

that are then to be reared at their expense by others, is not questioned; or if the expense is to be borne by the state, whether they may not overdo the thing, or perhaps (by preventive measures) entirely abandon it, is likewise left out of view. Mrs. Gilman does not share the "absurd" fear that then will be needed "either bribe or punishment to force women to true marriage with independence" (91), because to say otherwise is to belie the praise "we adoringly sing to the power of love" (300), and she has made plain to herself that a "lasting monogamous sex-union *can* exist without bribe and purchase" (115). That there will be sex-unions, monogamous at a time, we may of course be pretty sure; but how "true" and "lasting" they will be, is another matter. Love will be "pure," she tells us, because purified of the economic motive (300, 304); but whether it will be purified of the sensual motive (or does "pure" marriage mean marriage without children?), is the main question, and to prove this her argument seems to run as follows: "The immediately acting cause of sex-attraction," she recognises, "is sex-distinction. The more widely the sexes are differentiated, the more forcibly they are attracted to each other" (31). Here she agrees with the apostle of romantic love, Mr. Finck; who, however, on that account desires the distinction to be increased in order that the attraction may be increased.<sup>22</sup> But Mrs. Gilman wishes the opposite. The distinction is to be decreased, and then the attraction will be decreased. Love will then give way to friendship, which, she says, is a "higher force, in the sense of belonging to a later race-development" (305) — a statement with which Mr. Finck would not agree, as he holds that romantic love is the latest development.<sup>23</sup> Thus the new sex-relation is to be friendship, which is rather an "inter-human love" than an "inter-sexual" (142): woman is to "stand beside man as the comrade of his soul."<sup>24</sup> If the scheme were to be fully carried out, and if it could be, we might expect some such result. Men and women would be companions with one another,

<sup>22</sup> *Primitive Love and Personal Beauty*, 175-6, 290. The opposite he calls the "political virago movement," 175-6, 542. Similarly in *Primitive Love and Love Stories*: "Men and women fall in love with what is unlike, not with what is like them," 66.

<sup>23</sup> Not altogether correctly. When he invented his theory, he was ignorant of the late Greek erotic literature. Romantic love is a late development toward the culminating period of civilisation, and in its decline, accompanying the refinement of luxury. It existed in the last periods of the Greco-Roman civilisation, though it may perhaps reach a higher pitch in ours. The same mistake is made by Emil Lucka in his *Eros*, English translation, New York, 1915. His highest love, supposed to be only recently evolved, is nothing but the unproductive love which precedes and attends the down-grade of civilization.

<sup>24</sup> 237. So Mary Wollstonecraft had written: "We [women] shall then [when admitted by men into "rational fellowship, instead of slavish obedience"] love them with true affection," *Vindication*, ch. IX. end. This is better than talking about "purity." Mary Wollstonecraft also expected that women would then tend their own children.

as men are with men, and women with women. They would, according to the supposition, differ from each other so little<sup>25</sup> as to awaken little desire in them, except possibly only at a season of rut, as among some of the aboriginal tribes of America, India, and Australia,<sup>26</sup> and as was likely in the primitive mother-age;<sup>27</sup> or would produce children only from a sense of duty, or under state compulsion, like the socialised people of Paraguay, where the married couples had to be waked half an hour before the rising time. Among such creatures free love would produce no more disturbance than it does among animals; and marriage, being nothing but the comradeship of friends, of no earthly concern to anybody else, would need no ceremony, no law, no contract, no anything. But we know that this scheme cannot be carried through, because, as Mr. Finck says, of "the constant elimination of the masculine women."<sup>28</sup> Yet there are some few men and women already suited for it, and perhaps a hundred thousandth part of the female portion of the human species, "in the most advanced races" (140), those nearest to decline, have something of the sort in mind. If, then, any nation's institutions were made over, or abandoned, and accommodated to this minute minority, while other women are, and will continue to be, sexually different from men and therefore objects to them of sexual attraction (and also of sexual repulsion), and consequently the great majority of mankind are unsuited to such freedom of intercourse (of pairing and also of parting), there would soon be such irregularities and disorders as would ultimately ruin that nation, causing women meanwhile to be the greatest sufferers.

Mrs. Schreiner in her book on *Woman and Labour* (London, 1911) likewise shows fondness for naturalising. She finds her model especially among birds, asserting that in certain of their species (all of which abandon their young as soon as fledged) "sex has attained its highest aesthetic, and one might almost say intellectual, development on earth, a point of development to which no human race has yet reached, and which represents the realisation of the highest sexual ideal which haunts humanity" (5, cf. 193). Here she is merely expanding upon the naturalist Brehm, who had written that "real genuine marriage can be

<sup>25</sup> "If the viragoes had their way," says Finck, "men and women would in course of time revert to the condition of the lowest savages, differing only in their organs of generation," *Primitive Love and Love Stories*, 66.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 28–30.

<sup>27</sup> So Pearson, *Chances of Death*, ii. 104–5. He refers especially to the survival of it in the Walpurgisnacht orgies and May-day licentiousness, 21, 25ff. Cf. the reviling of a character in Ben Jonson's *Epicoene, or the Silent Woman*, act. IV., sc. i.: "You sons of noise and tumult, begot on an ill May-day." Cf. above, p. 88n.

<sup>28</sup> *Romantic Love and Personal Beauty*, 191, cf. 253.

found only among birds.”<sup>29</sup> She has also much more about the male in some low forms of animals doing work in rearing the young which we consider “inherent” in the female, and about “the female form exceeding the male in size and strength and often in predatory instinct in the great majority of species on the earth” (4, cf. 76n., 192); all which is intended to prepare us for a new mixing of the sexes in our species, but wherein she overlooks the concomitant difference that in these animals the female spends little energy in developing the eggs and none, or no more than the male, in rearing the young, while in the human species the female does spend much energy in these occupations, from which the male is free. She is attracted, furthermore, especially to the study of parasitic animals and plants, as she takes them for the prototypes of what would be the case with women but for the protest made against such a condition by the present feminist movement; of which more will be said in the next chapter. She even goes beyond Mrs. Gilman, who wishes women to become *human* again, for she wishes them to be *virile*.<sup>30</sup> Both these feminists think the world is wrong and has been wrong; but Mrs. Gilman, with a little wavering, thinks it has been wrong since mankind left the savage state, all through its period of civilising itself, while Mrs. Schreiner thinks it began to go wrong only about three centuries ago in our age, having gone wrong also in older civilisations toward their close. Here Mrs. Schreiner is more correct than Mrs. Gilman, who is often confused between the past and present behaviour of the upper and lower classes. Both wish to return to the early condition of undifferentiated equality of the sexes. Marriage, then, for Mrs. Schreiner also, will become “a fellowship of comrades” (269), and “the new woman’s conception of love between the sexes” will be “wholly of an affection between equals” (271); for what the man’s conception of it will be, does not seem to matter. Here again is the ideal of friendship in the place of love. The objection that there may possibly be a diminution of sex-attractiveness she meets by referring to the past, when the hard manual labour of the women did not unfit them for men’s love (236). She

<sup>29</sup> Brehm’s *Bird-life*, English translation, London, 1874, p. 285. Brehm referred only to its continuance till the death of one of the parties (with several known exceptions, and with little proof of its generality), hardly to the widow’s speedy consolation and taking up even with the slayer of her husband (see p. 290), like Anne in Shakespeare’s *Richard III*. More correctly Aimé Martin cited birds as animals that “have no family, no true parental affection.” Yet the constancy of *some* birds, such as pigeons or doves, to a single mate, has from of old been held up as a model to mankind, as noted, e.g., by Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, II. 23. As for others, Higginson thinks the treatment by the hornbill of his setting mate an extravagant model; but adds that “Nature has kindly provided various types of bird-households to suit all varieties of taste,” *Works*, iv. 129–32.

<sup>30</sup> So, frequently: 65, 80, 83, 86, 90, 91, 178 and n., 245, 246, 247, 271.

overlooks that in the past referred to, men and women had separate work, whereas her ideal is of their working side by side, as we shall see; and if in the past women were virile compared with our women, the men then were still more virile compared with our men, and, too, their love was not of the high order now contemplated. And against the objection that the free and independent women will not be willing to marry, she urges that "there is no ground for supposing that woman's need of man's comradeship would be diminished" (247-8). On the contrary, she says, "it is a movement of the woman toward the man" that is now going on, "of the sexes toward closer union" (265, cf. 272, 289). But the closer union is of greater companionship in work and in play, equal, common, promiscuous, like that of many friends toward many friends, ever changing; not the exclusive love of lovers, made permanent in wedlock. Indeed, Mrs. Schreiner depicts a coming condition when only a portion of women are to be child-bearers, and then only for half-a-dozen years (70, cf. 60-3). Because women are to do what has hitherto been men's work, evidently they are to have their own peculiar labour made as light as possible, and most of them are to be sterile, like the working female bees. And the alleviation may very well go on to excess, as here; for in the case supposed the few women devoted to race-propagation for a few years (very unlike the queen-bee, who makes up for the other females) could hardly have more than three or four children apiece. This would be systematised race-suicide. If Mrs. Schreiner should convert to her views her own country, England would soon cease to be. But the rest of the world would not stop on that account, and the British isles would soon be occupied by another race, with virile men and with women willing to be women.

Against such "amaternal" views,<sup>31</sup> as she calls them, from within the woman movement Ellen Key raises her voice in pro-

<sup>31</sup> Another amaternalist, because an apaternalist, Otto Weininger, in his *Sex and Character*, despite his opposition to the woman's movement, 71, and to granting the franchise to women (any more than to children and imbeciles), 339, may be classed among the feminists (and the feminist W. L. George bases feminism on Weininger's theory of the sexes, *Feminist Intentions*, *Atlantic Monthly*, Dec., 1913, p. 721), since he, too, has a solution of the woman question — one which is also a solution of the man question! His is that men should refrain from sexual intercourse with women — and let the race go, for the continuance of which we have no moral duty, 346. Men should refrain, because such intercourse is immoral; and it is immoral, because in it a man makes use of a woman as a means instead of an end, 337. This is but a misapplication of Kant's well-known ethical principle. Kant himself never so applied it, and if this application were correct, it would lead to the condemnation of kissing, and even of hand-shaking. We have a right to use others in exchange for allowing them to use us. We may hire servants, though we ought not to force any one into servitude. In sexual matters Kant's principle only forbids rape. Weininger's errors, standing out in strong contrast with some of those still to be described (especially Mrs. Gallichan's), are instances of the aberrations of the age, by himself described, 329-30, but without his apprehending that they mainly belong to the culminating period of an excessive civilisation.

test. Almost alone among the feminists she lays stress upon the unlikeness of men and women, and wishes their different functions and occupations to be respected, emphasising the duty of motherhood on the woman's part. Still, though saying nothing about any natural equality of the sexes, she insists upon the need of the abolition, "on both sides, of every external privilege," and the establishment of their complete equality "in legal right and personal freedom."<sup>32</sup> For her, as for the rest, the main object of the woman movement is to make the wife "of age," freeing her from her husband's guardianship, and making her "legally his equal," or setting up both "absolutely free and equal," as much for his benefit as for hers (41, 217, 110). Woman, moreover, is to have every "human right" as well without as within marriage (141), and, furthermore, she needs to be emancipated, not merely "as a human being," but "as a woman" (56). Ellen Key perceives the error of the recent change in the woman movement, from demanding equal rights, to demanding equal functions, similar application, and actual sameness with men (181). She recognises the danger of the increasing disinclination of women for maternity, and of its encouragement by the amaternal theory (172-3) of those whom she regards as the "ultra" or "extreme" feminists (127, 222, cf. 158), such as Mrs. Gilman and Rosa Mayreder (and she would probably have included Mrs. Schreiner but for the asynchronism); and nothing could be better than her denunciation of their philosophy (176-93). In her opinion it is not necessary for law to limit the choice of labour, as nature does that herself (182); for nature originally made the division of labour between men and women, principally with a view to woman's function of motherhood (186); and "on the whole," and "upon a higher plane," "the division of labour must remain the same as that which has hitherto existed," since "it is necessary for the higher ends of culture that woman shall in an ever more perfect manner fulfil what is her most exalted task, the bearing and rearing of the new generation" (187, cf. 215). Hence the error of those feminists who would have women compete with men, working side by side with them in occupations outside the home, and would repair this lack of home by co-operative housekeeping and social institutions for the care of children (41-2); which competition and outside work is an evil both to the women and to the men, lessening the latter's ability to enter into matrimony, employing paid labour for what should be the labour of love, and causing woman "to lose that character by which she gives happiness to man and receives it

from him" (124, 106, 126). Women, she says, should be employed only "in industrial fields of work where their powers are as productive as possible, with the least possible loss in time and strength; above all, in those fields where the work requires no long preparation and the dexterity does not suffer by interruptions" (42-3).

So far Ellen Key deserves the epithet of a "moderate" feminist which she arrogates (*cf.* 181); but hardly so will we consider her when we follow her to the end. She has demanded two things: that the wife shall be free and equal with her husband, and therefore independent of him, and that she shall not be employed in work unsuitable to the function of maternity, at least during the years properly devoted to that function. These two demands are incompatible, and she recognises there is no remedy "under the present economic system" (124). These objects can be realised only under "another possible ideal of the future," when "production is determined no longer by capitalistic interests, but by social-political interests" (42). Ellen Key also is a socialist, but her socialism is the kind usually denominated state socialism; and what she says about it is confined to the treatment of women. Women who have not children are to be employed (by the state or otherwise) in the fields already described as appropriate to them, but women who have children are to be "remunerated by the state" (43). Society by thus "recompensing the vocation of mother" will give her "a full equivalent for self-supporting labour" (163). The plan is of "a paternity assessment upon society as a contribution to the maintenance of children and a compensation of motherhood by the state" (149-50n.), "the service of mother receiving the honour and oblation that the state now gives to military service" (218). This will "restore, upon a higher plane, the arrangement which is already found in the lower stages of civilisation, the arrangement which nature herself created: that mother and child are most closely bound together, that they together, above all, form the family, in which the father enters [or not] through the mother's or his own free will."<sup>33</sup> For "then marriage will signify only the living together [the mating] of two people upon the ground of love and the common parenthood of children. Maternal right will in law take the place of paternal right, but in reality the father will continue to retain all the influence upon the children which he personally is able to exert, just as has hitherto been the case with the mother" (150n.). In fact, marriage will then be a wholly perfunctory

<sup>33</sup> Through his knowledge that he is the father, she should have said,—a knowledge which nature accords only to human beings, for them alone to make use of.

affair: the condition of maternity will entitle the woman to the state's support, and no questions need be asked about the father (except possibly as to his health). For child-bearing and -rearing by the mother is one thing, her living with the child's father is another thing, and if the state steps in and severs the necessary connection between the two, they may or may not co-exist any more: that will be a matter of indifference. At all events, they must not co-exist unless the mother so wills. The child will always go with its mother: that it should have a father, is not considered of much consequence.<sup>34</sup> The gains summed up are that no mother will ever be deprived of her children, and will nevermore, for her own and her children's maintenance, need to live with a brutal [or in any wise uncongenial] man. Curiously, it is concluded that there will be no fathers who avoid their economic duties toward their children (*ib.*); for the very sufficient reason that they have no such duties! Another advantage is that "there will be no more illegitimate children" (*ib.*), as there will be no distinction between child-bearing within and without marriage,—and practically no marriage at all, but only cohabitation while both parents agree. Child-bearing is one of the rights of woman as a human being,—rather as an animal being. On this, this "moderate" feminist insists. "All woman's rights," she says, "have little value, until this one thing is attained: that a woman who through her illegitimate motherhood has lost nothing of her personal worth, but on the contrary has proved it, does not forfeit social esteem" (171). There will be "a new morality" (223), and its arrival is "only a question of time," and "within a century" people will smile at our doubts on the subject (217).

So Ellen Key brings us back to a position little different from Grant Allen's. Women will do the light work they are capable of, and those with children will be supported by the state, that is, primarily by the men who do the hard work. Women, of course, in this plan as in all others, are to have all political rights, including the suffrage, although this is not insisted on,<sup>35</sup> and their election to office during motherhood is deprecated (27, 130-6); but, as it is acknowledged that they cannot support themselves as well as men, and need men's supplementary support, room is left for the claim, which men will not shut their eyes to, that men have a

<sup>34</sup> And all that has been gained to humanity by the knowledge of paternity may be abandoned!

<sup>35</sup> In 1896 Ellen Key attacked the suffragists for forgetting the maternal rights of women in their race for political and economic rights. But in 1905 she made a public statement of her allegiance to woman suffrage: Katherine Anthony, *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, 211-13, who, in her zeal for the latter cause, characterises Ellen Key as "the 'wise fool' of the woman movement."

better right to the direction of affairs than they. Men, though supporting children in general, are supposed to be willing to give up all rights over them, and to renounce having any children they can call their own, returning to the mother-right (and paternity-ignorance) of primitive times, though on the "higher plane" to which the efforts principally of men have raised women, and which consists in forgetting the means whereby the elevation was attained. And although women are to remain different from men, and therefore attractive to men, it is expected that this system of promiscuity will work smoothly and satisfactorily to all concerned! and the children who have a mother but whose father will be the state, are to be as well brought up as children are now who have a real father to boot! Surely if our present individualism *à deux* must give way to something else, it will not be to this, or the state that makes the exchange will itself give way to those which do not.

A maternalist, if not also a paternalist, is the physiologist Forel, whose comprehensive work on *The Sexual Question* contains many wise suggestions, but also some very deleterious matter. In it he advocates an approach toward free love,<sup>86</sup> and a return to many of the practices and excesses of the matronymic period. He considers "the most advantageous form of marriage for the future" to be "a kind of free monogamy (eventually [with permissive] polygamy), accompanied by obligations relative to the procreation of children and to the children procreated. Polyandry should only have an accessory right to existence in certain pathological or exceptional cases" (182). His principle, in agreement with Bebel's (and Pearson's), we have already seen.<sup>87</sup> More fully expressed, it is given thus: "Penal justice has only the right to intervene [in the sexual province] in cases where individuals or society are injured, *or run the risk of being injured*" (401). The latter proviso is too lightly taken. He does not think a third party [the child] is injured, provided the law puts certain obligations, mostly of a pecuniary sort, upon its unassociated parents. For he admits that "one of the principal tasks of man's sexual morality will always be to restrain his erotic polygamous desires, for the simple reason that they are especially apt to injure the rights and the welfare of others" (455); wherefore it is the duty of the state to penalise such offences. Or if undesired children were always avoided, by the common use of anti-conceptional measures, which he describes and recommends (although that part of his work is omitted in the

<sup>86</sup> Pp. 371, 377, 384-5, 525, of Rebman's edition of C. F. Marshall's translation.

<sup>87</sup> Above, ii. 43.

American edition, under our laws of freedom of the press!), he does not sufficiently consider what risk of injury would be involved to the nation that falls into these ways. In one place he says: "If the objection is raised that this [obligation of caring for the children every one is free to procreate] would lead immoral people to avoid [by anti-conceptual measures] the procreation of children so as to enjoy more varied sexual pleasure, I reply that this would be beneficial; for this anti-social class of individuals would be eliminated by sterility" (387). But immorality of this sort — anti-social selfishness — is in nine cases out of ten an acquired habit, which is not transmitted by heredity, so that from this point of view there is no need of eliminating such persons, and harm may be done, because they may have other good transmissible qualities. This is a matter of education, to which Forel's own doctrine may contribute, and it lies beyond the domain of heredity. What Forel here says puts him, for the nonce, in the class of "superficial prattlers" of whom we have quoted him as speaking.<sup>38</sup>

And now comes along the irrepressible George Bernard Shaw, who in the Preface to his amusing play entitled *Getting Married*, tirades against "the licentiousness of marriage"<sup>39</sup> and the intolerableness of tying a woman for life to a man who may commit murder;<sup>40</sup> and under the caption of "The Old Maid's Right to Motherhood" asserts that "the right to bear a child, perhaps the most sacred of all woman's rights,<sup>41</sup> is not one that should have any condition attached to it such as being saddled with the obligation to be the servant of a man, except in the interest of race welfare"; and in spite of this proviso, which would have provided him with a very plain reason, did he not shut his eyes to it from all but the eugenic point of view, and in spite of the fact that every right without exception is subject to conditions, expresses his entire inability to answer the question why "the taking of a husband should be imposed" on certain women, who dislike the domestic habits of men, etc., "as the price of their right to maternity" (153-4, 148). Reversely, of course, though Mr.

<sup>38</sup> Above, p. 28n.

<sup>39</sup> Pp. 122-8 of Brentano's edition. Cf. *Man and Superman*.

<sup>40</sup> P. 122. The woman then suffers vicariously. But another may be honoured vicariously when her husband does a noble deed — e.g., the former Mrs. now Lady Scott. The "for better, for worse" is double-edged. The choice must lie between getting either honour or dishonour as the case may be, or getting neither. Probably most honest women would choose the former, on the expectation that their own choice would turn out well. Cf. above, p. 124. As for licentiousness in marriage, that can hardly be touched except by the parties concerned, and their physicians.

<sup>41</sup> Note that Shaw here concedes that women have rights of their own not possessed by men, besides the one here mentioned. Then men have rights peculiarly theirs, not possessed by women, besides the one corresponding to the one here mentioned. Where, then, is the equality of the sexes?

Shaw seems to overlook it, a bachelor must have the right of fatherhood without the obligation of being saddled with a wife whose domestic ways he may not like: he might contract with one or more women for a child from each (with a contingency clause about twins), pay them, take the issue, and, with the help of trained nurses, raise a family of motherless children, with the advantage, if he likes, of having them all of the same age.<sup>42</sup> Evidently the state has a right, and duty, to put a finger in the pie here; which is just what it has done everywhere. Keeping the form of marriage, however, Mr. Shaw would get rid of its substance by means of perfectly free divorce, at the desire of either party, without anybody asking why,—“as easy, as cheap, and as private” as the marriage itself (203). “To impose a continuance of marriage on people who have ceased to desire to be married” he thinks as bad as would be to impose marriage on them against their will in the first place; while divorce by the action of either party he thinks no worse than is refusal by one party in the first place (181). Each must be free to discard the other when tired of him or her (182). A woman, then, might marry one day, conceive, and divorce the next day, and have a child without even the illegitimacy which Ellen Key would legitimise.<sup>43</sup> In the case of the matrimonially inclined woman that is discarded by her husband, Mr. Shaw says nothing about alimony; but he has in mind another arrangement which dispenses with that. This is our old friend, the economic independence of women, to be achieved for them by the state under socialism, after liberalism emancipates them politically (173, 183). “Until the central horror of the dependence of women on men is done away with” (he means the dependence of individual on individual, for that of all on all cannot possibly be done away with), until then, he says, “family life will never be decent” (164), and “we shall have to maintain marriage as slavery” (182); for the sexual relations may be made “decent and honourable [only] by making women economically independent of men.”<sup>44</sup> Yet if they then *may* be decent, he offers no reason for supposing they *will* be decent. It is the indecency of loveless marriage that shocks these modern prudes: for the indecencies committed by lovers under no

<sup>42</sup> Cf. above, p. 132 below.

<sup>43</sup> Shaw would get the same promiscuity even more directly. “What we need,” he says in *Sociological Papers*, 1904, p. 75, “is freedom for people who have never seen each other before and never intend to see one another again, to produce children under certain public conditions, without loss of honour.” Every great man might then have innumerable children; for eugenic women would come to him, as breeders bring their mares to a famous stallion, to have children by him. His time, indeed, might be so much occupied in this way, that he would soon cease to be a great man.

<sup>44</sup> 204. Cf. Pearson above, p. 122n.; who also speaks of “the pure gratification of sexual appetite,” *Ethic of Freethought*, 406.

restraint they have no sensibility. Their refinement is also shown by the fact that not only Shaw, but Grant Allen before him, see indelicacy in requiring the bride to give her consent in a public ceremony.<sup>45</sup> A society may grow too fine to live in this coarse world.<sup>46</sup> But in general, says our iconoclast, "until we abolish poverty it is impossible to push rational measures of any kind very far" (202). Let us, then, wait.

In the last remarks we have our finger on the core of much of the latter-day (a few years ago it would have been called *fin-de-siècle*) feminism, sounded by men and echoed by women. The canker gnawing there is the over refinement of feeling, running into sentimentality, that accompanies excessive luxury. Feeling is to be the guide, and nobody is to be compelled to do what he or she dislikes. I am not to inflict pain on another, if possibly avoidable; but at all events another is not to inflict pain on me, much less myself on myself. Hence I am not to be bound, if any obligation no longer pleases me. In freeing myself I may inflict pain on the other party; but consistency is restored by granting the same permission to him or her, if he or she happened first to desire the release. I will let every one else be selfish, if they will let me be selfish. This is the golden rule of the new morality. Each one is to live his or her own life, and let others live theirs. Each is to look after his or her own self. Each is to develop his or her own personality. Each — each — each, — the world is to consist of eaches! Thus in general, if any bargain once entered upon becomes in any way distasteful, there must be some way of getting out of it, else — so people now talk — one is not free, but enslaved. Obligations are obligations, to be sure, while they last; but every obligation must be dissolvable by incurring some slight penalty, mostly of a pecuniary nature, especially if this be nominated in the bond, or generally understood. If the one party breaks the contract, the other party is liberated. Hence every marriage, being regarded as a mere contract, can be unloosed when the one party desires and the other is willing, by the one breaking and the other denouncing it. Or, if only the one is anxious to withdraw from an agreement that has become irksome, provided he or she will satisfy obligations that have been promised to the other, and assumed, or ordered by the state, toward third parties (the offspring), which, however, need not be forthcoming, the other, though unwilling, must not be allowed to hold

<sup>45</sup> *The Woman Who Did*, 85. They both probably got the idea from the carping Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. xxix. n. 15.

<sup>46</sup> Yet, as we know, qualities tend to run into their opposites. For Forel "every pregnancy and every birth"—whether or no the accidental result of libidinous indulgence—should be "looked upon by society with honour and respect," *The Sexual Question*, 417.

her or him in bondage by denying the release. The yoke of duty is no longer pressed down: duty belonged to the old morality, and is now discarded.<sup>47</sup> Uppermost now is the sense of the agreeable, and the desire to avoid present pain,—these form the cornerstone of the new morality.<sup>48</sup> The old belief that marriage is a social duty for the procreation of children, the perpetuation of the family, the increase and improvement of society, and the safety of one's country, no longer holds. In its place marriage is to be a union of friends, to which the procreation of children is only incidental (and perhaps accidental),—a commingling of souls, it is described as being, though we all know that there is to remain one thing from the old, the commingling of bodies, legalised during the continuance of the connubial state, till divorce separates the parties for other unions and more comminglings. Again as in ancient Rome, the old *conjugium* is being abandoned for a mere *concubitus*.<sup>49</sup> If these unions for pleasure, instead of duty, are anything else than legalised harlotry, it is difficult to see the distinction.<sup>50</sup> That love alone sanctifies sexual intercourse, is absolutely false. What sanctifies (and sanctions) sexual intercourse, is the acceptance by both parties, before all the world, of certain permanent obligations toward each other and toward the offspring that are to be produced. Without such acceptance before all the world of these obligations, the more the parties love each other, the more indecent is their sexual intercourse. Just the opposite is the new view. According to it, the marital relation must be enjoyable to both parties, or (so it is maintained) it

<sup>47</sup> Thus W. L. George: "Duty is in a bad way, and I, for one, think that we should be well rid of duty; for it appears to me to be merely an excuse for acting without considering whether the deed is worthy," *The Break-up of the Family*, Harper's Magazine, July, 1916, pp. 256-7. In other words, every one must reconsider the question for himself every time.

<sup>48</sup> "The marriage service," says George in the same article, p. 259, "will need a new clause: we shall have to swear to be agreeable." How the sense of duty toward the public over against personal gratification is now lost, is well shown by a sentiment expressed by the Secretary of the Navy. There is a rule forbidding midshipmen to marry, just as there is in most colleges a similar rule, nothing preventing them from marrying a little later, when they have passed beyond the age of probation. A midshipman having broken the rule and been properly expelled, Secretary Daniels, after getting him reinstated, is reported in the papers (e.g., *The New York Times*, March 20, 1915) as saying: "If I were a young middy in love with a girl, I would marry her if it broke up the whole navy. I would let nothing like that [the navy, his country, and his oath of obedience] stand between me and the girl I loved." Of course the corollary to such a sentiment is, that if he ever ceased to love her and fell in love with another, he would divorce the one and marry the other if it broke up all society: he would not let such a little thing as the welfare of future generations stand between him and his new love.

<sup>49</sup> Marriage unions, says George, the feminists "would base exclusively upon love," *ib.* 722.

<sup>50</sup> "Scarcely more than liaisons, hardly deserving the name of marriage," Mrs. John Martin characterises them, *Feminism*, 210. "When pleasure," says Professor Nitz, "is sought for its own sake, without the responsibility and consequence of having children, matrimony loses its entire purpose, and becomes nothing else than a form of monogamic prostitution."

*ought* to cease.<sup>51</sup> The same principle would apply also to the parental and filial relations: they, too, should cease the instant they become disagreeable, although this seems to be overlooked for the moment.<sup>52</sup> But, for the principle applied to the marital relation, at best a flimsy and wholly unproved biological theory is invoked in excuse, that gladness is necessary for the procreation of fine offspring.<sup>53</sup> This stuff is now held up to the lovers of liberty (and of libertinism) as the "new ethics," in ignorance that it is as old as the decay of all the ancient civilisations.<sup>53a</sup>

The latest exponent of this "new morality of love"<sup>54</sup> is Mrs. W. M. Gallichan (C. G. Hartley) in her book *The Truth About Woman* (London, 1913). Another opponent of asexuality (268-70), she is likewise a follower of Ward, with whom she agrees in saying that "the female is the race" (292), and whom she outdoes by maintaining that by reason of the female's biological

<sup>51</sup> Cf. also Christabel Pankhurst: "Sexual intercourse, where there exists no bond of love and spiritual sympathy, is beneath human dignity. Such intercourse is forbidden by Nature herself . . . more strictly . . . than any other sin," *Plain Facts about a Great Evil*, 35.

<sup>52</sup> To be sure, there is no sexual intercourse here, but living together is an intimate intercourse which ought not to be imposed upon other people against their will, any more than upon husbands and wives. It is a hardship to compel parents to live with children they do not love. If they prefer others, why should they not adopt them, and turn their own over to the state? And grown children need have nothing more to do with parents they do not love. For, of course, love is a natural impulse that cannot be commanded—at least no more between parents and children than between husband and wife. Godwin, who long before our present-day dilettanti treated marriage only as friendship, and acted upon his theory, held that "in a state of equality [of property and of the sexes] it will be a question of no importance, to know who is the parent of each individual child. It is aristocracy, self-love, and family pride that teach us to set a value upon it at present. I ought to prefer no human being to another, because that being is my father, my wife, or my son, but because, for reasons which equally appear to all understandings, that being is entitled to preference," *Political Justice*, VIII. viii. This is only carrying out the principle to the bitter end.

<sup>53</sup> If Weininger's "law" of sexual attraction be correct, then the mating of the sexually complementary males and females, who most attract each other, might give "the best results," *Sex and Character*, 29-30, 36. But their characters do not change with every change of passion; nor is this corollary of his law (which is what W. L. George bases modern feminism on: above, p. 184n.) so plain as his law itself. Weininger himself, in a note, admits that "for special purposes the breeders, whose object often is to modify natural tendencies, will often disregard this law." The "best" results above referred to, are those which are most imitative of the parents. If the parents themselves do not deserve to be imitated, these results from their passionate mating are not desirable.

<sup>53a</sup> The leading advocates of this new morality, of course, have the best intentions, and believe they are offering to the world something fine and noble. They are deceived by the fact that they are aiming at the happiness of everybody; which certainly is unobjectionable. But they place happiness in freedom from constraint, and extend this to women as if men already had it. Herein they err, as they do not perceive that in allowing this to others they are claiming it for themselves, and that nothing else is the definition of selfishness. The socialists have equally good intentions; but intentions do not always realise their intent. Mr. Blease asserts that there is no analogy between the laxity of morals at the fall of Rome and this new movement, because of "the loftiness of its purpose, the purity of its motive, the emphasis which it lays upon the dignity of motherhood and the solemn duty of the women to maintain the purity and vigour of the race," *The Emancipation of English Women*, 226. But we have no reason to suppose that the emancipation of the Roman women was not likewise done with good intentions, although we know that the results were undesirable.

<sup>54</sup> P. 114 of the work to be cited.

anabolism,<sup>55</sup> and because women began the first productive operations of human society (22-3, 124, 144), woman's nature is especially the constructive, man's being destructive,<sup>56</sup> overlooking that in the periods of civilisation proper, men, in spite of their greater destructiveness, have been far more constructive than women; and by reason of this, and because the female sex was the original (49-50, quoting Ward), and also in the human species took the lead (44, 249), and women were the dominant force in the early mother-age (139-40, *cf.* 153, 169-70, 173), therefore the female is not now, as Ward held, the passive sex,<sup>57</sup> but woman is still and forever the predominant sex,<sup>58</sup> and all progress has rested and does rest on her (44, *cf.* 238, 251, 261). This is due to the erroneous view that what came first is natural and what followed is unnatural, artificial, or conventional; which is applied to the relation between the sexes (16, 21-2, 25, 34, 125, 140, 183, 206), although all Mrs. Gallichan had a right to say was what she also does say that there has been a "reversal of the early superiority of the female, in the human species," and its replacement by "the superiority of the male."<sup>59</sup> Here, too, she cannot keep consistency; for the intermediary stage of sexual equality she treats as the best, finding it among the animals in the marriages of birds, which, like Mrs. Schreiner, she places above ours, and among mankind in the contractual marriages of the later Egyptians, Babylonians, and Romans, which she recommends as

55 22, 42, 54n., here relying on Geddes and Thomson.

56 22, 24, 124, 135, 247, 262, 383, and in her later work, *The Position of Woman in Primitive Society*, London, 1914 (the references are to the New York edition, published under the title of *The Age of Mother-Power*), 246. Similarly Earl Barnes treats women as the conservers of life and men as its destroyers, *Woman's Place in the New Civilisation*, Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, Nov., 1914, p. 10.

57 50n., 250-3. She outdoes even Mrs. Gilman by asserting that woman still is the pursuer of the male, though not as openly as were to be desired, 66, 252-7, 309, 317, 352. Woman is not now "over-sexed," but "wrongly sexed," 265. The authoress commits also the same fallacy as Mrs. Gilman, above, p. 178, explaining: "It is only under the fully established patriarchal system, with its unequal development of the sexes, that motherhood is a source of weakness to women," 264, although the weakness of not being able to undertake motherhood did not exist when the patriarchal system was at its height (was "fully established"), *cf.* 280, but has always appeared when that system began to break down, *cf.* 197.

58 Pp. v., viii., 67, 257, 383, *cf.* 68, 251, 267, 291, 384, 385. Mrs. Gallichan likewise quotes the spider and cripited stories, and treats the latter as "a delightful case" and "a knock-down blow to the theory of the natural superiority of the male," and as showing "the true origin of the sexes," the female creating the male as her assistant, "his sole function being her impregnation," 52-3, 73, 74.

59 249, *cf.* 144-5, 247. Men "usurped" the place of women in the leadership, 168, 171, 206. She overlooks that all revolutions are usurpations from the point of view of the displaced (and their heirs), and by impartial onlookers are treated as such, or are justified, according to the results. Time, also, legitimises, the acquiescence of the conquered proving the fitness of the conquerors. Furthermore, in denouncing the later development of male superiority, she forgets her own statement that "there can be no upward change which is not in accord with the laws of Nature," 48. Her position is, that if the female had started and always and everywhere been inferior to the male, woman's outlook would be hopeless, 49; *cf.* the later work, 7-8. Yet the fact that the female started superior and has been excelled by men, would seem to make women's chances of (again) reaching equality still more desperate: *cf.* above, p. 54.

models for our imitation.<sup>60</sup> She concludes: "In the face of the facts before us one truth cries out its meaning: 'Women must be free face to face with men'" (241). She has simply neglected to note that that state of equality was reached, in every case, in the declining period of those civilisations; wherefore the truth taught by the facts is exactly the contrary.<sup>61</sup> She even goes back to primitive peoples; and the gynæcocracy of the Zuñi Indians, with its frequent divorce and small families, she praises as a good example for civilised peoples.<sup>62</sup>

Accordingly, despite the alleged superiority and predominancy of the female sex, Mrs. Gallichan would kindly claim no more for women than equality with men in all matters economic, political, social, and moral. Both matriarchy and patriarchy were incomplete (170): they must be united, woman must not take freedom away from man, but share it with him (175); not "free from man," but "free with man" must be the woman's watch-cry (269); men's opinions will also have to be respected (290); children belong to the fathers as well as to the mothers (62-3): in short, there must be something like Ward's gynandrocracy. First of all, as necessary for the rest, economic freedom must be re-

<sup>60</sup> 58, 59, *cf.* 92, 105, 113-14, 249; 188, 189, 210, 240-1, 343, 344. She has a high idea of the happiness of married life of the equal couples in ancient Egypt; which she probably has got from the idealised account drawn of it by Emily Simcox in her *Primitive Civilisations*. Miss Simcox, however, adds: "The marriage contracts of later Egypt were all in effect marriage settlements," ii. 461. There is, then, no need of imitating the Egyptians, as the English already have such settlements.

<sup>61</sup> She dwells with gusto upon the extensive activities of the women under the Roman empire, as proving that "the patriarchal subjection of women can never lead to progress," 236-8; although the progress their activities led to was decay. She seems to have been misled by Ellis, whom she quotes, 179 (194, 229), and 234.

<sup>62</sup> 137, *cf.* 132; and again in her later book, 147, quoting to the same effect an incidental remark by Mrs. James Stevenson. In this later book on mother-power Mrs. Gallichan has somewhat altered and disarranged the above cited views. Now, basing herself on the peculiar views advanced by J. J. Atkinson in his *Primal Law* (published by A. Lang together with the latter's *Social Origins*, London, 1903), she conceives that the mother-age was not the original, but was preceded by an age of brutal patriachism, when the full-grown males, under the influence of sexual jealousy, held for themselves many wives and added their daughters to their harems, and expelled their sons; till there came a time, suggested by the conduct of some turkey-hens which Mrs. Gallichan once observed, 62-4, when their wives and daughters combined and with the aid of the expelled sons of other fathers (it was an oversight on the part of the brutal fathers not to have killed these instead of expelling them) deposed the patriarchs, and in the interest of order instituted the maternal clan, in which the women, now also turning to industry and acquiring property, which descended to their daughters, became the leaders—Mrs. Gallichan is chary about calling them rulers. But this was only a transitional stage, and again gave way to the later patriachism, which still endures; for, because of their individualism and selfishness, the men again took to themselves the women, and other men were willing to sell their daughters. Mrs. Gallichan omits to call attention here to the fact that by now the men had become the principal producers and proprietors. This condition, she holds, likewise is transitional, and must be done away with, as in the other work. In all this she now has to abandon the idea that the original is the natural. But her mouth seems to water at the idea of that transitional period when women had their own way. She speaks of those women as having solved some of the most urgent questions which now confront us, 178; *cf.* the first book, 132. But, although she evidently claims that that transitional period was superior to the one which preceded, she will not admit that the one which succeeded is superior, 334, notwithstanding that nine-tenths of progress has been made under it.

gained by women—"by whatever means this is to be accomplished" (256); for Mrs. Gallichan does not enter into the details of socialism.<sup>63</sup> Men and women must work "together as lovers and comrades" (68): the mother "side by side with the father" both "in the home and in the larger home of the state" (175). They must co-operate in the framing of laws (352): that women are to have the franchise is treated as a matter of course. Law must regulate love in the interest both of the race and of the individual (240)—in the interest of the race, by accepting marriage (349, *cf.* 338), preferably monogamy (340-1, 352), and requiring provision for the children (348), and forbidding degenerates from reproducing their like (345-6, 355, *cf.* 257), because of the prenatal right of every child to be well born (17, 256); and in the interest of the individual, by permitting divorce, "without any shame or idea of delinquency," merely as "relief from a misfortune";<sup>64</sup> which is also in the interest of the race, because the unfit wife or husband is an unfit parent (355) and—here comes in the unproved biological basis—life must be given gladly to be given well (263, 342, *cf.* 345). "The fundamental principle of the new ideal morality is that love and marriage must always coincide, and, therefore, when love ceases the bond should be broken."<sup>65</sup> Mrs. Gallichan admits some difficulty in practice, to keep "free motherhood," which she advocates, from degenerating into free love, which she reprobates;<sup>66</sup> for, according to her, "the door of marriage itself must be left open to go out of as it is open to enter" (256). Free love is removed, she seems to think, by requiring responsibility even for temporary unions (*cf.* 191). These are not to be forbidden (even to the already married?), but are to be regulated by requiring that "the birth of every child, without exception, must be preceded [or else abortion employed?] by some form of contract which, though not necessarily binding the mother and father to each other, will place on both alike the obligation of adequate fulfilment of the duties to their child." Yet in the same breath she says that both "mothers and children must be safe-guarded,

<sup>63</sup> She suggests protection for mothers in recognition of their work for the state, 264; equal wages for equal work, and opening of all occupations, 282-9; else polygamy where women outnumber men, 278. Her husband, it may be remarked, has written a book in exculpation of polygamy.

<sup>64</sup> 354. She quotes with approval Cunningham Graham's saying that "divorce is the charter of woman's freedom," 357; and again in her later book, 178.

<sup>65</sup> 350. "The enforced continuance of an unreal marriage is really the grossest form of immorality, harmful not only to the individuals concerned, but to the children," 353, and tolerable only for the sake of the children already begotten, but even so, not to be required by the state, for only the parents "strong enough" to stand it "can safely remain in a marriage without love," 358.

<sup>66</sup> 349, 250, *cf.* 338; yet on p. 305 she joins "free motherhood" with "free love" as part of Ellen Key's doctrine, which she accepts.

whether in legal marriage or outside," since "the same act of love cannot be good or bad just because it is performed in or out of marriage" (as though in every case the morality of an act were not determined by the circumstances!); and therefore, if the parents cannot make adequate provision for their child, "the state must step in with some wide and fitting scheme of insurance of childhood" (348). Thus, even when there is a child, there will be little difference, at least so far as any poor but healthy woman is concerned, between this arrangement and free love, and when there is no child (as there need not be), no difference at all. At all events, "a woman's natural right is her right to be a mother,"<sup>67</sup> if she wants to,— and also, though this is not said, to have sexual intercourse with men when she wants to.<sup>68</sup>

Socially, the scheme likewise does not work out quite consistently, as more than an equal function seems to be assigned to the female. "It is woman, not man," says Mrs. Gallichan, "who must fix the standard in sex";<sup>69</sup> for "hers is the supreme responsibility in creating and moulding life": she is no longer to be man's help-mate, but man is to be "her agent, her helper."<sup>70</sup> Woman, therefore, by means of her renewed economic independence, is to regain her primitive<sup>71</sup> "free power of selection in love" (256), the duty being incumbent on her, as the predominant sex in reproduction, to "choose a fitting father for her children" (18), and to guide her choice "by the man's fitness alone, not, as now it is, by his capacity and power for work and protection" (255). Fitness for what, if it is not for work and protection? we may ask: is it mere bullishness?<sup>72</sup> And for this, of course, men, and women too, as Shaw perceived, must all be reduced to the same income, though Mrs. Gallichan says nothing about such socialism. Morality, of course, in her view, must be the same for both the sexes (240), and that of men must prevail, being the only natural one, that of women (the over-emphasis on chastity

<sup>67</sup> So in the later work, 345.

<sup>68</sup> For certainly if a woman may have a child whenever she wants, without anybody objecting, she may have sexual intercourse with a man whenever she wants, without anybody objecting. But then, by the principle of the single standard, any man may have sexual intercourse with any (willing) woman whenever he wants (and can find one), without anybody objecting. Such a simple *reductio ad absurdum* of their promises does not seem to occur to the logical minds of these reformers.

<sup>69</sup> 257, repeated in the later work, 345.

<sup>70</sup> 384. "Women and not men are the responsible sex in the great things of life that really matter," 292, *cf.* 251.

<sup>71</sup> According to the later work, her transitional!

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Bernard Houghton, criticising H. G. Wells's socialistic argument about women, economically independent, choosing the best men—those with "a fine, vigorous, and attractive personality": "If they chose able men, well and good, but the probability is that, as want of ability would, under socialism, entail no particular hardship, and as ability is by no means necessarily combined with 'a fine, vigorous, and attractive personality,' the latter quality—somewhat reminiscent, by-the-bye, of Nietzsche's 'big blond brute,'—would alone find acceptance in the ladies' eyes," *Socialism through Biological Spectacles*, Westminster Review, Sept., 1908, p. 246.

and modesty) having been imposed upon them in the false patriarchal régime, under the guiding principle of property;<sup>73</sup> whereas woman's moral character is not superior to man's, nor does Nature require it to be so.<sup>74</sup> Chastity, according to this believer "in passion as the supreme factor in race-building" (374, *cf.* 100, 114, 381), is defiled only by sexual intercourse from other motives than love (*cf.* 215, 342, 374), and with love and its result women should "be not ashamed of anything, but to be ashamed."<sup>75</sup> This is why motherhood should be protected outside of marriage as well as in. The founding of all mating on love, she avers, may even go far to do away with prostitution (368-9), as we may well believe.

But enough of this, which is becoming nauseous. Be it only added that all such emancipation of women—to be *given* them (256) because of their natural superiority (67, *cf.* 263, also 6, 27, 385)—is intended for the benefit of men as well as of women. "We [women] must free them [men] as well as ourselves," says Mrs. Gallichan (292, *cf.* 216, 279, 385). It reminds us of the analogous position of the socialists, voiced by the democratic corn-rimer, Ebenezer Elliott:—

"We'll forge no fetters into swords,  
But set our tyrants free."

73 171, *cf.* 189, 226, 238, 254, 255, 357. It is, she says in her later book, 238-9, important "that women should grasp firmly this truth: the virtue of chastity owes its origin to property." "The sense of ownership has been the seed-plot of our moral code." Even of fatherhood "property, not kinship, was the basis."

74 *Cf.* 258-61. On this subject Mrs. Gallichan speaks with no uncertain voice. "This false ideal of chastity was in the first place forced upon them [women], but by long habit it has been accentuated and has been backed up by woman's own blindness and fear. Thus to-day, in their new-found freedom, women are seeking to bind men up in the same bonds of denial which have restrained them. In the past they have over-readily imbibed the doctrine of a different standard of purity for the sexes, now they are in revolt—indeed, they are only just emerging from a period of bitterness in relation to this matter. Men made women into puritans, and women are arising in the strength of their faith to enforce puritanism on men. Is this malice or revenge? In any case it is foolishness," 326 Women "must come out and be common women among common men. This, I believe, is a better solution than to bring men up to women's level," 381. In other words, Mrs. Gallichan would prefer that women should now demoralise men, instead of men trying to moralise them any more. All this, it may be remarked, is repudiated by Christabel Pankhurst, who comes near to Weininger from the other side, and who writes as if she were commissioned to represent the sex. "It is very often said to women that their ideas of chastity are the result of past subjection. Supposing that were so, then women have the satisfaction of knowing that their subjection has brought them at least one great gain—a gain they will not surrender when the days of their subjection are over. The mastery of self and sex, which either by nature or by training women have, they will not yield up," *Plain Facts about a Great Evil*, 135.

75 317. *Cf.* Mrs. Tuttle: "To-day there is nothing in sex nor in the racial instincts to be ashamed of, except 'to be ashamed of being ashamed,'" *The Awakening of Woman*, 135. Mrs. Tuttle likewise, of course, disclaims any desire, in feminism, to establish free love, 149.

## CHAPTER VII.

### WOMEN AND WORK

IN primitive times, as still among backward peoples, the men were hunters and fighters, or else "sat about,"<sup>1</sup> while the women were the industrialists. Industries were originated by women; but women did not specialise their work, and so did not develop it highly. Men, when liberated from the tasks of hunting and fighting, at first fell into idleness, to which they still often revert.<sup>2</sup> This is what now generally happens upon an attempt to civilise barbarians, with the result of greater degradation.<sup>3</sup> But either under the influence of slavery or because of fortuitous aptitude in some ancient peoples, who on that account thrived and expanded and survived, men, as Ellis remarks, "gradually took up the occupations of women, specialised them, and developed them in an extraordinary degree."<sup>4</sup> Division of labour was not practised by women<sup>5</sup> because of the undifferentiated condition of maternity and of the avocations grouped about it: it is a masculine characteristic, primarily due to man's militancy, because the habits and needs of war enjoined subordination and organisation, and they applied the same to the slaves whose labours they superintended, and then to their own labours.<sup>6</sup> Commanders of armies easily become captains of industry. In those peoples, therefore, men have advanced, while women, forever bound (those of them who left progeny) by their maternal labours, have remained sta-

<sup>1</sup> According to an oft-quoted passage in Fison's and Howitt's *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, 206. Cf. Tacitus, *Germania*, 15, 17, 22.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Pearson: "When I watch to-day the peasant woman of Southern Germany or of Norway toiling in the house or fields, while the male looks on, then I do not think the one a downtrodden slave of the other. She appears to me the bearer of a civilisation to which he has not yet attained. She may be a fossil of the mother-age, but he is a fossil of a lower stratum — barbarism pure and simple," *Chances of Death*, ii. 49. Yet this does not keep him from speaking of the "subjection" of women in the most civilised lands of to-day, 96, although, again, he would throw overboard Mill's work on the subject, i. 232.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Mason, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, 238; hence greater difficulty in civilising the men, 274.

<sup>4</sup> *Man and Woman*, 11.

<sup>5</sup> "If a catalog of the primitive forms of labour were made, each woman would be found doing at least half-a-dozen things, while a man did one," Mrs. Gallichan, *The Position of Woman in Primitive Society*, 257.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas: "Male enterprizes have [from the beginning] demanded concerted action"; wherefore, when game gave out and men had to turn to women's industries, they brought "greater and better organising force to bear" on them, *Sex and Society*, 144, cf. 145-6, 230-1, 293.

tionary. The history of women's work, among the most civilised peoples, is always one of continually increasing inferiority in comparison with that of men.

At present, among ourselves, men's industries have been driving out of business the domestic industries of women, and, throwing women, and with them children, out of employment at home, are calling them into the lower rounds of factory work, converting them into wage-earners, placing them side by side with men, in competition with men. Those left in the home are left in comparative idleness. This is not a new phenomenon. Men have invaded women's industries at different times since the race began; and, after intervals of various length, women have found, or had assigned to them, other industries. Men drove women from pastoral occupations, from agriculture, from house-building, from pottery, from basket-making, from spinning and weaving, even from sweeping and cleaning and washing and from the preparation of food for the table,—did so by the superiority of their work, and have reduced women to be only their helpers and employés, under their guidance, to manipulate their machines in the small details fitted to female capacity. As long as this outside wage-earning labour of women is confined to their early adolescence, before they marry, no harm is appreciable. When it extends, and when an effort is made to extend it, to the whole lifetime of women, disregardful of their vocation as mothers, it threatens the continuance of the race which permits this condition; and such cannot be a perpetual, settled state. We are now nearly in one more such period of transition, and are still in an unsettled state, before things shake down into another stable equilibrium. A problem is before us, and upon its solution depends the question whether the equilibrium shall be restored in our cycle, which may then continue its advance, or shall not be restored until our cycle shall have come to its end and a new one be beginning. The solution, it would seem, must be the old and natural one, of women having new work within the reach of their abilities, compatible with their maternal function, and such as they can perform at home, in the company of their children, without competition with men. Then again will they be in a state, no longer of fancied independence, but of recognised dependence on men.

This they—some of them—do not like. The little taste of competition with men, unsatisfactory as it might seem, has whetted their appetite. Instead of desiring to bring women's work to the home, and leaving work abroad to men, they wish the present tendencies to go further, and all work to be thrown open

to women, and all occupations to be as freely and habitually entered by women as by men, without recognition of any distinction of sex. "The thing I loathe in this world more than I loathe anything else," says Anna Howard Shaw, "is sex distinction."<sup>7</sup> Preparation for doing without it, then, must be given to girls the same as to boys: their education must be alike. Boys, of course, cannot be educated for the function of maternity; and therefore girls need not be either, for if their education were specialised, analogy would require the boys' education to be specialised also, which is to be prevented at all hazards.<sup>8</sup> Exultingly, because "thousands" of women to-day are raising this cry for "free opportunity and the training that would fit them for freedom,"<sup>9</sup> it is expected that such is to be the order of the future, it being forgotten that there are to-day half a thousand million women on the earth, among whom a few "thousands" are but a drop in the ocean.<sup>10</sup> Somehow, also, in this new epicene world of labour the sex-functions are expected to accomplish themselves — instinctively: nature, it is said, will take care of that; notwithstanding that while instinctive attraction may bring the sexes together, reason and science may prevent the ordinary results.

This obliteration of sex in industry is one of the chief features in feminism. It requires that no generalisations from past experience about men's work and women's work shall be respected. "There is," publicly declares an American young lady, "no 'man's work' and no 'woman's work': everything is work for any one who can do it, and the humanity of the future will recognise this."<sup>11</sup> Especially in the higher branches is the opening for women desired; for, as we have seen, the hard labour of the world may be left to men.<sup>12</sup> Even before Mill's final work on the subject, Emily Davies denied the "theory" that men and women are complementary beings, together forming the human unit; desired

<sup>7</sup> *Woman Suffrage as an Educator*, an address delivered Jan. 13, 1910.

<sup>8</sup> "The woman's college is instinctively right," says Gertrude S. Martin, "in its steady refusal to introduce courses 'to meet the special needs of women,'" *Education of Women and Sex Equality*, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, Nov., 1914, p. 43.

<sup>9</sup> Mrs. Gallichan, *The Truth about Woman*, 68.

<sup>10</sup> Even in any large country, like England, a few thousands are but a small minority among ten or twelve odd million women there existing. And it is questionable whether in England to-day there are a thousand women entertaining this demand. Temporary seeking of employment is another matter. Yet the teaching of the adventurous few is working confusingly in the masses.

<sup>11</sup> Miss Mabel Powers, reported in *The New York Times*, April 13, 1914.

<sup>12</sup> "We exclude her [woman]," said Emma Hardinge, "alone from those positions where mere physical force and the habits, practice, and knowledge resulting from physical force, are needed," *The Place and Mission of Woman*, Boston, 1859, p. 6.

"All wearing physical labour," likewise wrote Gail Hamilton, "is unsuited to her [woman].". Man must "lift from her shoulder the burden that belongs to his," *Woman's Wrongs*, 208 (her work, in "fields which she alone can reap," 207, being "other and higher" than his, 206). Even that the intellectual work of supervising physical work is unsuited to the capacity of women, is contested, as also the right of men to object to being supervised by women in such occupations.

substantially the same education for both the sexes; idealised the marriage of a man and woman engaged in different occupations and sympathising with each other's difficulties and successes; and demanded that women as well as men should perform "all human duties — anything that is lovely and of good report."<sup>12a</sup> In this matter Mrs. Schreiner has put herself in the lead. She proclaims that "for the present we [women] take all labour for our province," and she cites the judge's seat, the legislator's chair, the statesman's closet, the merchant's office, the chemist's laboratory, the astronomer's tower: "there is no closed door we do not intend to force open" (though one might wonder why they do not enter and occupy those already open before trying to force others); and all this as an experiment, for "acting in us, and through us, nature will mercilessly expose to us our deficiencies in the field of human toil, and reveal to us our powers."<sup>13</sup> All past experience is to be cast to the winds, as if it were no better than chaff, although this is the subject that has probably been more than any other experimented with. Only recently, in the last century, for instance, an experiment was tried of employing women side by side with men in coal mines, half-naked on account of the heat; and it was found to brutalise all concerned; wherefore it was stopped by law. Is this law to be repealed, and the experiment tried over again? Oh, no, that is only a menial affair! It is the higher departments that are to be experimented with now. Well, Mrs. Schreiner notices that in intellectual professions, like medicine, woman has frequently "broken" into them, and "again and again taken her place beside the men in these fields of labour, showing thereby not only aptitude, but passionate and determined inclination in these directions" (231). On the contrary, the history of those experiments shows ever recurring lassitude on the part of the women; for they no sooner entered those professions than they dropped them: one or two generations have always sufficed. Still, "we [women] seek to enter the non-sexual fields of intellectual and physical toil, because we are unable to see to-day, with

<sup>12a</sup> *The Higher Education of Women*, 16-17; 131; 119; 36.

<sup>13</sup> *Woman and Labour*, 172-3, cf. 202, 203. So Mrs. Gallichan: "What such work [which women can do better than men] is, it must be women's purpose to find out. But before this is possible to be decided, all fields of activity must be open for them to enter," *The Truth about Woman*, 68. "First there must be a time of what may well prove to be dangerous experiments," 289. For "what women can or cannot do is as yet unproved," 302, cf. 314, 290. Similarly Mrs. Hale, re-echoing Mrs. Schreiner: "At least until, by free experiment, all women have learnt what their true limitations may be, they demand all labour for their province," *What Women Want*, 181. "Whatever their sex incapacitates women from doing, they will not do," said Curtis, *Orations and Addresses*, i. 202. He overlooked that the capacity for work of child-bearing and child-rearing women is different from that of childless women. This little oversight is generally made by those who wish to experiment with this matter.

regard to them, any dividing wall raised by sex which excludes us from them. We are yet equally determined to enter those in which sex does play its part, because it is here that woman, the bearer of the race, must stand side by side with man, the begetter, if a complete human wisdom . . . is to exist" (202-3). The blindness (inability to see) in this exquisite bit of feminine logic is frequently repeated. To the objection that men will still be better economic producers than women, she answers: "We see no reason why they should be so;"<sup>14</sup> and she relies on a possibility that woman's smaller muscle and finer nerves may in the future render her labour more valuable than man's (218-19), because, like the rest of the feminists, she looks forward to that paradise of women, the coming reign of peace and tranquillity,—a period, she calls it, of preservative and creative activity, different from the pugilistic and destructive activity of the past; and in this new period, so wholly different from all that has preceded, woman's work *may* be more valuable (224-5). So it is because of the long-desired advent of the reversed millennium that the renewed experiment is to be tried! And what if the peace be broken? In that case, viewed, however, as obsolescent, Mrs. Schreiner admits that women are not to be soldiers (past experience is here to be followed); but she tells us that the nation which first employs women as financiers, in the commissariat, as inspectors of provisions and clothing of the army, etc., "may be placed at a vast advantage over its fellows" (178). The idea seems to be, that women are to do the house-keeping part of the military service, which will set all the men free for fighting. But it is forgotten that women have never proved themselves capable of doing house-keeping on a large scale. Nothing prevents them, for instance, from hotel-keeping; yet while there are many female boarding-house keepers, with the fewest exceptions hotels are managed by men. The shutting of one's eyes to past and present experience is, indeed, the characteristic of all feminism. But progress, one exclaims, is made

<sup>14</sup> 217. Thus, again, she sees now "no such natural and spontaneous division of labour" as that which existed among savages when men fought and women cooked, tilled, and wove, 161; and because of this inability to see her way through the greater modern complexities she concludes there is none. In fact, a great deal of the argumentation of the feminists consists in taking their inability to see why a thing should not be as sufficient reason for thinking it should be. This myopia probably reached its climax in Mona Caird's assertion that "it is really difficult to see why a father should not be expected to devote himself wholly to domestic cares," *The Morality of Marriage*, London, 1897, p. 7. "We have," Mrs. Schreiner further says, "no adequate and scientific data from which to draw conclusions; and any attempt to divide the occupations in which male and female intellects and wills should be employed must be to attempt a purely artificial and arbitrary division," 164. For a very fine division, going into all details, perhaps we have not adequate scientific data, under modern conditions; but this does not show that we have not adequate data for a rough division, along grand lines of cleavage, allowable to be overstepped by exceptional cases, but not calling for all men and women to disregard them.

by experimentation. Still, in risky cases, experimentation is practised *in corpore vile*, and unless England and the United States consider themselves such, it behooves them to take care and not imperil their existence. It might be nice if Australia and New Zealand would experiment with socialism and feminism; but even if they were to be so obliging, we should have to wait at least a century before success could be proved, though a shorter period might expose failure.

Upon this general and fundamental demand of feminism, follow several corollaries. One is its immediate complement. If it be right (and this is claimed as if the experiment were already tried and turned out successfully) that women should enter all occupations alongside of men, it is only fair that all should start with equal equipment. Therefore to all institutions which prepare men for the world's work, women must be admitted. Women are not to be relegated to institutions of their own, made by themselves for themselves (they recognise how poor such would be): they must be allowed to enter those of men. It matters not that men, who have made the professions and brought technology in all departments to its present excellence, have established institutions for propagating their work, and have chosen to confine them to members of the sex which developed the work: that liberty, in the opinion of some members of the other sex, was wrongly exercised, and should not be continued: the institutions founded by men for men must be opened to women: it is an injustice if they are not. No more do the feminists than the socialists care for liberty, when it stands in their way. A high moral purpose animates them: it is for the good of all that women, too, must be allowed, and be prepared, to labour.<sup>15</sup> It is only old laws and customs, they claim, that preserve the old inequality; wherefore they demand abrogation of the laws and disregard of the customs. And because men are backward in carrying out their desire,<sup>16</sup> women demand the vote, that they may do it for themselves—or rather that they may order men to do it for them. The first woman suffrage movement of the last century only demanded "women's rights"—that they should be permitted to do all that they can of what is permitted to men.

<sup>15</sup> This demand appeared early. At the Worcester Convention in 1850, Harriet K. Hunt, a physician, said: "We ask for no separate medical college, . . . but we ask for women equal medical advantages with those enjoyed by men. . . . We ask that medical colleges may be opened to mind, not to sex, that the whole of human nature may aid in promoting the well-being of humanity," *Proceedings*, 47-8. More moderately, L. A. Hine, a man, suggested "the union of both sexes in all our schools, the amalgamation of male and female academies, the equal participation of women in collegiate advantages," 58.

<sup>16</sup> Their dilatoriness, according to Katherine Anthony, is apt to make the feminists "too furious to think," *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, 132.

Now that most of those alleged rights have been obtained, and little has come of them, the present demand of the feminists is that those rights must be put into execution, and women should be prepared and made to do what men do. Men must not only let them do it all, but men must help them to do it all. That women would then be abandoning work which they alone can do for work which men can do without them, does not stay them. The test by which alone liberty may rightfully be restrained, public utility, is invoked most hurriedly. The employment of all in scientific labours would at first sight seem to be better than the employment of half the human species. But it is overlooked that nature has already confined half the human species (its treatment of other species is not to the point) to one employment, and the most important of all for the continuance of the race and for the maintenance and extension of civilisation; wherefore it would, on second thought, seem much more natural that the other half of the species should have special employments, from which the specialised sex may rightfully be excluded, or at least not be invited to enter.

Another demand is for equal pay for alleged equal work. Women simply have not the same earning-power as men, except in the single occupation of giving pleasure. By acting, dancing, singing, and by the writing of novels (these mostly for consumption by women), women can earn as much as men; and by giving pleasure in other ways, better not mentioned, they can gain a living, sometimes a splendid one from the financial point of view; and in marriage itself the power of giving pleasure is a principal asset, and properly so, as it is generally conditioned by a good figure, health and vitality, and a quick mind, tact, and kindness, all of which are qualities deserving to be transmitted on. In all other branches of labour women, as we have already seen, are handicapped by their physiological constitution. When women were driven into wage-earning, it was at first only in the lowest and lightest kinds of work they could find employment, and only by accepting lower wages than the men with whom they competed. Men could in almost all occupations do equally well all that women did, and could do other things besides, wherefore men's wages were determined by the other things they could do, except in the case of some weak ones, who were capable only of working with women; while women, being restricted by their own nature (let alone custom, which variously respected their nature) to fewer occupations, underbid one another for employment more than did the men, and were able to do so both because they received more support from male relatives, and be-

cause they had less in the way of a family dependent on them. It does not aid matters to say that working women often have aged parents and younger sisters or brothers to provide for;<sup>17</sup> for men have these relatives to support just as much as do women, with wives and children to boot: the difference still exists. Some women, again, have sick husbands or fatherless children dependent on them; but these are exceptional cases, and constitute a special problem. The proper position of the generality of women cannot be deranged for them. Because of women's lesser efficiency in general, had women been forbidden to take less pay than men, they could not have got employment at all. Understanding this, some trades-unions of men prescribe that women shall not be employed at a lower wage, which they denounce as a "scab game," and while appearing gallant, preserve the occupation to themselves.<sup>18</sup>

There exists, in this connection, considerable difficulty about making correct generalisations, and much variableness in applying them. Different persons, or sets of persons, working at the same sort of job, the same number of hours a day, may have been differently prepared, may be differently in earnest, may accomplish different amounts and different qualities, may require different overseeing, may absent themselves for sickness or other reasons differently and though docked of pay may cause trouble differently, may be replaceable differently from the sources of supply, may be differently apt at repairing their tools or at doing odd but incidental jobs, may be differently reliable at an emergency for extra-hard tasks or at a pinch for work over time, and may be differently fit for promotion to higher places. Some persons are better suited for some tasks and others for others, and the numbers of these may differ without regard to the demand for them in the respective employments, so that the supply of labourers may be greater while the supply is smaller in one trade and in another the

<sup>17</sup> So frequently in Grace C. Strachan's *Equal Pay for Equal Work*, New York, 1910. She cites a few instances, 120-1, and asserts that most women teachers have dependents, 127; the old order changing, the burden of the other relatives is being shifted to the daughters, 207. Similarly Miss Lina E. Gano, quoted 491, 493-4, and Miss Elizabeth M. Jeliffe, 501. A man's children will support him in his old age, but the woman's parents will be gone when she needs help: so Elizabeth Du Bois Peck, 506, 508-9. Cf. also 52, 119, 447, 476, 512, 535.

<sup>18</sup> See the opinion of certain unionists objecting to the employment of women by the government at lower rates: "If this is allowed to continue, the first thing you know it will be allowed to enter the union," quoted in Miss Strachan's book, 338, cf. 26-7, 108, 117, 469, 549. Especially shrewd have been the telegraphers and the printers. In the latter trade, says Edith Abbott, women "are now admitted to the unions on the same terms as men, they pay the same dues, and receive the same benefits; but this is all done to protect the wage scale, not to encourage women to enter the trade. As a matter of fact, a comparatively small percentage of the women who work in printing offices belong to the union. A woman is not 'worth as much' as a man who works as an all-around printer, and to join the union and demand the same rate of wages is to invite discharge," *Women in Industry*, New York, 1909, pp. 260-1.

supply be smaller while the demand is greater. This affects the state of the labour-market, which is also affected by the "genteelness" of certain occupations, rendering them attractive and over-stocking them; and it causes the well-known differences in wages in the different trades. But different sets of workpeople are subject to similar differences of supply and demand, producing different wages for these sets in the same trade. Some of the above-mentioned factors may conceivably be altered in a re-modelled social state; but others of them are natural and unchangeable. All these things are more or less rightly taken into account by employers, and by the employés; for employers compete with one another for employés, and employés compete with one another for employers. Employers take inferior or for various of the reasons less desirable workpeople into inferior positions, or, giving them nominally the same positions, expect less of them, and of course give them lower wages, this being the reason for employing them. They further make the discrimination sometimes by choosing one set of employés and fitting the wages alike to them, and sometimes by offering different wages to the different sets of persons that apply. Thus in our country, in spite of all the talk and legislation against discrimination on account of colour, coloured "help" are employed in some hotels and restaurants and white in others, and the former generally at a lower rate for what would be roughly described as the same work. In spite, too, of talk against discrimination between the sexes, the very ladies of the upper classes who profess friendship for their working sisters, will give better wages to male waiters called butlers and to male cooks called *chefs*, than to plain waitresses and female cooks, as also they will pay more for gowns made by men dress-makers or "ladies' tailors." And they act rightly; for they are not giving unequal pay for equal work, but they are giving unequal pay for different work, and are taking into consideration the various circumstances that affect the case.<sup>19</sup>

In teaching, especially, tutors get more than governesses, and in private schools and colleges men generally obtain higher salaries than women, for the same amount of work. In tuition, obviously, although the time spent be the same and the same subjects taught, the work of men and of women is different, with different effect upon the scholars, however impalpable at the time this

<sup>19</sup> So Edith Abbott in her work already cited, 313-15, follows Mrs. Sidney Webb (*The Alleged Differences in the Wages of Men and Women*, *The Economic Journal*, Dec., 1891, pp. 649, 657) in admitting that generally women are paid less, not for similar work, but for inferior work. Cf. Gail Hamilton: "It seems to me that the great and simple cause of the low wages paid to women is the low work they produce," *Woman's Wrongs*, 121.

difference may be. Private employers can use their own discretion, and generally do so. Large corporations, however, and the government must enact general rules. In them it would be invidious to employ white men and coloured men, or men and women, side by side in the same positions, at different wages according to their colour or their sex. For instance, if the underground railway in New York should employ as ticket-choppers white men at some of the stations and coloured men at others, without regard to the traffic, getting from them as nearly as possible in the long run the same work; or if it should employ men as ticket-sellers in some of its booths and women in others, with similar indiscrimination of service,—it would seem unfair to pay the white men more than the coloured men, or the men more than the women, as long as they all were found equally satisfactory in a rough way, since the finer shades of distinction could not here be invoked.<sup>20</sup> So it is that in most positions of our civil service men and women are paid the same. But in New York City from 1900 to 1912 male and female public-school teachers were paid differently. The discrimination seems, in the circumstances, to have been somewhat too great, for while there were more than enough male applicants, there was a deficiency of female; and yet, from another point of view, here as elsewhere throughout our country our male teachers are not paid enough to fill the profession with professionals, the practise being to accept young men who teach only temporarily while preparing themselves for other better-paying professions, with the anomalous result that more women (though the proportion is not large) than men assume this profession as their life-work.<sup>21</sup> But apart from the ill-adaptedness of the rates, a hullabaloo was raised over injustice and indignity to the women teachers, in their being forced to accept less pay for equal work. Yet the discrimination had the good effect of attracting into the teaching force of this city more men (small as was their number) than previously, and so of stemming somewhat the tendency of effeminisation, not only of boys, but of men, and of public opinion, of which the effeminate character is so pronounced in our country,—an effeminisation which our female teachers and their friends would do better to praise, since they approve it, than to deny.<sup>22</sup> The method of making the discrimination, however, was wrong; for men and women were examined together and appointed al-

<sup>20</sup> Cf. W. G. McAdoo in Miss Strachan's book, 25, 404.

<sup>21</sup> So in Miss Strachan's book, 52, 337, 342, 351, 450.

<sup>22</sup> The Report of the Moseley Commission (English) several years ago might have helped to open our eyes to this condition, but for wilful blindness: cf. Miss Strachan, *op. cit.*, 81-9. Also Admirals Fiske and Chadwick are better authorities in this matter than Miss Strachan.

ternately to the same classes, at the caprice of the Board of Education; all which begat an unnecessary appearance of injustice, especially when the absurd predicament was sometimes presented of a female superintendent receiving less pay than some of the male teachers she supervised. The proper method would have been to regulate that the lower mixed classes, for children under thirteen years of age, should be taught chiefly by women, and the upper classes should be divided, and while the girls were taught by women mostly, the boys should be taught exclusively by men, who should be subjected to higher requirements; and over their department there should be only male superintendents. Then the pay could be determined by the market rates, high enough to obtain efficient women teachers for their appropriate work and men teachers (professionals) for theirs; in which case the higher rates necessary for obtaining the men would occasion no appearance of injustice, except to the squint-eyed, any more than when similar differences are shown in the pay-rolls of private schools. But in 1912 the good was quenched by fixing the rates the same for both sexes, at an intermediate figure, with the effect that the raise for women has attracted still more women to the profession, and the diminution for the men has repelled male applicants, lessening the numbers and lowering the efficiency of the male teachers obtainable. Similarly, in our hospital service, men and women nurses being paid alike, and the common pay at a figure attractive mostly to women, this profession has been overstocked with women, subjecting them and their male patients to much indecency.

And yet women still desire the suffrage in order to obtain "equal pay for equal work," even in the State of New York. This means that they desire "equal pay for equal work" to be thrust by law — not upon the State's employés, since these have it already — but in all private employments. Now, this is not really to demand equality, it is to demand inequality — the inequality of some getting more than they deserve, while others conversely are made to get less than they deserve. It is distinctly a demand for a new privilege for the female sex, that of being raised by law to a higher position than they can attain by their own efforts. Instead of instituting the much-heralded equal competition of men with women, it puts the women on a basis of public assistance, so that they shall be favoured in the competition with men. It is precisely analogous to the procedure of the socialists, who would require "equal pay for equal work" — equal pay for equal amount of work, equal pay for equal hours of work (which is the only way that work can be

measured if the higgling of the market is to be ignored)—between all persons, the weak and the strong, the inefficient and the efficient. This demand of the socialists extends absolutely to all—to women as well as to men. The feminists, however, confine it to women alone in comparison with men. Yet to that extent they are socialists. The woman-suffragists follow blindly. Probably not one in a hundred of them approves of socialism, yet they all cry out for this article of the socialist creed.

Still another demand is that women, being equal to men and even (in the most ultra view) like men, must be permitted to labour under equal and similar conditions. When only advantage is to be obtained, there is plain sailing. When disadvantage is involved, a quandary arises. So with laws forbidding over-work and night-work to female operatives. As preventing hardship, they are desired; but they interfere with the earning-capacity of women, and so the consistent feminist must oppose them.<sup>23</sup> The consistent feminist cannot be restrained even by moral scruples. Thus, as it is not customary for industrial establishments to discriminate between male employés whose relations with women are pure or otherwise, so already in the woman-suffrage State of Washington, before the State Industrial Commission recently engaged in investigating the relation of wages to morals, against the opinion of the male manager of a telegraph company who said "that it was the duty of employers to weed out of the list of employés girls and women who were immoral," and insisted "that employers owed this to the respectable women in their service," two women, members of the Commission, are reported to have maintained "that the employer had no right to be concerned about the morality or immorality of girl and women employés, provided they performed their tasks efficiently," and protested "that the employer had no right to exercise any control over the conduct of employés out of working hours."<sup>24</sup> The principle carried out would not permit ladies to inquire into the morals of their servant-girls. It is another illustration of the levelling-down action of the single standard-of-morality principle advocated by feminists. It is preparatory for the hoped-for condition when men and women shall work side

<sup>23</sup> In England there is a faction among the woman's rights advocates who have formed a League for Freedom of Labour Defence, which opposes laws for the special protection of women as unjustifiable and injudicious tutelage. The weekly feminist review, *The Freewoman*, edited by Dora Marsden and Mary Gawthorpe, supported this attitude. In its pages women were warned they had "to make a clear choice between the comforts of protection and the harsh responsibilities of freedom." In Germany also, the women started out by demanding no special favours; but they have had to abandon this position on account of "the double burden of domestic work and wage-earning": see Katherine Anthony's *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia, 191-2*.

<sup>24</sup> In *The New York Times*, October 24, 1913.

by side in all occupations and in all departments, in all factories and in all offices, indiscriminately, as if they were one sex. But that they will continue to be two sexes, and that sexuality will then have all the greater swing for its antics, although it is sometimes denied openly, everybody internally knows to be so. Sexuality, then, is to be indulged. That this will have deleterious effect upon the generality of the work performed, and will ultimately ruin the race, is mostly ignored.<sup>25</sup>

But here many feminists have another scheme up their sleeves, which is to prevent immorality between men and women altogether. "Prostitution must go," Christabel Pankhurst proclaims;<sup>26</sup> and Mary Austin asserts that nations are now "in the process of eliminating prostitution."<sup>27</sup> This is to be done (besides international legislation against "white slavery") by fixing by law a minimum wage for female employés, at a rate which is calculated to provide a "living wage"; since it is supposed that at present many girls and women can find work only at wages too low to yield them a decent living, on which account they are driven into prostitution.<sup>27a</sup> To the objection that this is discriminating in favour of women, since no such law is contemplated (at least in our country) fixing a minimum wage for men, it is replied that the discrimination is only apparent, because real discrimination already exists, as the lowest men's wages are sufficient to support them, and the purpose is to do away with this discrimination by evening-up the wages of females. The basis of the contention is hardly accurate, since on the one hand many men's wages are not sufficient in their own eyes, and they go in consequence into burglary or vagrancy, and such occupations would probably be pursued by some men in any case; and on the other hand, likewise some women would desire more, and to win it more easily, however great might be the salaries presented to them. Prostitution exists everywhere, except where its place is

25 On the incompatibility of men and women for working together and still doing their best, see A. E. Wright's *Unexpurgated Case against Woman Suffrage*, New York ed., 25-6, 139-51, 169-73. On the dangerous consequences even the feminist Forel remarks: "Certain occupations, such as those of employés in stores, telegraph offices, etc., in which the two sexes are closely associated in their work, constitute from this point of view [of continually exciting without satisfying the sexual appetite] a double-edged sword. Other unhealthy and monotonous occupations, combined with bad conditions of food and lodging, and with all kinds of seduction — factory hands for example — have a positively deleterious effect on sexual life, which becomes absolutely depraved when the two sexes work together," *The Sexual Question*, 337-8. (Yet he would have men and women "fight side by side," but apparently only in "the fight for social welfare," 456.) Recently in Baltimore an official investigation has reported some startling facts in this connection.

26 *Plain Facts about a Great Evil*, 17, cf. 112.

27 *Love and the Soul Maker*, 76.

27a Also Blease contends that woman suffrage will "improve the economic position of women and rob it of all its horrible incidents of prostitution," etc., *The Emancipation of English Women*, 206.

taken by promiscuity of some other sort.<sup>28</sup> Free promiscuity existed when the earnings of men were not so great as, or no greater than, those of women; but since men have taken the lead in industrial production that simple state has been changed for a more complex condition both of marriage (in which fatherhood plays its part) and of prostitution (from which fatherhood is absent). Prostitution, like marriage itself, is caused by the lower earning-capacity of women in everything but pleasure-giving occupations: it is not caused by lower wages, which are merely a consequence of that condition. On the wages of women it has a double and mutually neutralising influence, both to raise them, by taking off some of the supply of female workers, in case of professionals, and in the case of those who practise it only occasionally, to depress them, by offering an extra means of support.<sup>29</sup> If the minimum wage is fixed by law above the earning-capacity of many women, it will only have the effect of throwing them out of employment and leaving nothing open to them but the very thing sought to be avoided. For the earning-capacity of women in general, though it admits of improvement, is fixed by nature lower than that of men. At the same time, by furnishing pleasure to men, they mostly have their pleasures given to them by men, while men have to pay for theirs. Restricted by their incompetence to fewer occupations, so far as women are required to support themselves, their glutting of these depresses their wages. What saves them, is the taking of them off the labour market wholly either by prostitution or by marriage, or partially by the support given them by fathers, brothers, admirers, and lovers, while this very partial support of some of them keeps down, by competition, the wages of the unfortunates who have no support but their own efforts. The world has always been hard upon "unprotected females"—at times so hard that they could not exist, and so were not. Where government is strong and provides protection, single self-supporting females may exist, and the few who have exceptional

28 Pearson has shown that prostitution in civilised societies is but a remnant of the primitive promiscuity practised in the mother-age, a remnant which the father-age has never been able altogether to get rid of: *The Chances of Death*, ii, 109n., 150-1, 172-3, 174-5, 203, 227n., cf. 49. Mrs. Gallichan also once says that "it is possible that prostitution may be a relic of this early freedom," *The Truth about Woman*, 150n.; but more commonly she treats it as "a survival of the patriarchal idea of the property value of woman," 282-3,—"a result of monogamic marriage," and "not a survival of primitive sexual licence," 362; and yet again she calls it "the oldest profession in the world," 363.

29 Mrs. Gallichan: "It is because of the reserve fund thus established [by prostitution] that their honest wages suffer," *op. cit.*, 282. This authoress has studied prostitution closely, and recognises that many women "choose prostitution, they are not driven into it," 363. She agrees with Lippert that "the principal motives are 'idleness, frivolity, and, above all, the love of finery,'" 365. And she despises the fanaticism of "the belief in the efficacy of economic reform," since "the economic factor is by no means the only factor," 363.

talent or genius prosper, but the generality are not happy. Only socialism, by disregarding all relation between reward and earning-power, can place them on the equality desired; and that, as we have seen, would substitute for prostitution, as also for marriage, the promiscuity of free love. Meanwhile the agitation of a minimum wage for the purpose intended is only helping to increase the evil. A few years ago in Chicago at a public hearing ladies applauded when a young working girl was induced by leading questions to say that if she did not receive certain wages (something over a dollar a day), she would be justified in going "on the street." And in general the growing freedom of conversation on this subject, before the public and in private, has the effect, by suggestion, of increasing secret license. Prostitution is not so easy to dispose of as these people think. Like Proteus, it changes its forms; and, struck down in one, like John Barley Corn, it rises again. Free love may take the place of paid love.<sup>30</sup> These women reformers may interfere with the earnings of professional harlots only to find they have lost their own daughters.<sup>31</sup>

Obviously the best way to combat prostitution is to encourage its rival, marriage; in which aspect polygamy often receives unmerited praise.<sup>32</sup> And to encourage marriage is also to help keep up the wages and improve the lot of those women who cannot marry, or are not fitted for marriage, or have lost their husbands, since marriage does still, to some extent, though not as much as were desirable, take women off the labour market. Yet marriage itself can be best encouraged only by keeping up the wages of men in comparison with those of women. Here is a vicious circle, which is one of the obstacles nature sets in the way of social advancement in highly civilised states. Young men, looking forward to marriage, demand high pay in order that they may make savings and as an earnest of their future earnings: young women, expecting marriage, need not look ahead or save. "Treating" also is done by the young men to the young women, increasing the need for money of the former and decreasing

<sup>30</sup> Some feminists seem to be willing to make the exchange: e.g., Floyd Dell, *Women as World Builders*, cf. 87, 88, 104.

<sup>31</sup> Women, along with some goody-goody men, are already greatly responsible for one of the faults in the legislation on this subject, that the distinction is not observed between prostitution itself and an abuse of prostitution, the term "white slavery" being laxly used to cover both. The enslavement of girls to prostitution, to repeat, is a crime of the greatest magnitude, which should be stamped out ruthlessly. But it is entirely different from prostitution itself.

<sup>32</sup> For polygamous peoples, such as the Mohammedans (also the Jews in many climes) guard only their own women from prostitution, and are utterly indifferent to the fate of other women, and most lecherous with them. Slavery of women and concubinage are generally attendants also, and are hardly praiseworthy substitutes for prostitution. It is curious how to some minds a freely practiced evil does not appear so bad as one partially though not wholly suppressed, an open and flagrant evil not so bad as one kept out of sight.

that of the latter. Young women, therefore, compete in the wage market with young men on a different footing, just as married and partially supported women, when they go out to labour, compete unfairly both with other women and with married men. Young women, to be sure, may sometimes be burdened with parents and other relatives to support, and widows with children; but, as we have seen, men are equally exposed to this burden and normally have the other burden besides. Therefore the competition of less-burdened and individual women with family-supporting men brings down the wages of men, and so keeps many of them from marrying. This adds more unfair competition of individual men with the family-supporting men, and belies the original distinction between men as family-supporters and women as individuals, depriving men, as far as it extends, of this justification for their higher wages. The evil therefore growing, the destiny seems to be that no men shall any more be family-supporters, and all, men as well as women, shall be mere self-supporting individuals. And this, unprevented by the few children that shall continue to come into existence, valued for their rarity, spells the end of the nation that has got itself into this inextricable scrape.

The difficulty in which such a nation finds itself (and as yet we are only near its beginning) evidently is enhanced by any effort to encourage the employment of women and to raise their wages and salaries toward equality with those of men. Marriage is one of the vocations of women by which they earn a living. Mill spoke of it as "the one vocation in which there is nobody to compete with them," which they have all to themselves, and for which "the majority of women" are "always likely" to feel a preference.<sup>33</sup> Notwithstanding the false sentimentality that is now backing up feminism by denouncing marriage for anything except what is called pure love, but which is mostly little else than sensual attraction,<sup>34</sup> all the care of the home and of the children she bears is a worthy means of livelihood, of which no woman need be ashamed. But the more she earns already, or has the prospect of earning, in some other occupation, the less inducement has she to take up this one. It is not so with men. For men marriage is not a money-making, but a money-spending arrangement. The more a man earns, the more he has to spare and the more he longs to spend it in this way:

<sup>33</sup> *The Subjection of Women*, 93.

<sup>34</sup> E.g., "The fact that so many women are led to marry in order to improve their material condition, is hateful to our ideals," along with the idea that "independence of women would improve marriage" on the ground that "fewer women would marry because of necessity": editorial in the *New York Press*, Feb. 21, 1910, quoted by Miss Strachan, *op. cit.*, 437.

he wants a wife and the children she will bear to him and the home they will compose together. The more a woman earns, the more she will have to give up if she marries and goes in for domesticity, without which marriage is but a free-love union or inter-sexual pseudo-friendship. The more do women enter the higher professions and the harder they work at the preparation therefor, the less fitted are they for motherhood; but the harder do men work and prepare themselves, the better fitted are they for fatherhood: it is the unsuccessful men, and the successful women, that do not marry. The inviting, therefore, of women into what have been men's professions, and equalising their pay, helping to make women more capable of self-support, and disparaging the capacity of men, can only impede marriage, check propagation, and court ultimate disaster.<sup>35</sup> Accordingly, symptomatic of degeneracy is this calling in by men of women to take their places; yet it is going on at such a pace as to seem to lie in the path of progress. Indeed, Professor Dewey thinks "Chicago proved itself more progressive than New York, when it placed a woman at the head of its immense school system, because she was the fittest one for the place."<sup>36</sup> In New York itself there are female school and prison superintendents drawing salaries of five thousand a year and the like. Compare such a woman with a man earning the same amount. The woman to be fit for such a place must have devoted her life to the profession, and therefore she is unmarried (unless her marriage had been brief and unfruitful); and as she is still devoting her life to it, she has not time for domestic duties, and especially not for the intimate care of children of her own, and she can hardly be tempted into giving up such a salary unless she receives a proposal from a man with at least twice as much. But a man with a salary of five thousand may perfectly well be married already, or any marriage he now contracts will only spur him on to earn still more, except the rare one with an heiress, and even

<sup>35</sup> On the recent equalisation of salaries of male and female school-teachers in New York, in a letter which appeared in *The New York Times*, May 22, 1912, John Martin, a member of the Board of Education, wrote: "The whole incident illuminates the woman's revolution. . . . Men teachers in elementary schools must postpone marriage on the reduced salaries, if not forgo that blessing altogether. On condition that they remain single they, like their colleagues, the girl bachelors, can spend summers in Europe and beguile winter evenings with grand opera. But only the few among them who can win promotion, if reasonably prudent, will assume the obligations of a home. At the same time, the women teachers, habituated to the luxury which their greatly increased salaries permit, will naturally demand that the suitors for their hands shall wait until they earn incomes higher than formerly satisfied these ladies, before they consent to marry. The net effect will inevitably be 'the sacrifice of the race for the individual.' Teachers, both men and women, being especially fond of children, and trained in their management, should make the best parents in the community. It is a baleful law which tends to withdraw them both from parenthood."

<sup>36</sup> Quoted approvingly by Miss Strachan, *op. cit.*, 83.

then he will wish to keep up his end. High salaries, thus, of men, are conducive to perpetuation of the classes of persons capable of earning them, and of women, to their extinction. Surely the progression which is praised is in the wrong direction.<sup>37</sup>

Near the commencement of the feminist movement in America, at the Worcester convention in 1850, a woman advocate of equal opportunities to labour for women as for men, and of the equal preparation of girls as of boys "for every post of usefulness and profit that they might choose," said: "The newspaper press, clerkships, and book-keeping, not to mention different offices of government (whose duties are principally writing), would, if they were equally open to our daughters, afford them an opportunity of well-paid and congenial employment, would relieve them from the necessity of marriage or want, and thereby add dignity and energy to their character."<sup>38</sup> People prepare their sons to make their way in the world that they may be able to marry; and now people are advised to prepare their daughters to make their way in the world, equally independent, that they may not need to marry! To educate boys to be men, is to help perpetuate the race; to educate girls to be like men, is to help bring it to a stop.<sup>39</sup> Surely the distinction in the nature of the sexes is sufficient to justify a discrimination in the preparation of the young for their life-work, and to condemn the present-day decay-foreshadowing denial of discrimination.<sup>40</sup> Assist young men to advance themselves in the world, and in all probability you are leading them to marriage and the rearing of a family: help a boy and you are helping a girl, and are providing for the future. Assist young women to advance themselves in the world, and in all probability you are leading them away from marriage and from the rearing of a family: help a girl and you help her

<sup>37</sup> The blindness on this subject is truly amazing. The *New York Press*, in its editorial of Feb. 21, 1910, already cited, calls this argument against the equalisation of pay not only "reactionary," but "short-sighted"! A Catholic priest, J. F. Delany, writes: "I recall reading somewhere that the effect of the success of this agitation would be to confer such a degree of independence upon the women teachers as to deter them from marriage. That I believe to be rot; insanely amusing rot, but rot all the same. Even if it were so, I cannot but think it a piece of singular good fortune that would keep them from linking their lives with those of some of the superior sex who plume themselves on being the lords of creation," in Miss Strachan's *op. cit.*, 481. Some of the writers in this book show men so insanely chivalrous as to believe that, if anything, women ought to be better paid for their work, 374, 455, 484; which opinion the authoress herself seconds, 116-17. They think only of the individual, never of the race; and yet they pride themselves on being far-sighted!

<sup>38</sup> Mrs. Abby H. Price, *Proceedings*, 23, cf. 34-5.

<sup>39</sup> See also on this subject Mrs. John Martin, *Feminism*, 223-4.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Clarke: "The progress and development of the race depends upon the appropriate, and not on the identical, education of the sexes," *Sex in Education*, 161. Similarly Brooks, *The Law of Heredity*, 273. On "the danger to the general good of mankind" from equalisation of the sexes, see also Adele Crepaz, *The Emancipation of Women and its Probable Consequences*, English translation, London, 1893, pp. 51-67.

alone, and are shutting your eyes to the future.<sup>41</sup> Found a college for males, and you are aiding the advancement of the race. Found a college for females, and you are abetting race-suicide. Already the statistics of some of our female colleges show that barely one-half of the graduates marry; that of these a fifth have no children; and that the remaining forty *per cent.* (of the whole number) have a trifle over two children apiece, so that, if half of these be boys, every hundred female graduates leave behind them in the next generation about forty-four daughters.<sup>42</sup> At this rate (which in reality is still lower, since some of the children are sure to die before reaching maturity) the class from which these highly educated women and their husbands come is doomed (but for possible action by the other highly educated men who marry non-collegiate women) to speedy diminution and gradual extinction. But, though our male college graduates, on the whole, show a somewhat better result (it has been reckoned half as good again), it is by no means satisfactory from the point of view of future generations. And for this poor showing by the men the existence of so many female colleges is also to a great extent responsible, as they subtract so many otherwise eligible partners. Things being so in the green leaf, what will they be in the sere? When the feminist goal is reached and as many young women as young men are educated not only in colleges but in post-graduate departments and in business schools for all the professions, the birth-rate in the upper classes may be expected to sink to the vanishing point.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Elizabeth Blackwell, the first woman doctor in the nineteenth century (the modern Agnodiœc), is a good example. In her *Autobiographical Sketches* entitled *Pioneer Work in Opening the Medical Profession to Women*, she tells us she was one of nine children, and rejoiced in the "great advantage" of having "been born one of a large family group" (p. 1 of Everyman's ed.). Yet she deliberately chose to become a physician and "thus place a strong barrier between me and all ordinary marriage," 23. She therefore never entered even an extraordinary marriage (whatever that might be), but adopted a daughter; and two of her sisters, who followed her in the woman's rights movement, and one of them in the medical profession, likewise did not marry and each adopted a daughter. Thus the advanced females of a talented family, successful in their careers, ceased to propagate their line.

<sup>42</sup> See an article by Mr. and Mrs. John Martin in *The New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1915, which cites all the investigations that have been made on the subject.

<sup>43</sup> Mill actually took this restraining influence upon marriage and the size of families as a reason why women should receive the franchise and have all occupations opened to them, *Political Economy*, II. xiii. § 2, and IV. vii. § 3;—and if the opening of occupations to women exerts such an influence, much more will the preparation of them for them exert it. Having worked out his philosophy in days pre-Darwinian and pre-Galtonian, Mill knew nothing about the correlation between discouraging breeding from the incapable and encouraging it from the capable. Instead, he had an indiscriminate antipathy to much breeding, and showed no apprehension of any danger from under-breeding going too far. For, though the passages referred to were concerned mostly with the labouring classes, the following shows that he extended his views to the upper classes. "Little improvement," he wrote, "can be expected in morality until the producing large families is regarded with the same feelings as drunkenness or any other physical excess. But while the aristocracy and the clergy are foremost to set the example of this kind of incontinence, what can be expected from the poor!" foot-note in II. xiii. § 1. How those who can support large families and have them can set an example to those who cannot support them and yet have

This was not anticipated by the persons who started the movement — the pioneers of “the higher education of women.” Mrs. Emma Willard, perhaps the very first leader in America, had no experience of this sort during the early days of her seminary for young ladies.<sup>44</sup> It was, in truth, her intention and purpose to turn out her pupils to be “better wives and mothers.”<sup>45</sup> She probably had, and her followers still seem to have, the notion that as the higher education of men makes them better husbands and fathers, the higher education of women will have a corresponding effect. But this is a false argument. The higher education of men makes better teachers, clergymen, physicians, chemists, engineers, military and naval officers, lawyers, statesmen, etc. If it helps men on in the world, it makes them better fathers and husbands only in the sense of better providers. But women as wives and mothers are not the providers of the family. Hence a higher education that helps to make women better providers, encroaches on the men’s sphere. It is useless unless it is put into execution, and then the woman, being a provider, has not time to be a mother, whether she be wife or not. This is precisely the chief social difference between men and women (a direct result from their primary as well as their secondary sexual differences) that providing for the family does not interfere with the man’s occupation as husband and father, but it does interfere with the woman’s occupation as mother and hence with her proper occupation as wife. Hence the good done to men by higher education does not follow in the case of women. Nor is the higher education of women necessary to enable them to teach their children; for apart from religion, morals, and manners (which, far from being specialised, are apt to be neglected in colleges), mothers teach their children only the veriest elements of the various branches of knowledge, professional teachers being employed to do the rest. The higher education is not needed in motherhood, and, being in the way, it tends to keep women out of motherhood.

Other results meanwhile are produced, contributing to the grand *finale*, such as wastefulness and unfairness. Our feminists speak of educating girls just like boys, that they may take

them, he did not attempt to explain. As well say the rich ought not to have automobiles, because they might set an example to the poor. Besides, the having small families, among people of any intelligence, does not indicate continence, but only carelessness.

<sup>44</sup> “An English traveller said to me: ‘Madam, you are making a grand experiment here; . . . but I fear you are educating girls too highly, and that they will not be willing to marry.’ But I have never experienced any difficulty of this sort,” quoted in J. Lord’s *Life of Emma Willard*, 107. This was in 1830. Naturally the effect did not appear so soon.

<sup>45</sup> Lord’s *Life*, 42, 51-2. She included “domestic science” in her curriculum, *ib.* 70-2, which, however, is mostly omitted to-day.

care of themselves. But the real education of boys should aim at their taking care, not of themselves alone, but of others. This is not necessary on the part of girls; and so, if they are educated like boys, and boys like them, either they are educated too much, or the boys too little. The effort, at all events, is to do the former.<sup>46</sup> But now if the girl, so trained, after all marries, her education is, as we have seen, either useless in her vocation as mother, or positively prejudicial. Even preparation as a physician is wasteful to the mother, as it would be cheaper and safer to employ, when needed, a doctor who has wider experience.<sup>47</sup> Now, to-day four-fifths of the girls eventually marry, which figure may before long be reduced to three-fifths, while of boys probably nine-tenths will carry on the profession for which they have studied. The chances, then, are nine in ten that your son's education will pay; and they are at least three to one that your daughter's education will be thrown away. And this waste of money spent on the girl's education (whether by the parents, or by philanthropists, or by the state) means that less than otherwise can be spent on the education of the boys, who would profit by it to the ultimate benefit of the girls also.

Another avowed intention is likewise not reached. At present, if a boy has better prospects than a girl of making his fortune by his own efforts, the girl has the prospect of marrying a man as good as her brother, and so their prospects in life are equal. This is forgotten, or rather it is not desired that the girl's prospects shall be dependent on marriage, and so the intention is to equalise their prospects of self-advancement by equal preparation for the professions. But the girl will still have the opportunity of marrying, if she chooses, and so will have a double advantage. Consider the case of a young man of twenty-five and a young woman of the same age, who have both gone through college and a professional or technical school and are prepared for their "life-work" (at least his, but not necessarily hers), in some profession, science, or art. If they are normal young people, they will both expect to love and to marry, but in that event the man has the prospect of needing to support his wife, and the woman has the prospect of being supported by her husband. Can anybody maintain that their prospects in life are the same? that they have been put on a footing of equality?

<sup>46</sup> "Modern American education," says Clarke, "has a maxim, that boys' schools and girls' schools are one, and that one is the boys' school," *Sex in Education*, 123, 124, cf. 130, 159. Thus a feminist: "We can't afford to differentiate, as yet at least. To give women as 'good' an education as men, we must give them the same education," Elsie Clews Parsons, *Feminism and Conventionality*, *Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science*, Nov., 1914, p. 47.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. W. Brügelmann, *Die Frauenbewegung im besonderen und die sociale Bewegung im allgemeinen*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 7.

Is not the footing on which they have been put (mostly by the endowment of women's colleges by men, or from money made by men) one of superiority for the young woman? To continue endowing female educational institutes, to encourage girls to go through them, to offer to women workers as much pay and as many openings as to men—in some cases even to prefer them because of their greater docility,—is not that to discriminate in favour of the female sex above the male sex? Yet this question must not be too hastily answered. It is to discriminate in favour of *some* women—and the ones least likely (even when married) to rear any children; while it discriminates against the marrying and child-bearing kind of women, by discriminating against their husbands. It thus pulls down also their capacity to rear children and perpetuate the race. Or take a more particular instance, from the field of diplomacy, into which feminists desire women to press.<sup>48</sup> A man is rarely sent on an embassy unless he has a wife: there are already nearly as many ambassadressess as ambassadors, and the women share in all the honours and emoluments. If women were to become ambassadors too, they would probably be unmarried, or at all events their husbands could not share in their honours: their husbands would probably prefer to stay at home and look after the children, if there were any. The last century exhibited the ridiculous spectacle of a Prince Consort; but perfectly in the nature of human relations is the position of a queen consort: her function of queen mother is sufficiently onerous to be dignified, while that of a king father or official impregnator is too slight to be worthy of a man. Fortunately for the English the position of queen absolute is exceptional. If women of royal families were to have the same right of succession as the males, and if women were to become prime ministers, ambassadors, bishops, and fill other high offices equally with men, to the exclusion of men, at the same time they share in all the honours and emoluments of those offices as consorts to the men that fill them,<sup>49</sup> it is plain

<sup>48</sup> E.g., Laura Aberconway in an article on *The Other Side* in *The Nation*, London, May 31, 1913, complains of the "injustice" of men alone being admitted to such occupations as are offered by the state and the church, instancing diplomacy. As for entrance to positions in the church, be it here said that for women to become priestesses is entirely within the province of feminism, if new religions were founded holding its central idea. But for women to become Christian ministers is extraordinary, seeing that the holders of this religion profess to believe that it was founded by God coming to earth and on his departure leaving another member of the Trinity with his disciples, under whose instruction they forbade women to speak in the church (*I. Cor.*, XIV. 34-5, *I. Tim.*, II. 11-12, *cf. Rev.*, II. 20). It only shows how in an age ready for degeneracy people, and especially women, will play with things they pretend to hold sacred.

<sup>49</sup> The Roman Catholic Church excludes women even as consorts, and if the feminists should attack that one-sidedness, nobody but Roman Catholics would object. Every celibate man, where monogamy holds, means a celibate woman, and every male celibate institution requires some corresponding celibate female institution—all to the

that women would be in a favoured position — at least till our present kind of marriage ceases, and with it the civilised race.

Cato of old said that women, when they become men's equals, would be their superiors;<sup>50</sup> and his words have often been repeated.<sup>51</sup> Their truth seems to be proved by the fact that sociologists have been able to discover an age when women were superior and an age when men were and are superior, but not an age when both were equal, showing that the intermediate stage was one of unstable equilibrium, through which the transition was rapid. It is, in fact, impossible for two powers to keep the balance even between themselves. The ideal of man-and-woman rule is impracticable. The feminists themselves often run through it to the other side. They advocate subserviency to women, thinking it chivalrous to do so.<sup>52</sup> But chivalry, of course, is consistent only with recognition of the inferiority of woman's position, being an endeavour to even up their condition with men's. If it is to continue when the equality of women with men is proclaimed, it elevates them to a more favoured position, destroying the very equality aimed at.

Thorough feminists, however, are fair enough to wish to prevent this one-sidedness on the other side, and in order to obtain perfect equality, without privilege or favour, and without the wastefulness above objected to their scheme, require that women shall have all men's duties as well as all men's rights, and shall not forfeit either by marriage. Women, therefore, who have taken up a profession, are to continue in it after marrying, just as men do, the wife being as independent of the husband as the husband of the wife, and contributing equally with the husband to the support of the children they have in common;<sup>53</sup> for it is always supposed that the woman will earn as much as the man.<sup>54</sup> Husband and wife are to go each to his and her work in the morning, and meet again in the evening.<sup>55</sup>

prejudice of the race by withdrawing from parenthood men and women of talent. Also, through failure to provide sufficiently for the celibate women, a celibate priesthood always fosters prostitution. "Public celibacy," says Draper, "is private wickedness." *Conflict between Science and Religion*, 262.

<sup>50</sup> In *Livy*, XXXIV. 3.

<sup>51</sup> E.g., Schiller puts into the mouth of his Lady Milford, in *Kabale und Liebe*, Act II., Scene i.: "Wir Frauenzimmer können nur zwischen Herrschen und Dienen wählen." "This," says J. W. P. in *A Remonstrant View of Woman Suffrage*, p. 38, "is the age of the tyranny of the weak over the strong. As surely as women have half of the political power, they will have more than half."

<sup>52</sup> E.g., Edward R. Gilman: "Let us give a 'square deal' also to women, who are entitled to all our rights and, to my mind, to two more: the right of man's sympathy and of man's protection," in Miss Strachan's *op. cit.*, 544. Cf. above, p. 216n.

<sup>53</sup> "By way of illustration," says Christabel Pankhurst, "we may take the case of husband and wife who are both doctors, or actors, or industrial workers. Each earns an independent income, and both should contribute equally to the maintenance of the family," *Plain Facts about a Great Evil*, 121.

<sup>54</sup> But cf. above, p. 124, 180-1.

<sup>55</sup> This and what follows is not a recent demand of Mrs. Gilman and her followers only: it appeared early in the woman movement. In 1859 Miss Emma Hardinge

During the day men and women, married and unmarried, are to work together, side by side, without distinction of sex or status; and at even-tide men and women are still to enjoy themselves side by side, but now husband with wife, and among the unmarried, friend with friend (*ami avec amie*), as the case may be. This companionship in recreation has already been noticed.<sup>56</sup> Companionship in work is no less insisted upon by the consistent feminists. Wherever men work, women must work; and wherever women work, men must work—except (always there creeps in an exception) men are not to bear and tend children, and women are not to engage in tasks beyond their physical strength, though they may join in supervising strong men at their special labours, as men may join in supervising weak women in their special labours. With these exceptions—and even the work of the father with the children has sometimes been demanded<sup>57</sup>—complete side-by-sideness is always insisted on.<sup>58</sup> Marriage is not to interfere, nor any of its present associations. If their professional engagements take one of them away, the other will remain at his or her occupation. Thus, in this ultra theory, the wife of an ambassador, being a lawyer or a physician or a professor settled in some city, will remain when her husband goes off to his new position, as well as the husband will remain if his wife gets such a post. Hereby fairness and equality between the sexes will be restored—and, according to the feminists, be perfected. If their professional engagements separate them for long and they feel lonely, all they have to do is to get a divorce, and make new connubial unions, perhaps to reunite if circumstances again bring them together. Thus the side-by-sideness of men and women will always be maintainable. As for child-bearing, it, if it occurs, will no more deter a married woman from her professional labours than any other temporary indisposition.<sup>59</sup> And child-rearing may be assigned

in her *Inspirational Address on the Place and Mission of Woman*, p. 11, pictured how "The morning comes: the husband goes forth to his occupation, and so does the wife. . . . The hours of the day roll by, and when evening comes, both meet on equal terms."

<sup>56</sup> Above, pp. 138-9.

<sup>57</sup> Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton: "We would have men and women what God intended they should be, companions for each other, always together, in counsel, government, and every department of industry. If they have home and children, we would have them stay there. . . . Children need the watchful care and wise teaching of fathers as well as of mothers," in a letter to the Worcester Convention in 1850, *Proceedings*, p. 53. Similarly L. A. Hine (a man), *ib.*, 56.

<sup>58</sup> So at the Worcester Convention, Mrs. Abby H. Price and Harriet K. Hunt, *Proceedings* 24, 48; Emma Hardinge, *op. cit.*, 6; and frequently in the work of Mrs. Schreiner, 127, 174, 231, etc.

<sup>59</sup> The objection drawn from this matter is, in fact, treated by Thomas as "trivial," *Sex and Society*, 313.

to specialists, who will be paid for their services by the parents<sup>60</sup> — or by the state.<sup>61</sup>

With this scheme not all feminists are at present in accord. For married women have husbands to support them, and their competition with unmarried women is not contemplated with pleasure by these,— and these now monopolise the stage. Thus there was not long ago some unsavoury discussion in the New York public school system as to the right of a married school teacher to have a year off for the purpose of bearing and caring for a child; with whom not all her unmarried colleagues sympathised,<sup>62</sup> although some married ones and outsiders stood up for not discriminating in this respect between men and women, at least not against women,<sup>63</sup> overlooking that the man would not need such an interruption of his duties. But the objection of the unmarried women was no doubt a prejudice due to the continuance of old conditions; for when the new era comes in, they will perceive that it is no longer the duty of the husband to support the wife, and therefore the wife must not lose her

<sup>60</sup> Emma Hardinge in the passage above quoted goes on to say: When children arrive, either the mother continues to go forth, since there are many women "better qualified to train, teach, and guide the young than the mother," who may be employed, or "the mother may, if she is qualified to do so, undertake this office of teacher, professionally. She then does it still on an equality with her husband: she professionally hires herself as teacher, nurse, and physician, to her children."

<sup>61</sup> In the latter case, the mother also may be paid by the state for the time she loses from her profession during pregnancy and for a while after bearing.

<sup>62</sup> Even Miss Strachan, who led the women teachers' revolt against discrimination on the side of men teachers, and who in her book on *Equal Pay for Equal Work* could see no reason for a difference between the married and the unmarried woman's wages, 7, 122; who held that "considerations of family responsibilities have no place in the fixing of salary schedules," 118, *cf.* 35; and who denounced the "family wage" as necessitating "inquiry into one's private life, which is an intrusion to the extent almost of violating the Constitution," 8; now that victory over the men teachers has been won, seems to sing a different tune over against married female teachers; for she is reported to have objected to that woman's demand and to have declared that "that woman should resign and allow an unmarried woman to take her place. The married woman teacher does not need the money so much as her unmarried sister," in the *New York Sun*, March 9, 1913. The shoe pinches differently when it is removed from another's to one's own foot. In justice to Miss Strachan, however, it should be noted that she added a very good reason: "Besides, the married woman teacher cannot do justice to the school children and be absent every now and then to look after her own children. One or the other must suffer, and perhaps both. A married woman's place is at home with her children so long as she has a husband able to support the family." The woman in question had married a teacher in the same school with a salary of \$3000 a year. Miss Strachan, be it added, though a suffragist, uses the woman's-place-at-home argument when she needs it, but limited to happily married women. Since the revelation of her recent marriage it will be interesting to follow up her ultimate views.

<sup>63</sup> Thus in another case of a married woman teacher being dismissed for taking leave of absence to bear a child without properly reporting, at a meeting of the Woman's Political Union "Miss" Henrietta Rodman (she is a married woman) maintained that "instead of being dismissed for bearing a child, a woman teacher should receive an increase of salary. The Board of Education allows a teacher an increase of salary for a Bachelor of Arts degree. The degree counts for one year's experience. The teacher who bears a child performs a social service as great as the woman who obtains a degree, and she should receive a reward instead of a penalty." And another woman raised a laugh by asking: "Is it a rule of the Board of Education to dismiss a man teacher who becomes a father?" Reported in *The New York Times*, Oct. 20, 1913.

position on account of any merely temporary disability. If, in fact, the husband shall have any duty toward his wife, it will be to find a position for her, or to make one, if he can. Already the new form of nepotism has appeared of a public official appointing his wife to an office in his control.<sup>64</sup>

Still, if this new condition be introduced, Nature will again step in and block the plan, which does not recognise the distinctions she has established — in human beings at least, whatever may be her arrangements in other species. If there were never to be any children, and if women were not organised for producing children, marriages being mere unions for pleasurable intercourse, the plan might be carried out. But women are so organised, and society cannot last without children. By their organisation, as we have seen, women are periodically enfeebled, especially in the years of education and apprenticeship — of preparation for any other life-work. If in youth they prepare as hard as young men, they as women are likely to be either broken in health or stunted in child-bearing capacity, let alone child-rearing aptitude. The women who are capable of doing women's work, are not capable also of doing men's work. By their organism women are limited to special work, or to the lower ranks of work more suitable to men. Those who prepare themselves for men's full work, are handicapped in their own proper work. And if ever children do come, the mothers are confined for a time, and whether they or other women be employed, the care of young children devolves on women as their special work, which no man, as a rule, can or will perform. Some male animals may do so. A few male fishes see to the hatching of the eggs spawned by the females; the male sea-horses carry in a pouch the eggs of their mates; the male obstetric frogs perform the whole labour of incubation; and male ostriches attend to their fledglings. But if any men ever regularly performed such work as the last-mentioned, that tribe or nation would soon end. Even the *couvade* was too much to permit any race adopting it to amount to much. *Per contra*, when women engage in professional work like men, as they assume certain obligations that cannot thereafter be laid down without loss, in addition to their not improbable incapacity there is superinduced an unwillingness to have children, who would interfere with their work.<sup>65</sup> More-

<sup>64</sup> E.g., on Long Island a judge appointed his newly wedded wife to be his "confidential secretary" at a salary (to be paid by the public) of \$1500 a year. It was not allowed, but not on the ground of the appointee being his wife. See *The New York Times*, May 6, 1913. More recently a Governor of Colorado has appointed his wife Associate-Governor, keeping the salary in the family.

<sup>65</sup> In *The New York Times*, April 13, 1914, Miss Mabel Powers approvingly quotes a "wonder child," eleven years old, Winifred Stoner, of Pittsburgh, as follows: "I think we should have two Presidents of the United States — a Mr. President and a

over, as the boys are brought up with the idea that they are to be no better than women as providers for the home, they run a good chance of being no better than women in this respect, and in others too. They also, then, do not care to be burdened with children, or they relinquish the determination of this question to their wives. Therefore the middle or upper classes of the nation that takes up this new system, are doomed to ultimate extinction, leaving the country to the lower classes — to the less fit, and consequently abandoning it to decline.

Says Spencer: Just as occasional gynaecomasty in men, which can be exercised only at the cost of masculine strength, is not counted among masculine attributes, so exceptionally high intellectual production by women, under special discipline, should not be counted "as truly feminine, if it entails decreased fulfilment of the maternal functions. Only that mental energy is normally feminine which can co-exist with the production and nursing of the due number of children. Obviously a power of mind which, if general among the women of a society, would entail disappearance of the society, is a power not to be included in an estimate of the feminine nature as a social factor."<sup>66</sup> And Saleeby: "The individual development of women, their higher education, their expression in works of art and thought and practice, cannot safely be carried to the point at which motherhood is compromised; else the race in question will necessarily disappear and be replaced by any race whatsoever, the women of which continue to be mothers."<sup>67</sup> Thus, for the very good and sufficient reason of a physiological difference in their structure and functions, it is impossible for women in general to study so hard and to energise so continuously in intellectual, artistic, and industrial productivity, as men in general, and still perform, sufficiently, the indispensable work which they alone can do; and every attempt to give women in general the same education and training as men, and to induce them to enter as freely into the same occupations as men, is futile, wasteful, unfair, and dangerous.

Mrs. President. They ought to be of the same political party, and it would be better if they were married [to each other, apparently]. But they ought not to have very many children to look after; and while they are President, the doors of the White House should be closed to the stork." This child's prattle is cited here because it shows how the spirit of the times is caught up by a little girl, who easily sees that when women undertake the work that has usually been reserved for men, children are in the way. Miss Powers herself adds: "Something like this the future is bringing." A more serious expression of the new business woman's point of view is the statement of Mrs. Martha Cannon, herself a State-senator, of Utah, to the effect that "some day there will be a law compelling people to have no more than a certain amount [sic] of children, and then the mothers of this land can live as they ought to live," quoted from the Salt Lake Herald in the Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Soc. and Pol. Science, Supplement, May, 1910, p. 20.

<sup>66</sup> *Study of Sociology*, 441-2, cf. *Principles of Sociology*, § 367.

<sup>67</sup> *Parenthood and Race Culture*, 106.

To summarise this matter: There is a system in which the sons alone receive higher instruction and preparation for professional work, and they alone receive the family inheritance, which is handed on as a family trust: they are expected to support their sisters and to marry them off, if this has not already been done by the father; and they are expected themselves to marry and support, each one, some other woman, that she may be the head of his home and the mother of his children. As wives share their husbands' property, the prospects of the sons and the daughters are equal. In another system, generally growing out of the first (toward the end of the rising period of civilisation, or the beginning of its culminating point), the inheritance is divided equally among the sons and the daughters, the daughters have the prospect of marrying and sharing their husbands' professional incomes, and the sons also have the prospect of marrying women who have inherited property, and thereby of adding to their common fund: their prospects still are equal. But now the sons no longer have the duty of supporting their sisters, nor even themselves of marrying; and as the daughters are still not prepared in the higher education for professional labour, or only a beginning of this is made, those who do not marry and whose inheritance is not large enough to support them, are at a disadvantage. To remedy this, a third system is desired to be inaugurated — the system of the feminists. Property shall continue to be divided among the sons and the daughters equally, and also the daughters shall be educated and trained equally with the sons to support themselves in any and all professional labours. Here the prospects are supposed to be perfectly equal. And the intention is that when marriage takes place, the wife shall continue her professional labours just as the husband does, the husband no longer having any duty to support the wife, and toward the children the mother having the same duty to support them as the father has. The equality is to be kept up and continued in every respect. But here is where the difficulty comes in. As women have not the same capacity for professional labours that men have, if they are thrown on their own efforts for self-support all through their lives, their prospects are not equal to those of men. Equality can be maintained only by the men contributing something to the support of the women, despite the theory. This will be necessary especially if there be children resulting from the unions. But as the object is to minimise the disparity between the earnings of the men and the women, children will be in the women's way, and there will be a tendency to avoid having them, at least in any numbers sufficient to keep up the race.

Moreover, some women will never accept this new theory. This theory is, in fact, adapted only to exceptional women. The exceptional women will continue to practise their profession after marriage, or will avoid marrying in order to retain their profession. But other women will desire to marry, to have children, and to be supported as mothers by their husbands. The attempt to carry out this theory, therefore, will only introduce confusion, and is bound to be a failure. But it may go far enough to ruin the country that undertakes it.

To repeat, further, if there are to be children, men must, in one way or another, support the women who do the special work of bearing and rearing them. If it be the husband who does so, then we have the present condition over again, but with effort to hide, ignore, and belie it, producing confusion and secret discontent on both sides. If it be the state, then women as a class are dependent on men as a class, again with effort to shut one's eyes to this fact. Call it an exchange, if you will: the men get what they want — children and a home; and the women get what they need — food, clothing, shelter; yet the women get necessities, and they too get a home and the children (which latter some of them now claim as entirely their own): they are getting more than the men, they are in a favoured position, hence in a dependent position. Burdened, too, by their child-bearing organism, even if unexercised, and especially by their children, if they have any, they are weaker than men, both bodily and mentally, for self-supporting purposes, and consequently are in the power of men, let them prate about equality and independence all they please. Equality and independence can be attained — and never completely — only by renunciation of the child-bearing and -rearing function. This is not possible absolutely; but if it were, the race would come to an end in fifty years. It is, however, possible in part, and a nation may slowly die out. The plan of female independence may be made more or less general, but it cannot be made permanent, though it may be made final with a vengeance.

There is the alternative: female independence, without children, and then a certain end to civilisation; or female dependence, with children, and then the possibility of the continuance of civilisation.

Some feminists, especially the women among them, are so given over to the shibboleth of independence and of equality (which they identify with justice), whether it brings them happiness or not, that they will unhesitatingly choose the first branch of the alternative, desiring assimilation of women to men regardless of

consequences. They will not, in the words of a man, tolerate that the rights of living persons shall be interfered with by "any superstition about the effect on posterity,"<sup>68</sup> apparently "accounting future times impertinencies."<sup>69</sup> But their choice cannot be approved as wise, when one reflects that civilisation does not end like a candle going out, but the process of its ending is a slow and prolonged agony. The woman who wishes to be independent, let her be independent if she can; but when she gives advice to others, she should consult the welfare of all—of the untold generations to come as well as of the present generation. Advice that takes in less than the interest of the universality is foolishness.

It need not be denied that women can do, at a pinch or exceptionally, what men do (in the domain of the secondary sex functions), but it must be denied that women can do what men do and at the same time do what they are specially constructed to do (in the domain of the primary sex function). It may very well be that in the rest of this century there shall be a great outcropping of female productivity, with feats performed and works achieved by women in art, literature, science, politics, finance, etc., rivaling the medium performances and achievements of great men. This can happen only if there is a wide-spread striving to bring all women into the arena of competition with men by education, training, exercise, and encouragement. But, if so, the women who do enter into such competition (those with sound bodies and superior brains) will die off, with loss of energy in the coming generations to men also. For "advanced" women leave practically no progeny, and therefore cannot transmit their forwardness. Some women, to be sure (*e.g.*, Mrs. Pankhurst), have advanced after they have borne children; but they rear their daughters to be advanced women, and these cease to propagate. The intellectuals will cease to exist, and will leave the world in the hands of the brutal. Then the brutal men will again "subdue" the brutal women, and a new cycle of advance may begin, with the gradual emergence of a new set of intellectual men—to be followed, perhaps, by a new set of intellectualising women again closing the cycle. Would it not be better for intellectual men to continue their mastery, and for intelligent women to submit to it, doing it gently, instead of leaving it to be done by brutal men brutally? Then the race at least of intellectualising men may be kept up, and the present cycle may continue longer than it would do in the other case.

<sup>68</sup> J. M. Robertson in a criticism of a lecture by Ritchie on *Natural Rights*, in *The National Reformer*, Dec. 6, 1891. Cf. above, ii. 89n, and here p. 142n.

<sup>69</sup> Bacon, *Essay VIII*.

For why should the unrealisable dream of the two sexes always and everywhere living side by side, inseparable but unbound, equal, undistinguished, ever be dreamt? Nature has made women dependent on men for subsistence, and men dependent on women for happiness, both dependent on children for continuance and also for gladness (for the older we grow, the more we feel what a void the world would be without childhood and youthfulness around us), and children dependent on their parents for existence and preparation for the world. When you break one of these dependencies, you undo the whole colligation of interdependence: nature's whole plan is deranged, and civilisation suffers. No true advantage is gained by the proposed change. You may add so many millions of women working at a trade, industry, or profession, almost celibate and childless, in addition to so many millions of almost celibate and childless men workers, in place of so many millions of wives of the men who did that kind of work, while the women did the work at home and had and attended to children. What you gain is the production of more material things, what you lose is the proper use of them; and there can be no doubt on which side the greater happiness lies. Only blindness to the loss gives a vision of gain.<sup>70</sup> The choice lies between more commodities and more children; and the present tendency, encouraged by the feminists, is to choose more commodities. This materialism defeats its own ob-

<sup>70</sup> L. H. Courtney: "It is obvious that if large numbers of women are converted from mere consumers into helpers in production, there will be an increase in the mass of products without any corresponding increase in the mouths to be fed." *The Women's Suffrage Question*, *Contemporary Review*, June, 1892, p. 772. The *petitio* here is that women who enter industry, etc., would otherwise be "mere consumers" — and not producers, just because they do not produce things for sale. (So Mrs. Gilman treats half the world as "non-productive consumers," *Women and Economics*, 118, *cf.* 116, in spite of knowing the work they do in the home, 20, 21, 187). Courtney further complains that the opponents "confine their attention" to the temporary troubles caused by the displacement of labour, and "do not carry their minds forward to the gains that follow readjustment." On the contrary, it is precisely the losses that would follow readjustment to which objection is due. The ones who do not carry their minds forward to the ultimate effects, are the feminists. W. I. Thomas: "Certain it is that no civilisation can remain the highest if another civilisation adds to the intelligence of its men the intelligence of its women," *Sex and Society*, 314. This supposes that the intelligence of women is not now used, whereas in truth it is more likely that the way their intelligence always has been used in advancing civilised states is the proper one, and the proposed use of it in the fields there generally reserved for men is the wrong one, past experience in this matter being sufficiently large. The author has set up a good Darwinian test, and if it were to have the effect expected, the wonder is that it has not, amidst the myriads of social experiments, already resulted in a feminist state taking the leadership in the world, instead of the feminist states being found only among barbarians. But the reason is plain when we take into consideration (what these thinkers overlook) the influence of "adding women's intelligence" (*i.e.*, cultivating it equally and in the same way with men's) upon the physiological condition of women.—Apart from a hint in Plato (*Laws*, 805A-B, made plainer in Jowett's paraphrase, in the introduction to his translation, iv. 82), the origin of this argument is to be found in Mill, who confined the benefit to the "doubling the mass of mental faculties available for the higher service of humanity," *The Subjection of Women*, 153. Of course, if a few exceptional women engage in the higher service, there need be no objection; but we must not expect any doubling.

ject; for children give not only joy in the present but safety in the future, and without them there is blankness and despair. Moreover, to the extent that there is truth in the doctrine of the "iron law of wages," as interpreted by Henry George, the entrance of all women throughout their life-time (in marriage as well as in celibacy) into the trades, industries, and professions, will depress wages and salaries so that the earnings of both the parents (sufficient to keep up the family) will be little larger than would have been the earnings of the husband alone,<sup>71</sup> in spite of the increased production. The surplus will accrue to the capitalists and land-owners. These, both men and women, will be the only gainers, and only in a sordid way; and they alone, for a purely selfish purpose, should advocate this feminist plank. The men and the women of the working classes will gain little materially, and will lose much by comparison, till the upper classes become so weakened by luxury that they may be overthrown, and the world go to smash for another recovery. We are already in a half-way stage commencing the process that leads toward this result. Shall we go on into the error already begun — and make "progress," as is carelessly conceived; or shall we endeavour to go back to the state in which women worked at home in the midst of their children at occupations not inconsistent with motherhood? To all far-seeing minds it is difficult to understand how there can be any doubt or hesitancy between these alternatives. It may be said that it is impossible to go back to the healthier earlier state. This may be, but at least it is possible to strive against being carried further in the downward current.

Likewise justice is no more furthered by this feminist scheme than by the socialist scheme. It is no injustice to keep women in general from entering the fields of work not suited to them. Justice cannot demand the upsetting of the natural and preferable scheme. That men should exclude women from occupations for which women prepare themselves and show themselves fit, might seem harsh. But for the occupations more generally reserved to men, women have not prepared themselves, and have not shown themselves fit — not even absolutely, and much less so compatibly with their own function. The feminist demand is for men to prepare them, and keep on preparing them, in expectation that

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Ward: "A man working alone earns the same as when his wife and children also work," *Psychic Factors of Civilisation*, 279. This effect is already apparent in some occupations: see Mrs. Sidney Webb, in the article already cited from *The Economic Journal*, Dec., 1891, p. 645.—Mill admitted this effect, but considered the independence of women so supremely desirable as to be more than an equivalent, *Dissertations*, iii. 110, *Political Economy*, II. xiv. § 4. Emily Davies answered the objection only by supposing that, if not making money, women would be idle, *The Higher Education of Women*, 173-7, since their former household occupations had been invaded, 43-7 91-3, 109; for she did not seek the reinstatement of other domestic employments.

they will show themselves fit, even at the cost of unfitting them for their own work. But if men refrain from making this dangerous experiment, and refrain from preparing women for work which all experience and reason prove to be unsuitable for them, certainly there is no injustice in that. As it is, women share in all the advantages and advances of civilisation. No new invention is made by men, but women are invited into the use of it. Look at the automobiles passing your door: there are more women in them than men. At any recreation place or pleasure resort women more abound. For feminists to talk of injustice to women, is sheer nonsense.

Nor are women to be condemned for parasitism — unless they abandon their own work. The danger ahead of female parasitism is Mrs. Schreiner's pet discovery.<sup>72</sup> Against this great danger the woman's movement is now said to be fighting, by demanding the entrance of women into all the fields of labour side by side with men. This movement, Mrs. Schreiner admits, "has taken its rise almost exclusively among the wealthy, cultured, and brain-labouring classes, where alone at the present day the danger of degeneration through dependence on the sex function exists" (123). This "female labour movement is, in its ultimate essence, an endeavour on the part of a section of the race to save itself from inactivity and degeneration, and this even at the immediate cost of the most heavy loss in material comfort and ease to the individuals composing it" (123-4). It is, indeed, noble that women who might live in ease should seek work. The question only is as to the kind of work to be sought. For parasitism is a great evil. Everybody, whether male or female, should be ashamed of being dependent on another for support without making an adequate return therefor. But when such a return is made, there is nothing to be ashamed of, and there is no parasitism. The idea taught by the feminists that in itself, essentially, inherently, it is shameful for a wife to be supported by a husband — "revolting," Mrs. Gilman calls it,<sup>73</sup> — is an entirely false idea, which simply overlooks the return she makes, or dwells only on the "sex function," which, indeed,

<sup>72</sup> *Woman and Labour*, 75ff. "'The fine lady,' the human female parasite" she speaks of as "the most deadly microbe which can make its appearance on the surface of the social system," 81. Among the causes of decay, parasitism of women is "fundamental," 99. Mrs. Gilman, however, treats women in general, under present conditions (ever since savagery, mostly), as made by men into parasites, *Women and Economics*, 62, 141, cf. 116. The cause of her error may be seen above, pp. 171, 177. Mrs. Schreiner has real female parasitism in view, such as is already exhibited in so many middle-class married couples, and is extending, *Woman and Labour*, 101n., 191n. But it is not a new discovery. It has been an object of animadversion by moralists and cynics for many years. No stronger denunciation of women's shirking of their work can be found than one published in the London *Saturday Review* in 1868 (republished in *Modern Women*, pp. 281-90).

<sup>73</sup> *Women and Economics*, 17.

alone is not sufficient in marriage. It is comparable with the idea of the socialists that it is shameful for the upper classes to be supported by the lower classes; which likewise overlooks the return (of leadership) which the upper classes make—or might make. When the upper classes cease to make an adequate return to the lower classes, their state is truly shameful, and harmful to all concerned. This is the parasitism of men upon men, and unless corrected by reformation of the upper classes themselves, or by their overthrow and replacement by another set that does make an adequate return, it leads to the decline of civilisation. And when women cease to make an adequate return for their support, their state is similarly shameful and harmful. This is the parasitism of women upon men, which, superimposed on the parasitism of men upon men, hastens the decline of civilisation. In our country, where the parasitism of the upper classes upon the lower classes is only just beginning, the parasitism of women upon men has made considerable headway. It is due partly to the invasion of domestic labour by the factory system, which is common to other countries, and partly to the larger opportunities here for men to make a living and to the lesser number of women, which, giving them a scarcity value, has made men compete for their favours by unduly reducing the return required of them. Our American husbands should demand more from their wives, and require more their help, where it is feasible. And American wives should demand more to help their husbands. The "female labour movement" has come at an opportune time. But it has perverted its aim. If the women of the upper (and middle) classes, instead of desiring more money for their pleasures, want work, why do they not demand back the first of woman's labours—child-bearing and child-rearing, and the various domestic duties that go therewith? It is more this shirking of their own proper task than anything else, that has given our women an undue amount of leisure, and threatens to convert them into parasites. Yet it is precisely the feminist women who show little desire for this work: they turn their eyes to the flesh-pots of the outer world and yearn to share with man his labours—and his recreations. There is danger ahead from parasitism; but there is still greater danger ahead from this perversion of women's labour. In abandoning their own great task and its attendant labours—the household labours of the past, or in not finding new proper work of their own to replace that which men have taken from them,<sup>74</sup> and in

<sup>74</sup> What some of these may be under present conditions, is well explained by Miss Ida Tarbell in her *The Business of Being a Woman*.

trying to invade men's work, thereby lessening men's ability to support them and their own willingness to attend to children, women, like the socialists, who would confound the classes, will lose more than they will gain. They will act like the old woman who killed the goose that laid the golden eggs. They should remember the adage which advises not to bite the hand that feeds.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### WOMAN SUFFRAGE — THE ARGUMENTS FOR

BECAUSE they wish to carry out these feminist views, more or less; because they think they are the equals of men, and have a right to be treated as such; and because their feelings are hurt that they are not so treated,— some women desire the vote. And they desire it fully — not only in municipal and provincial (or, in our country, State) matters, but in national affairs. Not only this, but they desire to take part in all branches of the government. Where exists a state church, they aspire, by legislative enactment, to enter it also. Possessed of the franchise, they believe they can compel recognition of their equality with men in all other points not yet attained. At all events, they can then take an equal part with men in determining their own status and that of men — the relation between the sexes, and the management of children. They can then, equally with men, control their environment. They will supplement the male factor with the female factor, and consummate the full complement of humanity.

Their arguments for the suffrage are therefore of a threefold nature. In the ascending order of importance, they are (1) the sentimental, (2) the moral or rational (or *a priori*), and (3) the utilitarian (or *a posteriori*). We may briefly examine them in this order.

(1) *The sentimental arguments.*— Without political rights, as claimed, women complain that they are treated by men as chattels, as mere things; not as human beings, not as persons, not as a portion of the people, not as citizens: that they are held in subjection.<sup>1</sup>

To the first points in this complaint the reply is a flat denial of the statements made. Women simply are not treated as chattels and as mere things: they are distinguished from chattels, from slaves, from things, in the only countries worth considering, even though it be that they have been sometimes, and still are somewhere to some extent, treated in the way complained of. They

<sup>1</sup> E.g., Mrs. Abby H. Price, addressing the Woman's Rights Convention at Worcester, 1850: "Is there a woman here, who is willing to be disfranchised . . . to feel that she has no part or lot in the government under which she lives — that she is a mere thing!" *Proceedings*, 33.

are human beings, and persons in this sense, as playing parts in most of the drama of life; and their status as such is recognised; only they are not treated as men: their natural distinction from men is recognised, more or less correctly, in men's treatment of them; and not being admitted to play an equal part in politics, they are, if you like, not "political persons."<sup>2</sup> And so, to the remaining points the answer is that the element of truth in the statement of the complaint is not deservedly complained of. Women are not a portion of the political people: with few individual exceptions, they never were; and before they be admitted, they should give good reason for their admission, besides the mere desire of a small and varying number of them. The Latin term *populus* had a proper and an extended meaning, the former referring to the male citizens who took part in the conduct of the government, and the latter covering also the women and children attached to them.<sup>3</sup> From it our built-up term "population" has only the broad and all-inclusive meaning, but our immediately derivative term "people" has the same ambiguity as the ancient.<sup>3a</sup> In the political significance it still means only men. Our republic, for instance, was founded by men. When the Constitution says: "We the people of the United States, . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution," most certainly the people it meant (for such was the fact) were the men of the country.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the complaint of Mrs. Jacobi: "In a community where the definition of a social unit is the person who casts one vote, every one who casts no vote is reckoned as less than a unit,—and hence suffers in the social estimate and in her own," "*Common Sense*" applied to *Woman Suffrage*, 221. This is not the definition of a "social unit," though it may serve as the definition of a "political unit," and no such results need follow, unless the exclusion from politics does not correspond to the facts in the case. Suffering in the public estimate, in the sense of being adjudged a lower status, is generally a precedent, rather than a consequent, of any exclusion.

<sup>3</sup> The fact of this term being masculine is of some significance, because it is one of but few exceptions to the general rule in Latin that terms of multitude are feminine—as, for instance, *plebs*. In Greek also *demos* is masculine; and "democracy" means the power or rule of the male part of the lower people, as only in the males is there power to rule. Thucydides spoke of "the women and children of the Toronæans," but of the men as "the Toronæans themselves," V. 3 (4), cf. 82 (6). He wrote from the military and political point of view, to which Greek grammar lent itself. In other respects, of course, the wives and daughters of citizens were, not citizens, but citizenesses; for the Greek language continued to make the distinction: cf. Sophocles, *Electra*, 1227.

<sup>3a</sup> Thus Burke wrote of "the people (a word which, ill defined, is of the most dangerous use)," *Works* (Boston ed.), iv. 434; and he himself defined it, in the political sense, as conveying "the idea of a corporation," something "artificial" and "made by agreement," 169, and cf. 411 (probably getting the suggestion of this from Locke, as to be quoted in note 24 in the next chapter).

<sup>4</sup> Similarly in the case of the "We the people" in the constitutions of Massachusetts 1780, Maine 1820, New York 1821, and Rhode Island 1842. Where constitutions were set up by conventions, the "We, the representatives of the people" in the constitutions of Virginia 1776 and Georgia 1777 had precisely the same meaning as was expressed by the "We, the representatives of the freemen" in the constitutions of North Carolina 1776, Pennsylvania 1776, and Vermont 1777. In the Virginia constitution of 1776 (in its Bill of Rights, sect. 13) is mention of "a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people"; where it is evident that "people" was not intended to include women. Hence Higginson was absolutely wrong when he wrote that because of this "We the people" in our Constitution "it is impossible to state the national theory [of our government] in such a way that it

And the government of this country has since been run by men, who alone are its political people. The mere fact that men are human beings and are people in a broad sense, and also that women are human beings and are people in the same broad sense, does not give the latter any right to include themselves among the people in the narrow political signification of the term.<sup>5</sup> The same is the case with children, who are equally human beings and equally people in the broad sense of this term, and equally persons, but only in the incomplete sense of this term also. And women, and children too, are citizens; but if political activity is included in this term, they are not so completely.<sup>6</sup> In this matter is some logical difficulty, but one that is plain enough to those who seek clearness.<sup>7</sup> It does not speak well for the sincerity of the woman suffragists that they urge their cause by verbal quibbling.<sup>8</sup>

And if women are held in subjection, their complaint should be

shall not include them [women]," *Common Sense about Women, Works*, iv. 250. On the contrary, it is impossible to state correctly the theory of our government, as we shall abundantly see, without excluding women.

5 For the fallacy see above, p. 30. The fallacy recurs in another form of the complaint — that women are not treated as "grown-ups." It is overlooked that there are two kinds of grown-ups — grown-up men and grown-up women. Boys grow up into men, and girls grow up into women, but girls do not grow up into men. Women are treated differently from girls, and so are treated as grown-ups — that is, as grown-up women, not as grown-up men. And nothing is offered to show why they should be treated as grown-up men are treated.

6 Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, III. ii. 4; see also 4 (or ii. 1), where is mention of women citizens. A French arrangement attributed to Sieyès, and introduced in the constitutions of 1789 and 1791, divided citizens into the active and the non-active. This distinction was abolished in words by a Decree of August 11-12, 1792, but left in fact.

7 The question "Who are the people?" was the subject of much discussion, both in this connection and with regard to the distribution of representation, in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853. The *Official Report of Debates* shows that some members held that the term has only one meaning, one of them ascribing to it only that of all the adult males competent to take part in government (W. J. Bradford i. 212B), and others having it include all men, women and children (H. W. Kinsman 204B, B. M. Morton 225A, A. P. Marvin ii. 746; "every rational creature," said W. B. Greene, i. 200B, 201A, ii. 726B); while others gave it both these meanings. Thus F. T. Wallace pointed out that "we speak of the people in two senses," in "an actual sense," embracing every living soul in the commonwealth, and in "a legal or constitutional sense," covering only those who are recognised as voters i. 207; followed by J. W. Simonds 210A. Already O. P. Lord, who had started with the broad definition 170A-B, had admitted the narrow one 174B; and now E. P. Hathaway, making the same transition from the broad 208B to the narrow sense 228B, accepted both 229A; while B. F. Hallett, who had started out with the narrow definition of "people" 170A, 219B, recognised that it is "a relative term," with varying application according to circumstances 219B, and means both all the population as "the people in repose," and only a part of them as "the people in action" 221A [the French distinction]; followed by J. M. Earle 226B-227A. But even those who held, or laid emphasis on, only the broad definition, did not on that account admit the right of women to the suffrage. They said either that the legal voters represented all the rest, especially their women (H. Wilson 196B, B. J. Giles 198A, Morton 225A, Hathaway 228B, Marvin ii. 746A, also at first Greene i. 201A-B, later converted ii. 726A), or that they were the guardians or trustees of those (Wallace i. 207B, 208A, Hathaway 229A, cf. ii. 728A, and cf. Earle i. 227A). W. J. Hubbard well explained the whole matter by reference to the conduct of the men on the Mayflower 555-6, cf. Simonds 209B.

8 In English the word "people" is also used in a general sense, like the Greek *τις*, the French *on*, the German *man*. Of course women come under this sense of the word. This additional sense in which women are included adds strength to the illusion; and so this argument is, apparently, used much more by English-speaking peoples than by others.

aimed rather at their treatment in subjection, than at the fact itself; for women simply are in the power of men. They may not have been so in the beginning, when mankind little differed from animals; but since women have become different from other females by their long care of their offspring, and since men have gone ahead and carried civilisation, the foundation of which may have been laid by women, far beyond the capacity of the women who reproduce the species, men themselves cannot alter the fact established by nature. Strength of mind and body, unhampered by natural drawbacks, is needed for the continuance of civilisation, and for its preservative power to defend what is acquired. If women were excluded from the benefits of civilisation, they might justly complain, since they perform the essential task of bearing men; but as this is not the case, they have no just ground of complaint in simply not being admitted to functions which they did not originate and have never, but for infinitesimal exceptions, performed or, save a few man-like specimens, shown any aptitude for. The fact of inferiority in these respects, moreover, is recognised by women themselves, when they ask that the franchise, that economic independence, that equality in all things with men, be *given* to them by men. As though men could really give to women what they cannot receive,—what they cannot make their own, except in appearance, nature having withheld it from them! Men have not so behaved toward other men. When certain classes of men have grown strong enough to take part in government, they have declared themselves so, and taken the position, and required others to recognise it. So our ancestors acted toward England: they did not ask for independence or for permission to manage their own affairs: they did manage their own affairs, they did declare themselves independent, and they forced England to recognise this established fact. England has since practically recognised the independence of her other colonies, without waiting to be forced. And so in politics, statesmen have frequently admitted up-coming classes into the franchise, without waiting to be forced; and so they have appeared to give the franchise, though it was no longer theirs to withhold. A downright gift of the franchise was once made by the Northern whites to the Southern blacks, since those blacks were not ready to take it, and could not really receive it. Every gift of that sort is a mistake.

The extreme sensitiveness of the women suffragists is shown by another complaint, which is used as an argument, and which seems to have great weight with them. This is the long-standing lamentation that by exclusion from the franchise women are

classed with children, idiots, and criminals. Even the trousered logician Mill indulged in this negative classification.<sup>9</sup> But Harriet Martineau had not hesitated to class children with idiots and criminals (during "the season of sequestration" of the latter) as "the only fair exceptions" to the "democratic principle," which "requires the equal political representation of all human beings";<sup>10</sup>— and to the "fair" exceptions she might have added, if not slaves, at least foreigners. It is, however, a curious principle (and she might be asked where she got it?) affecting "all human beings," which yet excepts some—and at least one third of them; and if it excepts these, it may except others, with equal fairness, and the question at issue is, not whether women should be classed with children, idiots, and criminals, but whether they ought to be excluded from, or rather not be admitted to, the political franchise. There is a distinct reason for each case. Slaves are not admitted because they are not citizens; foreigners, because they are members of another people; children, because they are undeveloped; idiots, because they are unintelligent; criminals, because they do not recognise the rights of others; and women, because, as we shall see more fully later, they are deprived (by their organism and its proper functioning) of capacity to perform political duties in addition to their own.<sup>11</sup> Thus, though women are classed with certain others in the exclusion, they are not classed with them in the reasons for the exclusions.<sup>12</sup> It is no indignity to children to be thus negatively

<sup>9</sup> In his speech in Parliament, May 29, 1867; also about the same time Curtis, *Operations and Addresses*, i. 182, and Elizabeth C. Stanton, in her address at the First Anniversary of the American Equal Rights Association, New York, 1867, *Proceedings*, 15; followed by D. Masson in an address before a Woman Suffrage Meeting at Edinburgh, Jan. 12, 1871, and since by almost every man, woman, and child who speaks on the subject: for instance, it could not fail to appear in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1894, where it was raked up by C. H. Moore and M. L. Towns, *Revised Record*, ii. 215, 417; also again in England it has been used by Israel Zangwill, *Talked Out*, Report of a speech at Exeter Hall, March 8, 1907, p. 3. To F. J. Hall this seems a "shame," in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915. There were, however, precedents on the other side. Thus in 1840, W. Cook Taylor wrote: "In every free constitution that has ever existed, a principle of exclusion is established somewhere; even the wildest advocates of what is called 'universal suffrage' do not propose that females, infants, or the insane should be admitted into the class of electors and representatives," *Natural History of Civilization*, ii. 126. And sixty-five years before, Paley had cited "a child, a woman, a mad-man, or a fool," among "the feeblest and worst," to whom property often belongs, *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, Book III., Part i., ch. 1. Sometimes in science use is made of classification by negation, as in zoölogy, where invertebrates are treated as a class. Yet a lobster may differ from a worm more than does an amphioxus; and so a non-voting woman may have less in common with a non-voting criminal than with a voting philanthropist.

<sup>10</sup> *Society in America*, London, 1839, i. 200.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Hallett, Massachusetts Convention, *Official Report*, i. 221A-B.

<sup>12</sup> Of course, a general principle including most of these several reasons may be found; but this does not hinder the diversity of reasons in detail, as things may have a generic resemblance and at the same time specific differences. In the Virginia constitution of 1776 (Bill of Rights, sec. 6, drawn up by George Mason; cf. Elliot's *Debates*, V. 387), followed by those of Pennsylvania 1776, Maryland 1776, and Vermont 1777, the right of suffrage was qualified as belonging to "all men, having sufficient

classed with idiots and criminals, especially as these are often incomplete human beings. And it is no indignity to women to be thus negatively classed with children, between whom and men physiology, as we have seen, shows them to be intermediate. In England, also peers are excluded from the suffrage because they have a compensatory share in the government;<sup>13</sup> and clergymen of the Church of England cannot sit in the House of Commons, as theirs is another function and they have a Convocation of their own.<sup>14</sup> Women likewise have compensation in certain privileges. In these they do not mind being classed with children, as, for instance, in protective labour legislation. Nor do they decline being saved first, along with children, in shipwrecks; and with children they claim for themselves immunity in war. Widows and orphans have long been ranked together as objects deserving of charitable assistance; nor would our suffragists now separate them. Also women, children, and idiots, as also criminals during their sequestration (women cannot escape this classification), are exempt from service in the army and navy, and in the militia, and in the sheriff's *posse comitatus*. Here, too, women do not object. Their objection, therefore, is not to their companions, but to the fact — their exclusion from something they wish to enter; and they catch at any reason that presents itself. There is, indeed, or there ought to be, a reason for everything; and in every case, under the general reason, the reason peculiar to it is the one that principally calls for acceptance or refutation.<sup>15</sup>

evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to, the community." This, besides leaving out women, disqualified slaves and foreigners, and also paupers. We shall later dwell on another reason which is common to all but the first two sets of excluded persons (even to criminals during their sequestration). Here it may be noted that Harriet Martineau herself alluded to it. Her absurd "democratic" principle, which requires the inclusion of all human beings, she added, "allows the exclusion of none but incapables," *op. cit.*, i. 202. But that women are sufficiently capable of political activity she could maintain only by saying that "no man can deny that woman has power to represent her own interests, till she has been tried," 208. Yet she herself spoke of women as being the half of humanity "over whom the other half has power — from the exercise of the right of the strongest," iii. 105. That there is no "fairness" in the exclusion of women, is purely a dictum of her own, expressing only her own desire and sentiment in the matter. It may be added that the strength of the reason for the exclusion of women may be less pronounced than in the other cases (wherefore their exclusion alone has become a subject of debate), without this proving that the reason for women's exclusion is insufficient.

<sup>13</sup> In the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872-3 a couple of advocates of woman suffrage (T. MacConnell and J. M. Broomall) pointed to an inconsistency in allowing brutal Englishmen to come here and after a few years to vote, while Queen Victoria, if she came and settled here, would forever be excluded from the franchise, *Debates*, i. 537-8, 550B. They failed to note that neither Queen Victoria nor her husband nor her grown-up sons could vote in their own country.

<sup>14</sup> Also in many of our States clergymen used to be ineligible to elective offices.

<sup>15</sup> J. Fitzjames Stephen's "comparison between the subjection of women and the subjection of minors" is pronounced "sophistical" by Margaret L. Franklin in her *Case for Woman Suffrage*, p. 46, and to have been "particularly" well refuted by Lydia E. Becker in her *Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity* (a reply to Stephen's work of the same title) as follows: "The temporary subjection of the infant to the parent is an accidental [!] relation of two persons having inherently equal personal rights.

Analogous is the complaint that women are by their exclusion from the franchise treated as a "class" by themselves, over against men as another and superior "class." This complaint has come to the fore especially since the wide-spread adoption of almost complete male suffrage.<sup>16</sup> This treatment of women is regarded, not only again as ignominious, because of the association with other inferior excluded classes,<sup>17</sup> but as undemocratic,<sup>18</sup> and involving inconsistency,<sup>19</sup> and as necessarily leading to injustice, because, in the words of Curtis, "there is no class of citizens, and no single citizen, who can safely be intrusted with the permanent and exclusive possession of political power";<sup>20</sup> and as actually having done so;<sup>21</sup> wherefore women, as forming a class, need to be represented.<sup>22</sup> The induction is also indulged in, that as one class after another of men has come up and been admitted to the franchise, so finally the greatest class of all, all

The permanent subjection of women is affirmed to be a relation which presupposes inherently unequal rights." The rights of children and of adults are unequal—and inherently so—because of the inequality of their conditions, while the children are children, and they cease to be so only when the children become adults. The rights of women and of men are unequal because of the inequality of their conditions, and cannot cease to be so because women never can become men. The statement of a comparison always includes a difference, and its incorrectness is not proved by its agreement with facts.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Mrs. Jacobi, above, p. 111. Mrs. Jacobi further says there is now "one great line of cleavage, which makes a political class out of a sex," "*Common Sense applied to Woman Suffrage*, 210. "A class of people who are not allowed to be persons," 25; "a political class below that of every man," 74; a class of aliens, 202; "the only class of sane people" excluded "except the tribal Indians and the Chinese," 211. This work, as its title indicates, tried to extend Paine's views to woman suffrage. But futilely; for Paine's *Common Sense* was a work intended to show the want of right in the English people to rule the American people. The distinction between sovereign and subjects he regarded as arbitrary, and conferring no rights; but he expressly (in No. 2) contrasted with it the distinction between "male and female," which, he says, is one "of nature"—a little point which Mrs. Jacobi overlooked.

<sup>17</sup> "Every class," says Christabel Pankhurst, "which is denied the vote, is branded as an inferior class," *Plain Facts about a Great Evil*, 122.

<sup>18</sup> S. Josephine Baker: "No land has a right to call itself a democracy when it is governed solely by a privileged class"—i.e., by men, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915.

<sup>19</sup> So in 1792 Hippel: As estates (Stände=classes) can only be represented by their peers, how can women be excluded? *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber, Werke*, vi. 123.

<sup>20</sup> *Orations and Addresses*, i. 193, cf. 218-19. He quoted Buckle as saying "there is no instance on record of any class possessing political power without abusing it." But Buckle, although Curtis himself did ((232-3)), would hardly have viewed all men as a class. Similarly in this connection W. G. Eliot: "In a republic, an unrepresented class is the sure victim of injustice," *Woman's Work and Education in America*, 1870, p. 4. And Jessie H. Childs, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915: "Never has it been found safe to allow any class to hold power over another class whose needs were utterly different and sometimes opposed to the needs of the ruling class." Also, more fully, Higginson: "It is not in the nature of things, I take it, that a class politically subject can obtain justice from the governing class," *Common Sense about Women, Works*, iv. 342; "There never yet existed a race, nor a class, nor a sex, which was noble enough to be trusted with political power over another sex, or class, or race," 318. Similarly Gail Hamilton, *Woman's Wrongs*, 92-3.

<sup>21</sup> Anne O'Hagan: "Men, legislating as a class for women as a class, have done exactly what every every ruling class has always done—they have discriminated against a class which had no legal vote," *Do Men represent Women?* (a leaflet published by the National American Woman Suffrage Association).

<sup>22</sup> Mrs. Schreiner: Women demand to share in the electorate and ultimately in the legislative and executive, because "so far as they differ from the male they form a class, and are bound to represent the interests of that class," *Woman and Labour*, 200.

women, will be admitted.<sup>23</sup> There is here a simple error, and the inferences do not follow. Women are not a class, any more than children are a class; for, like children, they pervade all classes.<sup>24</sup> And, *per contra*, if women are a class, children are another class, whom it would be unsafe and unjust, according to this argument, for the two classes of adults, amalgamated into one, to govern. Individuals, too, may pass from one class to another, but (except in pathological cases) not from the one sex to the other. And weaker classes, as wholes, have thrown off the domination of stronger classes whenever they became strong enough to do so;<sup>24a</sup> but women cannot become as strong as men — they certainly are not so now. Moreover, there is no need of this conclusion of the series of class successions; for whenever a class of men (not all men, but some men) have risen in the political scale and taken the franchise, the women of that class have profited likewise: they have been emancipated with their fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons.<sup>25</sup> One class may tyrannise over another class because its oppressive laws do not affect its own members. But the laws made by the male sex for the female sex affect the female members of the class or classes that make them.<sup>26</sup> A tax imposed upon another class does not affect the property of a man belonging to the imposing class; but a tax upon women imposed by men may fall on any man's own property when inherited by his wife or daughter, or on

<sup>23</sup> So Jane Addams, *The Larger Aspects of the Woman's Movement*, Annals, Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, Nov., 1914, pp. 1-2. "Discrimination on account of sex," writes W. G. Wilcox, "is the last stronghold of class rule," in *The New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1915. This was Mill's fundamental error at the outset of his work on *The Subjection of Women*. He perceived the objection that while classes are arbitrary or artificial ranks, sex discrimination may be natural; to which he only replied by trying to raise a presumption against this, by pointing out that all arbitrary distinctions have seemed natural to those who were benefited by them and even to those who were subject to them, 20-4, and then by trying to make out that we cannot know the real distinction between the human sexes, 38; for which see above, p. 50; for, under the influence of his wife, he had been able to see no reason but the stronger man's cupidity for the distinction which to almost everybody else seems natural: see *Discussions*, iii. 113-14, where, however, the distinction is drawn too strongly. So also Blease treats all women as "a class apart from all men," and applies to women excluded the same arguments that have been applied to excluded classes of men, *The Emancipation of English Women*, 187, 194-5.

<sup>24</sup> Mrs. Jacobi quotes Goldwin Smith to this effect, *op. cit.*, 94 (from *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 208); but all his arguments appear to her as irrelevant as "the flowers which bloom in the spring, tra-la," 97.

<sup>24a</sup> Cf. Mill himself, *The Subjection of Women*, 11, 15-16.

<sup>25</sup> All this is virtually admitted by Mrs. Jacobi when she says: "The peculiarity of the position of women is, and it is unique for any new class of voters, that they are not homogeneous with each other, but are so with the men among whom they live," *op. cit.*, 176. And she knocks out the underpinning of Miss Addams's argument by saying: "In seeking the suffrage for women, we do not propose to lower the franchise: we are seeking for lateral, not vertical extension," 234.

<sup>26</sup> The full argument was stated by H. H. Van Amringe at the Woman's Rights Convention at Worcester in 1850: "It may be laid down as an indisputable axiom in government, that no people can safely be permitted to legislate for another people; no nation for another nation; no city for another city; and no employment for a distinct employment; and I will add, neither sex for the other sex." But he spoilt his point by admitting: "In respect to women, the fact of man's being related to them by blood and family interests, modifies the iniquity of a partial legislation," *Proceedings*, 40. A similar admission is made by Gail Hamilton, *Woman's Wrongs*, 99-104.

his wife's, or mother's, or sister's property, which he may inherit; wherefore men do not treat the property of women as they treat that of another nation, city, or class. And when a distinction between the sexes must be made, as for instance in labour legislation, the men of the enfranchised classes make the laws for members of their own classes — for their own daughters, in whose welfare their interest is as great as in that of their sons.<sup>27</sup>

Equally plain is the error of the appeal to the contrast presented by the fact that intelligent, educated, propertied, hard-working women cannot vote, while unintelligent, uneducated, unpropertied, loafing men can vote. "The tramp," says Mrs. Jacobi, "who begs cold victuals in the kitchen may vote; the heiress who feeds him and endows universities may not."<sup>28</sup> Changes innumerable are rung upon this theme. Now, if the suffrage were regulated by either intelligence, education, property, or labour, the admission of such men and the exclusion of such women would be contrary to principle. But the suffrage is not so regulated: some of these things are taken into consideration, but the main thing which regulates the suffrage is something else, as we shall see later. At present, in our country at least, the question is only that of admitting all women or none; for a proposition to enfranchise only women of the upper classes would be sure to be defeated by the men whose women were not to be admitted; and, too, it would be opposed by the political party that believed its opponents would be more benefited. Consequently, unintelligent, uneducated, unpropertied, idle women would be admitted, would match the men, and there would be no gain. There might even be loss, because more uneducated and more unpropertied voters at least (waiving the question of intelligence and diligence) would be added to the voting population. It is certainly a poor argument that because some women are better than some men, therefore all women should vote! True, there is much that ought not to be in the existing system. It is wrong that cripples and blind men who have to be helped to the polls, and paupers supported by public charity — men in the hands of others — should be allowed to vote. The vote also is given to foreigners too soon, before they are thoroughly naturalised; and too soon also to young men, before they are settled in life: at twenty-one they may manage their own property, but some years more should go by before they should be allowed to

<sup>27</sup> Ellen Key makes another variation: "As long as the law treats women as one *race*, and men as another, there is a woman question," *The Woman Question*, 70. Why not call things by their proper names? As long as the law treats women as one *sex*, and men as another, where sex-difference is essential, the law will be doing only what the facts in the case require of it.

<sup>28</sup> *Op. cit.*, 74.

take part in managing the nation's property. But the fact of existing error is not a good reason for increasing it. There may be too great as well as too small an extension of the franchise. The latter leads to corruption in the government, the former to corruption in the people. What is needed is that all the classes that contribute to the welfare of society should participate in its government; and this is accomplished when the men of all such classes have the franchise.

Woman suffrage is now a fashionable demand. Many women want it because others do. Most of these would otherwise be indifferent, but they do not wish to be left in the lurch. Their desire is also whetted by the fact that their demand is not instantly complied with. Like spoilt children, they think that they ought to be given what they want, and that, if they are not, they are unjustly treated. Hence their grievance, which is subsequent rather than anterior to the denial of the coveted object. The pioneers were doubtless man-like women—"strong-minded women," as they used to be called. From them the movement has spread little by little, aided by weak-minded men. Now the women who demand the suffrage are numerous and prominent enough to affect to look down upon those who do not—to despise the womanly women.<sup>29</sup> Virility is aped. Women like to be committee *men*, chairmen, spokesmen, and they aspire to be aldermen and statesmen. Old maids are now "bachelor girls" (have they no longer their maidenhood?). Words signifying the female gender, such as doctoress, authoress, songstress, huntress, etc., are discarded: only "actress" and "mistress" and "adventuress" remain in use. Perhaps some feminists would like to get rid of the distinction of gender in language altogether. That would be in line with their movement. Everything is to be masculine; and then masculinity need not be distinguished. Women, in fact, now imitate men in costume, manners, and occupations.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> A twice-elected President of the National Suffrage Association has contemptuously characterised her female opponents as advocates of "home, heaven, and mother." One of these has replied: "We are content to let the men decide between this holy alliance and the unholy alliance of suffrage, feminism, and socialism," Belle S. Baruch, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915.

<sup>30</sup> This is denied by Mrs. Schreiner, who defends women from the charge of imitating men even in the recent fashions of tailor-made dress, saying "what is really taking place is, that like causes are producing like effects on human creatures with common characteristics," *Woman and Labour*, 1911. So, stiff collars, four-in-hand cravats, lapels with curiously shaped incisions, useless buttons on sleeves, etc., are products of like causes working on human creatures with common characteristics! In man's attire these things have a history leading into the past, showing serial changes, sometimes of growth, sometimes of atrophy. But in woman's, they have no history, and except by imitation no explanation. If women are to become active like men, or virile, they will need to wear trousers, despite their ungainliness below the waist. Mrs. Schreiner herself complains of the "long-haired, colour-bedisoned, much-skirted female," 166. Women, however, are not so yet. And that their characteristics are not the same as men's, is still shown by the fact that their dresses are still buttoned in the opposite direction.

The fad, in its extreme form, is likely to pass; but its enormity makes for slowness, and a trail of survivals may be left in its wake. Also the history of the past shows its immense seriousness, fraught as it has been, and as it threatens to be, with danger to the race and the state that harbours it.

The woman movement, unlike socialism, has had its principal extension in the upper classes. There, idle women desire something to do, some more excitement; they say they wish to take part in the world's work. They complain, therefore, that they cannot enter politics, except on its outskirts. They cannot enter the army and navy except to succour the wounded; they cannot become policemen, except for some special service among women and children; they cannot be miners, foundry-men, engineers, stokers, and a hundred and one other kinds of workers needing strength and endurance or exposed to dangers.<sup>31</sup> From these occupations they do not mind being excluded. But politics appears so easy: you merely have to vote,<sup>32</sup> and talk gossip about candidates. The very fact that women (of the upper classes—how about the hard-working women of the lower?) have so much more leisure, is adduced as an argument in their favour.<sup>33</sup> The duty of voting, however, as we shall see, involves much more than dropping a ballot into a box at odd moments. The argument that women of leisure should be allowed to vote, like men of leisure, to give them something to do, is double-edged; for its proper conclusion is that men who do not work should not be allowed to vote, if they desire to do so merely for this reason. Such men are admitted for the fundamental reason which admits other men; but even without regard to that, they would be admitted for the practical reason that it would not be worth the trouble to

<sup>31</sup> They still are admitted to some dangerous industries, such as working with lead, etc.; but this is because they were inadvertently admitted in the beginning before the danger was known. They are gradually being eliminated.

<sup>32</sup> "Voting takes but a few minutes, and can be done on the way to market," says one of the broadsides of the National Woman Suffrage Association.

<sup>33</sup> Emerence M. Lemonche: "The Woman, in her hour of leisure and with composed mind, is much better fitted to look after the welfare of Humanity than Man, who, from morning till night, is occupied but with matters of commerce," *The New Era Woman's Era*, 86. Cf. Alice S. Blackwell: "Women of every [...] class have more leisure than men . . . They can take ten minutes [from their housework] to stop on their way to market and vote once or twice a year . . . They can find half an hour a day for the newspapers and other means of information," *Objections Answered*, 15-16. So also Francis A. Blackwell thinks the electorate will be improved in intelligence because women have more time than men for studying the details of proposed measures, *An Electorate of Men and Women*, *North American Review*, June, 1912, p. 811. Some women have more time for studying the science of politics, which they do not do; but the details of politics are learnt without study, by coming in contact with them. This men do, and women do not. Cf. J. W. P.: "Men learn politics almost insensibly, through their mode of life . . . What men can do without extra effort, or detriment to their daily work, women can only accomplish as an uncongenial task, at the cost of much time needed for their especial cares," *A Remonstrant View*, 13. Also an anonymous woman: "The father's business carries him out and about among men, where these 'public questions' come up at every turn, . . . whilst the woman must 'study up' and 'inform herself' of these things," *Rights of Men and Women*, 40-1.

exclude them. They are comparatively few, and their influence upon others is what counts most; and such influence women of wealth can exert also, if they go about it in the right way. In general, if women who are bored with idleness are in earnest with the desire for participation in the world's affairs, there is plenty for them to do. Especially that work which lies nearest to their hand — child-bearing and -rearing — that is most important for the world, and these women are most neglectful of it. Some women, of course, cannot bear, perhaps in consequence of too strenuous early application to study, perhaps because they are incapacitated by disease given them by their husbands, contracted from other women. Still they can rear, or do other useful work. Exceptional women may even enter all the business and professional occupations, if they care to. But they need not advise other women to follow their example, and they ought not to demand that a door should be flung open to all simply because they themselves wish to enter. Human affairs are not regulated to fit exceptional cases, and especially not so are politics regulated. Custom may admit exceptions, law cannot. "Society," said John Adams, "can be governed only by general rules."<sup>34</sup>

The sentimental arguments appeal to men also. Men feel abashed when upbraided for claiming superiority even in a detail, and though conceding superiority to women in other things. As the idea of charity has been converted from helping others to letting them help themselves, so the idea of chivalry, which originally was to protect others, has become perverted into letting others protect themselves. The kindness which lets children have what they want, even to their injury, is extended to women: if women want the ballot, say many men, they should have it. Gallantry requires that men make way for women. There is, of course, in the nature of the case, a limit to all these ideas of gallantry, kindness, chivalry, charity, since there are some things which the strong have no right to concede to the weak. But sentiment is blind to fine definitions. Sentiment, however, may be aroused on both sides of a question, by keeping within the bounds of reason, and by overflowing. In the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872-3 a member said he was in favour of female suffrage because his mother was a woman; whereupon another member replied "I am opposed to it because my mother was a woman, and further, because my wife is a woman."<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *Works*, ix. 378; cf. vi. 476. Similarly Goldwin Smith: "Political rules must be general and disregard exceptions." "It is upon general facts that political institutions must be founded." *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 205, 219. Similarly Gladstone, *Gleanings of Past Years*, i. 142. Likewise the feminist Wendell Phillips: "We legislate, we arrange society, for the masses, not the exceptions." *Shall Women have the Right to Vote?*<sup>23</sup> So, too, the Romans, of their law, *Digest*, I iii. 3-6.

<sup>35</sup> Broomall and J. M'Murray, *Debates*, i. 541A.

(2) *The moral or rational (a priori) arguments.*—The rights of women as human beings, it is alleged, are the same as those of men; for the statement that all men are free and equal is taken as applying to all human beings. Hence to deprive women of their equal rights to freedom and independence is considered unjust, and wrong to treat them as inferior when they are equal. This position seems to many women, and to some men, self-evident or axiomatic.<sup>36</sup>

The fundamental premise in this argument is a mere begging of the question. Women of course have the same rights as human beings that men have as human beings. But added to what men and women have in common as human beings, are qualities which women have alone, or mostly, and qualities which men have alone, or mostly; and with these added qualities go added duties and rights. Also children have fewer and different qualities than adults, and everybody recognises that they have fewer and different rights and duties; yet they are human beings.<sup>37</sup> Evidently, then, just as men have not the rights and duties that belong to women as women, women have not the rights and duties that belong to men as men. And whether the suffrage is a right or duty that belongs to women as well as to men (for all agree that it does not belong to children, hence not to all human beings), is just the question at issue.<sup>38</sup>

It is true that the doctrine of the equality of all men has been stated, in languages which make the distinction, in the form applying to all human beings. But when applied to all human beings, this doctrine referred to their condition in the state of nature. Thus was it expressed in the late Roman jurispru-

<sup>36</sup> E.g., Paulina W. Davis at the Worcester Convention, 1850: "We might say that the natural right of self-government is so clearly due to every human being alike, that it needs no argument to prove it," *Proceedings*, 11-12. Gail Hamilton: "I believe it is seldom, if ever, denied, that women have abstractly [what does that mean?] an equal right with men to vote," *Woman's Wrongs*, 75-6 (she therefore never attempts to prove it, although her whole work is based on it, cf. 171-2, and is a reply to a certain Dr. Todd, who did deny it. Also she cites no wrong that may be corrected by legislation). Mary U. Ferrin: "The right of suffrage is one of the natural inherent rights of the whole human race," *Woman's Defence*, 1869. Also Nathaniel C. Fowler Jr. does not consider argument necessary, but simply asserts that "the right to vote is a human right," *The Principle of Suffrage*, New York 1916, p. 55, cf. 47, 57, 59. Accordingly he is "unqualifiedly in favour of votes for women simply because woman is a human being," 45-6, cf. 55. He holds that men "accidentally" worked outside first, and so "accidentally" were the first to vote, and have kept the right to themselves through respect to precedent! 11-13, 15, 36, 47, 56. Forel goes even further: "The emancipation of women is not intended to transform women into men, but simply to give them their human rights, I might say, their natural animal rights," *The Sexual Question*, 504. By the latter, however, he refers rather to their sexual liberties.

<sup>37</sup> It will not do to say that they are incomplete human beings. They are not incomplete human beings. They are incomplete as adults, but as children they are complete; and children are human beings as well as adults.

<sup>38</sup> And so when Emerence M. Lemonche speaks of "Woman's rights derived from the laws of Nature," *The New Era Woman's Era*, 6, the question merely is, what are these rights derived from the laws of nature?

dence.<sup>39</sup> And the Christians maintained that in the sight of God all human beings are equal.<sup>40</sup> These statements apply to children as well as to women and to men. But in civil society things are different. In the natural state children may declare their independence whenever they are able to maintain it. In civil society they remain in tutelage for a fixed number of years. Nations are, with respect to one another, still in the state of nature; and any nation that can maintain its independence is held to be, with reference to its rights, as free as, and equal with, every other nation. When nations or states combine into a larger nation or state, they give up some of their independence and equality.<sup>41</sup> And so when certain persons enter into combination and form a state, they give up some of their liberty, and they introduce inequality of office. If they set up a monarchy or an aristocracy, they concede perpetual greater powers (inequality) to one or to a few lines of descent (heads of families). If they set up a republic, they grant power only to individuals temporarily by election; but all who thus combine and form the state, and all to whom they transmit their new status, remain equal among themselves in their power of electing their superiors. But others who did not join them in the action of setting up the state, and all those to whom they have not transmitted their status, are excluded, and yet they retain equally all their natural rights, except those which they must give up in acquiescing to enter or remain under the jurisdiction of the state. Among these is resigned the right to form and take part in the government of a state, since they did not take part in forming this state or inherit or otherwise receive participation in its government, not having been able to do so, or still not being able to do so,—unless they are able to do so. It was only men that have founded states; and those men who did so and who, or their assignees, take part in government, are free-men; and when all men have become powerful enough to force themselves, or to be invited, into participation in the government, it is a democracy. Such is our American state. But women did not take part in forming the state and establishing govern-

<sup>39</sup> "Jure naturali omnes homines ab initio liberi nascuntur," *Institutes*, I. ii. 2; similarly again, I. v. and *Digest*, I. i. 4. "Quod ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt," *Digest*, L. xvii. 32. Hobbes combined the two statements into one: "All men equally are by nature free," *Leviathan*, ch. 21. The founders of our state sometimes omitted the "by nature." Thus Theophilus Parsons: "All men are born equally free," *The Essex Result*, 1778, in Parsons's *Parsons*, p. 363, repeated 365. But "born" itself is equivalent to "in the state of nature."

<sup>40</sup> So Lactantius: "Deus . . . omnes aequos, id est, pares esse voluit. Eadem conditionem vivendi omnibus posuit . . . Nemo apud eum servus est, nemo dominus. Si enim cunctis idem pater est, aequo jure omnes liberi sumus," *Institutiones Divinae*, V. xiv. (or xv.).

<sup>41</sup> In our federal system, our States, though equal in the Senate, are not equal in the House of Representatives and in the election of President. They are, further, equally circumscribed in their powers.

ment, any more than children. And so it is that in the political state whatever is said about the equality of all men and their complete (or political) liberty, means men, and not women. And all writers on political science, when they speak of men as participants in government, mean men, and not women. When mankind were brutes, women were equal to men, and equally free and independent. In civilised states women are not equally free with men, or as independent of men as men are of one another, for the simple reason that women did not, and were not competent to, make either civilisation or the political state, and still are incompetent to play an equal part in carrying them on. They cannot force themselves into the government, as men have done, by revolution; nor, if admitted by an act of kindness, can they perform the same duties, or equivalent services, of citizenship, as men do.<sup>42</sup>

The theory of right is complex, and the question before us is often discussed in the form of affirming or denying that the vote, or the suffrage, or the franchise,—really the participation in government, in governing,—is a right,<sup>43</sup> the alternative allowed being that it is a duty.<sup>44</sup> For, if it is a right, it is thought that all women ought to have it; but if it is a duty, it is supposed that most women will not lay claim to anything so onerous, but will rather regard the extension of it to their shoulders as an oppressive imposition.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, if it is a right of all adult human beings, all adult human beings ought to have it, and the state ought to recognise this right in women as well as in men, whatever be the consequences. But if it is not, it is something in the gift of the state, the state being composed of those who already

<sup>42</sup> The bearing and rearing of children is a social rather than a political service or duty, and so cannot come into the comparison here.

<sup>43</sup> Most of the woman suffragists simply make the affirmation. Occasionally they amplify. Thus in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1894 Nelson Smith derived the right to vote from the right of self-defence, *Revised Record*, ii. 554. There, on the other side, a strong opponent, Elihu Root, said that "suffrage is not a natural right, but is simply a means of government," 521. Cf. Ritchie: the vote is "a means to the working of the government," not a prior right, but one "created by the law," *Natural Rights*, 255. Long ago Paley used the fact of the almost universal exclusion of women as disproving that representation is a natural right, *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, VI. vii. foot-note 3.

<sup>44</sup> Thus an advocate, W. G. Eliot: "We do not regard it [extending the suffrage] as the granting of a privilege or concession of a right, but as a duty to be imposed. . . . Those [women] only desire it who see its great uses," *Woman's Work and Education in America*, 1870, p. 4. And an opponent, W. P. Goodelle: the suffrage is not a natural right, but "a moral, if not a legal, duty imposed upon the individual citizen," not for the benefit, or to gratify the wish, of the recipient, but solely for the benefit of the state," *Revised Record*, New York Const. Conv., 1894, ii. 525.

<sup>45</sup> Catherine E. Beecher: "A large majority of American women would regard the gift of the ballot, not as a privilege conferred, but as an act of oppression, forcing them to assume responsibilities belonging to men, for which they are not equal and cannot be qualified," *Woman Suffrage and Woman's Work*, 7. So the authoress of *Rights of Men and Women*: "The imposition of political duties . . . seems to us, for our sex, the height of imposition," 29; and J. W. P.: "It [the granting of the ballot] is a needless imposition of the will of the few upon the many women of the thinking class," *A Remonstrant View of Woman Suffrage*, 11.

have it, having first appropriated it when they founded the state, or having inherited it from the founders, or having compelled or induced the possessors to give it to them. And especially if it is a duty, the state or those who already possess it, should be careful not to impose it on those who are not capable of performing it. Yet little is gained on either side by putting the question in this way; for the vote is coveted by many persons for their own advantage, and then is looked upon as a right; and it is also truly regarded as a duty by those who have it. As a duty, it should not be extended too widely; and as a right, it is possible for it to be, if not a natural, yet a political, right of men, and at least not a political right of women. Such certainly, if there be any natural or political rights, is the right (and the duty) to bear arms and to fight for one's country. This belongs to men, and not to women. The vote is also a power, and as such it can be a right belonging to, and duty incumbent on, only those who can wield it. The question before us is properly the deeper one, whether, as a right or as a duty or not, and certainly as a power, the suffrage belongs to women or not.

Further, the question is sometimes supposed to be still more thoroughly gone into if it be denied that there are any natural rights, and if it be held that all rights are conferred by the state, wherefore in any particular case the question is one of expediency, whether it be better for the people of the state that it be conferred on women or not. But again little is to be gained by entering into this dispute on either side. "It is impossible," said Higginson, "to deny the natural right to women to vote, except on grounds which exclude all natural right."<sup>46</sup> Some have accepted the challenge, and have denied all natural right. This is not necessary: Higginson's alternative is simply uncalled for. Higginson himself, although he agreed with Antisthenes that "the virtues of men and of women are the same," admitted that their "duties" may be different.<sup>47</sup> But then their "rights," which are correlative with their duties, may be different. For there is, of course, a close connection between right and duty, and also between these and ability.<sup>48</sup> What it is one's duty to do, one has

<sup>46</sup> *Common Sense about Women, Works*, iv. 250.

<sup>47</sup> *Ib.*, 78, 77.

<sup>48</sup> This is not recognised by the feminist Forel, who in consequence makes some incongruous statements. In his *Sexual Question*, though he identifies "absolute right" with "the right of the stronger," 359, and though he acknowledges women to be weaker than men, and even intellectually inferior, 368, yet he speaks of "the natural rights of the two sexes" as alike, 385, and of woman being properly "treated as the equal and companion of man," 455, of men and women being endowed with "absolute equality of rights," but with "a division of duties," 459; also of women having "duties equal to those of men (in accordance with sexual differences)," 504; and again of men and women being "brought up with absolutely equal rights," but with "differences in their life tasks, such as differences of sex and individuality indicate," 518. Many of the

a right to have recognised as such: one has a right to one's duties. But duties are limited to one's ability;<sup>49</sup> and therefore one's rights to duties are likewise so limited.<sup>50</sup> The suffrage is taking part in government: it is an action, and involves duties. It depends, therefore, on ability — not mere ability to vote, but ability to perform the duties involved in the vote. If there be no natural rights, then the question is the one of expediency just stated, determinative of political rights; but it, too, rests on the ability, or capacity, of the claimants for participation, as it can never be expedient to admit, in large numbers, the incapable. And if there be natural rights, yet, because civil and political rights differ from natural rights, the suffrage may not be, and in fact is not, a question of natural rights at all, but only a question of political right.<sup>51</sup> And because political rights are different in different human beings, according to their abilities, some being obviously different in men and women, and this one of voting being recognised to be different in adults and children, in foreigners and natives, in criminals and good men, in idiots and sane men, it remains a question whether the vote is a political right appropriate for women. It is not even necessary for us to inquire whether it is a political right appropriate for all men or only for some men, although it would be easy to decide that it is appropriate only for competent men; which, however, would leave over a new question as to those men who are competent. As for women, this question can be determined only by examining whether the vote, or participation in governing, is on the whole within their competency, and whether its extension to them would be advantageous or not,— very much the same as before.

Woman suffragists have never argued to prove that the suffrage is a natural right, or any kind of a right, belonging to women as women, always resting on the false premise that it is a right of all human beings, and never attempting even to prove that it is a right of all adult human beings, but always taking this for self-evident. But this is far from self-evident. Even if all men have a political right to the suffrage (which may very well

duties of men and women are, of course, in common; but some of their duties diverge, and when these diverge, their rights also diverge. To speak, then, of all their rights being the same (or equal in every respect, absolutely equal), is an absurdity.

<sup>49</sup> Kant and his transcendental followers, such as Emerson, inverted this and maintained that our abilities extend to our duties — what I ought to do, I can do. But this is merely because our duties, set up by mankind after much experience, are already adapted to our abilities. *E.g.*, if a child is ill, the parents' duty is, not to cure it, but to do all they can to cure it.

<sup>50</sup> "Capacity," said Guizot in this connection, "is the principle, the necessary condition of right," quoted by Lieber, *Political Ethics*, ed. of 1889, ii. 270.

<sup>51</sup> Thus even an advocate of woman suffrage, Ritchie, denies natural rights, in his work on the subject.

be denied,<sup>52</sup> without hindering us from acquiescing in, or even advocating, universal male suffrage), this can be only because most men, enough to represent all men, are roughly, but within limits sufficiently narrow for practical purposes, and with exceptions negligibly few, alike or equal in the qualifications for taking part in government; wherefore, where this is the case and all classes of men are powerful enough to compel their admission, if any man of any class is to have the vote, there is no practically good reason why every other man should not. But children are so different from men, that this reasoning does not apply to them; and women are so different from men, that this reasoning may not apply to them. If women have a right to vote because all men have a right to vote, it can be only because they possess, on the whole, the same qualifications for taking part in government. This is the condition which is rarely expressed, but always taken for granted, in the argument for the natural right of women to vote; or if expressed, it is only asseverated,<sup>53</sup> except by the feminists, whose arguments to prove the equality of women with men in all respects have already been examined and found wanting. It is, of course, not established (in the only way woman suffragists who are not feminists try to establish it, if they try it at all) by pointing to some individual intelligent and buxom woman and saying she is better qualified than some dull and puny man, or by referring to the ease with which women can drop ballots in a box and appealing to the instances of their doing so in some small states and provinces, which have recently adopted woman suffrage and where women's participation in government

<sup>52</sup> In one sense it may be said that men have the political right to the suffrage only when they have the suffrage, and that they have not the former when they have not the latter. But it may be claimed for certain persons that, not having a political right, they deserve to have it, or to be given it, and this may be put in the form that they have a right to this right, and the others have not a right to keep them from it. In this way, to deny that all men have the political right to the suffrage (or a right to this political right) is to deny that they all deserve it, or are competent for it.

<sup>53</sup> E.g., W. I. Bowditch: "If the adult male citizens of Massachusetts have any sort of right, call it or be it what you please, civil, natural, inherent, or just, in reference to their own government, the adult female citizens, having the same qualifications as men, ought to have precisely the same sort of right, civil, natural, inherent, or just, to a vote in reference to their government," *Woman Suffrage a Right, not a Privilege*, Boston, 1879. So, too, the *Report of the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage* (C. S. Thomas, Chairman), Jan. 8, 1916: "In patriotism, intelligence, devotion to the welfare of the government, and in capacity for the franchise, they [women] are in no wise inferior to men." An earlier writer, Gail Hamilton, wrote thus: "The exclusion of any one class from an equal position with another class regarding affairs in which both have an equal interest, and to which both contribute an equal support, is arbitrary and unnatural . . . On this ground female suffrage seems to me a right and wise measure," *Woman's Wrongs*, 93. (That women contribute equally to the support of the state, is illustrated by the statement that the farmer's wife who cooks his meals, does the house-work, and works just as long and as hard as he, "has earned just as much as" he the money he gets for his produce, 35. Then hotel cooks, who often work even harder than the hotel-proprietor, earn just as much as he the money he gets from his customers; and so of all other "help," male or female. This is the position of the socialists, but of nobody else. Miss Dodge probably did not apply this principle to her own cook.)

has not yet been put to any serious test. The argumentation of the woman suffragists is, rather, to slur over this point, and their procedure, in the countries where all men have gradually been conceded the right to vote, is to make a sudden jump off the end of this induction to the ultimate limit that all human beings have a right to vote, and then they use this as a principle for the deduction that women, because they are human beings, have a right to vote, although they do not apply it to children, who are equally human beings. Thus an unauthorised inference is followed by an inconsistent application, and they who commit these two absurdities pride themselves on their logic!

Again, a natural right has been defined to be "the right one has to do what is to his advantage";<sup>54</sup> and if anything is certain, it is certain that no one has a natural right (at least in the sense of a moral right) to do what may tend, in its ultimate effect, to be harmful to the community in which he lives and therefore to himself or to his descendants.<sup>54a</sup> It is for this reason that, even if we admit the existence of natural rights, the natural right of women to the suffrage can still be proved only by the argument of expediency. The term "natural right" is used, as we have seen, more properly as any right a person may have in the state of nature—a right "common to all animals" was the Roman definition of it.<sup>55</sup> In that state every one has the right, or liberty (for right and liberty are closely allied), to do whatever he pleases. But this is not a moral right. A moral right, or moral liberty, is that of doing whatever one pleases that is not injurious to any one. To this every one—man, woman, and child—has a natural right, because no reason can be given why any one should not have it; for all are equal in this respect. Now, on entering a civil state some natural rights are given up, in exchange for some new civil rights. Thus, for instance, the natural right to avenge an injury is handed over to the state, in exchange for the state's protection against injury, which now becomes the citizen's right. Suffrage, in the form of taking part in governing society, may then, if you will, be a natural right in everybody; and yet it may not in everybody be a civil right, being abandoned, or being such as ought to be abandoned, by the weak in exchange for protection by the strong. The strong, indeed, gave up some of their natural rights likewise, for the

<sup>54</sup> Dupont de Nemours, one of the early advocates of natural rights, in his Editorial Discourse prefixed to Quesnay's *Le Droit Naturel*, Daire's ed. of the Physiocrats, Part I., p. 10. Quesnay's own definition was: "the right a man has to the things proper for his enjoyment," *ib.*, p. 41.

<sup>54a</sup> Cf. Burke: "Men [and women too] have no right to what is not reasonable, or to what is not for their benefit," *Works*, iii. 313.

<sup>55</sup> *Institutes*, I. ii., *Digest*, I. i. 3.

protection of themselves by others; but they themselves contribute to the protection of others, and therefore they retain the natural right of taking part in government. But the weak who do not contribute protection to others, and yet get it from others,—they have given up, or should give up, the natural right to take part in government. Thus the civil right to take part in government belongs only to the strong, or, in other words, to the competent, those who can perform the duties involved in taking part in government; and this becomes a political right when it is accorded to them. The others, though they have lost a natural right, are not deprived of civil liberty, provided their moral liberty, or natural right, to do whatever is not injurious, is respected. To this civil liberty every one has a natural right, so far as he contributes to its preservation, or does not violate it; and to the extent that, deserving it, he is denied it, he suffers wrong, is more or less in a state of slavery, and has a right to complain and to amend the state, if he can. In addition to this, "political liberty" has been defined as "the right every man in the state has, to do whatever is not prohibited by laws to which he has given his consent" <sup>56</sup>— meaning laws in the making of which he had taken part; or, more briefly, political liberty consists in the right to participate in public affairs.<sup>57</sup> To be without this liberty does not, in any measure, constitute slavery, and is not in itself a wrong.<sup>57a</sup> It is a wrong only if one set of persons are excluded who have the same or as good qualifications for admission as another set who are admitted. For this liberty (really power<sup>58</sup>) is merely a means to the preceding liberty, and if that be obtained, the means is indifferent. The question is always, by what means civil liberty is to be best obtained — by

<sup>56</sup> Theophilus Parsons, *The Essex Result*, in Parsons's *Parsons*, 366.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Gérard de Rayneval, *Institutions du Droit de la Nature et des Gens*, 2d ed., Paris, 1803, p. 27. Lord John Russell gives the definitions compendiously: civil liberty — power of doing what is not forbidden by law; personal [or moral] liberty — power of doing what is harmless; political liberty — the right to share in government, *The English Government and Constitution*, London, 1866, p. 68.

<sup>57a</sup> Replying to Mill's contention about women being in subjection (in slavery), A. V. Dicey writes: "A man's rights as to his own concerns are his private or civil rights, and should be limited only, according to Mill, by respect to the equal rights of all his neighbours. But the rights of an individual with reference to matters which primarily concern the state, are public or political rights, or, in other words, duties or functions to be exercised by the possessor, not in accordance with his own wish or interest, but primarily at least with a view to the interest of the state, and therefore may, even according to Mill's doctrine, be limited or extended in any way which conduces to the welfare of the community. . . . Civil rights ought, according to Mill, to be governed by his law of liberty. To political rights this law has hardly any application. . . . A person's claim, in short, to govern himself, is a totally different thing from his claim to govern others. . . . The deprivation of civil rights may amount to slavery. The non-possession of political rights may, to an individual, be of the most trifling consequence," *Woman Suffrage*, Quarterly Review, Jan. 1909, pp. 286-7.

<sup>58</sup> Only the powerful can be free in this sense. The rest may be free by permission. If permitted all the liberty they can have, they have nothing to complain of.

how wide an extension of political liberty, it being granted that some, and considerable, political liberty or power, beyond that of one person or small class, is essential. And if a set of persons (women) be excluded because they, on the whole, are not politically competent, it is, in consequence of the necessary roughness of human affairs, no injustice to a few individuals among them, who may be competent, that they also are excluded. Nor is it derogatory to the set as a whole, that they may be said not to be politically free, since this is merely another phrase for saying that they have not the political franchise, and is in recognition of the fact that they are weaker than men and are in the power of men; which fact ought to be recognised, if it exists. Finally, the definition of justice is to give every one his due;<sup>59</sup> and therefore before complaining that exclusion from the franchise is an injustice to women, it must be proved that the franchise is their due; which, again, can be done only by showing that they are qualified for exercising it in a way beneficial to the state.

The error of this contention about the right of women to the suffrage may be shown also by the error of the consequences that flow from its admission. Two such consequences would ensue. The first is, that then everywhere and at all times it is right that women should be admitted to the franchise, and that they ought to be admitted, no matter what the consequences. This would be as true in Mexico as it is in the United States, and it would have been as true five hundred years ago in England as it is to-day. Yet most woman suffragists acquiesce in the rightness of women's exclusion when and where their inclusion is or was impracticable. They avow, too, that the suffrage is only a conventional right, obtainable by gift, after which it would be a political right, when they ask to have this right *given* to them.<sup>60</sup> If woman suffrage *is* just, women have shown great stupidity in being so long about finding it out;<sup>61</sup> for justice is eternal, the same in the past as in the future. But if the suffrage is to be judged by utility alone, then women have good reason for not sooner putting in their claim; for utility changes from age to age, and all they have to contend for, is that now conditions have made it useful for women to have the suffrage.

The second consequence is more important. It is, that if the franchise is a right belonging to women as well as to men on

<sup>59</sup> "Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi," *Institutes*, I. i. 1, *Digest*, I. i. 10.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Mrs. Price's "Give us our rights inalienable," (above, p. 24n.), which is a contradiction in terms.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. H. Alricks in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, 1872-3, *Debates*, i. 585B.

the ground that all the alleged "rights of men" are rights of human beings (at least of all adult human beings), there being no difference between the rights of men and women; then all rights of women will be rights of men also; and further, because rights and duties are reciprocal, therefore there is no difference between the duties of men and women. Then the terms "male" and "female" ought to be struck out not only from the constitution but from any and all laws, and also from the customs of the people (and to be still more consistent, all children should be treated as adults, or in no way differently where they can be treated alike). It is probable that in that case women would lose incomparably more than they could gain, since all the protective legislation governing the special interests of married and working women (and even of children), already on the statute books and still desired by most of the suffragist women themselves (as objects to be attained by their votes), would have to be abandoned. It is certain that the vast majority of women would not desire such a change, and probably most of the suffragist women themselves, although a few have inadvertently asked for it,<sup>62</sup> and one or two purposely demanded it;<sup>63</sup> and it would be unjust for men to impose it upon them. If, then, women are still to have the benefit of special laws after obtaining the suffrage, even temporarily till complete physical as well as economic equality of the sexes be attained, it must be

<sup>62</sup> Thus Maria L. Varney at the Worcester Woman's Rights Convention in 1850: "All law should be made without regard to sex, either in the governors or the governed," *Proceedings*, 75. In the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872-3 Broome, the principal advocate there of woman suffrage, asked for "equality of all human beings both before the law and in the making of the law," *Debates*, i. 553B; but probably he overlooked the meaning of "before the law." Similarly Mrs. Anna G. Spencer says women have come to see that "there is no argument that can be framed for equality before the law for all classes of men that does not also apply with equal force to both sexes," *The Logical Basis of Woman Suffrage*, in Supplement to Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, May, 1910, p. 11. In truth, if there be equality *behind* the law, consistency requires that there should be equality *before* the law. Men have desired both: women are really desirous only of the former, although they often talk differently. So again, recently the Executive Committee of the Feminist Alliance, in a meeting at the house of Henrietta Rodman, New York, wrote a letter asking President Wilson to use his influence to obtain an 18th amendment to the United States Constitution to the effect that "no civil or political right should be denied to any person on account of sex"; reported in *The New York Times*, April 13, 1914. Mill himself laid down the "simple rule: whatever would be the husband's or wife's if they were not married, should be under their [i.e. each one's] exclusive control during marriage," *Subjection of Women*, 86. This would free the husband from all financial responsibility about his wife.

<sup>63</sup> So Elsie Clews Parsons would cease neglecting "the legal rights of men," and would give up men's "inequalities before the law in responsibility for crime, for example, and in matters of property (damages for breach of promise, alimony, or any legal obligation to support women)" *Feminism and Conventionality*, Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, Nov., 1914, p. 47n. "Such consistency as this," says an anti, Mrs. Arthur M. Dodge, "is rare. It would be a brutal interpretation of woman's rights to insist that the hard-won body of legislation, which protects woman because she is the potential mother, be abolished and the vote given to woman in exchange," *Woman Suffrage opposed to Woman's Rights*, in the same number of the Annals, p. 99. Woman would, in the words of Mrs. John Martin (at an anti-suffrage meeting in New York, Jan. 9, 1913), be selling "her birthright for a mess of politics."

only because the suffrage is not a right belonging to women as human beings, but because it is accorded to them for utilitarian purposes.<sup>64</sup>

In particular, the right of women to vote is often derived from two other general principles, and this deductive argument is often thought to apply especially to us Americans, because our fore-fathers, besides adopting in their Declaration of Independence the principle of the equality of all men (upon their creation, *i.e.*, in the state of nature), adopted these two principles at the beginning of our national existence, and based their justification upon them; whereupon their extension to women was soon carried over to Europe by Condorcet and not long afterward brought back again to America by Harriet Martineau. These are the principles, at bottom the same, of the tyranny of taxation without representation, and of the injustice of government without consent of the governed; which representation and consent, it is held, cannot be obtained without the suffrage.<sup>65</sup>

Both these principles are much older than our revolutionary ancestors. They both depend, not on the principle of the equality of all human beings in the natural state, but on the principle of the equality, in the civil state, of all the men who take part in government. Far from including all women, they could not be extended even to all men until all men, roughly and rudely understood, became sufficiently equal, through the extension of arms, and especially of fire-arms, to claim equality and to proclaim it. Until then, and all along, the principle had been applied to all *freemen*, and confined to them;<sup>66</sup> and the only question that could arise in dispute was, how many were freemen? Long before the democratic condition was reached, these principles were established by the men of arms who could profit by them and who gathered in the folk-mote or sent representatives to parliament, to act as a help to the king and also to serve as a restraint upon him and upon the lords. Already then it was maintained that the king could not levy a tax except as it was granted to him by those men (or their representatives) who would otherwise refuse to pay it; nor could he enact a law

<sup>64</sup> It might be urged that, although the suffrage is a natural right belonging to human beings, there may be other natural rights belonging to women as women. But no woman suffragist has ever made this distinction, and to make it would give away their whole rational argument. If there is any natural right women possess as women, it is that of being protected by men. But the suffrage is intended as a means of dispensing with this protection by enabling them to protect themselves, and therefore with this right.

<sup>65</sup> This is pronounced "the basic argument" for woman suffrage by Mrs. C. C. Catt in her little pamphlet on *Woman Suffrage and its Basic Argument*, New York, 1907.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Coke: "The lord may tax his villain, high or low; but it is against the franchises of the land for freemen to be taxed but by their own consent in parliament," cited by Bancroft, *History of the United States*, v. 286.

except as it was consented to by those men (or their representatives) who were powerful enough to disobey it if they had withheld their consent. As maintained by our revolutionary ancestors, these principles had previously been formulated by the English revolutionists of the seventeenth century, and may be found in the writings of Harrington, Sydney, Milton, Locke, and Somers, and also of the Irish dissidents Molyneux and Swift at the beginning of the eighteenth, not to forget such a Tory in opposition at Bolingbroke; and of course now they were repeated by the English sympathisers with the Americans, for example Chatham and Camden, and especially by the radicals of those days, such as Price, Priestley, and Granville Sharp. Many of these latter extended them to all men,<sup>66a</sup> as for instance was done, while yet amongst his English associates, by Franklin;<sup>67</sup> but none ever drew from them the idea that women, to be taxed and ruled, had to have the political franchise,—nor is it logically derivable from any definition of "freeman," which was the term they used when they were precise.<sup>68</sup> At the very time they urged and relied on these principles, not only the English revolutionists and statesmen, but our own forefathers excluded from the franchise even many men, some of whom paid at least small taxes, and all of whom were ruled; and though they had as logical minds as we have, they saw no inconsistency in doing so, simply because they knew what their principles meant.<sup>69</sup> They

<sup>66a</sup> Also some of the earlier revolutionists, the levellers, such as Rainborow, Wildman, and Reade, in 1647, as reported in *The Clarke Papers*, published by the Camden Society, 1891, i. 300-56. (Wildman used the phrase "every person"; but the context shows he had in mind only men.)

<sup>67</sup> In 1766 he had approved the exclusion of all but the propertied, *Works*, Sparks's ed., iv. 221, 224; but after a couple more years of his stay in England, in 1768, he asserted that "every man of the commonalty (excepting infants, insane persons, and criminals) is, of common right, and by the laws of God, a freeman, and entitled to the free enjoyment of liberty. . . . Liberty, or freedom, consists in having an actual share in the appointment of those who frame the laws," ii. 372, cf. 489. If he did not except women, it was clearly because he did not consider them included under the term "man," as here used. In defining "liberty" in the sense that properly applies only to "political liberty," he inadvertently went too far. In 1783, in a conversation reported by Baynes in Romilly's *Memoirs*, i. 447, Franklin expressed almost the same views as those of the early writing, advocating "universal suffrage," but having only men in mind, and also admitting exceptions even among these, in which exceptions he again did not mention women because they were not included in the universal; yet his words now were that he would "exclude minors, servants, and others, who are liable to undue influence."

<sup>68</sup> Thus our early State constitutions, all except that of New Jersey, confined the suffrage either to all "male inhabitants," or to all "freemen" (and South Carolina to "every, free white man"), having certain qualifications, and in the latter the term "man" did not mean woman.

<sup>69</sup> Sumner in his speech of March 7, 1866, quoted Otis and other revolutionary fathers as proving the right of negroes to the suffrage—if they were to be recognised as freemen, *Works* x. 296ff. Higginson quoted Sumner's quoting of Otis to prove that women have the same right, *Common Sense about Women*, *Works*, iv. 260, failing to see that there was and could be no question about women becoming freemen. Otis never claimed for women the political liberty he claimed for all men who regarded themselves as free. For women to be free (fully, which includes politically), they must be independent of men, collectively as well as individually. Women may be free civilly, morally, personally, naturally, without being free politically. As a

did, indeed, claim some natural rights to be inalienable, but by no means all natural rights to be such; for they knew perfectly well that some natural rights are surrendered on entering civil society for the purpose of preserving the rest. And certain natural rights they allowed to be alienable or inalienable differently in men, children, and women; and even among men they admitted some natural rights, while inalienable in those who claimed and could maintain them, to be alienable in those who were willing to let them go — especially in those who consented to be slaves, and even in those who were willing to be servants, while they were servants.<sup>70</sup> 'If we allowed ourselves to be ruled and taxed by men to whose government we have not given our consent, not having taken part in their election, we should be slaves,' cried many of them. This was an exaggerated opinion, expressing not a truth, but the feelings of proud and independent men, men unwilling to be reduced to dependence on other men; who, however, did not expect the same feeling in their women and children, nor in their men servants. And rightly they did not expect it in any except those who were independent. A freeman will consent to submission to other men only when he takes part in the body which chooses their headship. If women formed a community by themselves, every woman who felt herself the equal of the others would probably have the same sentiment with regard to other women. But women do not naturally have this feeling toward men, because they know they are in the power of men. It can be produced in them only artificially by false arguments.

Our revolutionary forefathers, and their English prototypes, held a third principle, now fallen into abeyance, which limited those other two, by recognising that some human beings, including even some men at times, however equal they may all be in some other respects, or on the whole, do not reach equality in political qualification with those who form the state. This was

matter of fact, no one can be free with absolute fulness, as we are all subject at least to physical and economic limitations to our powers; but the powers of men in general, on the average, on the whole, being greater than those of women, men attain a greater freedom (and also wildness: cf. *Ellis, Man and Woman*, 395) than women in general can possibly possess.

<sup>70</sup> The people, said Harrington, meaning the male population, are "distributed into freemen, or citizens, and servants, while such, for if they attain to liberty, that is, to live of themselves, they are freemen or citizens," *Oceana*, ed. of 1747, p. 83. This was the modern analog of the distribution of persons made by the Roman law (in accordance with the law of nations) into free persons and slaves, *Institutes*, I. iii., *Digest*, I. v. 3, with the difference that the condition of the slave was not, and that of the servant is, terminable by his own efforts. John Adams, in a moment of excitement, reverted to the Roman division, writing in 1774: "There are but two sorts of men in the world, freemen and slaves. The very definition of freemen is one who is bound by no law to which he has not consented," *Works*, iv. 28. Here he also went too far, and later withdrew. Thus his draft of a constitution for Massachusetts in 1779 contained a property qualification for male voters, *ib.* 235, 243, 246, 264, (cf. 479).

expressed by saying that active participation in the representation should be accorded only to those who have a will of their own. By this principle they excluded not only slaves but servants, and all in a dependent economic position, as well women as children.<sup>71</sup> The property test was set up for this purpose.<sup>72</sup> Some went so far as to confine the suffrage to land-owners;<sup>73</sup> but this extravagant restriction was put into practice in but few of our States. The unfranchised persons, excluded only for their incompetency to take part, could be governed with perfect justice—nobody doubted that, and by no means Jefferson himself,<sup>74</sup>—provided they were not discriminated against, that is, provided they were governed, as far as possible, only by the same laws as were those who contributed to their making; and, as far as they were taxed at all, they could be justly taxed, provided they were subjected only to the same taxes as were those who granted them. Then, their interests being the same, they were said to be virtually represented. In England at the time of our revolution there were many unfranchised men, subject to the laws and required to pay the taxes imposed by the parliament; but they were subject to the same laws and had to pay the same taxes only as those who had the franchise: they were virtually represented, and they did not think themselves unjustly, except as they were unevenly, treated. Yet there were others, of the lower classes, different from the class of the enfranchised, who were subjected to laws that affected them specially and solely, and these did object, and later, in company with others of the excluded, obtained the franchise. Now the whole body of Englishmen in America were

<sup>71</sup> Thus one of the founders of the Massachusetts constitution, Theophilus Parsons, in *The Essex Result*, excluding those who have no will of their own, expressly cited minors, females, and slaves: Parsons's *Parsons*, 376.

<sup>72</sup> Thus Blackstone: the requirement of the property test is "to exclude such persons as are esteemed to have no will of their own," *Commentaries*, i. 171. So in 1773 John Adams placed the ground for granting the suffrage entirely on the having a will of one's own and on possessing property as an evidence of it. If propertiless persons were not excluded, he argued, then women too must be admitted, since those persons are "to all intents and purposes as much dependent upon others, who will please to feed, clothe, and employ them, as women are upon their husbands or children on their parents." Property goes with power, he further urged; and it is evident that ultimately it is power he was resting on. *Works*, ix. 376-7.

<sup>73</sup> See the debate in the Constitutional Convention, Aug. 7, 1787, where this proposition was made by Gouverneur Morris, defended by Dickinson, and favored by Madison: *Elliot's Debates*, v. 385-7.

<sup>74</sup> In extension of the suffrage Jefferson never went so far as Franklin. At first, like Adams, he confined the suffrage to male citizens who owned real estate and paid taxes: so in his proposed constitution for Virginia in 1776, *Works*, Ford's ed., ii. 14; but in 1783 and thereafter he extended it to include also those who served in the militia, iii. 323, (cf. 255), or were liable thereto, vi. 520, vii. 454. Further expressions of his are: the "free and equal right" of voting should be exercised by "every man who fights or pays," x. 39, (cf. 303, to be quoted later); "government by the people, acting not in person, but by representatives chosen by themselves, that is to say, by every man of ripe years and sane mind, who either contributes by his purse or person to the support of his country," Washington ed., vii. 319.

to be brought into that condition: they were never subject to the same laws and liable to the same taxes as the English in England, yet they were to be subjected to special laws and to be made liable to special taxes to be imposed upon them by others who did not impose the same upon themselves, but who imposed them upon others for their own benefit. It was against this want even of virtual representation that they rebelled, and established a government of their own in which they could make laws for and impose taxes upon themselves, at the same time extending the same laws and taxes to dependent persons, and so gaining for them virtual representation.<sup>75</sup> They were inconsistent in holding slaves outside of even virtual representation, and perhaps in so treating some freemen also. But those mistakes have since been rectified. The old division of the male population into freemen and servants, or into those with a will of their own and those without a will of their own, is now abandoned, not only here, but in other progressive countries, because in these countries even servants, let alone other employés, or workingmen, have shown, by their combinations, that they have a will of their own. This was especially the case in our country formerly, when every man could turn to the land and become a freeman; wherefore, if he remained in employment, he had to be treated with the same respect as a freeman. Hence it was that in our country universal male suffrage was introduced first. Here, as the principle had little application (in the case of men, who were the only ones thought of), our people

<sup>75</sup> Otis went too far when he said "no such phrase as virtual representation was ever known in law or constitution," as if there therefore were no such thing as virtual representation at all. (Quoted by Sumner in his speech of Feb. 5 and 6, 1866, *Works*, x. 160. But Sumner himself admitted virtual representation — even in the case of the slaves, 188, *cf.* 196-7, also 302). Virtual representation is an idea which, in truth, never has occasion to appear in laws or constitutions, but which is necessary in political science. The mistake of the English at the time was, not in invoking a principle that does not exist, but in wrongly applying a true principle, maintaining as they did that the Americans were virtually represented in the British parliament, when, as a fact, they were not. *Cf.* "Freeman" quoted by Bancroft, *History*, v. 280-1. See also Mackintosh, *Works* (cabinet ed.), iii. 567; where, however, he seems to have been cognizant only of the position taken by Otis and those who followed him, and not aware that others did take the other position. The application of this distinction was explained by R. H. Lee, though he was himself willing to extend the suffrage to all propertied unmarried or widowed women, writing to his widowed sister, who had complained of being taxed unrepresented: "It [the direct representation of women] might have been considered as not so necessary, seeing that the representatives themselves, as their immediate constituents, must suffer the tax imposed in exact proportion as does all other property taxed, and that therefore it could not be supposed that taxes would be laid where the public good did not demand it. . . . When we [men] complained of British taxation, we did so with much reason, and there is great difference between our case and that of the unrepresented [women and others] in this country. The English Parliament nor their representatives [= constituents] would pay a farthing of the tax they imposed on us, but quite otherwise. Their property would have been exonerated in exact proportion to the burthens they laid on ours. Oppression, therefore, without end and taxes without reason or public necessity would have been our fate, had we submitted to British usurpation." Letter to Mrs. H. Corbin, March 7, 1778 (Ballagh's *Letters of Richard Henry Lee*, i. 392-3).

came to forget the principle, which is true whatever its application; and so it happened that we went too far on the other side, and fell into the error of admitting to the franchise many dependents and imperfect citizens, who do not deserve to be there. But the principle remains applicable to women, as well as to children;<sup>76</sup> and the fact that, through disregard of troublesome distinctions, it has been extended too widely in the case of men, is not a good reason why we should go still further in this erroneous course by admitting all women. The induction that, because, in violation of the principle, some dependents have been admitted, a whole new set of dependents should be admitted, is only to proceed from a small error to a large one.<sup>77</sup>

Principles, to be used as slogans, must be briefly expressed, and so are often stated ambiguously. Such is the principle "No taxation without representation." This, to repeat, had its origin in England; and there it is plain that these general words could have two widely different meanings. They could mean (1) that there should be no taxation of the people by the king and his officers unless it was, and according as it was, authorised by the representatives of the people in parliament; for otherwise the king would be autocratic and all the people his slaves. Or they could mean (2) that no individual should be taxed unless he were represented in the parliament which authorised the tax by some member for whom (or against whom) he had voted. Which of these meanings the words had is wholly a historical question, and history decides for the first. As a fact, the parliament and the people behind it, in every portion of the kingdom inhabited by freemen, saw to it that no taxation was permitted without their representation in the matter. This simply was the meaning the inventors of the phrase attributed to it — the meaning they intended to convey when they invented it. What they had in mind was laid down un-

<sup>76</sup> Thus it was recalled, in slightly different terms, by Simonds in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853: "My idea of sovereignty is, that those rightfully possess it, who stand in the relation of independent in the community, and not that of dependent. I necessarily come to the conclusion, then, that the female portion of community are in this condition of dependence, that they never can, and never ought, rightfully, to be considered as possessing sovereign power. I derive this view from the reflection, that whoever exercises sovereign power, must in himself be to that extent independent. I find that a large proportion of the community is made up of children and young persons. Are these proper receptacles of power, are these to be considered as a part of the sovereignty of the Commonwealth? Not so; as I learn the principles of democratic institutions." *Official Report*, i. 210A.

<sup>77</sup> It cannot be too often reiterated: the Fathers did not believe in universal suffrage — of the whole population. They were not so foolish. Absolutely universal male suffrage (including even those who are practically foreigners, as we are finding to our cost) has grown up through the competition of irresponsible politicians for voters — and of capitalists for labourers. It has no basis but interest, sentiment, and imperfect reasoning. A wide suffrage certainly is better than a narrow one, provided the people are capable of it; and the people which is capable of a wide suffrage is better than a people which is not. But the fact that to some extent more of a thing is better than less, is not a sound reason for supposing that most, or all, is best. On the contrary, there always is a mean, beyond which deterioration takes place. Cf. above, pp. 70-1.

ambiguously in the Petition of Right addressed to Charles I. in 1628. There, basing themselves upon a law enacted in the time of Edward III., they claimed to have "inherited this freedom, that they should not be compelled to contribute to any tax, tallage, aid, or other like charge not set by common consent in parliament"; and they prayed that therefore no man should be "compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent by act of parliament." What the representation was in parliament at the time — whether it was wide or narrow, — was another question, not then discussed, although it afterward came up for discussion on several occasions, and the representation has been variously altered without any attendant alteration in the incidence of taxation. The second meaning, which is the one the woman suffragists adopt, was, apparently, never dreamt of by the inventors, and not for a long while was it ever thought of by any sane men. But sometimes the liberal writers put the principle in the singular, of any one, instead of the people in general (that he, instead of "they," should not be taxed without representation), and then the second meaning seemed to be expressed. It was probably in this way that the second meaning was suggested. Then the radicals, who arose more than a century later, advanced this second meaning as an afterthought, disregardful of history, and perverting it, by taking advantage of the fact that this meaning might be read into the indefinite words of the slogan. And now our woman suffragists, in their ignorance of history, are repeating this mistaken interpretation of those words — apparently unconscious, some of them, that those words could ever have meant anything else. It is possible that the new meaning dug out and introduced by the radicals may have contributed to aid the extension of the franchise to lower and lower classes of men; but this is no good reason why the error should be continued to aid its extension sidewise, at one spring, to all women, especially as there are other good reasons, entertained by the radicals themselves,<sup>77a</sup> for excluding women. This other and later meaning was not put into those words originally, because it was not necessary there. If the body of men represented in parliament were to tax the rest of the community only, exempting themselves, then they would have been tyrants, like the king whose acts they complained of, and the rest of the community would have been their slaves. But this was not their intention. The represented body taxed themselves, along with the rest of the people, and they taxed the rest as they taxed themselves, except for some lapses from the theory, due to differences of classes.<sup>77b</sup> A dis-

<sup>77a</sup> See, *e.g.*, some quotations from Price in note 23 in the next chapter.

<sup>77b</sup> For the old landowning class threw off some of the burden of taxation upon

tinction, to be sure, was left between the actually represented and the actually unrepresented, but it was not the invidious one of master and slave, and was provocative of oppression only as some class of men was left at the mercy of other classes of men,—an occasion for unjust taxation that does not exist between men and women, because men and women do not form different classes. Now, no class being left out of the franchise, the distinction, as regards taxation, is of little moment. Such is the state of the case in England. But with us in America, where our whole government is representative, the principle in its original sense hardly seems to have any application. We have representation and we have taxation, and, in a general way, there can be no question about our having the one without the other. Perhaps this is the reason why the second meaning has obtruded itself, since we wish to supply some sense to the words. But the true meaning should be sought in history.

Thus, in the meaning in which the principle was originally understood, the term "representation" was used in its all-inclusive sense, and the statement meant No taxation without at least some kind of representation, such as virtual representation, or the representation of some persons who are treated only as the actually represented and the legislators themselves are treated. Then it was true even of every individual that he (or she) was not taxed without being at least virtually represented. And only when even virtual representation itself was in the nature of things impracticable, was it employed to mean no taxation at all. At the time of our revolution, actual American representation in the British parliament, with common legislation for both countries, was not advisable, and, with diverse legislation, there was, and could be, no virtual representation; therefore taxation of the Americans by the British parliament, in which only the British people were actually and virtually represented, was not to be tolerated. But in their case an alternative existed: requisitions could have continued to be placed on the Americans, to be levied in their own way. With regard, now, to women's representation, their actual representation being likewise inadvisable, the case is the reverse: their virtual representation is at hand, and there is no alternative, as they cannot be formed into an *imperium in imperio*, and if their property were exempt, almost every man would turn over his property to some woman of his family, and little would be left to tax. Yet as now used by the woman suffragists, the principle has acquired the sense of No taxation without actual representation; which is something we have seen

introduced by the radicals, through a misunderstanding, and wrongly too, as we may see, since it is not true. Many persons are and must be taxed without actual representation: so taxed are foreigners who own property or reside in the country in question, so citizens owning property where they do not reside, so infants, so the insane, so criminals. So also are women, and the question is again, whether they ought to have actual representation; and the fact that some of them are required to pay, and do pay, taxes, does not determine the answer. If representation were based on the aristocratic principle that property is the thing represented and the property-owner merely casts the vote pertaining to the property, then the vote, in the hands of the property-owners *qua* property-owners, would logically, consistently, and rightly belong to all those who happened to own property, whatever their age or sex, and, too, wherever they owned property, so that one person might cast several votes, as was the case in England until recently; and consistency would further require that persons should have a number of votes in proportion to the amount of property they own, as is done, roughly, and in a roundabout way, in Prussia. Even children, then, that own property, would have the right to vote; only in their case the vote would be cast for them by their guardians (in addition to their own votes); or else their property could not be justly taxed! And so, too, where women are allowed to own property only under guardianship, it would be their guardians who would cast the vote representing their property. This also has been the status of women in some countries. In some others, women property-owners have been permitted to choose their proxies. In others still, as in England formerly, they could vote directly. Only there, and in almost all countries maintaining this originally feudal principle, property itself was rarely accorded to women, so that women voters were rare, and hardly affected the decision of any question. But that principle of representation hardly obtains anywhere any more; and where it does, some men have more votes than others, according to the location and amount of their property. Where it has been abandoned, men have only one vote apiece, and women and children have no vote. Its place has been taken by the democratic principle of personal representation, that the vote represents, not property, but a person, and not every person, but the person who takes part, or is capable, or belongs to a class who are capable, of taking part, in government, in ruling.<sup>78</sup> These persons are, in some coun-

<sup>78</sup> When our government was founded, this subject was in the transition stage. At the time of the revolution it was maintained that taxation and representation were in-

tries, men only of some classes; but in others (among ourselves especially), they are men of all classes that are citizens. Men citizens not only are capable of taking part in ruling, wherefore they have the vote, but they are often called upon and forced to take part in ruling, in protecting, in defending. Their personal services are required by the government: This is a tax to which all men (with a few exceptions) are equally liable, and from which all women (without exception) are exempt. This is the personal taxation with which representation is now more closely connected; and in accordance with it a man can have only one vote.<sup>79</sup> Property is the thing protected, as also are the persons of women. Men are the agents that protect. Men as offerers and needers of protection are equal, and therefore entitled to one vote each, notwithstanding that in their powers they are enormously different, because the greater powers of those who possess them are employed and rewarded otherwise — by greater influence, and by promotion to higher offices. The property of men (and of women) that is protected is enormously unequal; but the greater it is, the greater is the protection it receives, and the reciprocity of protection gives no title to a vote, much less to votes. Voting and property simply have no fitting connection.<sup>80</sup> Women property-owners are excluded from the franchise because their property-owning, a benefit received, earns for them no right to the vote. Women in general are excluded, not because they are not persons or not citizens, but because they are not political persons, or persons capable of ruling or of being called upon to take part in defending, and so of being full (active) citizens;<sup>81</sup> about which reason for excluding them more will be said in the next chapter.

separable. (So the Massachusetts House of Representatives in their letter, drawn up by Samuel Adams, to Lord Camden, Jan. 29, 1768, in Samuel Adams's *Works*, i. 175; and Adams again, quoting Camden himself, ii. 302.) This was interpreted both ways: it meant not only that nobody should be taxed who was not represented, but also that nobody should be (actually) represented (should vote) who was not taxed. Franklin and Jefferson led the way to break down this latter restriction — Jefferson by extending the idea of taxation to cover personal service in the militia or in other political ways. So late as 1824 he still had to raise his voice against the representation "of property instead of persons," *Works*, Washington ed., vii. 357. Since then we have confined neither taxation to representation nor representation to taxation. What consistency is there in trying to revive only half of the old principle?

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Rossiter Johnson, *The Blank-Cartridge Ballot*, 5; Mrs. Johnson, *Woman and the Republic*, 2d ed., New York, 1909, pp. 75-76. — Yet we do not hesitate to demand personal service of young men who cannot vote. Youths below the age of twenty-one are drafted into the army and navy. And so, if ever it happens that women be drafted into the Red Cross service, this will not *ipso facto* entitle them to the vote.

<sup>80</sup> In feudal days property and voting went together because property and power went together. Only the powerful were able to possess property that could not be hidden; and the possession of such property was a sign of power. Power was always the principal consideration. The possession of such property meant, too, mostly, that one was the head of a family belonging to the conquering race — a member of the powers that be.

<sup>81</sup> Hence, for those who look upon suffrage as all-important, democracy has appeared less favourable to women than aristocracy. Thus Mrs. Kate Trimble Woolsey has

As for the alleged "injustice" of excluding women from the franchise though they pay taxes, or of requiring them to pay taxes though they are not actually represented, that has been sufficiently refuted by the preceding considerations: But the subject admits of amplification. To repeat, it must be remembered that women and their property are protected by the government (and by the men who uphold the government), wherefore to the extent of their property they are justly required to contribute, it being after all not so much they as their property that makes the contribution. If special taxes were imposed upon them or their property, different from those imposed on men or men's property, and liable to be higher, this would be unjust, and it would mean that they have not even virtual representation. But this is not a condition in any civilised country, in any country with representative government, for a reason already explained. Furthermore, it should be remembered that most of the property now owned by women has been given to them by men — by their fathers or husbands principally.<sup>82</sup> The fact that men give them a great deal, does not entitle them to all; and their discontent over something being withheld only shows greed,<sup>83</sup> and, if anything, proves that too much has been given.<sup>84</sup> Before women can rightly use the principle of "No taxation without (actual) representation," they ought to become propertied in their own right, by their own exertions: they should not merely be given a sham, but should acquire a real, economic independence. Our forefathers, for instance, were thus propertied by their own exertions, when they demanded to be exempt from taxation of their property for the benefit, and at the discretion, of

written a book anonymously published under the title: *Republics versus Women; Contrasting the Treatment accorded to Women in Aristocracies with that meted out to them in Democracies*, New York, 1903, in which she concludes that women should work against republics. It is overlooked that aristocracy admits but very few women (only unmarried brotherless daughters of rich men, and widows acting as guardians) to political power, and excludes the majority even from the ownership of land.

<sup>82</sup> Men, of course, inherit from their mothers, and even from their wives. But the original from whom the property comes is generally a man.

<sup>83</sup> This subject is amplified by A. E. Wright in his *Unexpurgated Case against Woman's Suffrage*, 42-50. "The very revenues," he observes, "which the Woman Suffrage Societies devote to man's vilification are to a preponderating extent derived from funds which he earned and gave to woman," 47. He concludes that it is "ungrateful women" who "flock to the banner of Women's Freedom," 52. E.g., Elizabeth R. Pennell, who in a survey of men's Utopias writes: "Man, left to himself, free to be generous at no risk of personal discomfort, has done less for woman than nature and circumstances working together," *The Woman Question in Utopia*, Lippincott's Magazine, April, 1904, p. 455. Her complaint seems to be, as she says of Plato's scheme, that sex will not "count in her favour: it will secure her no privilege, win her no praise," 451-2. "Nature and circumstances" in the other passage does not seem to include men!

<sup>84</sup> "If she is to be voteless," says F. H. Barrow, "let her also be propertiless," *The Political Responsibility of Women*, Westminster Review, Sept., 1908, p. 251. It is a male advocate of woman suffrage who speaks thus, and if women, in despair of ever getting the vote, adopted his view, and it were put into effect, they would be cutting off their noses in spite of their faces.

others.<sup>85</sup> So, if ever it happens that women are as important as men as property-makers, and there is temptation to treat them unfairly, it may be right for them to claim representation on the score of their paying taxes; for then they would be, in the last analysis, the makers of the taxes they pay. Then they will be economically independent of men, really, by their own exertions, then they will be equal to men—at least to the men of their day; and may equally with them contribute their personal services to the government—be as good (or as bad) soldiers and policemen as the men. Then they will deserve the suffrage, not merely because they own property, or even because they make property, but because their doing so shows them to be, even for political purposes, as good as the men. But such equals of men, either economically or politically, they are not now; for still are they not, with the fewest exceptions, the makers of their own fortunes, and they are not likely to be in any future close enough for us to provide for. As for the exceptional women, the laws cannot be made over to apply to all women merely in order to apply to them. They should be satisfied that men permit them to act like men in some respects, though not in all.

As for the principle laid down by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, that governments “derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,” which is often appealed to as decisive of this question,<sup>86</sup> this principle also never was understood in its absolutely universal extension. It was enunciated in an absolutely universal fashion for the sake of forcefulness of expression, and because it was taken for granted that certain clear exceptions would always be made to it by persons of sense.<sup>87</sup> The principle was always treated as synonymous with another, really the same, and the proper statement of it—and the old form of it—to the effect that just government depends on

<sup>85</sup> They were not in the habit of making over their property to their women folk, and as the women did not acquire fortunes of their own, few were taxed; wherefore the principle of no taxation without representation was often expressly confined to men. Thus the constitution of Virginia 1776 (Bill of Rights, sec. 6). More fully that of Pennsylvania 1776 (Declaration of Rights, sec. 8): “No part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives”; which was copied in the constitutions of Vermont 1777 (Declaration of Rights, sec. 9) and of New Hampshire 1784 (Bill of Rights, sec. 12). The constitution of Massachusetts 1780 (Declaration of Rights, sec. 10) used here “individual,” but evidently as applying especially to men, saying “he is obliged . . . to give his personal service.” The constitution of Maryland 1776 (Declaration of Rights, sec. 13) said nothing about consent in connection with the duty of “every person [except paupers] to contribute his proportion of public taxes . . . according to his actual worth.”

<sup>86</sup> E.g., by Broomall in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872-3: the whole argument rests on the principle that all just governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed, since women are among the governed, and their consent should not be exacted differently from that of men. *Debates*, i. 546.

<sup>87</sup> Thus John Adams wrote, April 14, 1776, to his wife: “Depend upon it, we know better than to repeal our masculine system,” *Familiar Letters*, New York, 1876, p. 155.

the consent of the people;<sup>88</sup> the meaning of which is determined by that of "the people" (of course taken in the sense of the political people) already discussed and found to mean, in this connection, men only. The same comes out with equal plainness from the form of the statement itself. All governments derive their powers from the consent of the people governed;<sup>89</sup> but some derive them fraudulently, by seizing the upper hand by some lucky stroke and then using the advantage of position to keep it, playing off one portion of the people against another, and thus forcing their divided consent, and others derive them openly and frankly from the people, seeking and resting upon their consent honestly obtained and scrupulously ascertained. These latter are governments by consent, the former governments by force;<sup>90</sup> and the governments by consent are the only just governments — the only governments justly established. But all governments, the just and unjust alike, can derive their powers only from those among the population who have power, and these are only men — the political people.<sup>91</sup> "Political power," says Locke, "is that power which every man having in the state

<sup>88</sup> So the Humble Petition of divers well-affected Persons delivered the 6th day of July, 1659, (drawn up by Harrington, in the latter's *Oceana and Other Works*, 3d ed., 1747, p. 542): "The exercise of all just authority over a free people ought (under God) to arise from their own consent." Sydney: "This [the general consent] is the ground of all just governments," *Discourses*, ch. I, sec. x., cf. II. xxi., xxx., xxxi. end; also the heading of I. xx.: "All just magistratical power is from the people." Locke: "The consent of the people . . . the only title of all lawful governments," *Of Government*, Preface, cf. § 94, and *Of Civil Government*, §§ 22, 104, 112, 192, 198. John Adams: "It is certain, in theory, that the only moral foundation of government is the consent of the people," *Works*, ix. 375, similarly i. 193; so with "consent of the governed," iv. 108, "of the subject," ii. 215n., "common consent," iv. 403; cf. "The people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government," in his proposed constitution for Massachusetts, 1779, iv. 225, cf. 223, 228. Washington: "The basis of our political system is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government," *Farewell Address*, *Works*, Sparks's ed., x. 222. So our early constitutions themselves said. Thus that of Pennsylvania 1776: "Just forms of government . . . derived from and founded on the authority of the people only"; North Carolina 1776: "All political power is created and derived from the people only"; Maryland 1776 and New Hampshire 1784: "All government of right originates from the people, is founded on consent, and instituted for the general good"; Delaware 1792: "All just authority . . . is derived from the people, and established with their consent." And the reason was given in the constitutions of Kentucky 1792 and Maine 1820: "All power is inherent in the people." It, too, is an ancient doctrine: "Leges nulla alia ex causa nos tenent, quam quod iudicio populi receptae sunt," *Digest*, I. iii. 32.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Livy: "Imperium, cuius vis omnis in consensu obedientium est," II. 59.

<sup>90</sup> Such is the division made by Sydney, *Discourses*, I. xi, II. i., iv., xxxi. (Locke called the second "governments by constraint," *Of Civil Government*, § 192.) Similarly Matthew Robinson, *Further Examination of our Present American Measures*, Bath, 1776, p. 189. The "by force" refers to the way they obtain the people's consent, rather than to the way they use their force, as all governments use the people's force. Sydney and Locke said much about the different kind of rule, natural, of men over their children, and little about the same in connection with women, who are mostly left out of consideration. This was because they were combating Filmer, who derived governmental power from patriarchal power. Yet Locke touched upon it in *Of Civil Government*, § 82, already quoted, above, p. 85n.

<sup>91</sup> Or if the plural "powers" means authorisation, then men are the only ones who can authorise the government to act for them, as men are the only ones who have the power to act politically. They may, if they choose, permit women to take part; but they can get no authorisation from women.

of nature, has given up into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors.”<sup>92</sup> Therefore, when this principle was appealed to by our ancestors, who, to repeat, knew the meaning of their principles, it was clearly understood that women, children, and idiots — all but sane men — would be excepted. So evident was this to them, that they did not deem it necessary to express it. Yet Jefferson himself later showed that he so understood what he wrote. In fact, nobody has put the matter more concisely than he did in this one pregnant sentence: “However nature may by mental or physical disqualifications have marked infants and the weaker sex for the protection, rather than the direction, of government, yet among the men who either pay or fight for their country, no line of right can be drawn.”<sup>93</sup>

To-day the women themselves still allow, and must allow (for the principle taken absolutely would lead to all sorts of absurdities<sup>94</sup>), that children and idiots are to be excepted, and claim that they themselves are not to be, and some men admit their claim. Further reason is therefore needed to show why some human beings are to come under it and some not, and mere appeal to such an exceptionable principle proves nothing.<sup>95</sup> The principle itself, in the mouths of its supporters, did not claim to be absolutely, but only generally, true; or else the government of men by God would not be just unless God first got men’s consent. Evidently it is within the range of possibility that a government even by a few men over most men without their previous consent, may be just; only such a government is not likely to be just. The

<sup>92</sup> *Of Civil Government*, § 171.

<sup>93</sup> *Works*, Ford’s ed., x. 303. Cf. above, p. 259n. Further may be quoted: “Our good ladies [in America], I trust, have been too wise to wrinkle their foreheads with politics,” *ib.*, v. 9 (from Paris, where he saw women meddling with public affairs). “Man, the first moment he is at his ease, allots the internal employment to his female partner, and takes the external on himself,” Washington ed., ix. 396. Ten years before his death he added another reason for excluding women — “who, to prevent depravation of morals, and ambiguity of issue, could not mix promiscuously in the political meetings of men,” *ib.*, vii. 36: cf. Bentham, above p. 10n.

<sup>94</sup> For some of them see Wright’s *Unexpurgated Case*, 42.

<sup>95</sup> Lincoln, whose authority is often quoted by the woman suffragists, employed a slightly different form of the principle with equal inconsistency. Thus in an announcement of his political views, June 13, 1836, published in the Sangamon Journal, he wrote: “I go for all sharing the privileges of the government who assist in bearing its burdens. Consequently, I go for admitting all whites to the right of suffrage who pay taxes or bear arms (by no means excluding females),” *Works*, Tandy-Thomas ed., i. 15. Why did he exclude negro men, some of whom bore the burdens of government, when he admitted those (at that time very few) white women who at best paid taxes on property given them by men? The added clause, however, has every appearance of being a bit of humour, and as such may be capped by his verses on Adam and Eve, ending:

“The Woman she was taken

From under Adam’s arm,

So she must be protected

From injuries and harm.” *Ib.*, 290.

“No one ever thought more deeply on the subject [of woman suffrage] than Lincoln did,” writes a woman suffragist, Th. W. Hotchkiss, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915. On the contrary, Lincoln’s collected utterances, among which nothing else on the subject has been discovered, show that he never thought on this subject at all. He was occupied with much more important matters.

principle has most likely application, and has been mostly applied, to the cases of one or more classes of men being governed by another class of men, and still more plainly of one country or people being governed by another people or the government of another people.<sup>96</sup> To-day we have departed from the unlimited form of our ancestors' principle, and even from the form in which they held it, by governing the Filipinos, on the ground that they are incapable of governing themselves; and there is no evidence that one American woman in a thousand who appeals to this principle against the rule of women by men would, on receiving the franchise, cast her vote for the immediate liberation of that Malayan race.<sup>97</sup> Yet there is manifold more likelihood of the American people governing the Filipino people unjustly, than of American men governing American women unjustly, for the reason, already explained, that women do not form a class or distinct body, and their interests are inextricably bound up with those of men. For this reason, this principle covers tacit consent, just as its counterpart covers virtual representation, since for the one as for the other it is required that the unfranchised be governed only by laws by which those who take part in making them are themselves governed,<sup>98</sup> except that here, in matters where the laws naturally must be different for the two sexes, if those affecting only females are privileges, exempting them from duties imposed upon men, or giving them special protection not accorded to men, their consent may be

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Swift: "All government, without the consent of the governed, is the very definition of slavery," *Drapier's Letters, Works*, ed. of 1776, x. 99, cf. 132, 215; but he referred to the injustice of one nation binding another, iii. 150 (England binding Ireland was the case he had in mind); and therefore, within a single nation, he spoke of the dissenters, in England, as having liberty, though they were excluded from the civil offices, iii. 155, and he himself would have excluded them from the suffrage, xvi. 126-7, cf. iii. 258. Jefferson would not subscribe to the latter views; yet when he wrote that "every man, and every body of men on earth, possess the right of self-government," *Works*, Washington ed., vii. 496, cf. vi. 480, it is evident he did not extend this to women. Men can, women cannot govern.

<sup>97</sup> Perhaps they would *salve* their conscience with the thought that the Filipino men would not respect this principle with regard to their women, and therefore do not deserve to have it respected with regard to themselves. If so, American men could argue that as American women do not respect this principle with regard to the Filipino men, they do not deserve to have it respected with regard to themselves. There would be no end to the argument in this recriminatory shape. Are we sure that all women respect the rights of children, and are they to lose their own rights if they do not?

<sup>98</sup> This full form was expressed by Hamilton, who, although he wrote like Swift, Franklin, and Adams simply of non-representation being slavery, *Works*, Lodge's ed., i. 5, also wrote thus: "When any people are ruled by laws, in framing which they have no part, that are to bind them, to all intents and purposes without, in the same manner, binding the legislators themselves, they are, in the strictest sense, slaves," 77. But when they are all subject to the same laws, it would be absurd to say that the ones are slaves and the others not. "One thing is pretty clear," said James Mill, "that all those individuals whose interests are indisputably included in those of other individuals [who have the franchise], may be struck off [from the franchise] without inconvenience [without reducing them to slavery]. In this light may be viewed all children, up to a certain age, whose interests are involved in those of their parents. In this light, also, women may be regarded, the interest of almost all of whom is involved either in that of their fathers or in that of their husbands," *Government*, sect. viii.

taken for granted. If sometimes, in some respects, those special laws are unjust, not being exactly as they ought to be, as everything human is imperfect, then women have a right to complain of them, and the more they complain, the sooner will they get them rectified; but still they have not a good reason to complain of their disfranchisement, unless the present system works worse, not merely for them in some matters of detail, but for the state at large, which includes their general interests, than would work the system of their possessing the franchise.

The principle, also, has no direct application to the question before us. Representation is not a necessary means of consent. Persons not enfranchised may still give their consent to the government under which they live. There are many degrees of consent, from that exacted under compulsion to that voluntarily proffered. The principle does not say what degree of consent is required. It seems to cover all consent short of actual dissent, and so is the correlative of the right of expatriation and of revolution: those who are discontented because of unjust treatment, may withdraw or, if there is any prospect of success, may revolt. All who remain, or acquiesce, give their consent; though it does not follow that the government over them is just. The right of expatriation applies to individuals, singly; that of revolution, only to a majority, if not of numbers, at least of force. No individual deserves to be listened to, who says: 'This government does not please me, I do not give my consent, therefore it is not a just government.' This was the position actually taken by Harriet Martineau, and offered as a model to the women of America. "The acquiescence must be complete," she wrote: "I, for one, do not acquiesce."<sup>99</sup> But suppose many unfranchised persons get together and abandon tacit consent, proclaiming that they do not voluntarily consent, that their consent has been forced from them, that it is only an appearance, not a reality, and that it never will be real, voluntary, true, until the suffrage be granted them: is their desire immediately to be granted? Suppose it were, yet on the occasion of some other desired object not obtained, the same persons might combine again and say they are discontented and no longer give their

<sup>99</sup> *Society in America*, i. 204. The acquiescence of other women she dismissed as proving "nothing but the degradation of the injured party." The negroes were not degraded by their slavery, as they were already degraded enough to acquiesce in it; yet they may have been further degraded by their bad treatment in slavery. So some women may be degraded by bad treatment at the hands of some men; but they are not degraded by their non-enfranchisement, their acquiescence in which is simply an acknowledgment of their physical weakness. Slavery was introduced by a positive assault upon the liberty of persons. Women were never disfranchised, originally, in most of the states known to history, by any positive act: they were merely negatively left out when men instituted government.

consent to the government: why would not their desire need to be granted on this occasion as well as on the other? for if it had to be granted on that other occasion merely because it was a desire of theirs, without which they denied consent, so must this; that is, all desires accompanied by denial of consent must be granted; which is absurd. Evidently, however, it would be wise to grant the desire, in either case, if the combination that threatens discontent were powerful enough to upset the government for not granting it. No government can be stable if the mass of its subjects, upon whose support it must rely, are discontented. Yet the question may not call for a majority of the whole people: it may affect only a section of the people. It is evident that such a section of the people has not a right to demand it (to plead for it is something else), unless a majority of the section desire it. Even if a majority of them do make a demand (*e.g.*, if a majority of Quakers demand to be excused from military service), it is still an open question whether their demand deserves to be granted, or how. But if only a minority of them make it (not only for themselves, but for all the rest of the sect), it hardly deserves to be listened to, except on its merits, academically. In Great Britain to-day are two demands for emancipation—the one coming from Ireland, the other from women. The Irish demand for Home Rule is known to be from a majority of the Irish people, at least outside a corner of the island. But suppose it were not: suppose it were only a minority, say a third of the Irish people, who desired Home Rule. Evidently it would be absurd, nay, it would be wrong, for the British people to grant Home Rule to Ireland; for then it would be granting to a minority what they want, but would be imposing upon a larger number what they do not want. So in the case of woman suffrage, in which there is every evidence that only a minority of women desire it: if the British men grant to British women the suffrage, they will be granting to a minority of women what they want, but will be imposing upon a majority of women what they do not want. This it would not be right for the British men to do.<sup>1</sup> Just this, however, is what some American men in some of our States have done,

<sup>1</sup> There is good evidence of this. According to Heber Hart, *Woman Suffrage a National Danger*, London, 1912, p. 64, "in the years 1890 to 1906 the total number of signatures to petitions in favour of the suffrage was only 193,618, although associations for the promotion of the cause had been active for a much longer period. On the other hand, in March, 1909, a petition against the extension of the suffrage was presented with the signatures of more than a quarter of a million women, although no organisation generally known to the public had been in existence for the purpose of opposing the extension of the franchise until July, 1908." According to H. Owen, *Woman Adrift*, 115-17, some canvassings have pretty well shown that less than one woman in six is in favor of woman suffrage.

imposing the duty of the suffrage upon all, without even consulting the women to see if a majority of them desired it. And now, aware that they cannot get all the States to adopt it, the suffragists would by federal enactment impose it upon every State, regardless of whether the majority of men and of women in any State desired it or not. So little do they respect their own principle: so little can a false principle (or a true principle falsely taken) be respected.

The impropriety of thus imposing the suffrage upon a majority of women who may not want it, is not admitted by the woman suffragists. They maintain that if any women, even if only one woman, want the vote, she has a right to it (as a human being, etc.), and the fact that other women, no matter how many, do not want it (do not perceive their right), does not deprive those who do of their right — that it would be "preposterous" to exclude those who do wish to vote because others do not wish to vote.<sup>2</sup> Hence the woman suffragists do not care to have the question submitted to the women themselves, to find out how many of them desire the suffrage.<sup>3</sup> Yet this question was once submitted to the women of Massachusetts, in 1895, and of 575,000 adult women in that State, 23,065 took the trouble to vote, of whom 22,204 voted for, and 861 against. This has been hailed as a great victory by the women suffragists, as showing that of the women who are interested in the subject at all, a vast proportion desire the suffrage.<sup>4</sup> It is also contended that, as

<sup>2</sup> Paulina W. Davis, at the Worcester Woman's Rights Convention, 1850: "If some or a majority of women would not exercise this right, this is no ground for taking it from those who would," *Proceedings*, 12. Higginson: "If there is only one woman in the nation who claims the right to vote, she ought to have it" *Common Sense about Women, Works*, iv. 347. Curtis: If a majority of women did not wish the vote, "is that a reason for depriving one woman who is taxed of her equal representation?" *Orations and Addresses*, i. 200, cf. 236. They should not be asked, he further says, "it should be assumed that men and women wish to enjoy their natural rights," 199. F. Fraser in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1894: "If there is one woman within the confines of this State who desires to give expression to her judgment at the ballot-box, upon the living issues of the day, it is manifest injustice to deprive her of the right," *Revised Record*, ii. 502. Mrs. Jacobi: "We are sometimes told that the thousands [out of the millions] of women who do want the suffrage must wait until those [millions] who are now indifferent or even hostile, can be converted from their position. . . . We declare that theory is preposterous," "Common Sense" applied to *Woman Suffrage*, 230. Anna H. Shaw: "The number of women who want the suffrage . . . has no bearing on our question," *Equal Suffrage*, Annals, Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, Nov., 1914, p. 95.

<sup>3</sup> In 1910 an attempt was made to get a million signatures of women to a petition to Congress, and but 163,438 were obtained. Woman suffragists have actively opposed projects for submitting the question to the votes of women in New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Indiana, and recently (remembering the fiasco of the previous vote to be mentioned in the text) in Massachusetts.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Alice S. Blackwell: "On the only occasion when the government took an official referendum among women on the subject (in Massachusetts, in 1895), the women's vote was in favour of suffrage 25 to one," *Objections Answered*, 15. She quotes from the *Woman's Journal*, Aug. 1, 1908, the admission that "most women are as yet indifferent on the suffrage question," accompanied by the statement, in which perfect satisfaction seems to be found, that "of those who take any lively interest in it either way, the great majority are in favour."

in the referendum, when a question is referred to the men of a country, the majority of those who vote is decisive, so it ought to be in the referendum of women.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, men give some force to this claim by so treating the referendum in actuality, though it is an obvious mistake. In electing officials, where the impending vacancy has to be filled, there is no other way than to observe the majority of those voting. But in the referendum of a proposition, which does not need to be passed, only a majority of the electorate ought to be decisive of its passage, because the few who may desire it ought not to have the power of troubling all the rest to come out to vote against it. In fact, only those who vote for such a question ought ever to be asked to come to the polls.<sup>6</sup> In such matters, all those who are not for, are to be considered against.<sup>7</sup> Especially in a case where the purpose is not to form a decision, but merely to find the number of those who hold a certain opinion for the guidance of others who are to decide, only those who express it should be counted against the known remainder of those who refrain. In such an idle *questionnaire* as that undertaken in Massachusetts, naturally very few women were interested except those who ardently desired the vote. If the question were left to be decided by women, requiring of every one her opinion, the figures would be very different, and the result might be the reverse. Certainly if the majority of women prefer to be governed by men alone, rather than by men and women, their desire should prevail, especially if a majority of men so desire also. This is the proper way to put the question, and it answers the reply so often made by the suffragists that any woman who does not wish to vote need not do so. Voting is not to be forced upon any woman against her will, but the suffrage (the duty to vote) may be laid upon her. The question is not the personal one 'Do you desire to vote, or not?' but the universal one 'Do you desire all, or no, women to have the vote?' The suffragists are apt to treat it in the former way, and therefore they complain of the selfishness of the "antis" for holding that women should be kept from voting because they themselves do not want to vote, as if the vote were a sugar-plum which ought not to be denied to some merely be-

<sup>5</sup> Miss Blackwell again: "If, in the case of women, it were conceded that the matter ought to be decided by majority rule, then it ought to be decided, as other questions put to men are decided, by the wish of the majority of those caring enough about the matter to vote upon it," *When All the Women Want It*, New York, 1911 (quoted from Margaret L. Franklin's *Case for Woman Suffrage*, 133, who speaks of this as "one of the good points made.")

<sup>6</sup> But others should be allowed to come and cast a blank ballot; for otherwise the voting would not be secret.

<sup>7</sup> Therefore those who wish to vote for but are detained by sickness or absence, should be allowed to vote by proxy.

cause others do not happen to like it. The vote in the hands of women means their taking part in the government of the country; and if a majority of women do not wish their government to be one in which women take part, their opinion is of greater weight than that of a minority who do wish their government to be such. If the suffrage is a natural right, certainly it is exercisable primarily at the making of the constitution, and if a majority of women, or of men and women, do not then wish women to have the vote further, they have a right to refuse it even to those who still want it.<sup>8</sup> But if it is a majority of men who so wish? The fundamental reason why their will should prevail, will be shown later. Here be it only said that the mere fact that a majority of women, or even a majority of men and women, so wish, would not show that woman suffrage is a right (natural or moral), or that it is right, proper, and just that their wish should be granted.<sup>9</sup> Much less, then, as now appears to be the case, can this be shown by a minority of women desiring it; for, as a fact, even the active movement of the anti-suffragists is a strong and formidable one,<sup>10</sup> and it, too, represents the rights of women.<sup>11</sup> After all, the consent-of-the-governed argument is only another form of the sentimental argu-

8 Cf. Hamilton: "In the formation of a government, the society may multiply its precautions as much, and annex as many conditions to the enjoyment of its rights, as it shall judge expedient," *Works*, iii. 491. So a remonstrant woman has written: "In regard to this question we may be said . . . for the first time in our lives to need a vote; and why? Because for the first time we are really contending, not with the other sex, but with our own," *A Remonstrant View of Woman Suffrage*, 12. Even Fraser, whose strong opinion on the other side has been quoted, must have admitted this; for he said: "Not until a majority of the whole people [i.e., both men and women] shall impose a limitation upon the right to vote, will that limitation have any foundation in right or justice," *Revised Record*, ii. 501. Similarly Higginson, who also wrote: "Whenever women as a class refuse their consent to the present exclusively masculine government, it can no longer claim just powers," *Works*, iv. 253; for this would require a referendum of the question to women.

9 Cf. Mrs. Snowden: "It might be admitted that a very large proportion of women are either against the suffrage or entirely indifferent about it. But the question is not whether women are against the suffrage for themselves or not; it is, rather, why should women be against their own enfranchisement," *The Feminist Movement*, 166. So the opposite might be admitted, and the question would still be, not whether women are for the suffrage for themselves or not, but why they should be for the enfranchisement of all women.

10 Cf. Miss Alice Hill Chittenden: "History furnishes many instances where people suffering under some injustice of a tyrannous government have banded together to demand the suffrage and right their wrongs. But it has remained for the enlightened twentieth century to witness the birth and development, not only in this country, but also in England, of a well-organised movement among an unenfranchised class against having the suffrage forced upon them. This fact is so significant, that thoughtful men and women are beginning to realise it," *The Inexpediency of Granting the Suffrage to American Women*, 3.

11 So a statement issued by the National Association opposed to Woman Suffrage, Washington: "We, more than any other organisation, believe in woman's rights. We are fighting for woman's rights. First in the catalog of woman's rights is the right of exemption. By that we mean exemption from entrance into active politics and all that it involves. We have an abiding faith in both the justice and the necessity of this exemption, because by virtue of it woman is able to do her half of the world's work. Deprived of this exemption, woman becomes an incongruity. Called upon to do double duty, she will face the failure which is the fruit of an unnatural task," in the *New York Tribune*, Aug. 4, 1913.

ment: that what any number of persons want very badly, they should have, especially if they be women. And the only proper determinant of this question about the suffrage, whether they should have it when and where they want it, is, whether it would be better for them and for all that they should then and there have it.

Of late the suffragists are taking a new tack: they complain that in demanding of women to show that a majority of them want to vote (that a majority of them do not consent to the present order of things), as also that they will use it intelligently and efficiently (the third point about to be considered), their opponents are imposing upon them a task which never before was put upon men when a new class of men was admitted to the franchise. "Men were never thus enfranchised," says a United States Senate Committee.<sup>12</sup> "Nowhere," says Charles A. Beard, "was the absurd idea adopted of allowing the disfranchised to vote on their own issue."<sup>13</sup> In the cases of new classes of men, it never was necessary to ask whether a majority of them wanted the suffrage, for the simple reason that it was well known and undisputed that a majority of them did want it. Much truer is it to say, with Mrs. A. J. George, that "never before has it been proposed to extend the franchise to a new electorate, the majority of whom are acknowledged to be either indifferent or opposed to it."<sup>14</sup> The admission of women to the franchise is something different in kind from the admission of any class of men, and involves different methods and arguments. But of course, in this case as in others, it is those who are already in — and these in the present case are only men — that are the judges of the admission of others; but if the judges are affected by the desires of those to be admitted (whether they are candidates or not), it were only natural that they should find out, by counting them, the number of those desirous to be admitted. The women themselves seem to be realising the propriety of this; for they now are bending their energies to meet it, making frantic efforts to convert, not so much men, as other women. And they themselves are making the count, in their own way, and favourable to themselves — not in a secret unbiased vote, where the women who desire the suffrage will have to take the trouble of

<sup>12</sup> *On Woman Suffrage, Report, Jan. 8, 1916.*

<sup>13</sup> *The Common Man and the Franchise* (a leaflet published by the New York Men's League for Woman Suffrage, 1912). See also a letter by Mrs. Raymond Brown in *The New York Times*, March 7, 1915.

<sup>14</sup> *Woman's Rights vs. Woman Suffrage*, 7. During the process of extending the franchise to lower classes of men in England, it was sometimes claimed by the opponents — e.g., in 1877-8 — that the rural labourers who were then being admitted, did not want the vote. But the advocates never said this was no matter: they denied the statement of fact. Thus on that occasion Gladstone, *Gleanings*, i. 186.

coming and casting a ballot, but in a house-to-house canvass, where the active leaders take the trouble, and all the women who out of politeness do not decline to say they want to vote, or after a few minutes' talk consent to sign a paper, are counted on their side. Thus after much agitation a factitious majority is, perhaps, being acquired, although in truth the difficulty of acquiring it only shows how little spontaneous it is. As for the second question, about the use to be made of the vote if obtained by women, this kind of question has generally been considered when the question of enfranchisement of men has been up before the public, the opponents usually fearing bad consequences, and the advocates expecting, if not altogether good results, yet the avoidance of greater evils if the desire for admission were not complied with. It may be said that this way of arguing the matter has always been employed when the question of enfranchisement was passed upon intelligently. This was not done, notably, some fifty years ago, when the recently emancipated slaves in the Southern States were enfranchised; and their enfranchisement has there turned out a fiasco.

Thus the upshot of all these moral and rational arguments *a priori*, is the same as resulted from the sentimental arguments, that the only decisive argument adducible in favour of woman suffrage is the one which remains to be examined. It is just to give women the suffrage, if it is their due; and it is not unjust to withhold it from them, if it is not their due. And the question whether it is their due or not, and consequently whether they have a right to it or not, depends mostly on a consideration of the results that are likely to accrue from their having it: whether these would, on the whole, as far as we can foresee, be better for society (for all, and not for the present merely, but for the future), than are, or would continue to be, the results from their not having it.

(3) *The utilitarian (a posteriori) arguments.*—Women desire the vote because of the good they expect to do with it, and they say they ought to have it for the sake of this good.<sup>15</sup>

Here the form of the argument is sound, and the question is whether the premiss is correct. Most of the feminists proper have a more or less cut and dried system which they wish to introduce, and for which the suffrage in the hands of women

<sup>15</sup> *E. g.*, Miss Frances Power Cobbe: "I think we are bound to seek it [woman's political emancipation], in the first place, as a means, and a very great means, of doing good, fulfilling our social duty of contributing to the virtue and happiness of mankind. . . . We are bound to do all we can to promote the virtue and happiness of our fellow men, and therefore we must accept and seize every instrument [whether appropriate or not?], including the suffrage, for the purpose," *Duties of Women*, New York, 1882, Lecture VI.

may serve as a means and a beginning.<sup>16</sup> In particular, among the equalities they seek, they seem to aim at equal wages and equal morals<sup>17</sup>—two quasi socialistic demands. Their system has been weighed, and found wanting. Its adoption, however, is by no means certain as a consequence of women's having the vote; for it is only a small set of women, and still fewer men, who have put forward these views; and whether a majority even of women will accept them, is problematical. Just as we have seen under socialism it by no means follows that if the lower classes are put in possession of the government and of all the means of production, for the purpose of distributing the product equally among all, they would do this last, and would do all the good things which their leaders recommend and promise; so it does not follow that if women get the vote even in states where they are in majority, they will carry out the recommendations and desires of the leaders in the woman movement. Thus even in the case of the two great specified demands, this is doubtful. For it is not apparent that any great number of happily married women will vote to enlarge the occupations of unmarried women and to enhance their pay, at the expense of their own husbands and consequently to their own loss; nor is it evident that these experienced women will desire to give their daughters the same indulgences fathers allow their sons, and to subject them to the same responsibilities. It is possible, therefore, that these two great prospective evils may not be brought about even if women do get the suffrage. Still, it cannot be doubted that the granting of the suffrage to women, because it falls in with this line of thought, would give a powerful impetus to the feminist movement, lending it greater prestige, inspiring it with greater hope, and thus possibly to some extent increasing

<sup>16</sup> Elizabeth S. Chesser: "The winning of the Parliamentary vote is recognized by all thoughtful women as only one phase of the movement," *Women, Marriage and Motherhood*, 257. Mrs. Snowden: "The true feminist regards woman suffrage as a step, and only a very short step, in the direction of woman's freedom," *The Feminist Movement*, 139. W. L. George: "The giving of the vote is but an affair of outposts," *Feminist Intentions*, *Atlantic Monthly*, Dec., 1913, p. 724. Mrs. Gallichan: "The fight for the parliamentary suffrage is but as the vestibule to progress, the possession of the vote being no more than a necessary condition for attaining far larger and more fundamental ends," *Position of Woman in Primitive Society*, 5; Mrs. Hale: "Feminism is a tree, and woman suffrage merely one of its branches," *What Women Want*, 86, cf. 184, 209.

<sup>17</sup> In the New York Tribune of Oct. 10, 1913, appeared this: "According to Lady Ramsay, the two great issues in the woman suffrage fight are equal wages for women for equal service and equal standing in morality. To obtain these rights, Lady Ramsay said, women must be allowed to vote." Cf. Mrs. Pankhurst, Speech at Hartford, Nov. 13, 1913, *Verbatim Report*, pp. 28, 32. According to R. L. Owen, U. S. Senator from Oklahoma, "equal pay for equal work is the first great reason justifying this change of governmental policy," Supplement to *Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science*, May, 1910, p. 7. "One of the reasons why they [women] should have the vote," says Brand Whitlock, "is that they should become economically independent," *Women in Democracy*, address Feb. 24, 1910, published by the Equal Franchise Society of New York City, p. 5.

its accomplishment. Woman suffrage is not necessary for saving us from these feminist things, and as it is advocated for the purpose of procuring them, we are safer without it. It can do no good, and it may do much harm.

Other advocates of votes for women who are not all-around feminists work for the cause in order that women may take part in determining questions that come up, whatever may turn out to be the opinions of the majority of them, in trust that it will be better to have everything decided by men and women together, than by men alone.<sup>18</sup> The leaders in the suffrage movement affirm that women, because of their differences from men, are especially concerned with certain definite questions that affect women and that affect children, in whose welfare, they allege, women are more interested than men are. Questions affecting women are principally equal pay for equal work,<sup>19</sup> and the so-called social question;<sup>20</sup> questions affecting children are their employment in factories and school affairs; and questions affecting both are the liquor traffic, gambling, and sanitary surroundings, because of their reflex action on the family and the home. Women claim also to be especially interested in charities and correction of criminals, civic beauty, and public libraries — the last mostly in the circulating department and for providing light literature. Women, also, it is said, are *par excellence* the cleaners, although this seems to be denied by Mrs. Gilman,<sup>21</sup> and therefore they should not be withheld from controlling the cleaning of the streets.<sup>22</sup> All these things are only municipal, or, in our

18 Mrs. Pankhurst: "Women are working . . . to win the political enfranchisement of their sex, so that we may get better laws and better administration of laws. . . . We are not working to get the vote . . . merely to say we have the vote. We are going through all this to get the vote, so that by means of the vote we can bring about better conditions not only for ourselves but for the community as a whole," *Verbatim Report of Hartford Speech*, 34.

19 As long ago as 1873 in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, H. W. Palmer said the "vote meant equal wages for equal work," *Debates* i. 576A. He also mentioned several other things which the right to vote would procure for women, most of which have already been obtained without their voting, just as this one has been in the New York public school system. In spite of this last, the National Woman Suffrage Association issues in New York a broadside, *Why Women want the Vote*, in which it is said: "Teachers need the ballot to secure just wages and to influence the management of public schools." Yet teachers, male and female, for this very reason that they are interested parties, ought, if anything, not to have the vote on school questions. A prominent society woman, a woman suffragist, is now trying to form a union of the public school teachers of New York City. She is thinking only of the welfare of the teachers, not at all of the welfare of the children confided to their care, nor of that of the public who pay them.

20 The cure of the social evil, according to Christabel Pankhurst, is "chastity for men and votes for women," the latter for enforcing the former, *Plain Facts about a Great Evil*, 7, 46, 47, 58, 136, cf. 113; wherefore the latter is of first importance, and is treated as "the sole cure, [even if it does not obtain the result?]" 31, cf. 45, 113. In this she is supported by her mother, Mrs. Pankhurst, *op. cit.*, 33-4.

21 *Women and Economics*, 225, 246.

22 Women, indeed, are the cleaners on a small scale, as they have done everything else on a small scale, the broom having been one of their symbols from the matriarchal days down through witchcraft (see Pearson, *Chances of Death*, ii. 9, 23, 29-30); but on a large scale, and in heavy work, men are the cleaners — the scavengers and street-

country, State, matters. "All the affairs of municipal government," says the one-time President of the New York Woman Suffrage Association,— and it is a constant refrain,— "are only house-keeping on a large scale."<sup>23</sup> Yet the largeness of the scale might suggest that it is beyond woman's capacity, and that this is the reason she has not taken part in such work.<sup>24</sup> Dame Partington was "excellent at a slop or a puddle," but she was not successful when "she meddled with a tempest."

But even if women were attaining to this capacity, the fact that they are interested in municipal affairs and wish to take part in them, is no reason why they should seek to participate in national affairs and help decide the questions which arise over the tariff, the treatment of "trusts," finance, currency, banking, armaments, international relations, etc., in which they make no pretence of taking interest. Yet they are not content with offers of the municipal suffrage, and clamour for nothing short of suffrage on a perfect equality with men in the highest offices of the nation. At the reorganisation of our federal government in 1787, Madison advocated that, in order to keep the States from issuing paper-money, interfering with the collection of debts, and performing certain other "unrighteousnesses," "the federal head should be armed with a negative in all cases whatsoever on the local [State] legislatures."<sup>25</sup> On hearing of this, Jefferson reprehended the scheme on the ground that the patch was "not commensurate with the hole,"<sup>26</sup> and his criticism prevailed. So

sweepers, and the inventors of machinery for the purpose, as well, also, as the builders and managers of laundries:—"the city's cleaning," says Mrs. Gilman, "is his [man's] work," *op. cit.*, 247. What is desired by the woman suffragists, is depicted in a broadside, addressed *To the Male Citizens*, issued by the National American Woman Suffrage Association, on which is pictured a woman in uniform bossing the men who are sweeping the streets.

<sup>23</sup> Mrs. Raymond Brown, reported in the Patchogue Argus, Nov. 18, 1910. So also the broadside just referred to: "Government is public house-keeping." More qualifyingly Irving Putnam: "Municipal government, at least, is to a great extent house-keeping on a large scale," in *The New York Times*, March 21, 1915. "True politics," says Saleeby (but in a somewhat different connection), "is domestics." *Parenthood and Race Culture*, 38, cf. 330. Among the first to say this ("government is political economy — national housekeeping") was Theodore Parker in an address at the Music Hall, Boston, March, 1853, quoted in *The History of Woman Suffrage*, i. 280. He added that it is also "political morality — national ethics," and that women have not generally managed their households so badly as men have done the state, implying that their admission to rule the state would improve it.

<sup>24</sup> On the contrary, ignoring the difference produced by size, Olivia Howard Dunbar suggests that women, while accepting the duties at home "so passionately urged upon her," should add "that if she is competent to keep one house clean, she is competent to supervise thousands of uncared-for houses," *The City's Housekeepers*, Harper's Bazar, June, 1909. Similarly Emma Churchman Hewitt thinks that if men (tailors and bakers) sew and bake, women should superintend vast business enterprises, *The New Woman in her Relation to the "New Man."* *Westminster Review*, March, 1897,— i. e., if men invade women's small work, enlarging it, women should invade men's large work (and soon make it small). But one suffragist at least sees the fallacy here. Margaret L. Franklin, criticising this in her bibliography, *The Case for Woman Suffrage*, 216, says: "The vastness, of course, is precisely the point at issue. Men do not sew and bake on a small scale, and so the parallel is lost."

<sup>25</sup> *Writings*, i. 285.

<sup>26</sup> *Works*, Washington ed., ii. 152.

the giving the national franchise to women in order that they may do questionable good with the State franchise, is, to say the least, to provide a patch which, on pretext of mending a hole, will "cover the whole garment."<sup>27</sup>

In some countries, like England, it is difficult to separate local government from national interference; but in our country our State system might provide exactly the separation needed. Here the State franchise of women would be much less dangerous than their national franchise. As yet this is practically all that we have, since the federal Congressmen elected by the aid of women's votes are but few, and women exert by their votes little appreciable influence on national affairs. Yet, in consequence of an error in our system, which will be commented on later, there cannot be an extension of the State suffrage throughout many more States without women's participation being prominent also in the national electorate.<sup>28</sup> This is a great pity. If all our States could have their suffrage extended to women without the women *ipso facto* acquiring the federal suffrage, this might go a long way to satisfy them, and while the State franchise were everywhere granted to them, they might be kept from having any of the national franchise; whereas now, reversely, fear of their having the national franchise may keep them from obtaining the State franchise even in States where it might be well at least to experiment with it.

Even in State and municipal affairs it is difficult to see how the women's votes are going to accomplish the results the women's leaders expect, as most of their aims are really beyond the reach of legislation. The women's votes will certainly not abolish war, or prostitution, or the troubles between capital and labour. Equal pay for alleged equal work may by law be introduced among the employés of government; but government, in our country at least, has no right or power to fix the wages paid to men and women by private employers. The woman suffragists seem to think that women workers need the vote to alleviate their humble

<sup>27</sup> Arguments having reference, in our country, to national affairs that may be improved by women's votes, are few and far between. Here is one which may be taken for what it is worth. "It is a safe and easy assertion to say that this country would never have seen its tariff walls raised so high, had the women who buy and consume had an equal weight in the councils of the nation with the men who produce and sell"; for the men, as producers and earners, are interested in raising the prices of products, but women, as spenders and consumers, are interested in lowering the prices of goods. So Annie G. Porritt in a leaflet on *The Political Duties of Mothers*. Note that this argument applies only here and now; for it does not apply in England, and it may not apply even here after the feminists have their way and women become producers and earners.

<sup>28</sup> They may there, on some occasions, have, or appear to have, the balance of power. Already their influence is great enough to influence presidential candidates who fear their displeasure. It is maintained that they re-elected Mr. Wilson in November, 1916, doing so because "he has kept us out of the war." Thus already the feminine element is inoculating our nation with the weakening virus of pacifism.

lot. For this, on the one hand, they grossly exaggerate the number of *women* employés,<sup>29</sup> and, on the other hand, they forget that men labourers have not gained their desired object, although they have long possessed the ballot. Men labourers, by their votes, have caused some legislation to be passed regulating the conditions of labour; but in all these advantages women labourers have shared. If woman suffrage will add some female voters to the side of the labourers, it will also add female voters to the side of the employers, and where the gain to the women workers will be, it would be difficult to say. Indeed, the number of women interested in keeping down the wages of women workers is four or five times larger than the number of men interested in keeping down the wages of men workers.

Manhood suffrage is by no means the cause of men's wages being higher than women's wages. Men's wages were higher than women's wages when no workmen had the vote. Nor have the acquisitions of the suffrage by men been the cause of raising their wages. It is true that during the last sixty or seventy years men's wages have been rising, and it is true that men have during these years been winning more political representation — in Europe at least, for they already possessed nearly all they could have here. But the latter process has not been the cause of the former. There are plenty of economic reasons explaining and accounting for the rise of men's wages — and of women's wages too; for women's wages have also risen, without women possessing the suffrage. If there is any connection between the two phenomena, it is that the rise of men's wages (which began long before in America) has given them opportunity for obtaining and exerting more political power; and the rise of women's wages has given them the aspiration to obtain political power. But except in political offices, wages cannot be controlled by votes. The state that tries to regulate wages only faces disaster. Modern states have learnt this (although during this war they seem to be forgetting much that has been learnt), and although the capitalists have the greatest representation in most legislatures, they have given up trying to lower wages by direct legislation. But even if

<sup>29</sup> They speak of eight million women wage-earners in the United States. In letters in The New York Times in February, 1915, this assertion was repeated nine times. In the issues of March 7 and 21 two antis, Minnie Bronson Genung and Edward Toal, pointed out the error therein, quoting the Census of 1910, vol. iv, and a special report of June, 1914, to the effect that the eight million in question are all females over ten years of age "gainfully occupied" — not necessarily self-supporting, much less supporting others; and of these more than two million are under age, and not to be entitled to the vote even with woman suffrage, and of the remainder more than a third are in domestic service or occupied at home, so that the total number of women workers outside the home is a trifle over three million; which is to be compared with twenty odd million men (voters) in the same situation.

women are ignorant of this, why should the majority of them try to raise the wages of working women by legislation direct or indirect? To repeat, a very small minority of women are wage-earners. That the house-wives of America should vote to raise the wages of their domestic servants and of their husband's type-writers and other employés, is a pretty conceit. Complete feminism must be introduced first, with all women in the labour-market, and the majority of them as wage-earners rather than wage-payers. Meanwhile some philanthropic women, to be sure, advocate raising the wages of other people's female employés; but they could accomplish their purpose, as far as it is obtainable, much better without than with the votes of all women.

Altogether, in these State and municipal, or domestic, affairs, it is quite questionable whether women's influence is not better without than with the vote. Much foolishness has been written in depreciation of indirect influence, though for the individual this is the most powerful of all. "Indirect influence," said Miss Helen Todd at a public meeting,<sup>30</sup> "is an abstract thing that no man wants and that he thinks every woman ought to have." Yet this is just what every politician does want most of all. His political life depends on his influence upon other voters. His own vote is but a drop in the bucket. Women's influence that is due to feminine charm, itself enhanced by being partly veiled, would certainly suffer loss through exposure in public life, in spite of what the suffragist leaders say to the contrary.<sup>31</sup> But there is a larger aspect of the question. Without the vote, it is only the women actively interested in public affairs that have influence in politics, and they are principally the educated and the philanthropic. But with the vote, all women will have influence, the bad as well as the good, and the multitude of the indifferent, among whom those whose men have a sinister interest will be the ones most likely to be sent to the polls. The women who hitherto have interested themselves in politics have no doubt done so with the highest moral motives, and when they compare themselves and their associates with the general run of male politicians, they swell with pride at the contrast. They make a great mistake, however, when they thence conclude that the female electorate will improve upon that of men. They can

<sup>30</sup> Reported in *The New York Times*, April 9, 1914.

<sup>31</sup> E. g., Alice S. Blackwell: "A woman who has any of these means of influence now [beauty, goodness, taste, talent, manners, money, etc.], would still have them if she had a vote, and she would have this other potent means of influence besides," *Objections Answered*, 10-11. She might still have the same qualities, and yet not have the same influence as before; but it is more likely that some of the qualities themselves (especially her manners) would not remain the same.

retain their superiority only by the exclusion of women in general from the franchise.<sup>32</sup>

Hence it is much saner for public-spirited women to work for particular reforms directly, collaborating with the men who desire the same measures and helping to win over others, than to pursue the indirect course of first obtaining the franchise for other women as well, which may jeopardise their primary objects. Mrs. Pankhurst says of the English divorce law, it is so bad that in her opinion it alone "would justify a rebellion on the part of women."<sup>33</sup> Well, if that were so (which it is not), it is possible that if women had "militated" against that law, they could have got its amendment with one-tenth the amount of agitation they have wasted in the effort to get the suffrage. In the last resort, women must get what they want from men, by men's permission. If they get certain desired rights (as to hold real estate), it must be by men's grant. If they get the suffrage, it must be by men's concession. Hence the latter is not the proper means for the former. Evidently the men who would yield up so little apparent a right as that of the suffrage, would more willingly of themselves respect the more obvious rights, or improvements, to which women should call their attention;<sup>34</sup> and if they are not just enough to do the latter, they are not likely to do the former,<sup>35</sup>—or if they were flattered and cajoled into doing it, they would not observe it. Women, after all, must confide in men to execute the laws; then why not confide in them to make them?<sup>36</sup> The suffrage, said one ardent

<sup>32</sup> Now we have the good men backed up by the good women in opposition to the bad men. Then we shall have the good men and women in opposition to the bad men and women. This will not be a gain on the side of goodness. So Miss Emily P. Bissell, *A Talk to Women on the Suffrage Question*, 7; cf. Mrs. A. J. George, *Woman's Rights vs. Woman Suffrage*, 5. The superiority of women's influence, while they remain outside politics and act in a non-partisan spirit, is well described by Mrs. Barclay Hazard in her address, Oct. 30, 1907, *How Women can best serve the State*, published by the New York State Association opposed to Woman Suffrage.

<sup>33</sup> Speech at Hartford, Nov. 13, 1913, *Verbatim Report*, 30.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Miss Catherine E. Beecher: "They [men] cannot be forced by the weaker sex to resign their power. It [the relief of evils] must be sought, then, as the gift of justice and benevolence. If, then, there are laws and customs that we deem unjust and oppressive, the short and common-sense mode would be to petition the law-makers to change these laws according to the rules of justice and mercy. Instead of this the plea is, 'We cannot trust you to make laws; give us the ballot, and we will take better care of ourselves than you have done or will do.' Now, any class of men who, after such an implication of their intelligence and justice, would give the ballot to woman, would most surely be those most ready to redress any wrongs for which the ballot is sought. Why should we not rather take the shorter and surer mode and ask for the thing needed, instead of the circuitous and uncertain mode involved in the ballot?" *Woman Suffrage and Woman's Profession*, 17-18, cf. 191-2. Similarly A. P. Marvin, in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853, *Report of Debates*, ii, 749-50, 751-2.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Hart: "If women really believe that men are persistently unjust to them, or insufficiently amenable to their influence, how can they really believe in the possibility of obtaining their wish in this respect [of the suffrage]? And would not the plea for the necessity of the suffrage be proved to be ill-founded by the very fact of its success?" *Woman Suffrage a National Danger*, 59.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Mrs. Johnson: "If Mrs. Child could not trust her husband, her son, her brother, or best friend to look after her interests, she certainly could not trust the car-

advocate,<sup>37</sup> is a necessity to woman to get her property and other rights. If the suffrage itself were among these rights, it could not be got without first being had! This dilemma never presented itself in the cases of the lower classes of men as they grew up to political power; for they did not merely ask for the franchise: they threatened to take it.

By the demonstration of experience the question of advantage or disadvantage of woman suffrage cannot yet be determined either way. Nowhere are women on a political equality with men in any independent nation, although they come near to it in some of the small Scandinavian countries. In the provinces, colonies, and American States, in which they have been given the full suffrage, they decide little more than municipal or social questions, and there, too, the grant has been too recent to throw much light on the question.<sup>38</sup> In the United States there is much bandying to and fro of claims that great social improvements have been made in the States with woman suffrage and of the counter-claims that other States with only male suffrage are just as advanced; and no decision seems to be reachable, so closely neck-and-neck do they run.<sup>39</sup> The criterion itself is disputable. For instance, the woman suffragists often complain that male legislators pass laws regulating the sanitary conditions of animals, even of swine, but will not make appropriations for commissions to inquire into the treatment of babies.<sup>40</sup> It is overlooked by the women that the inspection of animals is intended ultimately for the protection of the health of people, including women and children, while men do not yet wish to class women with sows as needing governmental supervision in the upbringing

ry out of her wish, as expressed by her vote, to the men who cast their ballots by her side," *Woman and the Republic*, 77.

<sup>37</sup> J. H. Campbell, in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872-3, *Debates*, i, 558-9.

<sup>38</sup> Of woman suffrage in Finland an unfavourable account, *Where Women sit in Parliament*, by Edith Sellars, appeared in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, July, 1912. It was granted because of the aid rendered by women to the bloodless revolution of 1905; and it is said the Czar favoured the measure because it is his interest to have the Finnish parliament weak, p. 170. Men lose the vote when they are soldiers, women never; and men pay double poll tax, 167. The socialist party alone has gained, 174. "Babies, indeed, are rather at a discount among them [Finnish women] in this our day," 179. Female suicide and criminality are increasing, 180.

<sup>39</sup> Events transpiring in the spring and autumn of 1914 in Colorado have revealed that conditions there after twenty years of woman suffrage are more disgraceful than in any State in the Union except West Virginia. There, too, when trouble arose and there was some likelihood of redress through rebellion, the women congregated in great numbers and induced the governor to appeal to Washington for federal troops. This baby-act of crying to others for help has been much applauded by other woman suffragists and held up as proof of the advantage of having women take part in public affairs; but, while it stopped the shedding of blood, it put off, and has probably destroyed all chance of reaching, a just settlement of the fundamental difficulties. As for conditions in general in this State, Judge Lindsey is reported to have said in the winter of 1914-15: "We are twenty years behind Massachusetts in spite of [woman] suffrage," quoted in *The New York Times*, March 21, 1915.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. a leaflet published by the National Woman Suffrage Association, entitled *Pigs versus Boys; also another, Bees, Clams, and Children*.

ing of their young. For constructive legislation, at best the advocates can point to various measures, some of a socialistic nature and of questionable advantage, regarding the status of women and children, and most of them adopted in States which have only manhood suffrage; and even in the States now possessing woman suffrage some of them were adopted before the advent of that suffrage. Even national legislation, on the slimmest authorisation in the Constitution, has been enacted to repress the "white slave" traffic and to prevent child-labour. When the franchise is a novelty, almost all women vote; but as the novelty wears off, more and more stay away, and the electorate becomes irregular. In rural districts men whose women agree with them take them to the polls, but if their women disagree, they leave them at home. In Australia — so Henry I. Stimson reports James Bryce as saying — "certain classes of the commonwealth 'voted their women' *en masse*, while the women of other districts and of other classes did not vote at all. As a result, while the suffrage produced substantially no change in the condition of the women themselves, it very radically interfered with the due proportionate representation of the various localities and classes of citizens in the government."<sup>41</sup> It looks as if the experience of New Jersey a hundred years ago were to be repeated.<sup>42</sup>

If women are to vote and to be treated as equal to men, of course they are to be eligible to all offices. Already women sit in some legislatures, and one of them urges as a recommendation that women are less interested than men in business and more in persons: "laws," she says, "will not get by a woman without her seeing how they will affect the individual."<sup>43</sup> This, however, is only men's common objection to women in politics, that they look to immediate results, without taking ultimate consequences sufficiently into account. The strange phenomenon is frequently witnessed in this connection, that women suffragists find all sorts of superlative excellences in women different from men, though they are unwilling to admit any inferiorities. Or the present inferiorities which they must admit they explain as

<sup>41</sup> In *The Knickerbocker Press*, Albany, N. Y., July 26, 1915.

<sup>42</sup> "In Wyoming," says Ed. D. Cope, "men load up wagons with their women to drive them to the polls to vote their own ticket, as I have had opportunity of seeing in that territory. . . . If they wished to vote otherwise, they might stay at home," *The Relation of the Sexes to Government*, 9; cf. R. Johnson, *The Blank-Cartridge Ballot*, 6. A policeman at a Cooper Union Suffrage meeting is reported to have said: "Do I believe in woman suffrage? Sure I do. There's my wife and four daughters. If I had five votes to deliver right out of my own house, I could get all I wanted in my district" (from Emily P. Bissell, *A Talk to Women on the Suffrage Question*, 4). Thus men's "indirect influence" is increased by woman suffrage!

<sup>43</sup> Helen Ring Robinson, a Colorado State Senator, in *The New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1913.

due to men's past treatment of women, and think they will disappear under the new treatment; but women's excellences will still remain, none of these apparently being due to the past treatment or in any wise affectable by the new: even their modesty and chastity, when acknowledged to have been so produced, are regarded as defects to be corrected. "Women are better prepared to exercise the suffrage," says Ida Husted Harper, "than any class which has been admitted to the electorate."<sup>44</sup> Here again only the comparatively few women already exercising themselves in political matters are evidently had in mind. "Thousands of women," says Mrs. Jacobi, are on all sides admitted to be intellectually fitted for the functions of citizenship;<sup>45</sup> whence it is inferred that to the franchise should be admitted millions! Yet even on the questions supposed to be their especial concern women do not show much interest in voting, where they can; for it is notorious how few of them turn out to vote on school questions and on other questions concerning children<sup>46</sup>—and whether these be the ones most fitted to pass on the subjects is not known. Still, all sorts of claims are put forward as to the great things women are going to do with their votes—greater than in the case of any class of men ever admitted to the electorate. Women, as is well known, are going to put an end to war.<sup>47</sup> One woman is reported as thinking the first thing they will do will be to abolish the system of party government, because it is men who have made parties.<sup>48</sup> The sale of liquor, of course, is to be stopped; and gambling and prostitution are to disappear. One male abettor even recommends the cause by propounding that women, on account of their interest in low rents, "might" vote for the introduction of the single-tax!<sup>49</sup> Generally, however, to repeat, it is municipal matters that are to be improved,

<sup>44</sup> *Would Woman Suffrage benefit the State, and Woman herself?* North American Review, March, 1904, p. 374. And Anna Howard Shaw looks forward to the happy time when woman shall stand by man's side "his intellectual equal, and in many cases his intellectual and moral superior, and often, as statesmen, who are broader in their outlook, more splendid in their grasp, than men," *Woman Suffrage as an Educator*, an address delivered Jan. 13, 1910.

<sup>45</sup> "Common Sense," etc., 212, 213.

<sup>46</sup> E. g., in April, 1913, the Mayor of Berkeley, California, complained that only about 1500 out of 8000 women voters cared enough to vote on a question of providing playground facilities for the children: so a letter of Mrs. Wm. L. Duff in *The New York Times*, April 28, 1913.

<sup>47</sup> E. g., Lucia Ames Mead has written a pamphlet with the title: *What Women might do with the Ballot: the Abolition of the War System*, New York, 1912. Mary Austin claims that women "have a right to a voice in the government . . . a right to abolish war or modify it," *Love and the Soul Maker*, 168. And Vance Thompson holds that "wars do not matter, because in her [woman's] day, if she wants them stopped, they will be stopped," *Woman*, 7.

<sup>48</sup> Mrs. Flora Annie Steel, in *The New York Times*, March 14, 1914.

<sup>49</sup> B. C. Marsh, *What Women might do with the Ballot. Needed: Women's Votes to thwart Landlords' Greed*, published by the National American Woman Suffrage Association, New York. Similarly the single-tax philanthropist Joseph Fels, according to Mary Fels in her biography of him, *op. cit.*, 215-16.

and abuses abolished. An ardent social worker, after enumerating certain delinquencies of male magistrates in enforcing laws affecting children, asserts that "if the mothers and teachers voted in New York City, none of these things would occur."<sup>50</sup> She overlooks the other things that might occur if women voted in the United States.

The question of the expediency of woman suffrage is really, and ought to be actually, the same for women as for men. We are all in the same box in this little world. It would do women no good for some of them to gain a little of what they envy in men, if their country were to fall behind in the race with other countries because of the weakness the feminine element would bring into the guidance and administration of affairs. In the calamities that would ensue, women would be the greatest sufferers. The suffragist women do not sufficiently realise the danger they or their posterity would run in entrusting their fate to the decision of other women. They talk too little of women, and too much of woman, as if all were alike, and were like themselves. The question is wholly an objective one; for each person's subjective interest in it (the individual woman's single vote) is but a molecule in a mountain. The question is practically the same for a woman as for a man. The man asks: 'Shall I be ruled by all other men and all women?' and the woman asks: 'Shall I be ruled by all men and all other women?' and the difference between the two askings is infinitesimally small. And there is no good reason (for sentiment is not a good reason) why a woman's opinion about all men and all other women should be materially different from a man's opinion about all other men and all women; for the individual should subtract himself or herself as not affecting the answer.<sup>51</sup>

There is one form in which the argument from expediency shades into the sentimental argument. This is the recommendation of the extended suffrage because of its alleged beneficial influence upon women themselves. "After all," says Mrs. Jacobi, "the most important effect of suffrage is psychological."<sup>52</sup> The suffrage is to be a training school for the improvement of the female mind.<sup>53</sup> It would widen their point of view, enlarge their horizon, cure their pettiness, increase their public spirit, make them better instructors of their children, and consequently,

<sup>50</sup> Florence Kelley, *Persuasion or Responsibility?* p. 3, a Political Equality Leaflet issued by the same association.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. above, pp. 274-5.

<sup>52</sup> "Common Sense," etc., 180. The suffrage movement, says Blease, is "to its most thoughtful leaders psychological, . . . primarily a thing of mind," *The Emancipation of English Women*, 189.

<sup>53</sup> "Votes for women," writes Stella Adler, "is only one bridge to carry women toward perfection," in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915.

says Mrs. Gilman, "it would improve the human stock.<sup>54</sup> Especially, they expect, would it give them self-respect, and thereby win for them more respect from men.<sup>55</sup> In full the argument seems to run thus: It is maintained that exclusion from the franchise is degrading, and to this degrading influence some of the acknowledged inferiorities of women as they actually are, are ascribed. The conclusion is drawn that, *per contra*, the admission of women to the franchise would have an elevating influence upon them, would soon bring them up to the level of men in these points, while they would retain undiminished the points in which they are equal or superior to men. Hence their admission would ultimately raise the standard of the electorate. Most of the details of this argument have already been touched upon, and the likelihood of their correctness shown to be untenable. The argument, moreover, assumes what it offers to prove; for only if women ought to be admitted, can their exclusion be degrading.<sup>55a</sup> The same line of thought is also extended to men, it being asserted that classes of men have been degraded by exclusion and improved by subsequent admission. This might be true of men, and yet not be applicable to women, as it certainly is not applicable to children. It does, too, put the cart before the horse; for, as has already been remarked, it is rather the degradation, or backwardness, of certain classes of men (their want of arms and organisation), that has excluded them, than their exclusion that has degraded them. Still, for all men to have the opportunity of being in all ways equal to all other men, it is helpful that they should all have political equality. But political equality is not needful for giving women such an opportunity, since women cannot become equal to men even in political requirements. To exclude some men from the suffrage is to stamp them as different from the men who have it, perhaps contrary to fact. But to exclude women from the suffrage is merely to recognise the fact of their difference from men.

<sup>54</sup> At a Hearing before the Committee on Woman Suffrage of the United States Senate, Washington, 1904. *Report* thereof, p. 14.

<sup>55</sup> So Ida Husted Harper, in *The New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1915. In the same newspaper, Feb. 21 of the same year, Annie Clemett Thoma had written: "The self-respect and dignity of having a voice in the government will amply repay them [women] for the few hours they will have to spend 'learning how to vote.'

<sup>55a</sup> Or it rests on a suppressed premiss. Thus Blease: "To deprive them [women] of the power to control government is to invest them with an inferiority which injures their own character no less than that of men." *op. cit.*, 199 (leading them, for instance, into willingness to accept lower wages than men, 204); Why? He has asserted that women "are in natural capacity the equals of men," 198. If this were true, the consequence might be true (only then it would be difficult to account for their deprivation of a power which they have equally with men). As it is not true, the consequence need not follow. Much rather, bad consequences to their character and that of men would follow from treating them as politically men's equals (by admitting them to the franchise), since it would be putting them in a false position (and if it raised their wages to equality with men's, it would have the evil consequences we have already examined).

Women have the respect of men, when they perform rightly the part of women. They cannot increase it by trying to ape men. Nor can they increase their own self-respect by pretending to be what they are not. And as they are not men, they do not need the same horizon, the same point of view, that men have.<sup>56</sup> As for the improvement of their children, the males among them would be more improved if men put men instructors over them when they reach the age which distinguishes them from females. It is not necessary to make women like men in order to teach boys to be men.

Of all the arguments, this from expediency (except in the last form) is the least made use of by the suffragist women, and it seems to appeal to them least. The arguments which seem to have the greatest weight, are the sentimental first, as though women cannot be human beings unless they be permitted to act like men.<sup>57</sup> Then the rational, the claim that they have a right to the vote, and that it is right and just they should have it, whatever they would do with it. "Simple justice is all we women ask," says one.<sup>58</sup> "No other consideration than justice has any place in this discussion," says another.<sup>59</sup> Because of its justice, however, many are confident that it cannot do harm, at least not ultimately.<sup>60</sup> Its opponents might equally well argue that because it is wrong and unjust, it cannot do good, either in

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Mary Roberts Coolidge: "It is important to note that voting, with the occasional interest in political campaigns and large public questions, affords just the connection with the larger world which the domestic woman needs," *Why Women Are So*, 361. Does she? Would it improve her domesticity, or lessen it? The latter is the desire of the feminist, with all the danger it threatens to the people that permits it.

<sup>57</sup> Or such stuff as this: The woman suffragist leaders seek the franchise "most of all because they look upon the vote as a symbol of deep spiritual things and the hallmark of their individuality" (or "the symbol to them of eternal things"). Mrs. Snowden, *The Feminist Movement*, 147-8, 167. Cf. Elizabeth S. Chesser: "The vote is only a symbol," *op. cit.*, 254. Also Blease has adopted this talk, and speaks of the parliamentary franchise as "a symbol of social worth," *op. cit.*, 189.

<sup>58</sup> Mrs. R. C. Talbot-Perkins, President of Kings County Woman Suffrage Association, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915.

<sup>59</sup> Wm. N. Stevens, *ib.* So Helen Sumner says in her *Equal Suffrage: The Results of an Investigation in Colorado*, New York, 1909: "It is not pretended, of course, that such a study [of the influence of woman suffrage upon political and social life] can affect in any way the right of women to the ballot." "How women are likely to vote," says an editorial in *The New York American*, Feb. 8, 1915, "has no bearing on their right to vote, which is so self-evident that its demonstration seems superfluous." Similarly Elizabeth Steenrod in *The New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1915: "Whether it would or would not [tend to weaken the state and stir up society], is beside the mark. It is a question primarily of common justice and fair play." And so the *Report* of the United States Senate Committee of Woman Suffrage (C. S. Thomas, Chairman), Jan. 8, 1916: "The issue is not one of benefit to the nation, but of justice to womankind."

<sup>60</sup> "What they demand is justice, and justice always benefits," F. W. Seward, Jr., in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1916. Cf. Gail Hamilton: "It is natural that woman should have part in government, and therefore the consequence must be good," *Woman's Wrongs*, 158-9 (and the opposite is "unnatural, and all things unnatural are wrong and hurtful," 93). And N. C. Fowler, Jr., would grant the vote to women whatever transient or temporary harm might ensue, even if tremendous and lasting a hundred years, being confident that because it is right, it will in the end prove good, *The Principle of Suffrage*, New York, 1916, pp. 47-58.

the present or in the future.<sup>61</sup> 'What is right is good,' and 'what is wrong is bad,' are perfectly true propositions, but in an argument they can be used both ways; for what is not good cannot be right. The point is whether we should rely more on an intuitive moral judgment (in this case a very foolish one, because it cannot be consistently expressed, the principle being that all human beings have a right to the suffrage, notwithstanding that many exceptions are allowed), or in the teaching of experience (which in this case shows why women belong among the exceptions). The women leaders, however, are so daft on the subject of ill-considered justice, that not only the prospect of possible harm from woman suffrage does not deter them, but the prospect of possible good from continuance of their exclusion does not reconcile them. "If," wrote Mrs. Fawcett some years ago,—"if every law in the United Kingdom were ideally just to women, their claim to enfranchisement would, in my judgment, be quite as strong as it is now."<sup>62</sup> And this has recently been repeated by the Rev. Miss Anna Howard Shaw, who asserts that "the enfranchisement of women should be considered from the standpoint of justice and logic [sic] alone," and continues: "the reason for woman suffrage would remain, even though all the evils I have named, or could name, should be abolished at once."<sup>63</sup> Imagine the Chartists in 1840 saying that if all the laws of England were ideally perfect and just to labourers, they would still be as anxious to have the representation reformed! They never talked such nonsense. When an end is already procured and assured, sensible people do not bother about the means thereto.

All this should arouse suspicion that the suffrage movement is not well based. And it goes far to justify such statements by antis as these: "Women do not want the vote so much as they want what is denied them,—as they want men to bow to their demand";<sup>64</sup> and "The real motive power is derived from an expectation that women as a sex will be able to have things more their own way, if they become voters. Whether they will be to the advantage of the country as a whole, is a question much less carefully considered."<sup>65</sup> They will be consulted by men:

<sup>61</sup> This contrary argument is actually made by Wm. Parker, who would refuse the suffrage to women because, on account of men and women, like the state and the church, not being identical, woman suffrage is morally wrong, and therefore can never be socially or economically good, *The Fundamental Error of Woman Suffrage*, New York, 1915, p. 12, etc.

<sup>62</sup> Millicent Garrett Fawcett, *The Enfranchisement of Women*, Fortnightly Review, April, 1880, p. 560.

<sup>63</sup> *Equal Suffrage — a Problem of Political Justice*, Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, Nov., 1914, pp. 94, 97.

<sup>64</sup> Charlotte R. Bangs, in the New York Sun, Oct. 6, 1912.

<sup>65</sup> H. Hart, *Woman Suffrage*, 85-6.

this prospect fills their hearts with elation. Already one of them exults in "the historic appeal" of one of the two great political parties to the Women's Club of Denver: "Tell us what will endear our party to the women."<sup>66</sup> This, however, is not a single instance: it has become general in our western States.<sup>67</sup>

Here the three kinds of arguments for woman suffrage have been treated in the ascending order of their real importance. They have, however, been treated in the descending order of the importance attached to them by most women. Effort has occasionally been made to rest the arguments for woman's political emancipation not so much on their rights, as on their duties;<sup>68</sup> which, of course, do not go beyond their abilities. But at bottom it is the feeling of offended dignity at exclusion from the right to be equal with men, that underlies this demand for participation in the world's work and guidance just so far, and no further, than their strength (which is sufficient to drop a ballot) will carry them. They can now go into all industries and professions, if they like, and stay out of them also, as they please; and so they must be able to go into politics if they like, and stay out as much as they please. Whether they vote or not, is to be their own concern, not to be denied them by men. Whatever the reasons, and whatever the consequences, that is nobody's business, as long as any of them wish it. We are confronted with the apotheosis of Independence—and of License.<sup>69</sup> 'Do as you please,' and 'Do as we please,' are the present watchwords. Only the doing must be positive, not negative: it must not interfere with other

<sup>66</sup> Annie G. Porritt, *Votes and Babies*, 5.

<sup>67</sup> "In the equal suffrage States," writes Ida Husted Harper, "every candidate for a high office goes before the various organisations of women, explains his policies, and makes every possible effort to win their favourable opinion," in *The New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1915. "The procedure in all the equal suffrage States," says George Creel, "is very similar. A state federation of women's clubs, at its annual convention, will discuss what it wishes in the way of legislation, and what it does not wish. Bills already in the field are indorsed or condemned, new bills are framed to meet the demands, and then everything is placed in the hands of a legislative committee that is virtually an unpaid lobby. This committee, with an elastic membership of from ten to seventy-five, attends every session of the legislature. The progress of bills is watched, care is taken to see that none of them is lost or hidden, and in the event of trouble, these Paul Reverses send out a warning that rains down scores of telegrams from every quarter of the State on the heads of recalcitrant legislators," *What Have Women done with the Vote?*<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>68</sup> E. g., Enid Stacy, *A Century of Women's Rights*, in *Forecasts of the Coming Century*, ed. by Edw. Carpenter, London, 1897, and F. H. Barrow, *The Political Responsibility of Women*, *Westminster Review*, Sept., 1908. Miss Franklin, in her *The Case for Woman Suffrage*, p. 79, remarks: "This is an interesting point, and one not often made."

<sup>69</sup> Women should have the same right as men "to make their own mistakes," according to Anna Ross Weeks, and be "equally free to work out their own salvation," according to Caroline Brockel, both in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915. Frederic the Great would have left all his subjects to go to heaven or hell their own way; but he was strict about their going the right way (his way) in this world. These suffragist women, apparently, do not care whether women go the right way in this world even, provided they be allowed to go their own way.

people's doing. Every one can do what any one can do. No one must have more power (or even more wealth, say the socialists), than another. Men and women — all must be equal, or at least equally free.

## CHAPTER IX.

### WOMAN SUFFRAGE — THE ARGUMENT AGAINST

WOMAN suffrage having never existed on a large scale or for a length of time sufficient to note all its effects, the burden of proof is on its advocates. Their principal arguments have all been met and refuted. This ought to be sufficient. But to drive the nail in harder, it will be well to treat the matter as if the burden of proof were on the other side, as it would be were woman suffrage already a generally established fact, and to show why it should not be, even if it were. The principal argument against it, of course, is that it would not work well—that, even if it had some of the good results claimed for it, it would lead to greater evils. What would be or not be under other circumstances, can never be proved directly; and so the argument to show the probable evil effect of woman suffrage can best proceed by showing the true nature of suffrage and the perverseness of extending it to women.

The arguments for woman suffrage all depend ultimately on the idea that women are the equals of men. It is because they believe so, and because they think the true state of the case is wrongly judged by men, that there are women who feel hurt at not being admitted to the franchise. The vote, which one of them says is “the symbol of freedom and equality,”<sup>1</sup> they believe to be theirs by right, because they do not see the reason why they should not have it if all men have it. They are misled by the democratic principle that all men are equal, which is obviously false in most respects and can be maintained only in some particular sense, in which these women still think themselves included.

Now, for the claim of woman’s equality with men to have any bearing on the question of suffrage, it must be equality in political respects. This is overlooked. It is admitted by all but a few extreme feminists, that women are in some things different from men. This admission is even at times turned into an argument in favour of woman suffrage: if they were alike, it would not matter so much; being different, men cannot properly represent

<sup>1</sup> Christabel Pankhurst, *Plain Facts about a Great Evil*, 122.

them and cannot rightly legislate for them;<sup>2</sup>—an argument hardly conclusive as it stands, since it would equally apply, with evident falseness, to the case of children. Certainly if men and women were in all respects alike, they would not be distinguished as men and women, and there would be no reason for excluding the ones and including the others. The only possible reason for treating men and women differently is their difference. Now, the fact that men and women are different, though on the whole equal, shows that men are superior in some respects, and in others women. The fact that their superiorities may sum up even on both sides, is nothing to the point.<sup>2a</sup> All depends on the particular superiorities and inferiorities that fall to the shares of each, whether they be relevant to the subject in hand.<sup>3</sup>

Men are superior in the respect which has most to do with government—force. Government is a matter of force. It is not mere opinion, it is power. Men, possessing force, made government. Government is an affair of men. Hence men only are the proper participants in it. This “argument from force,” as it has been called, is generally pooh-poohed by women. They generally do not take it seriously. This is no reason why men should not take it seriously,<sup>4</sup> especially as some women do.<sup>5</sup> It is at the bottom of the question.<sup>6</sup>

Men were originally the disturbing portion of humanity. When women started industry and produced property, men

<sup>2</sup> So H. H. Van Amringe at the Woman's Rights Convention, Worcester, 1850, *Proceedings*, 40; Higginson, *Common Sense about Women, Works*, iv. 62, 307; Mrs. Jacobi, “*Common Sense*” applied to Woman Suffrage, 226; Alice S. Blackwell, *Objections Answered*, 2-3; S. Josephine Baker, and Jessie H. Childs, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915, and Mrs. Ernest Thompson Seton, *ib.*, Feb. 21, 1915. Says Annie G. Porritt in her leaflet on *The Political Duties of Mothers*: “The modern suffragist is far more emphatic than her ‘anti’ sister in asserting that the place of the women is the home, and that the work and functions of men and women are different. It is upon these two facts that she bases her claim to vote.”

<sup>2a</sup> Hence the absurdity of the position taken by Blease, who admits the claim of women for equality with men in politics because, as he puts it, woman is “in the sum total of her faculties the equal of man,” *The Emancipation of English Women*, 185, *cf.* 198; or “of equal worth,” 223.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Goldwin Smith: “Supposing woman even to be superior, it does not follow that the field of her superiority is public life,” *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 200, *cf.* 217.

<sup>4</sup> As for instance Lecky, who did not examine its full bearings, and moreover was only advocating a very restricted woman suffrage, *Democracy and Liberty*, ii. 546-7. He says no common soldier in the Crimea was so useful as Florence Nightingale; in which argument he was preceded by Curtis in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1867 (*Orations and Addresses*, i. 209-10), and by Broomall in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872-3, *Debates*, i. 551A. This is the fallacy pointed out above, p. 242.

<sup>5</sup> Thus Catherine E. Beecher: “It is not true that women are and should be treated as the equals of men in every respect. They certainly are not his equals in physical power, which is the final resort in government of both the family and the state. And it is owing to this fact that she is placed as a subordinate both in the family and the state,” *Woman Suffrage and Woman's Profession*, 183, *cf.* 177-8. Other women will be quoted to the same effect later.

<sup>6</sup> In the province of law, says Austin, “the term *superiority* signifies *might*. Whoever can oblige another to comply with his wishes, is the superior of that other, so far as the ability reaches,” *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, London, 1832, p. 19.

seized it. Other men then came to the rescue of women.<sup>7</sup> Even the first, when they got women and their productions into their power, likewise had to defend them from other men. Aggression engendered protection. Men therefore needed many means to increase their force, and they not only improved their weapons of attack and defence, but combined and organised themselves. This organisation, not needed against animals, but only against men, was the beginning of government; and the first subjects were not only the women, but the other men subdued. At first, possibly, in some places,<sup>8</sup> the men admitted women to their councils; for we have seen evidences of this among some primitive tribes; but, if so, as the incapacity of women for executing the behests of the councils became more pronounced, the men excluded the women, or (which is equally likely) the women themselves dropped out. Elsewhere, and probably mostwheres, men established governments without consulting their women: we have historical knowledge of this in the founding of our own states (*e.g.*, at Plymouth). Determination is not mere opinion or desire: it is will-power, and requires strength. Government was thus due both to the depredating instincts of men, and to their defensive interests. Force was the means both of the depredation and of the defence. Such activities developed men's intelligence, especially their organising capacity. The men they enslaved they put to work, and thereby industry was developed also among men, and, as we have seen, men's industry in time surpassed that of women, who were left in those employments which men could not or would not invade, or in which the superiority of men showed itself least.

Thus government was originally due to the badness of men. But it was not the goodness of women that made government. Government, so far as beneficent, was made by the goodness of other men. Bad men existing and combining, good men had to combine to resist them.<sup>9</sup> Unfortunately not only good men are among the governors and not only bad men among the governed, but bad men made and entered into governments as well as the good, and the problem of good government is to weed out the bad men. Attack and defence, moreover, are inextricably compounded: those who attack must also defend, and those whose

<sup>7</sup> We have seen Pearson's division of men at this stage into two sets: those who remained wild like their fathers, and hunted, and those who abided with their mothers and sisters, and helping them at home became agriculturists. The latter had to defend their women, and so became as warlike as the former. Where they did not, those tribes remained small, and ultimately vanished, except in out-of-the-way places. See above, p. 77 and n. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Among the men who stayed with the women.

<sup>9</sup> So Heineccius, *Elementa Juris Naturae et Gentium*, II. vi, §§ 194-6. Cf. Burke, of political parties, *Works*, i. 526.

main object is to defend may find it advisable to attack. Many governments have never set up repression of bad men as their main object, but to-day this is the avowed object of all civilised governments. To-day still the great majority of criminals are men. There are plenty of bad women, too; but women are bad in their own way, with less exhibition of force, with less courage, less venturesomeness, and generally as inciters or tools of men; for many criminal acts of men, as well as many of their virtuous acts, are done at the instigation and with the help of women. But the active, responsible, and punishable criminals are mostly men: they, it is said, constitute ninety-five *per cent.* of the inmates of our prisons.<sup>10</sup> This is sometimes used as an argument why women should be admitted to the franchise: the comparatively small number of female convicts is adduced as showing the moral superiority of women, and as auguring how much better they would do, if the management of things were intrusted to them.<sup>11</sup> It is, however, precisely the reason why women should not be admitted into participation in the government. It takes men to subdue men and keep them in order.<sup>12</sup>

Government was not made at first by all the men of any community coming together and establishing it. It was made by the strong men, and by the clever men who could sway the strength of other men. At first no doubt individuals entered the contest, each on his own footing; but in time classes were formed, and classes controlled the government by their collective strength, so that even weaker members of a strong class took part in government, while stronger men in a weak class were excluded. The possession of arms was the determining factor at a time when arms of the better sort were not plentiful enough to be acquired by everybody; and the possession of arms gave power for the acquisition of land, and the possession of land reciprocally gave power for the acquisition of arms, in the case of those who had

<sup>10</sup> In the rising period of civilisation a woman is not punished by the state, but by her father, husband, or guardian, who is held responsible by the state. And still, when a man and a woman participate in a crime, the blame and the punishment fall principally on the man — and rightly so.

<sup>11</sup> Thus Alice S. Blackwell: "Equal suffrage would increase the moral and law-abiding vote very largely, while increasing the vicious and criminal vote very little," *Objections Answered*, 7. Consequently "Women will certainly do much better than they [men]," Emerence M. Lemonche, *The New Era Woman's Era*, 37. "Woman cannot do worse than man has done," says James F. Brittingham, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915; the condition of things when women vote "couldn't be any worse than the mess men now make," Stella Carolyn Calkins, *ib.*; "could the world possibly be in a worse mess than it is at present," B. Peters (a woman), *ib.* Cf. Theodore Parker above, p. 280n.

<sup>12</sup> "Men must be governed by men," says Henry W. Hayden, "because men alone possess power to govern men. . . . The obligation to govern is placed upon man, because man alone has the power to enforce the decrees of government. . . . Man always has been and will be the real power, and when woman attempts to assume the actual power in government, she assumes an obligation which she is wholly unable to discharge," in *The New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1915.

strength enough to wield the arms when acquired ; for weaklings could not retain the possession of land. As civilisation advances, the metals are mined more abundantly, and small arms become cheap enough for the lower classes to procure them ; whereupon they too, when they also acquire intelligence enough to combine and to concentrate their power, force their way into control of the government. On the other hand, large weapons in the shape of artillery become too expensive to be owned by individuals, and can be managed only by the state. Hence land- and other property-owners always at last cease to be the only class having power.

Intelligence, of course, has always been an essential factor, but on another plane or story. Intelligence can do nothing of itself, it can only give direction to force. And force alone, without intelligence to guide it, is nothing : a muscular idiot plays no part in the state because his force fritters itself away, being used for no determinate purpose. Intelligence, however, in one person or in a few persons may often command the force of other men. It is, then, through their force that it operates. Intelligent individuals and classes, as especially in the early days of every civilisation-cycle the priesthood, have always been powerful, but only, by their monopoly of science, as using advice, warning, and persuasion to direct the force of others. If women had been originally endowed with, or their manner of life had developed, intelligence similar, or equal for this purpose, to that of men, they would no doubt have retained a prominent position at least in the priesthood ; which, but for a few scattered exceptions, they nowhere have done. Although women formed the first priesthood, as Karl Pearson has shown, they were surpassed by men, who ousted them also from this occupation, whereupon those of them who persisted, degenerated into witches, attempting to hold communication only with the powers of earth or the dead and buried — the infernal gods.

Even within the ruling class, contests for leadership and bickerings over the distribution of booty were often carried on by fighting amongst themselves, although such contests it would require little intelligence to frown upon, because they would weaken the class over against other classes, and the tribe over against other tribes. Hence the combination of fighting men had to keep order within their own territory ; which completed the purpose of government. But there might be struggles for the possession of the government itself. Now, it appears that men were long ago in possession of sufficient intelligence to perceive (for this would be very plain in small bands) that instead of fighting to see which faction was the stronger, the same result

could be more easily and safely reached by counting heads in advance, on the belief that the side which was the more numerous was the stronger and would win if it came to blows. This counting of heads is voting, which was practised among the most primitive peoples by the warriors on such important questions as going to war and the appointment of a leader. Voting was an invention of men to keep themselves from fighting.<sup>13</sup> It was generally effectual when the majority on one side was large, but did not always work when the majority was so inconsiderable and the opposite factions so nearly equal in numbers that the smaller might persuade themselves that, on account of unevenness in the strength of individuals, after all the greater force was on their side, or, when passions were excited, they would run the risk to see whether it were so.<sup>14</sup> Still greater intelligence, however, has at last recognised that even in that case it would be better to submit, for a time at least, since the evils caused by resistance would be greater than the good thereby obtainable.<sup>15</sup>

Very early, to repeat, when property, arms, and organisation were all or mostly in the hands of one set of men, or class, these excluded the rest from the vote, or simply did not include them, as not worth counting, and they counted only their own numbers. There was a restricted franchise, because the rest were in their power. But as the other classes came successively to acquire property, arms, and intelligence enough to combine, they too threatened to take part in the play of forces. They then either compelled those in possession of the government to admit them to the count, or those in possession of the government were wise enough to admit them peacefully into the franchise; and sometimes one party invited them in, for the purely selfish purpose of augmenting their own numbers. In new and colonial

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Munroe Smith: “‘The consent of the governed’ has meant, historically, the consent of those who were actually or potentially fighting units. Voting was invented, in early communities, to find out whether the rank and file of fighting men would or would not support action proposed by their leaders.” “The earliest method of counting votes was probably by division. The division was probably, at the outset, a line up for a fight, and the submission of the shorter to the longer line was due to ocular demonstration that resistance would be hopeless.” James Russell Lowell once said that voting was counting heads in place of breaking them.” *The Consent of the Governed*, in *Publications of the Academy of Political Science*, vol. v., 1914, pp. 82, 87, 87-8.

<sup>14</sup> This, of course, still holds good. “Great innovations,” said Jefferson, “should not be forced on a slender majority,” *Works*, Washington ed., v. 281, 282, cf. Madison, *Writings*, i. 516, and W. Maclay, *Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United States*, Harrisburg, 1880, p. 187. It would, for instance, have been unwise for the Democrats in 1896 to have attempted to introduce bimetallism, if they had won the election with only a small majority; for the other side, in possession of the machinery of the government and of a great excess of the property, were ready to resist with force.

<sup>15</sup> This is the essence of Jefferson’s political philosophy. “We are sensible,” wrote he, “of the duty and expediency of submitting our opinions to the will of the majority, and can wait with patience till they get right if they happen to be at any time wrong,” *Works*, Ford’s ed., vii. 418.

countries, like ours originally and our western States still, labouring men and foreigners have even been offered the franchise as an inducement to their coming, so much were they needed by those who settled there first; and in the neighbouring States in the East the ruling classes have found it necessary likewise to extend the franchise as an inducement to their labourers to stay at home. But even in our happy land everything has not been so peaceful, and in Rhode Island, which for two or three generations after the Revolution was ruled by a small and uneven electorate, a rebellion, known as Dorr's War, was necessary to compel a revision of the constitution and to gain the admission of the greater part of the male population. What was going on in America, by attracting emigration from abroad, induced greater democratisation in Europe and led to the widening of the electorate there too. So it happened that in many countries practically all men have been admitted to the franchise; and in a few of our States, beginning in the West, where women were fewest and most needed, even women have been admitted.

The process has often gone too far even where confined to men: in some countries too many men have been admitted, through force of momentum of the movement. This was notably the case when, in our country, a party in the North gave the political franchise to the newly emancipated slaves in the South, only with the result of causing much confusion at first and ending with the practical disfranchisement of the weakly organisable negroes there by the strongly organised whites, who, being the stronger, would not submit to the weaker, with complete disregard of numbers. But it is the case, to some extent, everywhere, almost normally, through the impossibility in human affairs of perfectly conforming practice to theory. It occurs wherever universal male suffrage is adopted. For, as we have seen, the cripples and those dependent on public charity have no claim for admission, nor have foreigners till they are thoroughly identified with the country of their adoption and completely detached from their native state. Not strictly in agreement with the theory, also weak men have been admitted to the franchise, although stronger women are excluded,—and yet not altogether so out of agreement, after all, since weak men can often fight, when it comes to blows, better than strong women. But it has ever been thus, and the disagreement is only that of practice in general, which is rough and never able to take account of trivial exceptions. When new classes became strong enough to demand recognition, also their weak members were admitted, as we have seen, and not inaptly, since in the strong classes already in possession also

their weaker (but not all too weak) members were consulted, while the strong members of weak classes were still excluded. And so, for the very reason that the minority of incompetent men cannot be excluded, the minority of competent women cannot be included, just as, in the South, weak white men are included and strong coloured men are excluded. Moreover, these admissions of comparatively weak men are made because it is not worth while to exclude them, as they do little harm. Ordinarily, according to the laws of probability, the weak are divided on both sides of a question in about the same proportions as are the strong, except possibly on questions of war, where the timidity of the weak may incline them more to peace; but on all other questions the difference between weakness and strength (in the same class, or in the same race or sex) does not enter among the determinants of opinion. Hence the presence of weak men in the franchise is not apt to change the relative position of forces on the opposite sides of most of the questions that come up for decision, and not materially in any.

Not so, however, would be the case, if women were admitted to the franchise. Women are as numerous as men on the whole, and in some countries more numerous. Their votes might on some questions be thrown mostly on one side, because sex does affect opinion (and for this reason women want the vote), and then the side which had a majority due to the women's votes would really be the weaker. Thus, with woman suffrage, the count of heads would no longer prove on which side the greater force lay, the method of obtaining this result would be confused, and the purpose of employing it defeated. Naturally it would never happen that all men would be on the one side and all women on the other:<sup>16</sup> if that could happen, there would be plain sailing, and nobody would dream of giving the suffrage to women. The difficulty arises from the mixture, and trouble would come from inability to know how much of the result is due to women and how much to men. On ordinary occasions, especially in countries already accustomed to submitting to the count of ballots, the difference between a man's vote and a woman's vote would pass unnoticed, and things would proceed as though women were men. Especially would this be the case

<sup>16</sup> This supposition has sometimes been inadvertently made, as by Mrs. Clara T. Leonard in a paper against *Woman Suffrage* read before a legislative committee in 1884. It has led some advocates of woman suffrage into the opposite error of rejecting the whole argument as "an ingenious effort of imagination, but of no weight as a practical argument," because this "contingency could never occur": so George Pellew, *Woman and the Commonwealth: or a Question of Expediency*, Cambridge, Mass., 1892, p. 14. Even Higginson seemed to think he disposed of this matter by saying "there is no possibility of a political division in which all the women shall be on one side and all the men on the other." *Common Sense about Women*, Works, iv. 332.

in sections of a country on their local affairs (of cities, and, in our country, of States), where the decision even of a known majority of women against a known majority of men would be executed, in case of forcible opposition, by aid from the rest of the country. But in national affairs especially, where there is no external superior arbiter, on subjects which arouse passion, such as are apt to occur every generation or two, the minority might suspect that they contained really the majority of men, and at last might refuse to respect the decision of the feminine majority. Fighting might therefore again be resorted to, and would probably end with depriving women of the franchise.

This is no fanciful picture; for, although we have not had woman suffrage long enough anywhere in modern times to reach such a catastrophe, and have only a legendary report of such an event in the past,<sup>17</sup> we have plenty of other instances of a strong minority of voters not submitting to a weak majority. The practical exclusion of the negroes from the franchise in the South is a case in point. There, before this final consummation, a minority of whites, over and over again, refused to submit to the decision of a majority of blacks. We have instances even of mistakes committed by a minority revolting because they thought themselves the stronger, though they were not. This was the case in our Civil War, when, although men were alone counted on both sides, the men of the South believed themselves superior to the men of the North. Revolt against a stolen majority, merely of votes, not of voters, would have again occurred in 1876-77 but for the realisation by the men of the Democratic side that after all they were not strong enough to have their way, or at least that it was not worth the trouble. If such things can happen with men alone voting, they would be still more frequent if women composed a half of the franchise.<sup>18</sup>

A case in point was recently before the world (in the winter of 1915-16) in the question in England whether to compel men to

<sup>17</sup> In ancient Attica, as above noticed, p. 83, when most of the men voted to dedicate the city to Poseidon and most of the women to Athene, and when, though the women's victory was allowed to stand, the men thereupon deprived them not only of the right to vote but of the headship in the family.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Francis Parkman: "Once in our history a minority rose against the majority, in the belief that it could out-fight it. This would happen often if the minority, as in the supposed case of woman suffrage, had not only the belief but the certainty that it could master the majority," *Some of the Reasons against Woman Suffrage*, p. 12.—Against this argument Blease urges that if ever such opposition occurred between a majority of men on the one side and a majority of women on the other, "then the dissolution of society is only a matter of time, whether women are enfranchised or not," *op. cit.*, 247. But he does not explain his meaning or attempt to support his position. Another mere assertion of his is that the risk of such opposition is so small as not to deserve to enter into political calculations, 253. He, of course, is more familiar with English than American women. Luckily for him, while the majority of men is opposed to this very question of woman suffrage, he is not confronted with a majority of women for it.

go to war, by conscription. The British legislature hesitated over this project, because they were not sure whether, if adopted, it could be enforced — that is, they did not know whether a majority of men in the country favoured it. Whether there was a majority of women for or against it, was immaterial, except for their "indirect influence" over the men. If the country had had woman suffrage, the women and their representatives might have been against conscription while the majority of men were for it, and so the country might have been deprived of this benefit. Or if the majority of men were against it, a majority of women might have been for it, and this majority with a minority of men might have passed the measure, and then have been unable to enforce it, plunging the country into turmoil.<sup>19</sup> Women's votes, of course, are not an utter nullity, where they exist. They must be counted, and some deference paid to them; for the forms of government cannot be lightly disregarded. The form of government admitting women's votes to the count, the majority of men cannot recognise itself and organise itself. The real machinery of government is defective. Hence the men's will may be defeated or thwarted, sometimes with permanent effect. For instance, during a war a majority of women added to a minority of men might make peace prematurely, and thus give away the very thing the majority of men were fighting for. Or in peace such a compound majority might refrain from going to war on a favourable opportunity, and so bring the country into dire straits on another occasion favourable to the enemy. Such might have been the predicament of Great Britain to-day, if at the election before 1914 as many women as men had voted for the members of Parliament; for then they might have elected more pacifist members — as indeed is the claim that they would do, — and Great Britain might have stayed out of the war, France have been crushed, and Great Britain now be contemplating a similar fate. Women's votes joined to men's mix no better than oil and water, but produce a confused emulsion, and misrepresent the power and will of a country, possibly underrating it at times, and overrating it at other times. Men alone often make such mistakes, but with women added to the count of heads without arms this result would happen still more frequently, exaggeratedly, and dangerously.

Votes represent power. "The suffrage," said Daniel Webster, "is the delegation of the power of an individual to some agent."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> It was a curious exhibition made by the Premier, Wm. M. Hughes, in Australia, in September and October, 1916, beseeching the women of that country at the coming referendum to permit some men to coerce other men to go to war to fight for them.

<sup>20</sup> *Works*, vi. 224, similarly 229. Cf. Brougham: "The essence of representa-

Votes represent opinions also, of course, but opinions controlling power, or the opinions of powerful men. No, says a female suffragist—and she is sustained by some men in her party—"a vote is simply a written expression of opinion."<sup>21</sup> No statement could be more false. Votes, properly, express, not mere opinion, not mere wish, but will, which is opinion and wish backed by force and by the determination to use force if necessary. "This is the true idea of the state," again said Webster: "it is an organised government representing the collected will of the people."<sup>22</sup> And the means of collecting this will is the vote. The suffrage, said Blackstone, is "the declaration of the people's will."<sup>23</sup> In a representative government it is not the mere opinion of a majority of the population that prevails, but the will of the majority of the people—the powerful members of the community.<sup>24</sup> "The will of the majority should prevail," said Jefferson, and he frequently repeated the statement, almost always in this connection using the term "will."<sup>25</sup> Of course, when men alone vote, their will coincides with their opinion, and so, after male suffrage became pretty general in our country, it be-

tion is that the power of the people should be parted with, and given over, for a limited period, to the deputy chosen by the people," *Political Philosophy*, iii. 33.

<sup>21</sup> Alice S. Blackwell, *Objections Answered*, i. So Gail Hamilton: "Voting is the prescribed, legal official way of expressing opinion," *Woman's Wrongs*, 98 (and in this book the authoress shows no other conception of the vote, cf. 76, 77, 88, 97, 110). Similar is the opinion of the Trade Union Woman's Suffrage League of Greater New York, as voiced by their President and Secretary, Alfred J. Boulton and Frank A. Byrne, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1915: "The ballot is an instrument by which a free people may register their views on questions which affect the Commonwealth." Even a judge, Wm. H. Wadham, is reported (in the same newspaper, April 7, 1915) to have spoken of the ballot as "merely an expression of opinion." What is to become of a country when its jurists do not know the first principles of constitutional law?

<sup>22</sup> *Works*, vi. 222.

<sup>23</sup> *Commentaries*, i. 170. The full meaning of "will" in this connection may be seen by comparing two definitions of government given by Price. "A government," wrote he in 1776, "is, or ought to be, nothing but an institution for collecting and carrying into execution the will of the people," *Observations on Civil Liberty*, 47. And again in 1785: "Civil government is an expedient for collecting the wisdom and force of a community," *Observations on the American Revolution*, 14. He here added: "Free states ought to be bodies of armed citizens, well regulated, and well disciplined, and always ready to turn out, when properly called upon, to execute the laws, to quell riots, and to keep the peace," 16. Cf. Mackintosh: "Representation is an expedient for peacefully, systematically, and unequivocally collecting this universal voice"—the reason of all men, guiding their will, to be expressed in law,—and he complained of the narrowness of the franchise in England in his day because "the general will does not govern," *Vindiciae Gallicae*, 1791, in *Works*, iii. 153, 154, cf. 151.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Locke: "When any number of men [note that it is men, and not women or children] have consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority; for that which acts any community being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority." *Of Civil Government*, 95-6.

<sup>25</sup> *Works*, Washington ed., ii. 332; similarly vii. 496, ix. 131, cf. ii. 297, iii. 489, vii. 183, viii. 125, and the passage above quoted, p. 299n.

came not uncommon to speak of "public opinion" as being our guiding principle.<sup>26</sup> Hence, because a cat may look at a king, and any woman can have an opinion, the totally wrong idea has originated that women's opinions ought to be counted, as part of public opinion, and that this is the full meaning of the democratic principle.<sup>27</sup> But the guiding principle of democracy is not public opinion but public will—or only public opinion confined to men's opinion. For it is the object of government, not merely to pass laws as expressions of the people's desires, but to enforce them as expressions of, and by means of, the people's will, determination, and power, which are embodied only in men. "The execution of the laws," said Jefferson, "is more important than the making of them."<sup>28</sup> Laws without force behind them are nullities; and law-makers without force in them are absurdities. "A legal proposition without compulsion behind it," some lawyer has said, "is a contradiction in itself: a fire that burns not, a light that shines not." Votes cast by women are like guns that fire not—guns without men behind them:<sup>29</sup> good enough for show in quiet times, but useless in times of stress—mere dummies then.<sup>30</sup> Hence the fatuity of the oft-repeated assertion that to

<sup>26</sup> Jefferson himself once wrote: "Government being founded on opinion, the opinion of the public, even when it is wrong, ought to be respected to a certain degree," *Works*, Ford's ed., v. 282. All his other writings show that he had only men in view in this connection, wherefore it was legitimate for him to speak of their "opinion" in place of their "will." Jefferson got the statement that "government is founded on opinion" from Hume, *Essays*, I, iv., who, however, was a Tory, and used it in a different sense, applying it to all governments, even to despotisms, which, he says, must at least lead their prætorian bands, or mamelukes "by their opinion." Hume used "governors" only of the leaders, and not of the whole body whose force keeps the rest in subjection. The leaders rest on this body by consent or opinion—it is the opinion only of men, and hence equivalent to their will; but the leaders do not consult the opinions or wishes of the rest. It is, therefore, wrong for Hume to say that "force is always on the side of the governed, the governors having nothing to support them but opinion." The governors have the force of their followers to support them, and with this force, either the majority, or if a minority, armed and organised, they are stronger than the rest, either a smaller or the larger part of the people whom they govern. When the oligarchy tried to rule at Athens in 404 B. C., Theramenes criticised them for wishing to rule by force while yet they were weaker than those whom they would rule; whereupon they disarmed all but their own three thousand partisans, attempting in this way at least to make the ruled weaker than the rulers. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II, iii. 19, 20.

<sup>27</sup> Hence also such an error as the following. "Representative government is not possible," says Anna Ross Weeks, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915, "if the opinion of one half of the people [= population] are unrecorded." Or reference is made to "the injustice of a constitution which allows a vote to only one-half its citizens," as by Mrs. B. O. Edey, in the *Patchogue Argus*, Sept. 29, 1916. The case, by the way, is really much worse, as not a quarter of the population have the suffrage, and not half of them would have it even with its extension to women. Then what right still would that minority have to rule the majority? It is owing to this error that democracy is spoken of as "the mother of feminism," Mrs. Hale, *What Women Want*, 8; repeated by Mrs. Tuttle, *The Awakening of Woman*, 107. Democracy has no such legitimate offspring.

<sup>28</sup> *Works*, Washington ed., iii. 82.

<sup>29</sup> "As boys playing 'soldier' with sticks for guns, the woman voter carries a gun that won't go off," Mrs. John Martin, *Feminism*, 323.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Lyman Abbott: "Nothing is law which has not authority behind it; and there is no real authority where there is not power to compel obedience. . . . A ballot is not a mere expression of opinion; it is an act of the will; and behind this act of the will must be power to compel obedience. . . . The ballot is explicitly an act

cast a ballot is a very easy operation — not so difficult, it has been said, as to match a ribbon,<sup>31</sup> and perfectly within the competence of women.<sup>32</sup> The act of voting is a very small part of the affair. It may be all, for the ordinary voter, when everything is working smoothly. But things are likely to work smoothly because it is not all — because there is the potentiality of force behind the vote.

The sovereignty of every country resides in those who have the power to execute their will. It has resided mostly in a few men, since the rest were not in possession of power enough to have a will of their own — a will they could make effectual. It has come in some countries to reside in practically all men, not because all are in this position, but because all classes of men now are, and most of the men in them. According to the democratic doctrine of our revolutionary ancestors, "in every government there is a supreme, sovereign, absolute, and uncontrollable power; but this power resides always in the body of the people."<sup>33</sup> Evidently this power does not reside in the women of the community, or else they would not now be begging for admission to the suffrage; nor can it ever reside in children.<sup>34</sup> It may have resided in women, to some extent, when they were strong enough. Herodotus tells us of a Scythian tribe, the Sauromatae, whose women hunted and fought in company with

of the will, and implicitly an expression of power or force. . . . Politics is pacific war. . . . The great elections are called, and not improperly called, campaigns." *Why Women do not Wish the Suffrage*, Atlantic Monthly, Sept., 1903, p. 293.

<sup>31</sup> Lady Holder, *Woman Suffrage in Australia*, The Independent, New York, June 9, 1904, quoted in a leaflet on the same subject published by the National Woman Suffrage Association, Political Equality Series, No. 6. Cf. above, p. 244. So the women of New Zealand said, according to Ch. E. Russell in *Everybody's Magazine*, New York, Dec., 1906 (quoted in another Political Equality Leaflet), "they had not found it any more dreadful to go to a polling place and vote there than to go to a store and buy bread."

<sup>32</sup> This argument has no less a sponsor than Bentham, in his *Constitutional Code*, published in 1827 (*Works*, ix. 108B). It is countenanced even by Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, ii. 548; also by John Bigelow, who in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1894 said "it takes very little time to cast a vote," *Revised Record*, ii. 410. Even T. Roosevelt has indulged in this argument. Yet since the outbreak of the war in Europe he has had to lay stress on the immense importance of force. Thus his book *Fear God and Take your own Part* is almost entirely addressed to men. He exhorts us to be worthy sons of our ancestors, 57; desires "a nation of freemen trained to the use of arms," 404; and thinks no man has a right to the vote who will not fit himself to fight for his country, 228, cf. 97-8, 106, 227. Resting upon the same faulty idea is such a statement as this, by Anna H. Shaw (following in the steps of Mrs. Gilman): "Lying between these two functions of father and mother [which cannot be exchanged], is the great plane of human functions which belongs equally to both men and women, and in that plane the ballot is included. And both men and women can use it equally well," *Ten Extempore Answers to Questions*, no. 5. The last is true only if the ballot is nothing but a piece of paper dropped in a box and containing an expression of opinion, which is somehow to actualise itself (like a child's letter to Santa Claus, as somebody has said), and so can be used by anybody who has an opinion.

<sup>33</sup> So a Proclamation, drafted by John Adams, of the Government and General Court of the Colony of Massachusetts in 1775; in Adams's *Works*, i. 193. Adams himself spoke of "the great body of the people as the source of all legitimate authority, no less than of all efficient power," ix. 148, cf. 107, vi. 469. Power and authority go together.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Simonds above, p. 261n.

the men.<sup>35</sup> As long as they did that, they probably voted with them.<sup>36</sup> Some of our women still hunt in company with men, in the delicate fashion of high civilisation, employing professional hunters (always men) to prepare the way. Some few women also fight in company with men, though probably most of them are Urnings. In the war now raging we hear every once in a while of a soldier being found to be a woman; which, of course, is no new thing, as the same has happened in every war. But the proportion is hardly one woman to a hundred thousand men. There have been women captains, who have led their men valiantly, as, for instance, Boadicea among the ancient Britons. But they, like Joan of Arc, have done their work as women, different from men,—as inspirers of enthusiasm; and mostly among primitive peoples have they done so, and never could they have led other women; such women, in fact, have generally despised other women. Women have also taken part in revolutions, but generally during the irregularities at the beginning, and when serious, organised, and long-continued effort became the order of the day, they have receded to the background as incompetent. They are not competent to seize a share in the sovereignty of any civilised country. To give them a share in the sovereignty is to give them what they cannot receive, except in appearance, on sufferance.

Men, to repeat, have made government, and to do so have not asked leave of women. Women never have made, and never could make, government without the leave of men. Under the so-called matriarchy there was no real government by women. As for the Amazons, it is related of them that they lamed their male offspring to keep them from becoming stronger than themselves:<sup>37</sup> in no other way could they rule over men. Women's inferior competency for governing is historically demonstrated. If women think, however, that they are now becoming equally competent with men, or soon will be, let them (if previous refutations are not sufficient) consider the case of their running the government alone. Men have run the government alone, and have done so gladly, of their own initiative, assuming the charge, and performing the duties—more or less imperfectly, to be sure, but only as women themselves have performed their household duties more or less imperfectly. If women are equally com-

<sup>35</sup> IV. 116-17. The same is told of them by Hippocrates, *De Aere, Aquis, Locis*, c. 24; Plato, *Laws*, VII. 804E-805A; Diodorus, II. xliv. Cf. Pacuvius of the Scritthini (a Finnish tribe), *Bel. Goth.*, II. 15.

<sup>36</sup> Possibly also the women of the Zaucees, in Libya, who acted as charioteers for their husbands, Herodotus, IV. 193.

<sup>37</sup> Hippocrates, *De Articulis*, c. 53. Other accounts are that they either killed or sent them away. So even in historical times. In Bohemia in the eighth century, according to Aeneas Silvius, the amazons under Valasca had the right eye and thumb of the boys removed.

petent with men to take part in government, they ought to be equally able to run the government alone equally as well as men, and equally as willingly. Well, would women be willing, seriously, to do so? Would they not, on the contrary, stand aghast at the very proposal of men turning over the government to them and leaving them in control? Some of their intransigent leaders might asseverate their willingness. But the majority of sensible women would not. They would know that they would be completely incapable of maintaining order within their own borders — of suppressing the lawlessness and criminality of men; and that they would be utterly incapable of defending the country against attacks of the wicked men who control other countries. Only let men — all men, throughout all the world — be good enough to obey the women governors set up by women voters, and carry out their commands, then women might rule. But men are not so good everywhere, and not even anywhere. Men make women obey them, women cannot make men obey them. Let the men in any country stand aside and leave it to the women to govern it: within a week the women's absolute incompetence would be revealed; and if they were given fifty or a hundred years to prepare, the result would not be different. Nature has made men the rulers, and women the ruled. Men are not responsible for this arrangement, and if women do not consent to it, they are only foolish, for they must still submit to it.<sup>38</sup> Men's power over women is not a usurped power, as some women have idly charged: <sup>38a</sup> men have simply employed the power which Nature has entrusted to them alone.<sup>38b</sup>

Men, to repeat again, have made, and still do make, government. This is their original and indefeasible title to its management.<sup>39</sup> So it is with us. Our forefathers made our governments: they, as we have seen, were the people from whom the

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Mrs. John Martin: Woman "casts her ballot when and where men suffer her to do so. She can neither secure the ballot nor hold it without his consent. She may rail at this as much as she likes; but such is the case, and nobody is to blame for it except Nature, which made her the weaker," *Feminism*, 323.

<sup>38a</sup> E.g., Victoria C. Woodhull: "Women have no government. Men have organized a government, and they maintain it to the utter exclusion of women. Women are as much members of the nation as men are, and they have the same right to govern themselves which men have. Men have none but an usurped right to the arbitrary control of women," in Paulina W. Davis's *History of the National Woman Suffrage Movement*, 117.

<sup>38b</sup> Contrast with the preceding statement of Mrs. Emma Willard: "The only natural government on earth is that of a family — the only natural sovereign, the husband and father. Other just governments are these sovereigns confederated; that they may together the better secure the advantage of all their families combined," in Lord's *Life of Emma Willard*, 117.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Edward Curtis: "Such association, grown from simple beginnings to the complex organisation known as the state, is thus, primordially and essentially, an organisation of the males, by the males, for the masculine function of provisions and defence," *The Philosophy of It*, quoted by Mrs. Jacobi in her "Common Sense" applied to the Woman Suffrage Question, 110. The argument makes no impression on her because she thinks the situation now "reversed," 111, 115.

authority of our governments sprang; and they have handed down their handiwork to their male descendants as the proper persons to take their places in it. Some of our fathers in the line of descent, using the power transmitted to them, have extended participation to other men — to men coming from abroad, and to men of lower classes, on the belief (not always right) that they too would be competent. We American men now have the right to vote — have what Gail Hamilton (without perceiving its import) called “the lordship of voting,”<sup>40</sup> — not because we are men, or human beings, or citizens, or the people, but because the right, or the recognition of the power, was obtained for us by other men, with the understanding that we hand it on to other men,<sup>41</sup> “The right to choose representatives,” said Webster, “is every man’s part (if he has the proper qualifications) in the exercise of sovereign power.”<sup>42</sup>

Such, in rather full outline, is the argument, which, to repeat, has been called “the force argument,” for not going beyond men in the extension of the franchise. One form or another of it has constantly been expounded by writers on this side of the suffrage question. Perhaps it has never been better expressed than by a most womanly woman, Mrs. Mary Mapes Dodge. “Voting power,” she wrote, “is based on fighting power. The rule of the majority is at bottom the rule of force. Sixty thousand voters yield to a hundred thousand voters not because they believe them to be wiser than themselves, but because they know them to be stronger. When they do not believe them to be stronger, they do not yield. They resist, and we have a rebellion. It is the knowledge that there is a physical force under-

<sup>40</sup> *Woman’s Wrongs*, 166.

<sup>41</sup> This meets certain counter-statements of woman suffragists, which repeat the fallacy, above pointed out, p. 252, of taking the end of an induction carried too far for the beginning of a deduction. Thus Wm. I. Bowditch: “The men of 1780 had the right of suffrage, not because of any law or constitution or charter or grant whatever, not even because they were men, or men who were actually in possession of power, but solely because they formed part of the people, in whom alone the power of sovereignty resided. In like manner the men of to-day, we ourselves, have the right of suffrage, not because we [as before], but solely because we form part of the people of the state,” *Woman Suffrage a Right, not a Privilege*, Boston, 1879, p. 7. Brand Whitlock: “Men vote because they are men. There is no other reason than that, and women have the right to vote because they are women, because with men they are part of humanity,” *Women and Democracy*, 7-8. Ch. A. Beard: “Every argument which can be adduced in favour of allowing anybody but kings to share in the government, can be adduced in favour of women,” *The Common Man and the Franchise*. Anna H. Shaw: “The reason men are enfranchised is that, as citizens, they have a stake in the government. That is all there is to this question of woman suffrage,” *Equal Suffrage — a Problem of Political Justice*, Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, Jan., 1914, p. 96.

<sup>42</sup> *Works*, vi. 223. A mistake is sometimes made in this connection by opponents of woman suffrage, as, for instance, Gronlund, when he says “the suffrage is a trust granted by the state for its own benefit to such citizens as,” etc., *The New Economy*, 126-7. The state has no existence apart from its citizens. A state was originally made by some men, who granted the suffrage to themselves and their male descendants; and they or their male descendants either offered it to, or had it extorted from them by, other men as they came to deserve it by acquiring power enough to wield it.

neath the vote strong enough to uphold the vote that gives to the vote its power; so that the ballot is not simply the expression of desire, but the measure of strength.”<sup>43</sup> A man’s expression of it may be quoted as follows, in the words of Rossiter Johnson: “As the financial world has invented bank-notes, checks, and letters of credit, which pass current for the things they represent, so various devices have been brought into use by which available forces can be measured and the result of a conflict be foretold, whereupon the destined losers submit without a conflict, and thus save life and treasure. This is the philosophy of a popular election.”<sup>44</sup> It has long been before the public both here<sup>45</sup> and in England.<sup>46</sup> It lurks even, at times, in the words of its opponents.<sup>46a</sup> It has never been refuted.

<sup>43</sup> *Woman’s Worth and Worthlessness*, New York, 1872, p. 247. More briefly another woman, Mrs. Francis Scott: “The vote is only a way of avoiding a physical contest over every difference of opinion,” in *The New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1913. The argument is fully expounded by Mrs. Johnson, who emphasises the need of confining the ballot to the hands of those who can enforce the decrees they issue, for the sake of stability of government in a democracy, *Woman and the Republic*, 49, 55-73, 78-85. See also Mrs. John Martin, *Feminism*, 322.

<sup>44</sup> *The Blank-Cartridge Ballot*, 2-3. He adds, like Mrs. Dodge: “Those who find themselves in the minority give up, and permit the majority to have their way, not because they are convinced that they have been in the wrong and their opponents in the right”—they would change their views, in that case, which they rarely do, unless the result turns out well,—“but because they know that if they do not submit peacefully, they will be compelled to do so,” 2-3. “Our only safety is in manhood suffrage, because the final arbiter is manhood strength,” 4. “The ballot is not a power, but only a means of reckoning power,” 7.

<sup>45</sup> In the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853, A. P. Marvin (force now necessary; when not, then the vote itself not; see above, p. 284n.). In the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872-3, L. Bartholomew (in part: “Woman takes no part in the functions of government by reason of her weakness”) *Debates*, i. 577A-B. In the New York Constitutional Convention of 1894, C. W. H. Arnold (“The foundation of every government must, as a last resort, rest in force. . . . We give the right to vote because it goes with the duty of enforcing governmental decrees”) *Revised Record*, ii. 506-7; W. P. Goodelle (“it would be harmful to invest with controlling powers of legislation citizens who confessedly would be unable to enforce their laws by physical force, if necessity required”) *ib.*, 531; Elihu Root (“Politics is modified war. . . . In the divine distribution of powers, the duty and the right of protection rests with the male”) *ib.*, 522; N. A. Woodward (“Nature has placed this duty of defending women and children upon the male sex”) *ib.*, 560. Reference may also be made to E. D. Cope’s *The Relation of the Sexes to Government*, 11.

<sup>46</sup> Frederic Harrison: “It is because men—and men only—can do these things [fight, build, dig, etc.] and represent the material force, that men, and men only, are entitled to the political control which in the last resort their muscular force has to make good and defend.” “Nothing has occurred to shake the ancient and eternal truth that men are far more fit than women to rule the state, which, materially speaking, is mainly the work of men’s toil, and which in the way of physical defence is solely the task of men’s bodies and lives.” *Realities and Ideals*, London, 1908, pp. 131, 141. H. Hart: “When a man votes, he shows how he would, if occasion arose, exercise his corresponding share of the physical power of the state. If a woman voted, she would express an opinion which she would have no corresponding power to enforce. Her vote would count as much in the election as the vote of a man. But, unlike him, she could not enforce her own vote. Her vote, therefore, would not be finally decisive. It would depend upon the disposition of the men whether they would give effect to it or not,” *Woman Suffrage*, 29. His general argument along this line covers pp. 19-30. Cf. Wright, *Unexpurgated Case against Woman Suffrage*, 71, 82-7, 88, 160, 177, 182-3, 184; also A. V. Dicey, *Woman Suffrage Quarterly Review*, Jan., 1909, pp. 292-7, 300; and H. Owen, *Woman Adrift*, 67-80, 126-7, 222.

<sup>46a</sup> Thus the woman suffragist Walter Lippmann writes: “What does an election mean? It means that there is a counting of electoral strength, followed by one party’s taking possession of the government,” *The Stakes of Diplomacy*, 212. It must be added that he says on the next page, “the element of force has practically dis-

Very few even have been the attempts to answer it. As already stated, it is generally pooh-poohed, so much easier is it so to treat what one cannot meet and does not wish to understand. It has, too, been ridiculed as old and mouldy, as though an argument loses strength through age.<sup>47</sup> It must, indeed, have been an ancient argument, coeval with government itself, although we have little mention of it, so self-evident did it appear.<sup>48</sup> And yet Mr. Blease in England, probably from ignorance, objects to it that it is new—"entirely modern,"—and finds significance therein, as "old prejudices never want for new arguments to defend them."<sup>48a</sup>

The few attempted replies to it generally show misunderstanding of it. One of the commonest is to point to the fact that in no modern democratic state is the franchise confined to those men who are conscripted into the army or militia, or even to those who are capable of serving. Young men are excluded who can

appear, because people are able to form opinions, express them, and trust their fellow-citizens to realise them in practice"; but this is inconsistent with the much truer statement made on the page before, that "what has happened within territories like the United States is not the abolition of force, but its sublimination." Cf., also John Morley, to be quoted later in note 64.

47 E.g., Katherine Anthony: "In the fourteenth century the guilds began to exclude women and to limit their work. They discovered that there was an old rule which declared that only those persons could be members who were able to bear arms. This same argument, mouldy and musty from the Middle Ages, has been revived in the twentieth century for use against the suffragists," *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia*, 174. As a fact, the guilds were modelled upon the governmental regulations of their day. Women were in them only as members of the family, but sonless widows and brotherless heiresses remained in them of their own right till they married. They took no part in deliberations, but attended festivities and enjoyed benefices. So. W. E. Wilde, *Das Gildenwesen im Mittelalter*, Halle, 1831, p. 116, cf. 329, 330-1. They could be apprentices and workers, but not masters, because masters had to serve on the *guet*, or watch (*i.e.*, the city militia and police), and women could not so serve: E. Martin-Saint-Léon, *Histoire des Corporations de Métier*, Paris, 1897, pp. 96-7. Thus even as widows and heiresses they could not be full members, because they could not perform the whole duties. Nothing could be simpler.

48 Perhaps the earliest record of the use of this argument from force is found in the works of Aristotle, though in a slightly different connection, in his criticism of Hippodamus. That Milesian city-builder would have divided the people into three classes—of warriors, artisans, and farmers,—and have given to all the right to vote; but he would have allowed to the warriors alone the possession of arms. Aristotle pointed out that this class would exclude the others, *Politics*, II. viii. The reverse of this, in fact, was the conduct of the oligarchy at Athens, above referred to, p. 305n., who, in order to exclude, disarmed.

48a *The Emancipation of English Women*, 224n. Unfortunately, he does not define how modern or new he conceives it to be. As it stands, it is in America at least sixty years old, to judge from quotations above in notes 5 and 45 of this chapter and on p. 309; and it is latent in older English as well as American doctrine from Locke downward: see above in the preceding chapter notes 72, 74, and 76, and in this chapter notes 20, 23, and 24; and so plain is it that suffragists themselves sometimes fall into using it: see above, note 46a. Naturally, when the question was only about extending the franchise to lower classes of men in England prior to sixty years ago, there was little occasion for this argument, as all men are tolerably equal in physical force. Then the question was mostly about inequality of intelligence and differences of interests. But when the men's franchise was extended, then some women were indignant over such considerations excluding them. Therefore the occasion arose for the true argument peculiarly excluding them, and the argument appeared. Still, it is pronounced by Blease "the most pretentious and the most worthless of all arguments against woman suffrage," 253, and one that could prevail only "in the debating societies of Cloudbuckootown," 254. We may note that Blease's work is considered by Owen (*Woman Adrift*, 195n.) "the most tempered and reasoned" thing written in England on the suffragist side since Mill.

fight; old men are included who cannot fight; and even mature men, who because of their weak physique are rejected as soldiers, are not on that account disfranchised.<sup>49</sup> The rejection of such men from the army is merely due to the fact that in most cases it is not necessary for the army to include all the men of the country, and so the government takes its pick of the most suitable men. When the emergency is greater, more and more men are called, until at last practically all men are summoned.<sup>50</sup> In ordinary cases, no matter how strong all the men may be (or how weak all the women), yet on account of the differences in the strength of different men, only the strongest would be chosen.<sup>51</sup> Evidently the numbers of men rejected indicate nothing about the relative strength and fighting capacity of men and women. For, furthermore, the force argument does not refer only to defence against external foes: it refers to the enforcement of decisions on internal questions as well. The execution of these depends on men. Even such a purely social decree as a regulation requiring householders to clean the sidewalk before their doors, needs a policeman to arrest the occupant in case of disobedience. Some women are now policemen (save the mark!); but only to deal with other women and with children. Not all men, again, are qualified to be policemen. But men who have not these qualifications, still can fight when it comes to a revolution — then no height and chest measurements are made. We have already seen that, because of human roughness, weak men of strong classes were admitted when strong men of weak classes were excluded; and that, between the sexes, the same reason holds for admitting weak men, although strong women must be excluded. Moreover, if intelligence were also (as desired by the women suf-

<sup>49</sup> Much was made of this seeming inconsistency by Higginson, in his *Common Sense about Women*. He cited the Provost Marshal's figures during our Civil War, which declared that of every thousand in the different occupations 348 labourers, 544 lawyers, 954 clergymen, etc. were found unfit for service in the army, *Works*, iv. 328; and these figures are now cited by almost every female soap-box orator on the subject. Some of them, of course, especially the last, are absurdly exaggerated, indicating much favouritism in the selection of soldiers. Higginson further asserted that in most civilised countries the ruling classes could not stand up in a fight against the classes they rule, adducing this as proof that the world is ruled by brains (as if proof of that were needed!), *ib.*, 327-8. In this assertion he forgets the retainers, whose interests attach them to the rulers. When the ruled, whose interests are opposed, find that they are strong enough to overthrow their rulers, they do so. He overlooks, too, that many scattered men are not so strong collectively as are a few men combined and organised. Moreover, we in our country are not ruled by our officeholders, but by the majority of voters; and certainly these could stand up in a fight against the minority of voters, while the rest, the wholly ruled (the excluded men, women, and children), are likely to be divided in nearly the same proportions, and if not, it would be of no consequence, their power being small. Higginson's view is merely a repetition of Hume's: see above, p. 305n., which was applied to all governments. Brains had control in the past as well as now, — and force too.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Rossiter Johnson, *The Blank-Cartridge Ballot*, 6; Mrs. Johnson, *Woman and the Republic*, 59.

<sup>51</sup> Thus in strong races the requirements are always higher than in weak races.

fragists) taken as the principal norm for voting, the same difficulty would recur; for very stupid persons would still be allowed to vote. And if the theory, about force being at the bottom of government, cannot in the nature of things be carried out exactly as it ought to be in the case of men, this is not a reason why it should be thrown to the winds for the sake of admitting women. Even if we have not carried it out as accurately as it admits of being done, this is not a reason for giving up all attempt at accuracy and for substituting an entirely wrong theory. We may have admitted too many men to the franchise. The proper thing, then, to do, is to exclude the excess. Certainly, for instance, the "conscientious objector," who in time of war will not fight for his country, if he be excused from military service, ought to be disfranchised.<sup>52</sup> It is true that if people go far in a certain direction, this fact may be used as an argument for their going further. But the fact that we have gone too far, cannot rightly be adduced as a reason why we should go further.

Another attempted reply is the statement that, although women cannot bear arms, they bear the soldiers who bear the arms. Thus Lady Somerset has said, "she who bears soldiers does not need to bear arms."<sup>53</sup> It would be interesting to know whether this argument is made as frequently in other countries as in England and the United States, as it seems to be due to a pun upon the meanings of the English word "bear," and so is another quibble. However, it is backed up by the assertion, much insisted on, though not true on the whole, that the one performance is as dangerous as the other,<sup>54</sup> notwithstanding the one is

<sup>52</sup> This need not be looked upon as a punishment. It is simply a recognition of the loss of the right to take part in the management of a country when one refuses to take part in the defence of the country. Banishment would be the correct treatment in full of such slackers, who do not do their share in the social contract. But banishing is no longer in favour, as we have too much respect for our neighbours. Anyhow, metics are allowed in every country.

<sup>53</sup> Quoted by Alice S. Blackwell, *Objections Answered*, 19. Cf. Mrs. Snoad: "Some say women should not have the suffrage because they cannot fight—as well say men should not have the vote because they cannot bear children," *A Plea for Justice*, Westminster Review, July, 1892. In England this is called "the battlefield-of-maternity argument": see H. Owen, *Woman Adrift*, 97-100. As good, though no better, is Marie Corelli's reply, about "the plain, trite truth that woman was and is destined to make voters rather than to be one of them," *Woman or Suffragette?* London, 1907, p. 4.

<sup>54</sup> E.g., Henrietta Rodman, in *The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1915: "We do not ask the privilege [note the word] of bearing arms, because we have the privilege [again] of bearing children. The latter is quite as heavy a burden [so, privileges are burdens!] as is that of military service. This has been proved by statistics. In the United States alone 10,000 women die every year in childbirth, a greater number than there were men killed in battle in the Spanish-American war, and the women pay their toll every year." She gives only one side of the statistics, and does not state that the excess of deaths of males over females every year in our country alone from accidents to which their harder occupations expose them is about three times that figure.

purely an affair of nature.<sup>55</sup> Women and soldiers, also, are often contrasted by saying that the former give and save life, while it is the function of the latter to take life, with the implication that the advantage is with the women. The last is a general, and therefore an incomplete, statement. It is the soldier's business to take the life of the enemy, and the better he accomplishes this, the more lives of his own people he saves. Soldiers as men are, in fact, as necessary for the giving of life as are women, though they do not bear the new lives at their beginning; and they save more lives than do the women nurses at the rear, and in addition, if successful, they save the cause, which in their opinion, and in that of their women, is worth more than the lives lost. It is not easy to see the relevancy of this reply, until it is put in the fuller form as stated by Miss Blackwell, who, after quoting Mrs. Z. G. Wallace to the effect that "if women do not fight, they give to the state all its soldiers," adds "this ought in all fairness to be taken as an offset for the military service that women do not render."<sup>56</sup> The matter is looked upon as an exchange of services; men serve the state one way, women another, both equally (or it is said the women's service is the more important), therefore the state should recognise this equality, and treat them equally, giving the men no more privileges than the women, and withholding from the women no such privilege as the suffrage. The argument hardly admits of correct statement even, because the state, without giving more privileges to men than to women, might give different privileges to men and to women, and so confine the suffrage to men, while giving other privileges to women, such as exemption from military service. It also assumes that the suffrage is a privilege. A correct analysis of the argument leads to an entirely different conclusion. The services rendered to the state by men and by women, though different, are equal: let it be granted for the sake of the argument. Men and women, therefore, should have equal — what? Rights and duties? Hardly, since these are determined by the services they are capable of, which are admitted to be different, and the right or duty to vote has a direct connection with the function of enforcing the laws against

<sup>55</sup> The question has already been raised whether in a commonwealth of spiders the stronger females ought to grant the suffrage to the picayune males. Yet the danger the males among them run in fecundating the females seems to be greater than the danger incurred by females of the *genus homo* in bearing their offspring. Would this fact increase the duty of the female spiders to admit the males to equality in determining their public questions?

<sup>56</sup> *Objections Answered*, 18-19. Similarly Mrs. Jacobi: "The military functions performed by men, and so often perverted to most atrocious uses, have never been more than the equivalent for the function of childbearing imposed by nature upon women," "Common Sense" applied to *Woman Suffrage*, 215.

internal and external opponents, but none whatever with the function of bearing children. If the value of the services rendered in various ways (not only in fighting) by men to the state and to society, and the value of the services rendered in various ways (and not only in child-bearing) by women to the state and to society, be equal, or to the extent that they be equal, to that extent they should have equal reward. There is no other conclusion from the premisses. But voting, whether it be a right or a duty in those who can properly wield it, or even a privilege, is certainly not correctly regarded as a reward. Voting, therefore, does not come into consideration in the balancing up of the rewards. Voting is much rather one of the services themselves rendered by men to the state, being a virtual promise to see to it that the laws be enforced, and so is closely allied to the liability to military and other law-enforcing service.<sup>57</sup> Men, of course, do not receive the suffrage because of their services to the state; for then the suffrage would be treated as a reward for their services; which we have just seen it cannot be. Men have the suffrage for the much better reason that they constitute and support the state; which they do in time of need by fighting, and killing those who are inimical to the state. So far as support of the state is a service, the suffrage has connection with a service, but not with service in general—with any service. But it is not even a reward for this service, being a part of this service itself.<sup>58</sup> As for the rewards obtained for services, rewards for their services women get in plenty: they share in all the benefits of civilisation made by men, in all the benefits rendered to society by the state made by men, not to forget that children would seem to be their own reward.<sup>59</sup> It is, too, a curious commentary upon this argument, that it is advanced when and where women are putting off their function of child-bearing. In the days when women made a duty of so

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Mrs. Johnson, *Woman and the Republic*, 66.

<sup>58</sup> Roosevelt, who would confine the suffrage to those men who are willing to fight for their country, because a man does not otherwise do "a citizen's full duty," *Fear God and Take your own Part*, 98, cf. 349; yet would extend the suffrage also to women, or to some of them, because they too can "serve the country" according to their capacity [and no more can be required of any man], 102, cf. 73. But children also can serve the state: we now have boy scouts; yet we do not give them the suffrage on that account. The suffrage has no connection even with work.

<sup>59</sup> This offsetting of services and rewards, apart from the vote, is apparent enough to women when their contention needs defence thereby. Thus in reply to the argument that if women vote they should give up their present privileges, such as the wife's legal right to support from the husband, the Empire State Campaign Committee in a leaflet on *Women and New York State Laws* maintain that "the man's obligation to support his wife has nothing to do with voting," as "a man must support his wife because she gives him her services"—keeps house for him, for instance, and "brings up his children." Among these services one of the most important is this very one of bearing children to him; and for this "he is obliged to give her food, clothes, and shelter." Here, then, we have the compensation to women for child-bearing, and it has nothing to do with voting.

serving the state, they did not demand the franchise. Now they demand to bear children only when they want to. The explanation probably is, that the more irksome the function becomes, the more they need to be coaxed into it. Yet the result of the coaxing, as we have abundantly seen, would be more refusal.

The objection to the force argument which has most weight, is the sentiment that force ought not to have the importance which this argument attaches to it. In the New York Constitutional Convention of 1894 the venerable John Bigelow spoke of it as a "somewhat singular theory that the foundation of government was force," and said he almost felt he ought "to apologise for referring to it."<sup>60</sup> Instead, the notion is that importance should be assigned, and is coming to be assigned, rather to reason, intelligence, wisdom.<sup>61</sup> Yet the aristocratic idea that on this account only the intelligent and the educated, those whose reason has been trained and in whom wisdom has been developed, should be admitted to the franchise, has been abandoned by such democrats as Mr. Bigelow, and in our country at least, the idea prevails that the ruling power should be the will of the people. This, however, is nowadays not uncommonly perverted into the idea that the ruling power is public opinion—the opinion of the majority. "Where rests the Sovereign Power?" asks the female suffragist Mrs. Jacobi; and "the answer," she says, is, "according to the theory of democratic society: With the Public Opinion."<sup>62</sup> The origin of this error has already been explained.<sup>63</sup> It is an absurdity in itself; for only some force or power can be sovereign. The public will can be such, the public opinion never. If public opinion rules, it must do so by some force—a force of its own; and so we have the phrase "the force of public opinion." But as public opinion does not really rule, and only guides those who have power enough to rule, there is in reality no such thing as the force of public opinion, but only

<sup>60</sup> Yet the only thing he urged against it was to ask the lawyer who had advanced it "What force is? Did he ever feel force? Did he ever smell or taste force? Has force any sex?" *Revised Record*, ii. 409.

<sup>61</sup> Higginson: "The basis of civilised society is not physical force, but on the contrary brains." "The truth is that as civilisation advances the world is governed more and more unequivocally by brains; and whether the brains are deposited in a strong body or a weak one becomes a matter of less and less importance." *Common Sense about Women, Works*, iv. 326, 329. Similarly Ch. P. Howland says: "The force of the United States is the same force whether it is directed by men or by women," in *The New York Times*, March 28, 1915. No such divorce between force and its direction is possible. The force of a strong human body is not the same force, if it is directed by a sane or by an insane mind. The directions which forces take are necessary components of the resultant whole force which accomplishes some purpose, or does some work.

<sup>62</sup> "Common Sense" applied to Woman Suffrage, 82.

<sup>63</sup> Above, pp. 304-5.

the influence of public opinion — an influence in which women can share, though the final determination be not theirs.<sup>63a</sup>

But the idea is, rather, that, even if public opinion have not the power to rule, yet it ought to rule, or ought to be respected by the rulers.<sup>64</sup> This, to repeat, is now supposed to be the democratic principle. Or it is said, for instance by Max Eastman, that "the democratic hypothesis" is for the officials of government, not to sit back and think what ought to be done, but to "go and ask" the people what their desires are — what they want.<sup>65</sup> The wish of the people is now substituted for the will of the people, as the guiding principle of democracy. And as women can wish as well as men, their wishes, it is held, ought likewise to be respected, and their expressions of their wishes ought to be counted — in the vote. It is the new morality extended to politics: wishes, right or wrong, must not be contravened. But wishes are determined by opinions; and so the neo- (and pseudo-)democratic principle is, that the opinions of the majority of the population (children alone excepted) should prevail.

It is important to note that the substitute offered for force

<sup>63a</sup> Hence the absurdity of Blease's reply to the force argument: "Police are required to prevent offences. . . . But the police alone are nothing. Behind the police is the force of public opinion," *The Emancipation of English Women*, 244. Much truer would it be to say that public opinion alone is nothing: behind it is the force not only of the police but of all the men who have reason for obeying the call. Blease continues that if the suffrage be granted to women, "nothing is taken away from it, and the weight of additional opinion [of women] is added to it," 245-6. This is at bottom the same error as that committed by Mr. Howland above in note 61.

<sup>64</sup> "The will of the majority," further says Mrs. Jacobi, "rules, for the time being, not because, as has been crudely asserted, it possesses the power, by brute force, to compel the minority to obey its behests; but because, after ages of strife, it has been found more convenient, more equitable, more conducive to the welfare of the state, that the minority should submit, until, through argument and persuasion, they shall be able to win over the majority," *op. cit.*, 214. The statement is hollow, because it assigns no reason why, after ages of strife, this peaceful result has been attained; and if the writer would look for a reason, the only one to appear would be that the counting of heads of those who can fight gives the same result and clearly is "more convenient" and "more conducive to the welfare of the state," and not a whit less "equitable," than fighting would be. So even the suffragist John Morley: "The inconvenience to the minority of submitting to a law which they dislike, is less than the inconvenience of fighting to have their own way, or retiring to form a separate community. The minority submit to obey laws which were made against their will, because they cannot avoid the necessity of undergoing worse inconveniences than are involved in the submission," *Rousseau*, ii. 185. He also perceives that "the obedience of the subject to the sovereign has its root . . . in force,—the force of the sovereign to punish disobedience," 184. Again Mrs. Jacobi, after asking why men do not still settle all their disputes by fisticuffs, says "the answer is really in every one's mouth. It is not that *it* [this mode of settling disputes] cannot be done, but that *it* should not be done. It is not that physical force is respected less, but that mental force is respected more," 91. To be sure, the physically strong have acquired sufficient mental force, or intelligence, to see its value — to see that the use of it to foretell the result of using physical force is a great disturbance-saving substitute for the use of physical force (With Morley *cf.* above, n. 46a.)

<sup>65</sup> *Is Woman Suffrage Important?* North American Review, Jan., 1911, also reprinted by the Men's League for Woman Suffrage, and five-starred by Miss Franklin in her bibliography. So also H. Parsons: "The theory of democratic government, even under representative institutions, is that in the end the desire of the voters shall be accomplished," in *The New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1915.

as the basis of government is not wisdom, but opinion.<sup>66</sup> No one, apart from a few ultras, pretends that women are wiser than men, and that their admission to the franchise will increase the wisdom with which the government is conducted. Wisdom, of course, is the highest desideratum — wisdom guiding force. But, in the absence of absolute wisdom, why should the public opinion prevail? If it is conjoined with the public force, we see a good reason why it should prevail; if not, there is none. For opinion is not necessarily reasonable, intelligent, or wise, and not as good a reason can be given why the majority of opinion should rule, as why the majority of force should be submitted to; for the plain reason for the latter is that it must be, and for the former there is no good reason at all. The only assignable reason why the majority of opinion should be granted the right of way, is to please the greatest number. This is not the utilitarian principle, which is to act in the way most conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number: it is the namby-pambiness that would spoil a child by letting it always have what it wants. Merely to please is not a high ideal, although it seems to be the one now set up. On picnics decisions on questions that arise are generally made according to the wishes of the majority; and there the voices of women and even of children are not only heard, but they receive greater weight than any others. But government is not an ephemeral pleasure junket. It is something serious and permanent, which must look not merely to present desires, but to consequences in the future. It must often act directly against the desires not only of many of its own citizens, but of other states. If it cannot win them over by reason, it must coerce them by force. Reason and persuasion are used first, but force and compulsion are the reserve fund of last resort.<sup>67</sup>

What *ought* to rule, is the right; what *must* rule, is force. What we should strive to effectuate, is to bring force into agreement with the right. Might is not right; and to say it is, is to make a jumbling jingle of words, like saying ruth is truth, or beauty is duty. Nor is right might, or else the world would be perfect. Nor, again, does might make right — that is, moral right, though under certain circumstances it does make legal right.<sup>68</sup> Yet the moral right to do something requires might

<sup>66</sup> Thus, expecting an affirmative answer, Wm. G. Wilcox asks: "What is the basis of democratic government but the consensus of opinions of all classes and conditions of the community?" in *The New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1915.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. an anonymous woman opponent in *The New York Sun*, Oct. 6, 1912: "The suffragists claim that the moral forces ought to supplant mere physical force. But the law is made for the law breaker, who always uses physical force."

<sup>68</sup> For it is the might of the rulers, or the sovereign (in a democracy, the majority of men) that makes laws and institutes rights under the laws. Might makes

enough, or ability, to do the thing, or to attempt to do it with some prospect of success; for inability to do a thing frees from responsibility, and the right to do it must be sought elsewhere. It must be sought in power. The world is actually ruled by force, either rightly guided by true reason laboriously acquired, or wrongly guided by false opinions engendered by evil passions, or in an intermediate mixture; but always by force. If intelligence rules, it is only through force. Our misfortune is, that no amount of intelligence can rule without force, but force can rule with very little intelligence.

The true principle, in other words again, is, not that opinion should rule, but that right opinion should rule. Humanity, unfortunately, has not this at its command, since to err is human. But a majority of numbers is no more likely to reach it than a majority of force, and for the rule of the latter the plain reason is that it can rule, while against the rule of the former is the plain fact that it cannot. In default of anything better, therefore, the majority of force ought to rule, and the majority of mere numbers ought not to make pretension thereto. There need be no hesitation over this. The universe itself is ruled not merely by divine wisdom, but by divine power. An all-wise God, who were not an all-powerful God, would be a futile object of commiseration. And it would be a strange sort of universe that were presided over by two gods, the one all-wise, and the other all-powerful. On the earth itself there is no need for this separation; for here wisdom (the best we have) is not disjoined from power. Authority goes with power, and it is power that gives its right to authority. Therefore in politics, only when and where the majority of numbers indicates the majority of force, has the former the right to rule, because it has the power to rule which the latter gives it. Some time in the dim future, perhaps, right opinion, or justice, may rule in all men's minds; and then, as all men will voluntarily act alike, obeying the same dictates of true reason, compulsion through external force will not be necessary—and government itself will not be necessary. Those who now object to the use of force, ought to become anarchists right away, who in dispensing with government will dispense with all suffrage.<sup>69</sup>

such right by agreement. Or rather it is agreement that makes laws and establishes rights, but might may compel agreement, the minority agreeing to what the majority imposes. Without agreement might does not make right, as in war,—until the conquered consent.

<sup>69</sup> They should follow Godwin, who, though he held with Hume (above, p. 305n., *cf.* p. 312n.) that "government is founded in opinion," *Political Justice*, I. vi., II. iii., III. vi., IV. i., iii., V. vii., also maintained that it "is a question of force, and not consent," "nothing but regulated force," III. vi., its object "the suppression of vio-

Nothing is further from the right than is foolishness, and it is foolishness to suppose that weakness can vie with strength. A side now weak may eventually prevail over a side now strong, if, having the right, it can persuade members of the strong side to come over to it, whereupon it becomes the stronger side, and prevails because of its strength. As said before, wisdom and force are on different planes, and do not come directly into conflict with each other. You cannot pit pure intelligence against pure force. But you may pit an intelligent man with little strength against a strong man with little intelligence; and if the former wins, you will find that he did so by making a more intelligent use of his less force, or, which is the more common way, by enlisting the greater force of others. So a weak man may kill a strong bear or lion by concentrating his force upon the point of a javelin and striking first from a distance, or by enlisting the forces of chemistry in advance and putting them behind a bullet. Or a small army may defeat a large army, but only by concentrating most of its own force at a weak place in the enemy's line, and so really applying greater force, like the last Horatius slaying separately the three Curtii individually weaker than himself, though collectively they would have been stronger. Force wasted is no better than no force at all. What is really important, is the work done by force. To accomplish work, force must be rightly applied. While force is the agent, intelligence is the guide. Separate, neither can effectuate a purpose. They must be united. And, to some extent, they must be united in the same body. For intelligence in one body could accomplish nothing, unless the force in another body or bodies had intelligence enough to execute its will. Now, in government not only guidance is needed, but execution. In council more weight belongs to intelligence, in execution more to force. The better intelligence should guide,—here everything depends on quality, nothing on quantity, except as quantity supports quality. The greater force should execute,—here everything depends on quantity, nothing on quality, except as quality improves quantity. Therefore in government every one should be free to give his or her opinion—there should be liberty of discussion,—in order that the best advice should have likeliest vent; but the decision rests with those who are to control the execution, hence only with those who have force; and this is why counting, to determine quantity, is here reasonable, since it would be senseless to count heads to get the highest wisdom. It would be absurd to

lence, either external or internal," its means the employment of "violence of a more regulated kind," V. xxii.; and therefore, considered it an evil that should itself be suppressed as far as possible, V. i., VI. i.

say that in a legislature the vote of the majority determines which opinion is the truer or better:<sup>70</sup> it only determines which opinion is adopted by the greater force and in consequence will be executed. Arguments, however, need to be presented in order to try to win over the greater force by proving to as many as possible who possess or represent force, that the opinion advocated is the truer or better.

Hence there is no contrariety between the statements that intelligence should rule, and that force should rule. The only absurdity is the notion that opinion (or desire) should rule. Opinion (or desire), counted by heads alone, has no more sanctity in politics than in philosophy. Democracy does not rest on anything so foolish. It rests, like aristocracy, like plutocracy, like monarchy, even like theocracy, on force—on force, to be sure, guided by opinion, but directly guided by the opinion of those who wield force, and indirectly under the influence of those whose opinion is more intelligent or more persuasive or more seductive. Political society, or the state, has been ideally defined as “the methodical and permanent organisation of force in the service of justice,” and government as “the combination of powers by which political society subsists.”<sup>71</sup> Accordingly, “political power,” says Goldwin Smith, “has hitherto been exercised by the male sex, because men alone could uphold government and enforce the law. Let the edifice of law be as moral and as intellectual as you will, its foundation is the force of the community, and the force of the community is male.”<sup>72</sup> Mrs. Fawcett thinks she sufficiently replies to this by saying merely that governments “must be sustained by moral forces also, and this essential part of the foundation of all good government is contributed by the female as well as the male citizens of the state.”<sup>73</sup> Mrs. Fawcett misses the point. Moral force is not in the foundation, it is in the superstructure. Women may contribute to this otherwise than by the vote; but as they cannot contribute physical force, also essential, they ought not to have the vote, which sways the physical force. Government does not rest on moral force, it rests on physical force, which should uphold moral force, according to the intellectual force at its disposal.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Thus Godwin spoke of “the intolerable insult upon all reason and justice, the deciding upon truth by the counting up of numbers,” *Political Justice*, V. xxiii.

<sup>71</sup> Huet, *Le Régne social du Christianisme*, 26.

<sup>72</sup> *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 203. “This fundamental fact,” he adds, “that law rests on public force, may be hidden from sight for the moment by clouds of emotional rhetoric, but it will assert itself in the end. Laws passed by the women’s vote will not be felt to have force behind them,” 203-4, *cf.* 237.

<sup>73</sup> *The Enfranchisement of Women*, Fortnightly Review, April, 1889, p. 567.

<sup>74</sup> Or consider Mrs. Fawcett’s argument in itself. Suppose both A and B are essentially necessary for a certain undertaking, and suppose one person contributes prac-

“Moral” or “intellectual force,” moreover, is only a metaphorical expression. Morality and intelligence are not forces in themselves, but only guides of force.<sup>75</sup> Moral and intelligent opinions influence persons who possess force to exert their force in a better way than they otherwise would do. Moral and intelligent opinions expressed by women may influence men to exert their force in a better way. Still it is men who exert it, and they must use their own judgment upon the opinions presented to them. Force proper is only physical. This the suffragist women refuse to see. “Government,” says Mrs. Pankhurst, “does not rest on force at all: it rests on consent.”<sup>76</sup> The incompleteness of the latter half of the statement is what permits the error of the former. Government rests on both force and consent; for it rests on the consent of those who have force, and on the force of those who consent,<sup>77</sup> without considering the consent, or absence of consent, of those who have only weakness and need protection. Mrs. Pankhurst herself, we may wager, did not ask the consent of her children for her rule over them when they were young and feeble. Their opinions, too, might have outvoted hers; but that, we may believe, was not considered. At all events, if she did give in to them, she did wrong.

For though might never alone makes moral right, yet might gives right to those who possess it to its exercise, when its non-exercise would permit wrong. When might *is* used by some for bad purposes, others who have might have the right, and the duty, to use it to prevent the wrong use of it. And because they have not only the right but the duty to do this, they have not the right not to do it.<sup>78</sup> We hear nowadays much adverse comment about the rights of the strong, but we speak too little in favour of the duties of the strong. The duties of the strong converge upon the protection of the weak; and though it behoves the strong to consult the opinions and listen to the desires of their *protégés*, it is not their duty, not even their right,

tically all of A and half (really more than half) of B, and another person contributes the remainder of B: has this other person the same right to control as has the first?

<sup>75</sup> They are guides of force only in living bodies. *How* they are so there, is utterly unknown. But as they can determine whether my hand shall move to the right or the left, just as a force can switch a train to the right or the left, they are conceived of as forces.

<sup>76</sup> Speech at Hartford, *Verbatim Report*, 23, 24.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Livy, quoted above, p. 268n. Also his saying that the Roman consuls “facile experti sunt, parum tutam majestatem sine viribus esse,” II. 54, (cf. I. 10). Only where the people have strength (collectively), does the government rest on them.

<sup>78</sup> “It is a wicked thing,” says Roosevelt, “to chatter about right without preparing to put might back of right,” *Fear God and Take your own Part*, 74, similarly 171, cf. 55, 75, also 383. Yet he would put women’s weakness back of government, therewith diluting men’s strength! Mr. Bryan can consistently be a woman suffragist, Mr. Roosevelt not.

to turn over the decision, or a share in the decision, to their *protégés*. Since the strong are the ones to act, it is their duty to keep the decision in their own hands, retaining all the responsibility. Thus those who have the greater might, the greater physical force, are under moral obligation to use it under the guidance of the best reason they possess or can command; and the mere fact that there may be a greater number of individuals needing their protection, has nothing to do with the matter. The greater the number of the *protégés*, the greater the need of care; but the number of the *protégés* does not affect their rights. A party of men are justified in allowing themselves to be guided, or rather led, by what they believe to be the wrong opinions of others, if the others have strength enough to compel them to do so. But nobody can be justified in acting contrary to his own views, and in accordance with the views of others, if the greater force is on his own side.

This is the sole justification, as also the imperative need, for government—for courts, for prisons, for policemen, for soldiers. And it is the justification for the use of might by men combined in government where the interests of women and of children are concerned. Good men are the guardians of women and children against bad men. And it is right that the decision be left with those who alone have the might to execute it. Those, once more, who are helped, may give advice and should be heard: they may appear before the council and express their wants, or send in petitions; but not for them is it to take part in the decision, because not theirs is the power of execution. They are the beneficiaries: it is for the benefactors to do what they do.<sup>79</sup>

For instance, take such an important question as socialism. If socialism is the best system of government and society, its supporters will, nevertheless, in all probability, have to fight to introduce it, because the owners of vested interests will not abandon them without a struggle. If it is a bad system, its opponents will perhaps some day have to fight to prevent its introduction, because its supporters, thinking themselves right, will use force to introduce it. In either case might is needed to sustain right, because might is likely to be employed to sustain wrong. Here it is evident that the decision, though it ought, abstractly, to lie with those who have the right, yet will, in fact, lie

<sup>79</sup> So Mrs. Johnson: "Woman's only relation to this defence [of the laws] is that of beneficiary, and therefore her relation to the laws with which that defence is associated must be one of advice and not of control," *Woman and the Republic*, 66. But Mrs. Jacobi voraciously claims the suffrage for women, supported by men, on the ground of "who can be more concerned about provision than those who are to be fed?" "Common Sense," etc., 123.

with those who have the might; and in *their* opinion it ought to lie where it does, since they hold their side to be the right side. It is not sufficient for the supporters of socialism to think themselves in the right, they must also think that they have the major might, before it will be right for them to undertake to employ force to introduce their system; and they will be employing force even if they are in such majority as to be able to pass a law introducing socialism, since it will require force to put the law into execution. This would be true even if the others submitted without forceful resistance, because they would be submitting to what they knew would be greater force without employing what they knew would be useless resistance. Hence it is important even for the socialists that only those who have might should have their votes counted; for if they carried such a law principally by the votes of women and children, or of the former alone, it is absurd to suppose that socialism would be introduced, though a great deal of confusion and turmoil would be brought about. And it cannot be rightly maintained that the majority of men on the opposite side, having the greater might, as well as having equally strong convictions about the right in the case, ought to submit to the feebler might of a merely greater number of persons whom they have no reason to suppose wiser than themselves. The greater number should have their way if they have the greater force, because then they have the greater responsibility. Responsibility goes with force, not with mere numbers. A majority of homogeneous numbers has the responsibility because it has the greater force, and so the democratic rule, in a country prepared for it, is correct when confined to men of tolerably equal force. But a majority of heterogeneous numbers is not indicative of the possession of greater force, and therefore has not responsibility, and does not deserve to be considered. It is therefore not a democratic principle, but a perversion of democracy.

It is strange that there should be any confusion of thought on so plain a subject. A speaker in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872-3 admitted that "voting is an invention to take the place of fighting," but drew from it the diametrically wrong conclusion. "The strong," he said, "can protect themselves," and "governments were devised for the benefit, not of the strong, but of the weak"; wherefore, he concluded, if it could be demonstrated to his satisfaction "that woman is weaker, mentally or physically, than man" (for this he doubted because some women are stronger and, he said, can fight better than some men), then "there is the greater reason

why woman should receive equal political power with man." <sup>80</sup> He no doubt admitted children to be mentally and physically weaker than men, without drawing the conclusion that they ought on that account to be enfranchised. That he drew it of women was probably due to his belief, against all evidence and due to a fallacious argument, in the physical equality of women with men. Yet his own words belie their own import. The strong can protect themselves, and only they can protect the weak. "The weak," says Roosevelt, "cannot be helped by the weak." <sup>81</sup> The weak may be helped to protect themselves, if they can be made strong; not otherwise. You cannot give power to those who cannot receive that power. The ballot is not a power in itself, that can be handed over and conferred upon and given to those who have not power. It is merely a token of the power of those who already possess power.<sup>82</sup> The token may be given; but not the

<sup>80</sup> Broomall, *Debates*, i. 551B, 550B. Long before Hippel had made the same use of the Biblical phrase. Not the strong need the physician, said he in this connection, but the weak, *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber, Werke*, vi. 130. But Broomall probably got it from Higginson, who in his *Common Sense about Women* wrote of "one sure principle—that legislation is mainly for the protection of the weak against the strong, and that for this purpose the weak must be directly represented," *Works*, iv. 332. And Higginson probably got it from Sumner, who in his great speech of Feb. 6 and 7, 1866, in advocacy of extending the suffrage to the recently emancipated slaves, had said: "The ballot is protector . . . To him who has the ballot all other things shall be given. . . . The ballot is the Horn of Abundance. . . . 'Give me the ballot and I will move the world' may be the exclamation of the race despoiled of this right. There is nothing it cannot open with almost fabulous power. . . . As a protector, it is of immeasurable power,—like a fifteen-inch Columbiad pointed from a Monitor. Ay, Sir, the ballot is the Columbiad of our political life, and every citizen who has it is a full-armed Monitor," *Works*, x. 222-4. Subsequent events have proved every word here uttered to be rubbish. Sumner would never have spoken thus of paper-money without a strong backing of real value behind it; but the ballot is a similar scrap of paper (endowed only with power of confusion), unless it has real power behind it (*cf.* above, p. 310). And he might still more easily have seen his error, if he had stopped a moment to think of putting women behind Columbiads (*cf.* above, p. 754). The moving reason of Sumner's argument is contained in the next page: "Only through him [the southern freedman] can you redress the balance of our political system and assure the safety of patriot [*i.e.*, northern] citizens. . . . He is our [the Republican party's] best guaranty. Use him." Our male advocates of woman suffrage, however, all except the feminists, have no such self-interested motive: their advocacy is pure foolishness.

<sup>81</sup> *Fear God and Take your own Part*, 208.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Rossiter Johnson above, p. 310n. Hence the absurdity of this: "The ballot is the gift of the strong to the weak, the generous recognition by the strong that the weak have rights which he is bound by justice and honour to respect, whether he is able to ignore them by his superior strength or not." Ch. H. Chapman, *The Rights of Women to the Ballot in The Ballot and the Bullet*, New York, 1897 (containing some replies to Rossiter Johnson), p. 45. Only in the case of our slaves, apart from the woman question, was such a gift ever made by the strong to the weak, and then only in another part of the country from that in which the donors lived, and with success only to the selfish purposes of the donors. Precisely because the strong ought to respect the rights of the weak—the essential one of which is to protection—they should not leave it to them to protect themselves. It may be added that Burke, *Works*, iv. 225, followed by Mackintosh, *Works*, iii. 108n., spoke of the suffrage as a "shield." But they had in mind classes of men and women exposed to special laws by which the ruling classes of men, with their women, were not affected. Women are shielded by the men of their own classes; for it takes as much strength to wield a shield as a sword or a gun. Blease says "the vote is only a means of protection, a device for directly or indirectly redressing the grievances of the voter," *op. cit.*, 266. While things work smoothly, it is much more than that; when not, it alone is not sufficient to give protection.

reality behind it. Political power may be *lent* to women, so long as men choose to respect the loan. But men cannot part with their supremacy absolutely.<sup>83</sup> Precisely in the tumultuous times over important questions, when men will not respect the mere appearance of power, and when women will want the power most, they will find they have it not. Government is, among other purposes, for the protection of the weak by the strong; and for this very reason it is the protectors and not the protected who should take part in government.<sup>84</sup>

A distinction needs here to be made. In the state men can, of course, lend power — their own power — to certain other persons. It is, in fact, essential to government that they should do so. This is the delegation of power — of legislative, executive, and judicial power. In small democracies the people — the male citizens — have attempted to keep most of these powers in their own hands, but have not been able to do so in all cases, as especially in military enterprizes, where the appointment of leaders is absolutely necessary. But in large republics all political powers are delegated by the people to the governmental officials, whom the people — still the male citizens — choose to act for them.<sup>85</sup> Voting we have seen to be the means for this delegation of power.<sup>86</sup> Thereby the people who have power hand it over and confer it upon those who are to be their governors, or helmsmen. They do so by giving them the command of their own power. Political power in the governors may then be looked upon as power lent them by those who own it. And such a loan of their own power men can make even to women, as in the case of queens. This loan of their power men have occasionally made to women. But men cannot lend, or hand over, or confer, or give to women elective or delegating power — power for them to hand on and delegate to the elected representatives, since such power is only the power which the individual elector himself has. This is original or primary power, and only those have it to whom nature has given it. Men's inherent power can be delegated to and concentrated upon the chosen governors; but it cannot be

<sup>83</sup> To men in general may be addressed what Eumenius said to a Roman emperor: "Tu potes imperium, Maximiane, dare, non potes non habere," *Panegyricus*, VI. 7.

<sup>84</sup> Similarly to the above quotations, Mrs. Jacobi speaks of a "double principle which runs through all our institutions, namely: that all the intelligence in the state must be enlisted for its [the state's] welfare, and that all the weakness in the community must be represented for its own defence," "*Common Sense*," applied to *Woman Suffrage*, 220, cf. 93. There is no such double principle running through our institutions. The former half enlists all male ignorance and stupidity as well as all male intelligence in its effort to include all male strength. The latter, letting weakness represent itself, we have committed only in the case of the negroes, and have, luckily, not yet done so, to any great extent, in the case of women, as we will never do it in the case of children.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. above, p. 268n.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. above, pp. 303-4.

transferred sidewise from one elector to another elector. Newly admitted electors bring into the state only their own power. If the power of newly admitted electors is not equal, on the average, to that of the old electors, it cannot be made so, and it is not made so, simply by their admission, or by their receiving an equal vote. Their votes may be counted as equal, but the power behind the votes will not be equal. The counting of the votes will no longer be a measure of the power behind them. Thus any attempt to *give* such power to the weaker sex is a mere sham, being an attempt to do what in the nature of things cannot be done.<sup>87</sup>

This may be made plain by an example. Imagine a small society composed of ten men and ten women, and, to make the case plain, suppose the ten men big and burly and the ten women small and weak. The ten men may now set up a government and elect their chief. The man A may seem to five others to be the strongest and wisest, though B, perhaps really the strongest and wisest, may seem so to himself and to three others. A, then, is elected by six votes (including his own) to four. The four now yield acquiescence, and A is clothed with the power of all the ten, and is almost ten times as powerful as he was in his own nature. But suppose the ten men have a notion that they ought to "give" equal power to the women, and admit them to the franchise. Then perhaps the weakest and silliest man of the lot, Z, because the best looking, might be "the favourite of the ladies," and with his own vote he would be elected by eleven votes, although all the other men, nine, settled upon A as their choice. Z would now be legally invested with all the power of the state — of nine other strong men handed over to him at the behest of the women, *plus* their own small addition. He might now issue such foolish commands, and so endanger the state, that the other nine would reconsider the matter, and see that they ought really to take back control of things, since it is principally their power which Z is commanding and using contrary to their views, at the behest of persons who are backing him up with much less power. They would accordingly depose Z, and set up their own choice, A, disregarding the "equal" power they had fictitiously assigned, but not really given, to the ten women.

This example is not a true representation of any state. In

<sup>87</sup> "Weakness," said Goldwin Smith, has not "a right to artificial power," *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 199. Here he did not express himself accurately. Weakness has not a right to sham power; but weakness has a right to artificial power, if this be conferred upon it, as in the case of a weak leader (for every leader as a single man compared with the rest is weak) chosen by many men. In fact, all government is artificial power, contrived by the artifice of delegation.

no state is every man stronger than every woman; and in no state would all the men be for one candidate and all the women for another. Still, this example represents in a simple but exaggerated and therefore plain form what does in a more mixed and complex and therefore disguised form exist in all states.

It may be used to illustrate one more point. It is plain that the ten men, if they chose, might elect a woman to be their chief — their queen. And if she were wise, or wise enough to be guided by good advisers, she might continue to retain their allegiance. She would then be endowed with all the power of the ten men — practically all the power of the state. This shows that the reason why women may rule as queens is entirely distinct from any reason why women should be granted the suffrage. When women rule as queens, it is still by the consent of the men, and not of the women, that they rule. There is therefore no inconsistency in men permitting themselves to be ruled by a queen and their not allowing women (including the queen) to take part in the election of their rulers.<sup>88</sup>

Therefore, in a world in which force rules, women, as the weaker sex, ought to be, and, except temporarily or in minor matters, will be excluded from the franchise, unless one or both of these two things happen: either (1) that women become equal to men in force, or (2) that force no longer is needed to effectuate opinion. Neither of these is in prospect within a reasonable period, any more than it is at hand, although both are expected, and are even supposed to be present.

(1) Even the first is now assumed by some of the feminists. They harp so much on women being equal to men (on the whole), that they have come to believe that they are equal to men in every detail, including force — or that they soon will be, if they be but allowed to develop into what they suppose themselves naturally to be. But women naturally are weaker than men (whatever may be the relation between females and males in other species), or else they would never have been left out of government. This first position is not held by the majority of woman suffragists.

Yet in England recently those of them called "suffragettes," who aspire to be "militants," have been acting as if they be-

<sup>88</sup> Hence, too, it would be perfectly consistent in a republic to allow women to be eligible to office, while excluding them from the franchise. For if the male electorate prefer to choose a woman for some office, some further reason (and there are reasons), needs to be invoked. It is only the predetermination (in the constitution) of the men of the whole state that prevents men of some locality from making fools of themselves in some moment of aberration. As a fact, there is nothing but the pronoun in our Constitution excluding a woman from being elected President. We rely on the men of the country never being so demented. Yet already a woman has been elected to Congress, who made a spectacle of herself at her first vote.

lieved that women, too, could gain their ends by force.<sup>89</sup> Their leader, Mrs. Pankhurst, claims to be "a soldier."<sup>90</sup> She is reported to have said, a little before, that "at last women have learned the joy of war, a joy too long withheld from them by men." An American defender of "militancy," Mrs. Marian Cox, has said of the argument that women must not be voters because they cannot fight, "this argument is for ever destroyed by the militants."<sup>91</sup> The argument which has really been destroyed by the behaviour of the English would-be furies is this old one, now little more heard: "When the rights of woman shall be practically and generally recognised, then public meetings will be to party meetings of the present day, what a refined and courteous assembly in a parlour is to a rowdy gathering in a bar-room."<sup>92</sup> But they have acted as they did only because of the forbearance of men. When socialists act as these women have acted, the heads of the socialists are broken not only by the mobs but by the police. But these women warriors are protected by the police from the mobs—or they raise a great howl if they are not.<sup>93</sup> Imprisoned for petty criminal offences, they refused to eat, and the prison-authorities, instead of inviting their friends in and telling them the life of such and such a one was in their hands, were weak enough to let them out, not wishing to allow any of them to become a martyr to the cause. On both sides a point was made that life was not to be taken, but the authorities arrested and imprisoned the women, and the women destroyed property. Destroying private property by bombs and chemicals and in the dark, they acted like the Nihilists of Russia and the Irish Nationalists, who superficially terrorised Europe some four decades ago, and have long since been forgotten.<sup>94</sup> No revolutions have ever been won by such underhand means; and unless the Irish and the Russians had adopted better methods they would never have won their freedom. While these suffragette disturbances were going on in England, the men

<sup>89</sup> See above, pp. 16-17.

<sup>90</sup> Speech at Hartford, Nov. 13, 1913, *Verbatim Report*, 5. She reminds of the early Christians. "Are not we, too, soldiers?" asked Tertullian, *Exhortatio ad Castitatem*, c. 12; following Paul, *Phil.*, II. 25, *II. Tim.*, II. 3-4. So Annie Besant would have men and women "co-soldiers in every just cause," *The Political Status of Women*, 17. Well, the English are now fighting in a just cause: are women co-soldiers with the men? They are helping the men well in the rear; but it is a misuse of words to speak of them as "soldiering" with the men.

<sup>91</sup> In *The New York Times*, June 22, 1913.

<sup>92</sup> H. G. Amringe, at the Worcester Woman's Rights Convention, 1850, *Proceedings*, 43.

<sup>93</sup> As a fact, women could not even parade through the streets without the protection of men—of policemen; and they complain if it is not accorded. The socialists, however, instead of asking for protection by the police, desire mostly to be left alone by the police. Here the similarity between the woman movement and socialism breaks down. The socialists, having men among them, are able to fight.

<sup>94</sup> A caricature of them may still be read in R. L. Stevenson's *Dynamiter*.

of the lower classes in Austria and in Belgium, by real fighting in the streets of Vienna and of Brussels, destructive of life (and of their own too) as well as of property, exhibiting a threatening power, won an extension of the franchise. The English suffragette movement, though claiming to be "real militancy,"<sup>95</sup> was but a mimickry of warfare—a mere farce, which the real war now raging in Europe has put an end to for a long time to come, if not forever. It was an exhibition of meanness on the part of women, such as no man can admire, taking advantage as they did of "the benefit of sex," which De Quincey has said is "a stronger privilege than the benefit of clergy."<sup>96</sup> Some of the women exposed themselves, it is true, to considerable suffering; but the one suffering which would have ended their misery and their cause, death, they knew they were safe from: when things approached the breaking point, they knew their very enemies would save them. Only one woman, Miss Davison, lost her life, and she by committing suicide publicly, at a race-course, at the expense of the life of a horse and nearly of its rider, without any connection with the cause she was advocating, thus putting her act in unfavourable comparison with that of the monk Telemachus, who brought about the end of the gladiatorial sports of Rome by sacrificing himself in the arena—an act which had direct connection with his aim.<sup>97</sup>

Else it was but a toy game, with new rules of its own, entirely one-sided. The object was to annoy. They wished to be obstreperous, like a baby which cries and kicks and gets attended to first,<sup>98</sup>—and yet, while committing such baby acts, they dislike being classified with children! In England, it was said, men themselves could not gain any point except by keeping their cause constantly before the public. Women, therefore, acting under the advice of men,<sup>99</sup> would do so too. They seemed

<sup>95</sup> Mrs. Pankhurst, *Verbatim Report*, 13.

<sup>96</sup> *Works*, xvi, 505.—H. Owen points out that the movement was an effort to impose upon men the "odious alternative" of giving in or of having to treat women as they would treat other men, at the same time that the feminists deny that men show chivalry to women, or that women desire it, *Woman Adrift*, 182-4.

<sup>97</sup> A poem, with a note giving references, about this Telemachus, may be found in Tennyson's *Works*.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Mrs. Pankhurst: "I don't know whether I have used the domestic illustration in Hartford, but it is a very good one; it is quite worth using again. You have two babies very hungry and wanting to be fed. One baby is a patient baby, and waits indefinitely until its mother is ready to feed it. The other baby is an impatient baby and cries lustily, screams and kicks and makes everybody uncomfortable until it is fed. Well, we know perfectly which baby is attended to first. That is the whole history of politics." *Verbatim Report*, 16.

<sup>99</sup> E.g., Justin McCarthy: "The House of Commons . . . makes reform only because and when it has to be made. Incessant pressure must be brought to bear by those who have a movement in hand. They must make themselves disagreeable, intolerable, to each and to every government, until at last some government finds it necessary to come to terms with them, take the reform out of their hands, and carry it as a measure of administration. . . . They [the woman suffragists] will have sooner

to think that if only a new cause, good in the eyes of its advocates, be thus brought and kept forward, it must win.<sup>1</sup> They forgot that many have been lost. They imitated also the talk of men about "the inherent right of revolution and rebellion":<sup>2</sup> women, too, they said, have the same right, and imply that they may use the same means, although they cannot.<sup>3</sup> They overlooked the condition, which is that there is likelihood of success, so that the rebellion may become a revolution, or, in other words, a probability that the force possessed or obtainable is sufficient.<sup>4</sup> When the force is hopelessly small, appeal to it is stupid,—and men have generally found this out to their cost. The suffragette women never even showed that the majority of women, for whose "rights" they were striving, desired the suffrage: much less could they show that the majority of women wished to employ their so-called "militancy," since those who did resort to it were comparatively a very small number—"a mere handful of women," their leader acknowledged.<sup>5</sup> They threatened, indeed, a universal strike of women, like the universal strike of labouring men, so long threatened by the socialists; which none have been able to bring on.<sup>6</sup> In this connection they exhibited the bad taste of paraphrasing and performing Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, the most obscene perhaps of that comic poet's obscene plays, which contains not a word about the suffrage.<sup>7</sup> It is apparent

or later to make themselves very disagreeable if they are determined to have anything speedily done," *Women in English Politics*, North American Review, Nov., 1891, p. 571.

<sup>1</sup> So Mrs. Pankhurst spoke of having adopted "methods which when pressed with sufficient courage and determination are bound, in the long run, to win," *Verbatim Report*, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Mrs. Pankhurst, *Verbatim Report*, 8.

<sup>3</sup> They can make themselves disagreeable, but they cannot make themselves dangerous, which is really the main thing. Mrs. Pankhurst thought they could, and to prove it she cited the fact that they stopped telegraphic communication between London and Glasgow for a whole day! "If women can do that," she asked, "is there any limit to what we can do, except the limit we put upon ourselves?"—that of not taking life! *Verbatim Report*, 21-2.

<sup>4</sup> In one form or another this condition has probably been recognised by every male writer on political science from Paley (*Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, Book VI., ch. iii.) to Woolsey (*Political Science*, ii. 426-7) and Ritchie (*Natural Rights*, 243).

<sup>5</sup> Mrs. Pankhurst, *Verbatim Report*, 15.

<sup>6</sup> "A sex-strike among the greater mass of western women," writes Walter M. Gallichan, "would overthrow the supposed male supremacy in a few weeks," *Women under Polygamy*, New York ed., 338. On the contrary, says A. E. Wright, "if a sufficient number of men should come to the conclusion that it was not worth their while to marry except on terms of fair give-and-take, the suffragist women's demands would have to come down," *Unexpurgated Case against Woman Suffrage*, 176.

<sup>7</sup> It represents the women of Athens as gaining a point which Aristophanes had much at heart, peace with Lacedaemon (he wrote during the Peloponnesian war), by going on a love strike, much against their own inclination; whereby is shown a case of moral (or immoral) influence, exactly what the suffragists disclaim, and for which they wish to substitute the ballot. Lysistrata herself, however, that would-be "dissolver of armies," may well represent their frame of mind, when she says:

ἔγώ γυνή μέν εἰμι, νοῦς δ' ἔνεστι μοι,  
αὐτὴ δ' ἐμαυτῆς οὐ κακῶς γνώμης ἔχω.

that Mrs. Pankhurst never did lead a rebellion — she tried to, she wished to produce a situation which would compel men to give women the suffrage;<sup>8</sup> but she did not even get enough women followers, let alone men supporters, to come within sight of the goal: she merely led a disturbance.

Surely this movement for the franchise differs from all previous ones made by men. This fact was cited by Curtis as a recommendation of it. "Behind every demand for the enlargement of the suffrage hitherto," he said, "there was always a threat. . . . But this reform hides no menace. It lies wholly in the sphere of reason."<sup>9</sup> Behind the demands made by men for the suffrage was always the threat that, being competent to exercise it, they would seize it, using violence if resisted; and this was the reason which justified the demand. This demand, being without force either to back it or to uphold the suffrage when obtained, cannot lie wholly, or even at all, in the sphere of reason, because in this matter reason requires that it should rest on force.

At present there is real war raging in Europe, and England is taking part. The men of the country are waging the war — sacrificing their lives, injuring their health, giving of their very substance. And the women of the country are helping them — nursing the sick and wounded, taking vacant places in field and workshop, grieving, encouraging, consoling. Somehow the claim is getting abroad that this activity of theirs is entitling them to the vote. "Before the war," says Sidney Brooks, "there were people who said that women could not vote because they could not fight. We all know better now. We all know you cannot wage war without the help of women"; whence he draws the conclusion that the men of England will admit the women do "share more and more in the opportunities and responsibilities of men,"<sup>10</sup> including the political opportunity and responsibility of voting. If Sidney Brooks did not know about women's assistance in wartime before this war, he was singularly forgetful

As for Aristophanes' views on the subject of women's rule, they may be better gathered from the *Ecclesiazusae*, where he represents women with false beards and in men's clothes stolen from their husbands seizing the state, and ridicules the socialistic and communistic laws (including the communism of love) which they enact under the belief that men will then have no occasion to act criminally.

8 In her own words: "to bring about a political situation which can only be solved by giving women the vote," *Verbatim Report*, 7; to "put the enemy in the position where they will have to choose between giving us freedom or giving *us* death," 27, — not the position of giving us freedom or *themselves* running risk of being killed, which is the alternative male rebels offer. "Nothing under heaven," she says, "will make women give way . . . once they are determined," 26. But how many women have shown this determination? A mere "handful"!

<sup>9</sup> *Orations and Addresses*, i. 218.

<sup>10</sup> Approvingly quoted in the *Report* of the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage, Jan. 8, 1916.

of history; for all history shows that in every war women have helped the men with corresponding enthusiasm according to their abilities.<sup>10a</sup> Since civilisation began, women have been the helpmates of men, in war as well as in peace. War is a reversion to the state of nature, and women must then return to the industries men have taken from them. But their strenuous labours in these industries can only be temporary, as their continuance would interfere with women's own proper function under civilisation, and would impair the vitality of the nation. In this war, as in others, when the sides are evenly balanced, and every little will tell, their help may be of the last importance; yet their services are small compared with those of the men. In the military service of to-day men are counted by the millions, women by the thousands. Behind the lines even in the Red Cross work the number of women is exceeded by that of the male assistants — surgeons, stretcher-bearers, ambulance drivers, men nurses. Perhaps the women, because of greater emotional sensitiveness, suffer more, mourning for their lost fathers, husbands, brothers, sons. But the men also lose, and mourn the loss of, fathers, brothers, and sons; and, furthermore, men are the fathers, brothers, and sons lost. The case is really this: the suffering is caused by the enemy, and it is principally the labours of the men of the country that ward it off as much as possible both from themselves and from the women. To the men falls the conduct of the war; to them belongs its direction; and with them should lie the determination whether there is to be war or not. Women, possessed of the vote, would have but a half-power: a power to get the country involved in war, and then the defence of the country would be left to the men, with only the women's feeble assistance behind the lines. The basis of the new idea is wholly false. There has been so much talk about *giving* the suffrage to women, that women have come to look upon the suffrage as a gift, a present, a reward for good behaviour. The women of England during the last two years have behaved well. Therefore, it is argued, they deserve this gift, this reward, and it would be a shame after the war to withhold it from them. This, as we have seen, is an utterly wrong conception of the nature of the franchise. The reward which women get for their services during war is precisely the same as the reward which men get

<sup>10a</sup> And they made the same claim after our Civil War. "When the war came," wrote Paulina W. Davis in 1871, "women of the highest order of patriotism and earnestness entered the country's service, breaking down prejudice in the hospitals and on the battle-field, doing work which should forever close the mouths of all opponents to woman's suffrage on the ground that the franchise makes her liable to military duty, for which she is incompetent," *History of the National Woman's Rights Movement*, 21.

— the safety of their country, of their children, of themselves. As in peace they share equally in the benefits of civilisation mostly made by men, so after war they share equally in the benefits of victory mostly won (if won at all) by men. Their services in war no more entitle them to the vote than their services in peace, the factor of sufficient force being absent in both cases.

(2) By most of the women who desire the vote, and their male advocates, reliance is put on the other alternative. It is evident that if all men were good, individually within each state obeying of their free will the laws, and collectively between states refraining from preying upon one another, using only moral principles for the guidance of their actions, then women, on the supposition of their having equal intelligence (which children have not, so that here the distinction is supplied why children should still be excluded), would be as competent as men to vote and take part in making the laws, since their lack of physical force would no longer be relevant in governmental affairs, when through the universal obedience the laws automatically execute themselves. In fact, governments and the division of nationalities into states would then be of little importance, since the moral laws of conduct do not need legislation to tell what they are, and all that would be necessary would be, as advised by the socialists, some committees of administration in the natural territorial communities for managing their common interests. Extremes meet, and as mankind began without government when they were brutes, they may end without government when they are saints. Women, however, are not to be placated with this idea of their being admitted to participation in government only when government is no longer of importance.<sup>11</sup> Consequently those who now wish to participate maintain the entirely inconsistent position that while government is still needed, men are good enough to be guided only by opinion and right reason, without the need of force — that the minority obeys the majority simply out of respect for the right of the majority to have its way,<sup>12</sup> and that, though policemen at least, if not soldiers, are still needed, the laws somehow enforce themselves.<sup>13</sup> People, to be sure, do not all agree as to what is right in all details, and therefore government

<sup>11</sup> Thus sixty years ago Paulina W. Davis said: "The rule of force and fraud must well nigh be overturned, and learning and religion and the fine arts must have cultivated mankind into a state of wisdom and justice tempered by most benevolent affections, before woman can be installed in her highest offices," Presidential Address at the Woman's Rights Convention, Worcester, 1850, *Proceedings*, 10. Yet she desired the vote even then.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Mrs. Jacobi above, p. 317n.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. W. J. Bryan: "This [the force] argument is seldom offered now [?], for the reason that as civilisation advances laws are obeyed because they are an expression of the public opinion, not merely because they have power and lead behind them," Formal Statement published in the newspapers July 17, 1914.

is still needed for concert upon these; but, it is alleged, people are all convinced about the right of government to guide and their duty to obey, and, it is believed, governments will never again employ force against their neighbours, or if they do when women take part in them, it will only be on occasions when justice enjoins, and men will then spring to the defence of justice as readily as they now do, or in the past have done, in support of injustice. For the women suffragists accept the notion we have seen to be entertained to-day (or up to the first of August, 1914), by some men and by all the socialists, that the world has already entered, or is on the point of entering, a new era, that of industrialism, taking the place of militarism,<sup>14</sup> and that henceforth force gives way and intelligence rules the world;<sup>15</sup> wherefore, they conclude, force is no longer relevant, in the conduct of government, although it is admitted that it has been, and now women, having intelligence, may as well take part as men, since their lack of physical force no longer counts.<sup>16</sup>

The error of the premise which carries this conclusion has in this work been abundantly proved, and since the middle of the year 1914 it ought to be manifest to everybody. What hid it was the long peace which the principal nations of the world enjoyed for nearly a century, broken only by a few sharp contests that were confined to a few distant battle fields, and that lasted at most but a few months. In nineteen years out of twenty peace has reigned between the greatest nations, and within the most civilised countries in ninety-nine localities out of a hundred everything has been quiet, with a few house-breakings and head-breakings, which we read about in the papers but rarely see, or an infrequent riot on the occasion of a strike—a kind of disorder which it is supposed will soon be done away with. Civilised governments run smoothly, and this smoothness of their working gives an appearance of absence of force, merely because, on account of its pervading and easily summoned presence, force

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Mrs. Jacobi in her attempted application of Paine's "*Common Sense*": "The share of women in political rights and life—imperfect, or deferred, or abrogated during the predominance of militarism—has become natural, has become inevitable, with the advent of industrialism, in which they so largely share," 190. "Now that this stage in the evolution of modern societies has been reached, it has become possible for women to demand their share also in the expression of the Public Opinion which is to rule. They could not claim this while it was necessary to defend opinions by arms; but this is no longer either necessary or expected," 214.

<sup>15</sup> Mrs. Jacobi: "Every one knows that physical force is at present the servant, and not, as it has been, the master of intelligence," 83.

<sup>16</sup> Mrs. Jacobi once more: "Until now, the exclusion of women from the Sovereignty has been justified by the fear that their immense inferiority would infuse a contemptible weakness into the body politic. But to-day, the one form of strength of which women are deprived [*sic.* by nature!], is the very form which has ceased to be essential for the purpose [of Sovereignty?]. Necessary for pugilistic contests, which are forbidden by law, it is irrelevant to the qualifications of those who either administer or vote for a government founded on opinion," 212.

does not often need to be actually employed. It is easy to make laws — women have strength enough to do that; and as laws are now obeyed, what more is needed? It is overlooked that laws are obeyed, indeed, by some because these recognise the duty of obeying them, and for these the laws are least needed; but by those who need them most, they are obeyed only because of the well-organised force that lies behind them. Exhibitions of brute force are now prohibited by law, to be sure, but the law is respected because of the civil force behind it, and when it is not, as still happens, the civil force has to convert itself into brute force. This latency of brute force under civil force is ignored. Of the "force argument" against woman suffrage a constitutional speaker has said: "This argument is based upon the assumption that brute force governs the world. There was, no doubt, a time when this was the fact, but that time has long since passed away."<sup>17</sup> The "force argument" does not confine itself to brute force: it refers to all force, and allows for the silent working of civil force, which, however, in ultimate analysis, rests on brute force, yet on brute force no longer brutal and used for private passional ends, but civilised and employed rationally for the public good.<sup>18</sup> So, when a female feminist adduces that what has endured from antiquity to the present is not the Roman Empire, which was built on physical force, but Christianity, which was not built on physical force, and thence concludes that "physical force has not the staying power it is assumed to have," which belongs rather to spiritual force,<sup>19</sup> she overlooks that the Holy Roman Empire, if there ever was such a thing, and every other empire or government to-day is built on force as much as ever. If persuasion is used, it is used to guide force, to induce lesser force to submit to greater force, to fit all forces together; and persuasion had to be used by the Roman rulers (witness Menenius Agrippa) as much as by any to-day. The persuasion then used was different from the persuasion now used, and the use of force then was different from the use of force now; but always persuasion is needed in its place, and force in its, and neither can be dispensed with until all men are perfect.

"The essential characteristic of all government," wrote President Wilson, "is authority." "And the authority of governors,

<sup>17</sup> Fraser in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1894, *Revised Record*, ii. 503.

<sup>18</sup> By "brute" force of course is meant animal and physical force. It is specifically brute force only if used in the way brutes use it. But no reason is adduced why men in civilised society should use their physical force like brutes. It is a poor argument that hinges on a term wrongly suggestive.

<sup>19</sup> Josephine P. Knowles, *The Upholstered Cage*, London, 1892, p. xxxiv.

directly or indirectly, rests in all cases ultimately on force. Government, in its last analysis, is organised force." But "the force behind authority must not be looked for as if it were always to be seen or were always being exercised"; still "there is force behind governments none the less because it never shows itself." In governments which "rest upon the free consent of the governed," "the force which they embody is not the force of a dominant dynasty nor of a prevalent minority, but the force of an agreeing majority. And the overwhelming nature of this force is evident in the fact that the minority very seldom challenge its exercise. It is latent just because it is understood to be omnipotent. There is force behind the authority of the elected magistrate, no less than behind that of the usurping despot, a much greater force behind the President of the United States, than behind the Czar of Russia. The difference lies in the display of coercive power. Physical force is the prop of both, though in the one it is the last, while in the other it is the first resort."<sup>20</sup>

Even more clearly is the matter illustrated by James Fitz-james Stephen. "Society," says he, through the government which directs it, "rests ultimately upon force in these days, just as much as it did in the wildest and most stormy periods of history. Compare Scotland in the fourteenth century with Scotland in the nineteenth century. In the fourteenth century the whole country was a scene of wild confusion, of which one of the most learned of Scott's novels, *The Fair Maid of Perth*, gives a striking picture. . . . Every page of the book is full of the feuds of Highland and Lowland, Douglas and March, burghers and nobles, Clan Chattan and Clan Quhele. The first impression on comparing this spirited picture with the Scotland which we all know—the Scotland of quiet industry, farming, commerce, and amusement, is that the fourteenth century was entirely subject to the law of force, and that Scotland in the nineteenth century has ceased to be the theatre of force at all. Look a little deeper and this impression is as false, not to say as childish, as the supposition that a clumsy rowboat, manned by a quarrelsome crew, who can neither keep time with their oars, nor resist the temptation to fight among themselves, displays force, and that an ocean steamer which will carry a townful of people to the end of the earth at the rate of three hundred miles a day so smoothly that during the greater part of the time they are unconscious of any motion or effort whatever, displays none. The force which goes to govern the Scotland of these

days is to the force employed for the same purpose in the fourteenth century what the force of a line-of-battle ship is to the force of an individual prize-fighter. The reason why it works so quietly is that no one doubts either its existence, or its direction, or its crushing superiority to any individual resistance which could be offered to it.”<sup>21</sup>

Replying to Stephen, Lydia E. Becker seems to think she undermines the cogency of his remarks by pointing to the fact that the ocean steamer to-day may be “owned by a company of shareholders of both sexes, whose voice in the direction of the voyage is determined, not by the degree of strength, but by the amount of shares they hold”; whence she concludes that “women shareholders could exercise power”—in governments, in the ownership and direction of line-of-battle ships—“on exactly the same terms, and at neither greater or less disadvantage than men.”<sup>22</sup> Here is an oft-repeated argument for woman suffrage, which was not noticed in the last chapter, because it is rather a counter-argument to the force argument against woman suffrage. It runs to the effect that as women vote in corporations, and the state is but a corporation, therefore they ought to vote in the state.<sup>23</sup> This was advanced even by so sensible a man as Bentham, who was struck by the inconsistency of women voting for Directors of the East India Company, which ruled over all India, while they could not vote for the governors of their own country.<sup>24</sup> There was, indeed, an inconsistency, but it was the other way, and an end was put to it not long afterward by the British government taking over that Company. Because India was larger than Great Britain, Bentham thought that “while gnats are strained at, camels are swallowed.” However that was then and in that case, to-day and in all other cases the reverse is much rather the true state of things, and while gnats are swallowed, camels are strained at. For not only states are enormously larger and mightier than any of the corporations they contain (or woe to the state in which this relationship does not hold!), but it is entirely questionable whether the state should be regarded as a corporation at all; and certainly it is an essentially different kind of corporation from those which it itself creates. In modern states, too, the individuals who compose the state do not own various amounts of

<sup>21</sup> *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, London, 1873, pp. 226-8.

<sup>22</sup> *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—A Reply to Mr. Stephen's Strictures on Mr. Mill's 'Subjection of Women'*, Manchester, 1874, p. 23.

<sup>23</sup> E.g., Curtis in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1867, *Orations and Addresses*, i. 202, and W. Darlington in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872-3, *Debates*, i. 582B.

<sup>24</sup> *Works*, ix. 108A; cf. also iii. 463B, 541A, 567An.

shares and vote according to the numbers of their shares; for, while in corporations only property is affected, in the state much more is at stake. This much more—the control of life and liberty—is precisely what invalidates this corporation argument for woman suffrage. In corporations, as in municipal affairs, the decisions of the participants are, in case of need, enforced by the state. Force, therefore, is not needed for participation in a corporation, but it is needed for participation in a state.<sup>24a</sup> Moreover, even in corporations themselves the actual working of the women's participation likewise stultifies the argument; for women seldom attend meetings, and generally give their proxy to men.<sup>25</sup> When women take an active part in corporations, in proportion to their property-interests therein, and by their own efforts approximate their property-interests to those of men, it will be time enough for them to say they are prepared to enter the corporation of the state.

As a fact—*as a fact*, be it well observed—men are the executors of government. All the hard work of government is done by men, and must be done by men almost entirely. Hence it is justly theirs to decide what is to be done, since it is theirs to do what is decided upon. Men, indeed, are divided among the governors and the governed; but in democratic states the governed men also act in, or upon, the government: they tell the governors what they are to do, and compel them to do it, choosing them for the purpose; and if the governors do otherwise, they refuse obedience, and set others in their place. But women cannot compel the governors to do what they prescribe, and cannot refuse obedience if they do not, or set others in their place. Hence women are among the governed only. "Men and women," says a female suffragist, "have each a distinct and separate place in the world; but," she proceeds to say, "that is no reason why one sex should be at the mercy of the other, or men make laws to suit themselves."<sup>26</sup> Men should not make laws to suit themselves only, as it is the duty of legislators to make laws for all men and for all women and for all children—for the whole state; and if male legislators often abuse their trust, there is no guarantee that female legislators would act better in that respect. But *as a fact*—whether with or without reason, let theology in its department of theodicy decide—

<sup>24a</sup> Similarly the voting of women in communistic societies, as among the German Perfectionists, founded at Zoar, Ohio, in 1817, and incorporated in 1832 (*Nordhoff's Communistic Societies of the United States*, 106), has no bearing on the question. The members of those societies never had to fight for their existence.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. G. C. Crocker, in an argument before a Committee on Woman Suffrage, Jan. 29, 1884, p. 5.

<sup>26</sup> Mrs. Snoad, *A Plea for Justice*, Westminster Review, July, 1892.

the weaker sex, like the weaker age, *is* at the mercy of the stronger, and always will be, suffrage or no suffrage: nature has made it so, and we men are not responsible for this fact, though we are responsible for our performance of the duty thereby imposed upon us.<sup>27</sup> Who are they who to-day are devastating the homes of the women and children of Belgium? Are they the women or the men of Germany? And who are they who are defending them and may possibly restore them to their homes? Are they the women of Belgium, of France, of England, or the men of those countries? These questions answer themselves. "Our soldiers are our saviours," said the Cardinal Bishop of Malines.<sup>28</sup> Had the women of England the vote, they probably would have agreed to the war, though with more holding back, and therefore with more impeding; and if they had outvoted the men, sent pacifists to Parliament, and prevented England from going to war, the women and children of Belgium would have gone without sufficient male protection. Had the women of Germany the vote, you say, they might have prevented the German aggression. Possibly, but there is not the slightest proof that they would or could have done so. As a fact, however, they have not the vote there, and this fact should be taken into account in England and elsewhere.<sup>29</sup> Women cannot check, except by moral suasion, men's aggression on other people, and in most cases they do not wish to: at all events the women of one country cannot check the men of another country. Women cannot oppose men's aggression: only men can do that. The

27 The two sexes form "two human estates," according to John S. Henderson, Jr., wherefore they should both "have co-equal powers in the government of a state," in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915. Let him tell this to the Maker of these two estates. At a suffragist meeting in California an old woman, after listening to an exposition of the laws affecting women, is reported to have risen and said: "Wal, gals! I reckon your quarrel is with the Lord and not with the law!" in *Mrs. Barclay Hazard's How Women can Serve the State*, 8.

28 Mercier, in his Pastoral Letter, Christmas, 1914.

29 "Is it conceivable," asks Darwin J. Meserole in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915, "that Europe would be where she is to-day had women been accorded their just place in the council chambers of these stricken nations?" The idea is of women everywhere in Europe having the suffrage,—the same supposition which the socialists (Mr. Meserole is a socialist) always make when they talk about the benefits of their scheme, notwithstanding that the only question any nation can have before it is its own adoption of what is recommended. In the same issue of *The Times*, J. Howard Coperthwait gave the answer: "A favourite argument of the suffragists has been that woman's influence in politics would be for peace and disarmament. Therefore it seems fair to say that if England had had woman suffrage that country would have been less well prepared for war, would have hesitated longer last Summer, and might, indeed, have stayed out of the conflict. At this moment Germany might have France in subjection, might be making peace with Russia on terms favourable to Germany, and might be getting ready to spring at England when England should be without allies." Of course, had it been the other way about and had Germany had woman suffrage and the other states not, *this* war would not have taken place, but another war would not thereby have been prevented. It is certainly not correct to use an argument applying to one thing (woman suffrage throughout the world) for another thing (woman suffrage in this or that country alone). Those who use this argument should be willing to wait at home till at least the majority of other countries, including all the most powerful ones, are ready to adopt woman suffrage.

conduct of this world is in the hands of men, and the women are only foolish who do not recognise so plain a fact.

Democratic states are those in which all men are supposed to be capable of taking part in the conduct of government. The exclusion of women in no wise militates against this democratic principle, because they are known to be incapable of taking part in the conduct of government. The ideal democratic state would be one in which all men actually are capable of taking part in the conduct of government. None such exists; for in actuality everywhere some men are not capable of taking part in the conduct of government; yet, where they are so few as to be negligible, they are admitted, as if they were, because of the inconvenience and impracticability of excluding them. It is in no wise a democratic ideal that all, or any, women should be capable of taking part in the conduct of government. As a fact, some women, having more or other strength than what is suitable for their own function in the state and in society, are capable of taking part in the conduct of government. Yet, too, they are excluded for the same reason of the inconvenience and impracticability of admitting them. It is a misfortune that some men are incapable of taking part in the conduct of government; but nothing is gained by the fact that some women are thus capable, since it does not improve, but distinctly hinders, their own proper function.

On the contrary, for women to be admitted to the franchise in a democratic country, violates the democratic principle, as it violates every principle of government, since it admits to the potentially governing set those who, commonly and naturally, have not even the potentiality of governing. There was an old Germanic saying: "Wo wir nicht mit rathen, wollen wir nicht mit thun."<sup>80</sup> Thus spoke men. They offered *Mitthun*, if they had *Mitrathen*. But the suffragist women wish for *Mitrathen*, without offering *Mitthun*. They reverse the saying of the kodak people, which is: "You press the button, and we do the rest"; for they virtually say: "Let us press the button (drop a vote), and you do the rest." This is contrary to the democratic principle of equality, applied to those who participate in government. Yet our women suffragists have the face to speak of their cause as that of "equal suffrage." It is most unequal suffrage; for, while men's vote is an expression of will and determination, women's vote would be an expression only of opinion and wish. Women expect to retain their own privileges along with their new rights; they expect to get men's privileges, without men's

<sup>80</sup> According to Wachsmuth, *Geschichte der Parteien*, ii. 276.

duties. And, in truth, if they get the suffrage, they will get only a privilege and not a duty.<sup>31</sup> They will still be different from men, and their citizenship will still be different from men's citizenship.<sup>32</sup> Is it just, then, to give women the suffrage? On the contrary, it is the height of injustice, since justice is to give every one his due, but this is to give to women more than their due.

In all this there is nothing that prevents women from the expression of opinion; for this is within their competency. "Why," asks a woman suffragist, "should not women have the right to speak for themselves, and by their own mouths to make their own wants known?"<sup>33</sup> They have: with us they have this right in public, everywhere they have it in private. Women demand the franchise and entrance into every department of government, says another feminist, because "they are bound to give the state the benefit of their insight."<sup>34</sup> They can give the state this benefit perfectly well as things are. Women are the natural critics, encouragers, restrainers, inspirers of men's actions. They should be listened to, and they are listened to when they show intelligence enough to deserve it.<sup>35</sup> But be they ever so wise, they are not to decide. The voting booth is not the place in which to express a mere opinion or desire: there men express power and determination, which women have not to ex-

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Mrs. A. M. Dodge: "The vote of the man is a sort of contract to support the verdict of the ballot box, if need be, by the jury box, the cartridge belt, the sheriff's summons. The voting woman is exempt from these obligations. She is a privileged voter. . . . Certainly it is unequal suffrage while women retain the exemptions demanded by their physical nature, and exercise political power without political responsibility," *Woman Suffrage opposed to Woman's Rights*, Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, Nov., 1914, p. 99. (So Mrs. Humphry Ward had opposed woman suffrage as giving women "power without responsibility," in a letter in *The Times*, March 8, 1907. It might be equally correct to say it would give them responsibility without power; for in either case what is attempted to be given is more than can be received. H. Owen was inaccurate here in saying, that with the vote women would have "complete power without final responsibility," *Woman Adrift*, 33.) On the other side cf. Mrs. Jacobi: "Certainly if women claim to exercise the functions of sovereignty, they must be prepared to assume a fair share of the public duties of citizenship. Precisely because they must be exempted from military and constable duty, where they would be of no use, should women be expected to hold themselves in readiness to fulfil such functions as those of jurors," "*Common Sense*," etc., 35. So, to take part in one of the easiest of men's political functions is to assume "a fair share" of the voter's duties!

<sup>32</sup> Mrs. John Martin: "A woman's vote has no guaranty behind it, and therefore she can never be a citizen in the same sense that a man is a citizen. At most she can only become a sort of left-handed or morganatic citizen — never quite legitimately wedded to the state. She can vote only by courtesy as a sort of honorary citizen, a citizen emeritus, not an active, sustaining member of the body politic," *Feminism*, 323.

<sup>33</sup> Mrs. Jacobi, "*Common Sense*," etc., 223.

<sup>34</sup> Mrs. Schreiner, *Woman and Labour*, 205.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Mrs. Johnson, *Woman and the Republic*, 51-3. As a rule, in the culminating and declining periods of civilisation female authors and artists, because of men's gallantry and women's vanity, receive more attention than male authors and artists of corresponding merit. It is analogous to the greater glory accorded to women, in the early period, for equal deeds. Cloelia was honoured with an equestrian statue by the Romans for a feat which would have passed unnoticed performed by a man (and, too, for one not altogether honourable or allowable to a man); and the modern Grace Darling won fame for assisting her father in a bold rescue.

press.<sup>36</sup> In the affairs in which women are wiser than men, if such there be, they would be like experts, who now are often summoned by legislative bodies, or imposed upon them, to give information and advice, but whose vote is not taken. So far as they have sufficient intelligence, let them raise their voice; but as they have not sufficient force, theirs is not the will of the state.

Suppose angels frequented the society of mankind, possessing perfect intelligence and the power of communicating thought to us, but not having bodies or any influence upon bodies, completely lacking in physical force. Their numbers would then be wholly immaterial, and their voices would not be counted. They ought to be listened to and their counsel heeded; and that would be the case, as far as men were wise enough to comprehend their wisdom: the majority of men, accepting their advice, would compel the rest to observe it. Women are not such angels; for they possess some physical force and not so much intelligence. But so long as their physical force is not enough to command consideration, their intelligence, however great it may be, deserves only to be consulted.<sup>37</sup> If they can persuade the majority of men, the majority of men will adopt and execute their advice.<sup>38</sup>

This view of the case answers all the previous arguments for woman suffrage. It shows that women ought not to feel hurt at being excluded from the political franchise, because their exclusion does not indicate that they are inferior to men on the whole, but only in the one respect, by all acknowledged, of not possessing force enough to carry on government. It shows that on account of their inferiority in force, they have not a right to take part in government,—on the contrary, that it is an unfair

<sup>36</sup> Hence the error of this demand, that men should "enfranchise women and let them go to the polls, and there allow them to express their political opinions after the manner accorded to present-day [male] voters": Penelope Pauli in *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1915. "It should be remembered," says Rossiter Johnson, "that every popular election has two phases—the phase of discussion, and the phase of determination. In the canvass (the phase of discussion), men exchange facts and arguments and express their opinions. When that is over, they go to the polls, where each one expresses his determination that the conduct of the government shall be thus and so—provided enough men are found to be on his side," *The Blank-Cartridge Ballot*, 7.

<sup>37</sup> Annie S. Peck says she wants to vote because she desires "to be regarded as an intelligent human being," in *The New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1915. She does not desire to be regarded as a strong human being, capable of fighting for her own and others' rights. She would show more intelligence if she recognised that in the question of suffrage this is the main point.

<sup>38</sup> This discloses the error of the principle upon which Condorcet rested his argument for woman suffrage, above, p. 7. If Swift's Lilliputians were a reality and lived amongst us, since they were "sensible beings, susceptible of acquiring moral ideas, and of reasoning on these ideas," we should no doubt recognise in them certain rights, but as they would be incapable of taking part in the public defence, we should not feel ourselves called upon to acknowledge in them a right to perform a duty which they would be incapable of carrying through. Their rights would be principally to protection. They would have civil, but not political rights.

demand of those who cannot act that they should be permitted to direct those who do; wherefore their exclusion is not unjust, and not inconsistent with the principles that rule in representative and democratic states. It shows that to admit women would be to introduce a disturbing element into politics — the ballot without bullet,<sup>39</sup> or "the blank cartridge ballot," as it has been called,<sup>40</sup> — and, because of their physical incapacity, could not accomplish good.

Here we come to the argument against woman suffrage from its inexpediency. The actual working of woman suffrage in the few isolated spots where it has been introduced,— where women are in the minority, where men are gallant, where, especially, the vote of the majority is guaranteed to be enforced by the larger nation which surrounds them, and international questions come not into question,— the actual working there within a period too short for a test proves nothing one way or the other. For its working in the long run, in large states independent amidst other and possibly hostile states, with the total control of everything shared between them,— for that we have only probability to rely on. And the probability is that when natural distinctions are not respected, when weakness is treated as strength, when the ultimate foundation of government is undermined, when those who must execute its decrees have resigned the decision, and those who have the responsibility would put it off on others; then, although things may run smoothly for a time under quiet and peaceful conditions, yet when difficulties arise and passions are excited, such confused suffrage, unevenly mixed, will collapse. Bad men may advocate it, as giving them troubled waters to fish in; shrewd politicians may espouse it to conciliate possible future voters; careless good men may favour it, because it appeals to their generosity, since some women out of

<sup>39</sup> For there is a real connection between these things, and not merely an etymological connection between the terms.

<sup>40</sup> See Rossiter Johnson's pamphlet under this title, already frequently cited. "A ballot put into the box by a woman," says he, "would be simply a blank cartridge."

4. And "to make any party victorious at the polls by means of blank-cartridge ballots would only present an increased temptation to the numerical minority to assert itself as the military majority," 4-5. This called forth several futile replies, which were collected in a book, *The Ballot and the Bullet*, compiled by Mrs. C. C. Catt and issued by the National American Woman Suffrage Association, 1897. Curtis, getting a hint from Sumner (above, p. 325n.), seems to have indirectly given origin to this argument against woman suffrage. Arguing for it, he said: "A man with civil rights merely [i.e., without the political, without the franchise] is a blank cartridge. Give him the ballot and you add the bullet and make him effective," *Orations and Addresses*, i. 194. He overlooked that to add the bullet in the hands of women would still be ineffective. So on p. 230 he says: "When we gave the freedmen [the negroes] their civil rights, we gave them a gun; when we added political equality [the suffrage], we loaded it and made it effective." That was said in 1870, and events soon proved that the loaded gun in the weak hands of the negroes was still no better than an unloaded gun. Not only a bullet is needed in the gun, but a man is needed behind the gun.

petty pride desire it; but wise good men, and all wise women, should repudiate it as useless and dangerous. Its extension to municipalities that not yet have it may perhaps do little harm, and possibly some good, especially if coupled with confinement of the expenditure of municipal moneys to the direction of those who pay them, provided some curb could be put upon men to keep them from handing over too much property to women; and in our States, whose enactments are likewise guaranteed by the nation, it might also, though more risky, and though unreasonable, be not altogether noxious, provided it were separated (by a revision of the federal constitution) from the national representation. But national representation in our country, as in every large country that stands on its own feet and has a part to play in the world's affairs, would, till all men in all the world are good and peaceful, be fraught with the greatest likelihood of mischief.

This probability is itself obtained by the argument from force. The argument from force is alone sufficient to condemn woman suffrage. The equality of women with men may be conceded, and woman suffrage is still to be proscribed until men's universal goodness renders women's inferiority in force inessential. If, however, women further do not possess intelligence equal to that of men, on the whole (for the fact that some women may in this respect surpass some men, is nothing to the point), or if the circumstances of women's lives properly conducted for the perpetuation of the species do not permit them to develop their intelligence equally with men (and whether their intuition is greater, is also not to the point), that would provide a further reason for not admitting women to the franchise. But it would be a superfluous reason, as regards national affairs at least, since the other is already sufficient. It would, however, provide an additional reason why woman suffrage should not be indulged in for municipal affairs. Yet, as these are less important, and as failure there would not be so momentous, and as women are touchy on this subject, experimentation there might be permissible, if women and their abettors were willing to confine it there. But even there the hope of success is so small as to make the experimentation hardly worth while.

Returning to national representation, or to the subject in general, let us make one more supposition. Suppose the vast majority of men had talent for painting, and very few women; and suppose the vast majority of women had talent for music, and very few men. Then there might be a congress of painters, in which only men would take part, and a congress of women, in

which only women would take part; or in each case the other sex would be admitted only as spectators or auditors, and be consulted only as critics. If, again, in the women's sphere men were more capable than women in the men's sphere, it would only be more natural for the men to take more part in the women's congress than the women in the men's.

Now, there actually is such a division between the proper occupations of men and women. Men's talent is for government, women's for society. Government and society are different, though they are related. The distinction has never been better expounded than by one of the first who drew attention to it. "Society," said Thomas Paine, "is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last is a punisher."<sup>41</sup> He omitted only to say that society was made by women, government by men, society being an extension of the family, government or the state a limit set thereto. Else all that we can now say on the subject, is to amplify what he said. Society acts for positive good, government negatively to prevent evil. Society regulates manners, government morals. Society only prescribes rules of conduct, government sees to their execution. Society at most punishes the breakers of manners by ostracising them. But it often works badly, and welcomes the greatest thieves and the most immoral men and women, if only they are not caught; but it is the function of government to catch them. Government defends society from its own evil elements, and from outside enemies. It manages the police and the army. It employs force, while society employs only opinion. In government, therefore, only men can properly take part; but in society women play the chief rôle. Society is woman's province, not only in the narrow sense of the fashionable set, but in the wider sense of human companionship.<sup>42</sup> And socially woman's is the superior sex, but man's is the superior politically.<sup>43</sup>

Thus already we have that supplementation of the masculine factor by the feminine factor, so much desired by the feminists.

<sup>41</sup> *Common Sense*, opening.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Riehl, *Die Familie*, 24; also Rev. Underhill, reported in the *New York Sun*, March 20, 1910. Forel only shows carelessness of speech when he demands equal "social" rights for women, *The Sexual Question*, 368, cf. 504. Cf. also Mrs. Jacobi above quoted, p. 235n.

<sup>43</sup> So Comte recognised in women "a secondary superiority considered from the social point of view," *Cours de Philosophie positive*, iv. 406, 408; cf. *Système de Politique positive*, i. 210 (where, and on p. 211, he also says man must command, because of his greater force, despite his lesser morality and his consequent lesser worthiness), and iv. 62-3 (where he treats of "the sociocratic supremacy" of women).

Only, instead of both being in government and both in society, the man is in government, and the woman in society. If man also plays a part in society, more than woman can in government, it is because he is more fitted for this than she is for that.

Government, however, is not to be confined merely to the military and the police power. Thomas Paine in his later days himself went too far in urging such confinement.<sup>44</sup> That is not rightly a democratic principle: democracies have demanded it only at their beginning, when they mistrusted government in the hands of the upper classes; for when they have become familiar with the fact of its being in their own hands, they have wished to exercise it for the common good. Government must not merely keep people from committing crimes, it must direct their common action in the common interest.<sup>45</sup> So especially in municipal government, wherefore it is only in municipal matters that the admission of women to the franchise should even be thought of. But even here the public works which municipalities must attend to are usually on that large scale which women are not competent for, while still performing their own meticulous functions. As for the regulation of labour and other matters of that sort, entrusted by our polity to our State governments, that is an affair of restraint from evil-doing on the part of employers and employés, and so is an affair of force, and therefore properly confined to men. Women should be heard, but men's should be the decision, as theirs is the execution.

Woman suffrage, by admitting women to the government, would take them more out of society: it would revolutionise society as well as government.<sup>46</sup> It involves a total reorganisation of society, a totally new social system,—feminism, in fact.<sup>47</sup> For it depends throughout on the claim that women are equal to men, denying their secondary differences, lest in the respect which concerns government women might be found inferior. To be sure, some of the mere suffragists, who are not feminists, argue against the force argument that force is no longer essential in government and therefore the inferiority of women in force

<sup>44</sup> *The Rights of Man*, Part II, ch. i.

<sup>45</sup> Elihu Root fell short when he said: "The whole science of government is the science of protecting life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness," in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1894, *Revised Record*, ii. 522. But his critic, Inez Milholland (the late Mrs. Boissevain) went too far in the other direction when she wrote: "We conceive the chief functions of the state to be humanitarian and life-enhancing," adding that "in reality, politics has more to do with the nursery" than with disciplining armies and building jails: in *The New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1913. Safety must come first. The enhancement of life may be a chief aim of society, but only a secondary one can it be in government.

<sup>46</sup> That the woman movement means "a social revolution," is recognised by Lily Braun, *Die Frauenfrage*, 207.

<sup>47</sup> This is not only admitted but claimed by all feminists; and it is vainly denied by those female suffragists who refuse "to go the whole hog."

may be conceded without impairing women's claim to the suffrage. But we have seen the utter falsity of their argument; wherefore some even of the mere suffragists claim that women have enough force to take their places beside men, especially as some men who vote have not force enough to make their vote good, if it came to blows. Here, however, the suffragists approach the position of the feminists, which is the only thorough-going one: that to admit any distinction between men and women is to deny to women their birthright as human beings. Though this conclusion is fallacious, the consequence of it is that if the claim to equality be allowed in government, it must be allowed in society also, and if women are the equals of men in government, men are the equals of women in society. Then the special privileges of women must be abandoned,<sup>48</sup> and also the special responsibilities and obligations of men.<sup>49</sup> Even trivial concessions to women must no longer be tolerated, since they would require in return some corresponding concession to men. Chivalry and gallantry must be ended,<sup>50</sup> and, too, all rules of politeness and etiquette that are different in the sexes.<sup>51</sup> There must be a single standard in social as in moral conduct. In society as in government women must be treated like men. They must become their own, and to a half share their children's, breadwinners, economically independent of men, standing on their own feet — proud, elated, at last full human beings! In place of the age-long dovetailing of the sexes, there is to be side-by-sideness — companionship, to be sure, but also rivalry. The competition between men is to extend to women also. The ideal is complete individualism, every woman looking out for herself as well as every man for himself. Such is the first thought, and it is entertained by all

48 "Women cannot have both equality and privilege," Goldwin Smith, *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 210, and similarly 234.

49 Above, p. 315n, we have seen a reply to this, to the effect that husbands must still support their wives in return for the services their wives render to them, and voting has nothing to do with it. But the fundamental argument for women's voting is that they are equal to men, and unless this argument be thrown overboard, it follows that husbands need not be obliged to support their views, unless they expressly contract to do so. At present the legal obligation continues even though the wife renders no service in return, when they are legally separated, even when they are divorced. Certainly all claims to alimony should be abolished; also breach-of-promise suits should cease.

50 Feminists "have no use for knightliness and chivalry," W. L. George, *Feminist Intentions*, Atlantic Monthly, Dec., 1913, p. 722.

51 E.g., at present when a man and a woman walking together meet a man and a woman, if the women bow, the men must also, but if the men bow (only they being acquainted with each other), the women do not. Why this difference? It is a recognition of woman's superiority in social relations. This may be proved as follows. If two grandees, each with a suite of retainers, meeting, salaam to each other, their followers must do likewise; but if some members of the suite nod to each other, their masters do not. This custom, therefore, will have to be changed; for if women do not recognise the superiority of men in government, men need not recognise the superiority of women in society. Hence in future men will be emancipated from this degrading thraldom!

the thoroughgoing feminists,<sup>52</sup> who perceive that feminism is the logical sequel of woman suffrage. But it soon is seen that exceptions must be made, of the women who bear and suckle children, while they bear and suckle children. These, then, must still be made independent of individual men: they must be cared for by the state. Enters socialism—of one kind at least. But for state socialism, we should have retrogression to the primitive condition when women took care of themselves like the females of brutes, with an approximation to the quasi equality of strength which then existed between the sexes.<sup>53</sup> With this much of socialism, the provision offered them by the state, which will still be mostly run by men, will in all probability be indescribably poorer than that made by individual men.

Naturally most of the women who demand the suffrage, as also their kind-hearted male abettors, do not recognise this, the full logic of their demand. Only the socialists among them—the full socialists—are consistent, and desire the end of the movement of which the others desire only the beginning. Next to them are the feminists, who apply socialism at least to women. It is most likely, also, that if women get the suffrage, they will not vote to carry out the feminist schemes to their full extent. There will be holding back on the part of the majority of women. Consistency, of course, is not a necessity. "It is not necessary," says a prominent suffragist, who is only a suffragist, Mrs. Ida Husted Harper,—"it is not necessary for women to lose anything whatever, nor would they do so."<sup>54</sup> Indeed, women desire to keep their present privileges, with those of men added.<sup>55</sup> If,

<sup>52</sup> For instance, Mrs. Gallichan, who objects to women coming down from their pedestal whenever they want to and climbing back again whenever they want to, and would have them be "common women with common men," *The Truth about Woman*, 381.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Mrs. Arthur M. Dodge: "Woman suffrage in its last analysis is a retrogressive movement toward conditions when the work of men and women was the same because neither sex had evolved enough to see the wisdom of being a specialist in its own line," *Woman Suffrage opposed to Woman's Rights*, in *Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science*, Nov., 1914, p. 99.

<sup>54</sup> In *The New York Times*, March 7, 1915.

<sup>55</sup> In the same issue of the newspaper cited in the preceding note, Helen McCulloch Phyne attempts to show that women may keep their privileges consistently—without violating any principle. She argues that women's privileges were not extended to them to offset their exclusion from the franchise, and therefore the granting of the franchise will not entail abrogation of the privileges. The privileges, she maintains, have been granted because women are physically and economically different from men; which differences will remain, still requiring the same discrimination of privileges. The first statement is correct; and neither is the franchise a reward to men for their services, nor is the exclusion of women from it a hardship needing to be offset by some favours. But the second statement immediately refers, though incompletely, to the principle which requires their exclusion. The physical and economic differences between the sexes will remain despite the opening of the franchise, and the most important discrimination these differences require is the very one at issue—the inclusion of men in, and the exclusion of women from, the governing power, because women lack the power to govern. But the denial of this lack and the claim that women have the power to govern, mean that they should forgo privileges which are granted to them because of their lack of power and their need of protection.

to take the distinction between male and female out of the constitution, it was required also to take it out of all laws and customs, to make absolutely no distinction between men and women, to give to men the same privileges as to women and to impose upon women the same duties as upon men (abolishing those which are incompatible with this combination), few women would desire it — nay, the vast majority of women would be terrified at the prospect. Yet that is what consistency would require. Consistency, however, is not even wanted. From the feminist and socialist programmes women will pick out what pleases them most. By setting up unfair demands, they will fall into a position as unstable as it will be untenable.

Women are weaker than men, and therefore *are* in the power of men. Mill, to set a period to the rulership of men, spoke of "protection" as something "which, in the present state of civilisation, women have almost ceased to need."<sup>56</sup> Ceased to need — because they have it, organised and systematised, pressed down and running over, in fuller measure than ever before! The protection which the man-made state throws over women is the proof itself of their dependence. This condition women cannot escape from by *receiving* power from men, nor can men avoid their responsibility by *giving* power to women, because, as we have already seen,<sup>57</sup> power of this sort — primary power — cannot be really given and received, it will still remain with the grantors, and the attempt to make the transfer is only a sham. Force cannot be created by legislative enactment. We may grant the vote as if women had force enough to exert the power it implies; but we might as well put guns in their hands and dress them up as soldiers: in times of peace they would do as well as men (and perhaps look better: they now boast that they can march better than men), but in times of trouble their weakness would disclose itself.

Here also it may be repeated that if men are good enough to let women vote, they are good enough for women not to need the vote; and if they are not good enough in the latter way, they are not good enough in the former, and would only belie their own nature if they pretended they were.<sup>58</sup> Even if men were in our single country, this United States of ours, so good as to make it a matter of indifference whether they gave women the suffrage or not, men are not so in other countries, and it behoves the men of this country to stand forth before the world as the guardians of our women and children. But men are not so even in our

<sup>56</sup> *Dissertations*, iii. 116.

<sup>57</sup> Above, pp. 325-6.

<sup>58</sup> Above, p. 284.

country: in our country there are more murders, in proportion to the population, than in any other civilised country on the earth, and more laws and less observance of them, more law-breaking, than anywhere else. It is so because our men are not manly enough, are too effeminate, too squeamish, to inflict punishment with severity sufficient to deter. Our co-education, our exaggerated deference to women, have enervated us. This has gone furthest in the upper, the ruling classes. The good are weakened: strength remains with the bad. It is bad enough to have our boys taught by women, and if this system continues much longer, our "school marms" will be our ruination. The evil will be only fixed more firmly upon us, and enhanced, and the ruination brought still sooner, if women be admitted amongst our rulers.<sup>59</sup>

Responsibility for the conduct of the world lies with men, not with women. Our women now talk as if they too were responsible.<sup>60</sup> They are indeed responsible in their own proper field—in society, in the family. They are not responsible for affairs of government,<sup>61</sup> and the talk of their being so is only a delusion of decadent civilisation. For men to accept such talk and to repeat it, is a sign that they are shirking their own proper responsibility. Men have no right to shirk their own proper responsibility: they ought not to abdicate leadership in matters which do, or may, require force. They should, too, be careful not to disguise their conduct, or to cheat themselves, with a misleading appearance of kindness. "I shall," said our late Secretary of State, before his retirement,—"I shall ask no political rights for myself that I am not willing to grant to my wife."<sup>62</sup> Would he, then, assume no political duties that he would not impose upon his wife? His position was met twenty years before by one of his predecessors, in language unfortunately too florid to stand comparison with his simple words, yet with a correctness deserving to be quoted: "I,

<sup>59</sup> "The transfer of power from the military to the unmilitary sex," says Goldwin Smith, "involves a change in the character of a nation. It involves, in short, national emasculation," *Essays on Questions of the Day*, 205.

<sup>60</sup> Thus Mrs. Raymond Brown "asked women to realise that they were grown up and must accept responsibilities as adult human beings, who are as responsible for conditions in the world to-day as are men," as reported in *The Argus*, Patchogue, Nov. 18, 1910. Let her answer this question to-day: are women responsible for present conditions in Belgium? And if Belgium be restored, will women be responsible for its restoration?

<sup>61</sup> A broadside entitled *Women in the Home* issued by the American Woman Suffrage Association contains this galimatias: "In fact, men are responsible for the conditions under which children live, but we [the public] hold women responsible for the results of these conditions. If we hold women responsible for the results, must we not, in simple justice, let them have something to say as to what these conditions shall be? There is one simple way of doing so. Give them the same means that men have. Let them vote."

<sup>62</sup> W. J. Bryan, in the public statement already referred to. Imagine his wife saying, 'I shall ask no social rights for myself that I am not willing to grant to my husband'!

for one, will never consent to part with the divine right of protecting my wife, my daughter, . . . and place that high duty in the weak and nerveless hands of those designed by God to be protected rather than to engage in the stern warfare of government.”<sup>63</sup> Wise women would show contempt for men who would act otherwise,— and the antisuffragist women do show such contempt,<sup>64</sup> and probably many suffragist women feel it. After all, it is the strong man who wins woman’s respect.<sup>65</sup> In fact, only where and when men have begun to shirk their duties, do women demand participation.<sup>66</sup> But they would be wiser if they stung men with reproaches into doing their duty; for they still need men to be men in order to protect them. If they do not feel this need in our country, it is because our country has for so long been in a situation of almost perfect security. But let days of danger come, as undoubtedly they will before many years, and women, unless they shall have changed their course, will be sorry they did not leave men to be men, instead of trying to make men of women.

In our small western States, where women are few and in demand, and where men can afford to be extravagantly gallant, we need not blame men overmuch for opening the door to this farce of woman suffrage. But in the older States or nations, where women are numerous, and where weighty problems exist within and dangers threaten from without, so that it behooves people to be serious, men would be culpable to the last degree if they resigned their power and abandoned their responsibility. In what condition would England and France be to-day to defend themselves from Germany, if twenty-five years ago they had extended the suffrage to women? It is idle to say that Germany would be in a similar condition if she too had done so. We know that some countries will not do so when others do. Woe to the one which tries this dangerous experiment first!

<sup>63</sup> Elihu Root, in the New York Constitutional Convention of 1914, *Revised Record*, ii, 522. This was recently reprinted in the newspapers, July 12, 1915; and to one woman, Mary D. Campbell, as she wrote in a letter printed in *The New York Times* a few days later, it appeared “screamingly funny,” “deliciously illogical,” and “absolutely apart from the point at issue.”

<sup>64</sup> So Prestonia Mann (Mrs. John) Martin: “As for the male suffragist, puling and driveling and howling for women to come and help him out of his political difficulties—he ought to be put to bed with a bottle of milk to suck, or sent to an asylum for incompetents,” in *The New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1915.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. another anti: “At heart she [woman] knows the man who does not yield [to her demand for the suffrage] is a true man,” Charlotte R. Bangs, in *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1912.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Coventry Patmore: “When man becomes womanish, . . . she [woman] is all abroad. She does not know what to do with herself, and begins to chatter and scream about her rights.” “When this order [recognising the inequality of the sexes] ceases to exist, and with it the life and delight of love, it is wholly the man’s fault. A woman will consent to be small only when the man is great. . . . The widely extended impatience of women under the present condition of things is nothing but an unconscious protest against the diminished masculinity of men,” *Religio Poetæ*, 155, 157.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND PROSPECT

A GREAT evil in modern as in all advanced societies is the existence, not of inequality, but of too little inequality, between the sexes. The advance of civilisation breaks down barriers no longer needed, and it is apt to go too far and make apparent breaches in barriers still needful — barriers not built by art and therefore temporary, but raised by nature and therefore enduring. The situation will continue to be a jumble until a new heterogeneity be evolved and a new classification constructed. The feminists make a mistake in wishing to demolish the most natural of all barriers, that of sex; and the woman suffragists are feminists in politics. As the socialists would sacrifice liberty to equality, so the feminists would sacrifice the lasting interests of humanity to their transient whims.

Evils exist of which women complain, and evils that need correction. The great evil, in this connection, the mother of other evils, is the driving of women out of their home industries into employment under strange men. It is this which is destroying the home and the family, making children inconvenient and marriage superfluous, and endangering the race. The problem is to bring them back to the home, to occupy them there, so that they need not seek to interfere elsewhere, may there desire the company of children, and may be able to contribute to the support of the family; for men are excusable for not wishing to support women in idleness. This need of domestic occupation is felt especially in the upper and middle classes; for it is there that increase of the birth-rate is most to be desired, and not in the lower classes — in the competent and thrifty, and not in the incompetent and thrifless — in the superior race, and not in the inferior. Among the latter, among the poor, to keep women out of competition with men will still be necessary. Distinct occupations, especially for the unmarried, should again be established, preferably by custom: typewriting for women is a hopeful example. For the married most needed is their healthful collaboration at congenial but different tasks. The work of fishwives, so common throughout Europe, during part of the day in marketing their husband's

catch, is an instance in point. If such open-air occupation keeps them from having too many children, all the better. It is dying at the top that is the threatening danger. To prevent this, it is necessary to set up again, not the old, but new home industries, new household work, new domestic interests, new occupations compatible with the female primary function, the problem being to find or invent them. This the feminists do not recognise. They would extend and regularise the evil, and thereby increase it. The return of women to the home, says one of them, is impossible.<sup>1</sup> Thus the true problem is abandoned.

Even when some of the evil consequences are acknowledged, they are so only in part and are not rightly faced. "The care of the baby is the weak point of feminism," has said a prominent feminist, who is engaged, as President of a Feminist Alliance, in preparing for it by trying to found in New York an apartment house where "the four primitive industries of women — care of house, clothes, food, and children" — may be attended to by "trained staffs" of hired women, while the wives and mothers go out to business. She has wished to retract that saying,<sup>2</sup> but in truth she did not go far enough; for the weakest point in feminism is the production of babies. In that same apartment house childless married couples are to be admitted, as also unmarried men and women. How many children will live there, it will be interesting to see.

There are, as we have seen, other causes in plenty, in highly developed civilisation, for the decrease of the birth-rate, especially in the upper classes. But these causes it is impossible to eradicate directly. It is impossible at present to abolish hotels and restaurants that make living easy for bachelors; impossible to annihilate the canning and preserving industry and the preparation of breakfast foods, that take the place of women's domestic cooking; impossible to suppress amusements that lessen the need of domestic love and the fondling of children. On the other hand, however, while the feminists are going ahead and would even use the law for artificially raising the wages of women to an equality with those of men, invoking the aid of the state to contribute to the support of women and thus render the indi-

<sup>1</sup> Mrs. Gallichan, *The Truth about Woman*, 289. She also writes: "The home with its old full activities has passed away from women's hands. But woman's work is not less needed. To-day the state claims her; the nation's housekeeping needs the vitalising mother-force more than anything else," 280, *cf.* 283. By no means; the state does not claim her. She is imposing herself upon the state, unwanted. There is no such thing as the nation's housekeeping (a mere metaphor) to need her mother-force (another metaphor, especially as it is not to be employed with motherhood). — On the superfluousness of woman in the activities of the state, see H. Owen, *Woman Adrift*, ch. v.

<sup>2</sup> Henrietta Rodman, in *The New York Times*, January 24, 1915.

vidual woman independent of the individual man—the wife of the husband, the grown daughter of the parent,—it is possible to hold back and hinder such advance in the wrong direction, such crab-like “progress.” And when new work is discovered for women at home, intellectual or otherwise, which does not interfere with the care of children, and to which children, in the spare hours from their studies, may contribute, thus rendering themselves useful and once more in the world desirable, and once more being trained to discipline and inured to labour, then it may be possible even for the law to step in little by little to restrict the out-of-home work of women that is unsuited to a sound social constitution, as has already been done in the case of mining. Above all, if excessive inequality of fortunes may be prevented (without the other extreme of excessive equality), the evil of luxury in enervating the rich and dispiriting the poor may be curbed. If some such things be done, the continuance of civilisation may be prolonged by putting off and retarding its decline; if they are not done, the decline of civilisation will follow its usual course; if the fundamental evil be abetted, the end of our cycle of civilisation will be hastened.

Such hastening of decay will be effected by feminism, which looks only to the present and would get rid of certain disagreeable things without regard to more serious consequences that may be left to the future. It will be enhanced by the adoption of woman suffrage, especially in countries where women abound. For woman suffrage is based on the same false principle as all feminism, and tends, more or less far, in the same direction. No woman suffragist ever contemplates the true problem before us in the proper light, and every woman suffragist that speaks on social questions goes some distance on the road with the feminists. If women have the suffrage, they will, in all probability, not adopt the full programme of feminism; but will enact enough of it to do harm. Still more harm, amounting to a catastrophe, they are likely to accomplish, because of their proneness to another ism—pacifism.

Peace-talk is good, and it is bad: the distinction deserves to be noted. It may be good enough in general, it may be very bad in particular. It is good for inculcating the keeping of the peace, when a real peace exists; it is bad in enjoining a sham observance of peace, when the peace is already disturbed and when fighting is needed to restore it. There are two kinds of peace—a righteous peace, which guards the rights of the citizens, while respecting those of others, and a craven peace, which sacrifices even

the former. Peace-talk that sanctions the existence of wrong, is bad. There are two sides to war — an aggressive side, which, when attacking for selfish purposes, is unjust, and a defensive side, which, when upholding a good cause, is just. Peace-talk that prevents the former, is good; that prevents the latter, bad. We ought not to encourage the military in the direction of unjust aggression; we ought to encourage it so as to be sufficient for just defence.

Shortly after the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the feminists and pacifists of New York marched up (or was it down?) Fifth Avenue, parading in demonstration against War — not against this war as waged by the Dual Alliance or against this war as waged by the Triple Entente, but against War in general — an abstraction! They might as well have demonstrated against the Plague! Peace is likewise a mere abstraction, since all depends on what kind of a peace it is. Yet these people do come back to concrete facts, but with little better success. This war they talk about as being contrary to civilisation and as bringing the world back to barbarism; whereas, as a matter of fact, this is the most civilised war that has ever been fought — a war making the greatest exhibition of power the world has ever seen; the greatest war absolutely, though not relatively, as it is likely to do less devastation, in comparison with the lives and property at stake, than did the Peloponnesian war, the Punic wars, the Thirty Years war, the last of which reduced the population of Germany to less than half, at the end, of what it was at the beginning.

Nor is war in general uncivilised, since the most civilised peoples have been the greatest warriors — that is, the most successful, although they have not been the most preoccupied with military matters. And wars have taken place in all stages of the cycles of civilisation — in the ascending as well as in the descending: they have not hindered the ascent, and it cannot be doubted that they have sometimes retarded the descent — certainly successful defensive wars have done so, while others have sometimes chastened the people and reawakened their manhood. The end of every civilisation has, indeed, generally come in war, but only when the civilisation was decrepit and needing the last shove to topple it over. There is even some connection between war and civilisation, since both are effects of the same cause — an exuberance of virile spirit. War is to be regretted, but it does not deserve always to be shunned. Above all things, we should not think of it, and talk of it, without making the distinction between its two kind — its two faces, as the Romans represented it. Un-

justified aggressive war should be discouraged always. On the other hand, defensive war will always be necessary as long as aggression from others is likely; and aggression from others — both outside and inside any one state — will always be likely as long as men are bad.

Unjust war is murder, unjust war is robbery — that does not prevent its being engaged in by states, just as individuals engage in similar crimes. The enormity of such crimes on the tremendous scale on which states perform them, tends to lessen their frequency; but there are counter considerations. Wars are waged by impersonal entities, states, which, like corporations, are soulless and cannot sin;<sup>3</sup> and the individual persons who conduct them feel responsible only to and for their own fellow citizens or subjects, not to and for their enemies. Every one is fighting for all the others in his own country: individually they all feel altruistic, although all collectively may be egoistic. The imaginary I of the state is made to look out only for itself, and to feel pride in doing so.

That unjust war is murder, is plain enough — murder on so grand a scale as to be respectable (like the fraudulency of billionaires); and though the killing must be done by individuals, each individual's share is shoved off to the impersonal whole. That aggressive war is robbery, or that it is murder for the sake of robbery, is openly acknowledged in the early and rising stage of civilisation. The early Greeks, for instance, made no bones about it. Herodotus represents Aristagoras as urging the Persian satrap of Sardis to conquer Naxos for the great treasure there stored, and again as advising the Spartans to attack the rich Persians, instead of warring with their neighbours, who had "no gold or silver, for which the desire leads men to die fighting."<sup>4</sup> Successful warfare was, in fact, regarded as the most gainful of occupations.<sup>4a</sup> But when people become more sophisticated, they use pretexts to hide their real intent — at last even from themselves. The Romans became adepts at this,<sup>5</sup> as to-day

<sup>3</sup> It was an old doctrine that states can sin, but that, as they cannot be punished by God in another world, they are punished with destruction in this, whereas individuals, being punishable in another world, are not punished by God in this. But the truth seems rather that states are not destroyed as a consequence of sins, but as a consequence of mistakes; for, as a fact, states, or rather the people in them, sin as much in the ascending period, but those who do ascend are organised with a view to the welfare of the whole, and after reaching a certain stage of prosperity think more of the welfare of individuals, and then slowly fall to pieces. Individuals likewise perish, with more connection with mistakes than with sins.

<sup>4</sup> *Hist.*, V. 31, 49.

<sup>4a</sup> Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, IV. ii. 26.

<sup>5</sup> E.g., of the first Punic war, breaking out in a contest over Sicily, Florus says the Romans acted "specie quidem socios juvandi, re autem sollicitante praeda," I. 18 (or II. 2). But he was able to say of his countrymen, what cannot be said to-day of the Germans: "Summa foederum Romanis religio est," I. 22 (or II. 6). In mak-

the English,— both, because the responsibility of their rulers to the people required it. In great wars the plea is, that the other state will destroy us, if we do not destroy it. This is sufficient especially in countries governed despotically or aristocratically. The Persians were in this stage when they invaded Greece, and according to Herodotus Xerxes said: “The choice lies between acting and suffering, and either our country must come under the power of the Greeks, or theirs must come under the power of the Persians.”<sup>6</sup> At this very day the Germans are talking the same way: Nietzsche offered the alternative of the hammer or the anvil, and in Bernhardi’s book is a chapter headed “World-power or Downfall.” The poor Germans, however, (still primitive, which accounts for their better organisation and stricter sense of public duty) are not even yet quite out of the simple robber age, and the same Bernhardi plainly spoke of their desire to obtain the colonial possessions of their neighbours “as the result of a successful European war.”<sup>7</sup>

When a nation reaches the culminating period of its civilisation, like the Romans under Augustus, it is satisfied, seeks no further expansion, and desires peace. This, and not the mere polity of a nation, is the cause of peacefulness; for democracies have been as warlike as monarchies.<sup>8</sup> When nothing more can be gained by

ing treaties they invoked a curse upon themselves if they broke it: see Livy, I. 24. How formal they were in declaring war, may be seen from *ib.* 32.

<sup>6</sup> VII. 11. Cf. Thucydides, VI. 18 (3), even in a democracy.

<sup>7</sup> *Germany and the Next War*, New York ed., 107. These poor deluded Germans, who want to be hated, provided they be feared, probably think this a Roman motto (*oderint, dum metuant*). They forget that Cicero, who quotes it from a Greek drama, found fault with it as indecorous even in the mouth of an unjust tyrant, *De Officiis*, I. xxviii., and that the only Roman who is known to have adopted it was the most degraded of all—Caligula (according to Suetonius, in his life of him, c. 30; who says even of Tiberius that he turned it into “*oderint, dum probent*,” in the latter’s life, c. 59). If anybody in Germany ought to be ashamed of themselves for this robber war they inaugurated in 1914 under the plea of self-defence, it should be the socialists, who to a barefaced hypocrisy have added treason to their own life-cause. Or have they merely shown themselves children of their forefathers? of whom Cæsar said that, individually faithful to one another, collectively they thought it honourable to plunder the neighbouring peoples, *De Bello Gallico*, VI. 23, and whom Tacitus characterised as fighting for booty, while the Batavians fought for glory and the Gauls for liberty, *Historia*, IV. 78— a discrimination curiously verified to-day. Yet these half-civilised workmen, whose *Kultur* has come to them from above, would found an International of brotherly love—one in which, to be sure, they were to rule the roost. There is, too, no guarding against religious fanaticism, which may break out in unexpected places and times. There can be no doubt that William II. really believed himself commissioned by God to put himself at the head of the world, for the good of the world. Yet who could have foreseen such an outcropping of irrationalism in so rational a people as the Germans? The explanation can be found, partly, perhaps, in the fact that the Kaiser’s mother was English, but mostly in the colossal conceit of the German people, which is like that of the Jews, one of whom wrote in the *Talmud*: “Ten measures of wisdom came into the world: the land of Israel received nine, and the rest of the world one.”

<sup>8</sup> Compare republican Rome and imperial China. Between the Peloponnesian war and the present there is a strong analogy, only with the parts reversed. Democratic Athens was the aggressive state, that sought the subjugation of the rest of Greece, while aristocratic Sparta feared her ascendancy, and stood for the liberty of the small states: Thucydides, I. 23 (6), 86 (5), 88, 118 (2); II. 8 (4), IV. 85, 86, 108 (2). Sparta aspired, indeed, to lead all Greece; but Athens, to rule all Greece: *ib.* VI. 92

fighting, people denounce war both as immoral and futile. And they are right; for always purely aggressive war is wrong, and always work pays better than pillage. But it is only the people of the prosperous state, which has no more even apparently to gain, that see this. The benefit of war may be a "great illusion," as one pacifist has declared it, in a bumptious work under that title; but so is the benefit of murder and robbery committed by individuals. When murder and robbery cease among individuals, war may be expected to cease among states. Men are not guided by diluted general truths. Nearly a hundred and forty years ago Thomas Paine wrote that "mankind are pretty well convinced that it can never be worth their while to go to war for profit's sake";<sup>9</sup> and within a couple of decades the Napoleonic wars of conquest broke loose. Peace may be recognised as best, yet war be chosen as a temporary disturbance, to fortify our position, or to save from a worse fate<sup>10</sup>—like a disagreeable medicine taken to restore health. Two thousand years ago a Roman poet spoke of "war useful to many."<sup>11</sup> War is useful to some for improving their fortunes, to others for providing entertainment, to still others for presenting opportunity for glory. All these run chances of loss, but they are willing to take ordinary chances. War is a lottery, a gamble; but men engage in lotteries and in gambling. Only when men are satiated, and the chances against further gain are overwhelming, do they wish to desist. Then, with regard to war, others perhaps will not let them. The unfortunate nature of war is that, when some peoples want it, others can stop it only by war, or by ability to wage war.<sup>12</sup>

When the present war is fought to its finish, as is to be hoped it will be, there will probably be peace in Europe for fifty years or so, because of exhaustion, because of disappointment, because of disgust. Possibly may be formed a confederation of Europe to keep the peace—in Europe. Perhaps, then, wars in Europe may be ended for the rest of our cycle of civilisation, excepting only rebellions. But this will not do away with wars. It will only increase the scale of wars. If Europe, with Africa under its

(5), VIII. 2 (4); VI. 90 (3), VII. 66 (2). It was the Athenians, too, who slaughtered all the able-bodied men of Melos and enslaved the women and children, *ib.* V. 116, and came near treating the inhabitants of Mytilene in the same way, *ib.* III. 36, 49. In general, they adopted toward their revolted subjects the policy of *Schrecklichkeit*: cf. Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II. 1. 31-2. The Spartans committed no such atrocities. On the contrary, one of their generals, Callicratidas, refused to enslave any Greek, *ib.* I. vi. 14; and when they had the Athenians in their power, they refused to treat them as they had treated others and as they expected to be treated, *ib.* II. ii. 19-20; 3, 10, 14.

<sup>9</sup> *The Crisis*, VII.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Thucydides, IV. 59, 62.

<sup>11</sup> "Multis utile bellum," Lucan, *Pharsalia*, I. 182.

<sup>12</sup> Says a feminist: "When human life is appreciated at its full face value, no nation will be permitted to declare war," Mrs. Tuttle, *The Awakening of woman*, 114. But how any nation is to be prevented, she does not explain.

sway, forms one confederation, America will form another, Asia another. Between these, wars will continue to take place. Or let America join the European confederation, and Asia too; still there will be rebellions, which will be nothing less than wars. For the causes of war will remain. The fundamental cause of war is uneven population — overpopulation in some regions, and underpopulation in others. This was, at bottom, the cause of the present war — the overpopulation of Germany compared with France,<sup>13</sup> and the underpopulation of France compared with Germany.<sup>14</sup> This was the most general or fundamental reason. A more special reason was that the way from Germany to Bagdad and the way from Russia to the Mediterranean cross at Constantinople; while France and England joined in because of their fear for their future if Germany won. After an interim of a generation or two, the uneven increase of population will show its effects again, with still greater pressure outward in the more populous countries; and new crossings of interests will occur. The ugly side of the last war will be forgotten, the glamour of glory will abide, and the love of strife and the desire for gain by strife will revive.

As for our country, we have till recently been secure from any danger from the West, across the Pacific, because of its distance and its backwardness; and we have been secure from any danger from the East, across the Atlantic, because of the even balance there existing between its great rival powers, so that no country there could dare to attack us. We have therefore been permitted to develop in peace, turning our attention to the conquest of nature, having no reason, since the rounding out of our borders in 1848, to attack our fellow men. But those days are past. The West across the Pacific has been brought, by the increased rapidity of navigation, as near to us as Europe was fifty years

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Bernhardi: "Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a given moment they require a national expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors — that is to say, by conquest," *Germany and the Next War*, 21.

<sup>14</sup> This caused uneasiness to many far-sighted French publicists,—for instance, Ch. Richef, who wrote on the subject in *La Réforme sociale*. This seemed foolishness to our lovers of ease who admire small families as less troublesome. "If," wrote an editor of *The Nation*, New York, May 21, 1891, p. 418, commenting on Richef's warning,—"if thirty-nine millions of Frenchmen can manage to lead a comfortable and agreeable existence, why should it worry them that Germany has fifty-two millions?" If this critic be alive to-day, perhaps he now sees why it should have worried them. If the French during the last fifty years had had three children to a family instead of two, it would have caused them a little more inconvenience at the time (with more joy, however), but now either this war would not have taken place, or a large part of their territory would not be devastated, and they would not be dependent on their allies for their very existence as a nation. Their army, too, might to-day be fighting as well as the German, not being composed, as it now is, of single sons, whose lives must not be hazarded. Certainly the quality of their sons need not have been poorer. There is no sign of deterioration among the larger-familied Germans.

ago, and a mighty warlike nation has there sprung up. The East across the Atlantic will now, after the present war, settle its internal tension, so that either it as a whole or its victorious part will be free to act with its full force against other continents. Thus this present war, instead of lessening our exposure to attack, will increase it. Our greatest danger, however, does not come from the East, which for a long while will be exhausted, but from the puffed-up West,—and it is a danger which one of our recent Presidents, by his insensate humanitarian meddling, which gained him a peace-prize, let loose upon us. Our pusillanimous neutrality during more than two years of the present war, if continued, would have won for us no allies and no good will. If we were to be defeated and humiliated by Japan, we may imagine the great guffaw that would have resounded in Europe. Luckily the danger is now passed, and we may hold up our heads with some self-respect, being respected by others. Still, for the future, we shall need to rely upon ourselves for defence; which, too, is only what our honour requires. We shall need to remain prepared, sufficiently for our situation and the possible occasion.

Preparation for war does not prevent war, the pacifists now proclaim. The old saying, Washington's saying, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, they say is disproved by the present war in Europe, which has come on top of so much preparation for it. It is difficult to understand such perversity of reasoning, which has nothing for it but the paralogism of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. On account of the preparation of most of its great states, Europe has had peace within its borders (not reckoning Turkey as Europe) for forty-two years, which is longer than at any period since the fall of the Roman empire — nay, since the first immigration into it of the Aryans. There is, on the other hand, no knowing how many wars it would have had during these last forty years, had not the vast preparations stayed the hand of those who thought of aggression. In all probability, too, the peace would have been still longer, if England had been better prepared. Of course, if all the European states had disbanded their armies, and all were so good as not to wish to encroach upon their neighbours, or so wise as to recognise the folly of doing so, this war would not have taken place, and no other war in Europe, until attacked from without, would ever take place. But the women and the pacifists of one country, even if successful in their own country, cannot produce this condition in other countries. And all that the women, if they had the vote in our country, could do, would be, not to make our men paragons of virtue, but to enervate them

into milksops; and so, instead of saving us from war, they would invite attack.

Our country is the richest in the world, the most open to attack, its finest cities situated directly on the sea,<sup>15</sup> and yet the least protected,—like India lying helpless at the feet of Alexander, a “dives eadem at imbellis regio,”<sup>16</sup> or like Gaul in the Roman empire, with its “wealthy and unwarlike” population, which, as Civilis said, lay “a prey” to his conquering Germans.<sup>17</sup> Yet safety is found in the belief that people—other people—do not, or will not, fight any more as they used to do for plunder, for entertainment, for glory! Already—so great is the influence of women—nearly forty years after *Pinafore* was produced in England, we in America have a Secretary of the Navy for whom it might have been composed; and a professed pacifist has been promoted to be our Secretary of War! Once we could play with our navy and our army, with impunity, so removed were we from danger. But now our former immunity has passed away. Conditions have changed, and we have contributed thereto. We have even taken some so-called colonies, which we do not need, and which others do, or think they do; whereby we have excited cupidity. Only some four years ago a writer, by no means a pacifist, mentioning the practicability of the Japanese landing an army on the Pacific coast or the Germans taking possession of New York or Boston (which some day they may do simultaneously, unless the latter are now well trounced), asked “*Sed cui bono?*”<sup>18</sup> The idea that they might exact a thousand million or so dollars of indemnity for not destroying them, while achieving their other purposes, never then occurred to him. But that possibility cannot, after the doings at Brussels and Antwerp, now escape any one.<sup>19</sup> Unless we are prepared, the Japanese might not only take the Philippines, but make us pay them for their trouble. If we are not prepared, we should act like a rich man, with a large treasure in his house, who should go to bed without locking his doors. In a community where all are honest, or all are equally rich, this course might be rational; but, however

<sup>15</sup> And as if Brooklyn were not near enough to the ocean, there is now a project of opening a new harbour in Jamaica Bay, just behind the sand-dunes of the sea-shore—a most insane project. In fact, the best use of all that tract of Brooklyn which lies within several miles of the ocean would be for pleasure grounds, exercise fields, military encampments, and cemeteries.

<sup>16</sup> Quintus Curtius, IX. 10.

<sup>17</sup> Tacitus, *Annals*, XI. 18, *Hist.*, IV. 76.

<sup>18</sup> R. G. Usher, *Pan-Germanism*, 140.

<sup>19</sup> N. Angell, who is a pacifist, wrote, likewise, as late as a year before the war, that “every financier in Europe knows that if Germany conquered Holland or Belgium to-morrow, she would have to leave their wealth untouched,” *The Great Illusion*, 4th ed., 43. Believing this, Angell believed that the immense majority of the adult men of Germany, though being trained to arms, would never see a battle, 217, 225.

honest and peaceful the man himself may be (and it ought to be easy for a rich man to be honest and peaceful), in a community of burglars (or merely of poor people, who may be tempted by the opportunity) it would be folly to act thus. Nor would his folly be lessened by preaching morality to his neighbours, or telling them, however truthfully, that their real interest lies in being good, attending to their own business, and leaving him alone. All people are not yet actuated by morality only, or even by enlightened self-interest. They are swayed by the appearance of gain, even by illusion.

Yet in this prosperous country of ours, basking in the sunlight, the presidentess of a woman suffrage association went about telling people that "to teach our boys in a public school to shoot, is to return to barbarism,"<sup>20</sup>—it might, indeed, frighten the little girls, their companions in all things! Boys, remember, must not be taught anything girls are not: that would re-establish inequality of the sexes. Still, as both sides of the equation must be tried, girls must be taught whatever boys are taught: so we have the farce of young women being drilled and instructed how to shoot, they thereby being fitted for the fate of snipers! What can be expected of men who wish women to accompany them to the firing line? This unnerving of men is one of the things that may be anticipated from woman suffrage. A National Woman's Peace Party has recently been formed, with the object of "abolishing war," one plank in its platform being the "removal of the economic causes of war." As one of the chief economic causes of war is overpopulation, they may indeed remove that, in their own country at least, apart from immigration (and we receive from Europe the most unwarlike, those who flee from conscription); but only by falling into another economic cause of war, which is underpopulation, this being the cause of defensive, as that of aggressive, war. Indeed, at one of the organising meetings in New York, Miss Alice Carpenter, explaining the attitude of women toward war, said: "Now they feel they are justified in saying that they will not bear sons to be slaughtered."<sup>21</sup> If this policy were to be put into practice in the United States, how would that preserve the United States from being attacked and devastated by some other nation? The effrontery of these women passes all bounds. Mrs. Gilman, in presenting the platform, introduced it with the remark—so the papers report—that "the Woman's Peace Party's programme was designed not only to

<sup>20</sup> Mrs. C. C. Catt, *e.g.*, at the New Year's reception of the Equal Suffrage League at New York: see *The New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1915. Since then she has advocated women helping in the war.

<sup>21</sup> In *The New York Times*, Feb. 20, 1915.

hasten the end of the present war, but to alter humanity so that there can be no more war on earth.”<sup>22</sup> So, Mrs. Gilman and her women friends will do in a jiffy what Jesus and the whole Christian church has not been able to accomplish in nineteen hundred years! Only Henry Ford and his argosy of sweet ladies and pleasant gentlemen, all sponging on his lavishness for a joy-ride to Europe, for the purpose of getting the soldiers out of the trenches, have come near equalling that; but he at least would act (and spend money), and not merely talk, and he seems to have learnt the lesson of the futility of folly.

No, our women cannot do what their leaders expect them to do. But what they can do, and what they are doing in our country, is to effeminate our boys and weaken our future men; and if they ever receive the vote widely, they may do this systematically, and, in conjunction with the men they have enervated, they may, and probably will, interfere with and prevent our country’s proper preparation to resist attack,—and yet, so emotional are they, when an occasion for war arises, they will be more fervid for it than the men. Our present men, if they are not already too emasculated, should beware how they admit such human beings, not into their councils, where they always have had admission, but into the decision on affairs of state. Let our women first go to Germany and convert the men there to willingness to grant the suffrage to their women. Then let them do the same in Japan. After that it will be time enough, and they may with good grace, ask the men of America to take them into partnership in the business of government.<sup>23</sup>

What may stop war is enlightenment to true interests. This is, in the matter before us, easy in the culminating period of civilisation, in those nations which have reached the top. It is not easy in other nations. If those in the former position would persuade the latter, they ought meanwhile to refrain from other forms of aggression. It is easy, to repeat, for a nation that has gobbled up all it can digest, to see that its interest lies in quiet assimilation, in the shade of its own fig trees. It is not easy even for such a nation to see that its true interest lies also in not being greedy and in sharing with others its own good things. Complete enlightenment can be acquired only little by little: all details must

<sup>22</sup> The New York Times, Feb. 5, 1915.

<sup>23</sup> Some women suffragists are coming to see this danger. Writes Mrs. Henry A. Wise Wood, replying to Mrs. Catt and other suffrage leaders, and renouncing further connection with them: “The war and the rereading of history have taught me that military strength still is the ruling factor in the lives of nations, that the nations that would be preserved must masculinise rather than effeminise themselves, and that the people where government is compounded of the sexes cannot maintain itself in the face of another people ruled by men alone.” In The New York Times, Oct. 17, 1916.

be filled in, before the whole is acquired. There is one important detail which only one great nation has yet attained, and even that one not fully,— and it is not our nation.

This important detail is the refraining from commercial war; for such is the so-called protective system, embodied in high tariffs, with the design to keep the products of other countries out of one's own, and with the result of keeping one's own productions out from the others. Such "protection" protects some at the expense of others, and so it is founded in greed. It protects the weaker from the stronger, the inferior from the superior, the less productive from the more productive, the incompetent from the competent; and so it goes against nature. It emphasises the artificial distinction of states, erecting barriers where nature has not placed them. It thereby arrays people against people, increasing ill-will, and multiplying occasions for friction. A people, therefore, that is to be wise enough to avoid war, must be wise enough to abandon the protective tariff system—and better still, all tariffs whatever, except in agreement with its own internal revenue system—and best of all, no tariff and no internal revenue system, revenue being taken from land solely.<sup>24</sup>

Also, to avoid every kind of fighting, a people should be wise enough to get rid of occasion for class conflicts within itself. It must, therefore, seek to avoid countenancing by law the undue concentration of wealth, especially of land-holding. It is demonstrable that where wealth is well distributed, happiness is greatest. By the principle that enjoyment diminishes as satiety is approached, a fortune of a hundred million dollars in the hands of one man gives little more happiness than a fortune of a few millions; wherefore upon him the additional millions are wasted. Divide his fortune among ten men, with ten millions each, and their united happiness is certainly nine times greater. Divide it among a hundred, with a million each, and their united happiness is probably seven times greater still, or more than sixty times that of the one man. Divide it among a thousand, with a hundred thousand each, and their united happiness is perhaps four times greater than in the previous case, or two hundred and fifty times the first.<sup>25</sup> But the division may go too far. Divide it among a hundred million people, so that each obtains a dollar, its effect would be diluted and dissipated, and reduced almost to

<sup>24</sup> We in America do exactly the opposite of what we ought to do: we put hindrances in the way of the importation of goods, which can do no harm and which come only as we want them, but persons, who can do harm and who come for their own wants, we let in freely—at least from Europe, but for a few restrictions.

<sup>25</sup> The question is the happiness of the owners. There may be servants and dependents who share the wealth; but also these are probably more numerous, the more numerous the owners, up to a certain point.

nothing. Divide it and all property so that it is equal to everybody, their happiness would be less than where inequality reigns, because none will have the pleasure of eminence, none of assisting or being assisted, and some will still have more than they deserve and others less. The golden mean should be observed in all things. When it, wherever it be, is approached, the greatest happiness (as far as due to wealth) exists — and also the greatest contentment, and consequently the greatest peacefulness.

A country that has attained this degree of fortune and of wisdom, may be able, the best of all, to defend itself. It will be the least likely to attack others, and also the least likely to be attacked. Let one country after another reach this condition, and keep it,<sup>26</sup> and wars will cease forever. There is no other prospect for stopping war, except during the periods, of longer or shorter extent, when the countries whose recognised interest is peace are stronger than the countries whose apparent interest is attack.

But to all this woman suffrage contributes nothing. We have not the slightest reason to suppose that woman suffrage will hasten free trade in our country, or in any country; not the slightest, that it will hasten the curbing of "trusts," the improvement of the financial and monetary system, the better distribution of wealth, even the better production of children. Woman suffrage goes off on another track by itself, for the righting of an alleged wrong that does not exist, by making equal what nature makes unequal, and for instituting certain reforms (many of them bad) that belong more to society than to government — at all events not to the national government, and in our States are beyond the power and the comprehension of the women who perform their own function in life. Much less does feminism help the matter, which would weaken the most advanced nations and races, and would leave the rest to grow and become strong enough to destroy them. Like the advocates of socialism, these women and their male abettors dream of an ideal end and of reaching it at one bound by adopting certain off-hand direct and easy measures that would have all sorts of indirect consequences, to which

<sup>26</sup> There is, in a given condition of science and industry, in any country a maximum population for the attainment of its maximum happiness, present and future, all things considered, reference to colonies included. When a country reaches this maximum population, it will be well for it to adopt birth-control and medium-sized families, to keep its population steady; and it will then still recommend small families for the incompetent and large families for the competent, to balance each other and improve the breed. Our country is not yet in this condition; nor even is England, or France, with a view to their colonies. These still need to recommend large families even to the indifferent — those between the competent and the incompetent. But they do not. They anticipate a condition they have not yet reached, and even so they do not adopt the policy advisable for such a condition (though an exception has been quoted, p. 143n.). Our country, with its prohibition of instruction of contraception to the ignorant and incompetent, is the worst sinner of all.

they shut their eyes, while they turn not their hands to the immediate but more difficult tasks that lie before us in the series of reforms from the bad to the good.

Both these isms, including woman suffragism, try at once to undo nature. Nature, however, cannot be changed suddenly. Yet there may be a gradual change, effected some time in the distant future. When men fight themselves out, when they learn wisdom over a wider and wider surface of the globe, when they approach everywhere to the golden mean of equality and inequality of economic conditions, when industrialism becomes general throughout the world, when men universally become weakened thereby; then men may descend to the position of women and women be economically independent of men, and if this be so everywhere, women may take part on an equality with men in the management of affairs. This cannot be till the power of attack be less than the power of defence; and therefore it cannot take place till the decline of our civilisation, perhaps in the next cycle of civilisation. Perhaps even, in a future age of simplicity, due to the diminution of resources, and of frugal work conducted as in primitive times mostly by women, either over the whole world or in some large division of it (one of the continents) unreachable from the rest, the women may have acquired the subtlety of bees and ants and will limit the number of the useless and possibly turbulent males by putting to death, unlike the disobedient Hebrew midwives in Egypt,<sup>27</sup> most of their male infants (or, better, learn the art of regulating the sex of their offspring and confine themselves to bringing forth mostly females), and raise only enough men to keep up the race—say one in twenty, as was done in the stud of the Babylonian kings, where one stallion was kept for twenty mares.<sup>28</sup> But woe to that nation of women if anywhere in their neighbourhood or in reach of them—anywhere in the world, or on their continent—this policy be rejected or neglected, and a race of men arise, who take it into their heads to conquer the rest, as men did of yore. The cyclism of what has been will then recur. Mother-right will again give place to father-right, and the greater force of men, instead of the lesser force of women, will prevail. Women's only hope is that men will not be disorderly, and will do only what they ought to do. But what they are to do must be left with the men themselves to decide. It is better for the pyramid to rest on its base, than on its apex,—where it is likely to remain, than where it is likely to be upset.

<sup>27</sup> *Exodus*, I. 15-22.

<sup>28</sup> *Herodotus*, I. 192.

## CHAPTER XI.

### THE OUTLOOK IN THE UNITED STATES

IN the United States the case is serious. In most of the large states of the world there is little chance of woman suffrage ever being introduced. But our situation is precarious. Here woman suffrage does not have to be accepted at one stroke or continue to be rejected by the whole country at large: it needs only to be considered piecemeal by one State after another, principally for their own affairs, so that the effect upon the nation escapes notice. By this "sapping and mining" there is danger of woman suffrage spreading from one State to another, its adoption by each State for its own legislative representatives involving (such is our peculiar constitutional arrangement) its employment also in that State's election of representatives in the national government while each State may within itself grant to women the right to vote for the President. Already more than forty Congressmen are elected by an electorate including women, twenty-four Senators, and over a sixth of the Presidential electors. As yet this infusion of women in the national electorate can have little influence, except in a close vote, as in November, 1916; but because of the ever present possibility of a close vote, the politicians already fear the power of women, and are ready to knock under to their wishes without regard to their own judgment of the merit of their wishes, so that there is likelihood that the impetus of the woman's political movement will grow, till a majority of representatives be elected and a majority of States ruled by such miscellane electorates. Then there will be a more concerted effort made to jam through the scheme of imposing woman suffrage upon the rest of the country; and because of its existent prevalence, and because of the cowardice of politicians, such an attempt will be likely to succeed.<sup>1</sup> Even at present the woman-suffrage advocates have been attempting to do this, not being content with the

<sup>1</sup> A man of experience writes: "Even if both political parties were convinced and remained convinced that woman's entrance into the political fold as voter would be injurious to government and to woman's progress, party expediency would still bring woman suffrage. [For] whatever else political parties have before them, their chief aim is to win. In balancing possible good against possible evil any uncertain evils of suffrage are bound to seem relatively slight when compared with the certain benefits of winning next year's election and the next." Wm. H. Allen, *Woman's Part in Government*, New York, 1911, p. vi.

slow progression of their propaganda. Their strategy at present is faulty, since they are abandoning the very course which alone gives them the prospect of ultimate success, such as their compeers possess in no other large nation in the world. But when they shall have acquired a standing in three-quarters of our States, it will be in their power, and it will be the logical sequence of their position, to beat down the rock-ribbed opposition of a few conservative States, and spring at one final stroke to uniform completeness.

This final movement, in the way it is most likely to be carried out, if we judge by the past and the present, will really, in an important part, be contrary to the spirit, though in entire conformity with the letter, of our confederation or federal union. For the fundamental principle of our union is that each State shall rule its own affairs, and the nation govern only in national affairs; and this principle ought to apply to representation as well as to anything else. In other words, each State ought to regulate the representation of its own government in its own particular way, and the nation at large ought to regulate the representation of the national government in one common way. Thus the people in Michigan, for instance, have no more to say who shall be the electors in Florida for the State and municipal governments in Florida, than they have to say what laws the government in Florida shall pass; but the people of Michigan have a right, along with the people of Florida and of all other States of the nation, all being in the same box together, to say who shall be the electors, the same throughout all the States, for the national government common to all, just as they have a right to deliberate and decide, along with the people of Florida and of all the other States, what shall be the laws of the whole nation. Unfortunately, however, this principle, so plain in itself, was not correctly carried out at the beginning of our national existence. Each State was allowed to regulate its own representation within itself — which was right; but each State's electorate in its own representation was made its electorate in its share of the national representation<sup>2</sup> — and that was wrong. The correction of the initial mistake can now be made only by an amendment of the federal constitution. A constitutional amendment affecting the electorate was made about a third of the way back in our national existence; but unfortunately again that amendment likewise did not respect the fundamental principle of our union, but placed the error on the other side. The

<sup>2</sup> Except in the election of Presidential electors, where the popular electorate was left to the determination of each State's legislature — a still worse method, without reason or principle.

majority of the people of the Union wished a certain kind of representation (one which should disregard the distinction of colour) for the national representation—and to that they had a right; but, not content with obtaining it for the national representation, they forced the same upon all the States individually for their State and municipal representation—which was wrong, and had baleful effect in many parts of the Union. It ought to have been sufficient, if the majority of the people of the United States desired negro suffrage, to have forced it upon all the States for the national representation, in the States that did not want it as well as in those that did, since that was a national affair. But they went too far, beyond the true principle of our union, when they forced it upon every State, whether it wanted it or not, for its internal representation, since that was each State's own affair. The same mistake now threatens to be repeated in the case of woman suffrage. Its advocates now agitate to pass an amendment requiring all States, not only in their national representation, but in their internal representation, to disregard the distinction of sex. Such a third violation of the real spirit and true principle of our federal union would be inexcusable. Luckily this undertaking is not likely to succeed at the present moment, and there is a short respite for deliberation before the further spread of woman suffrage makes the prospect imminent.

In its place, what is needed is a proper amendment of the federal constitution, that shall at last establish the federal and State representations upon their appropriate footing. The national representation should be separated from the State representation, the whole nation regulating its national representation, uniform everywhere, and letting each State regulate its own representation, diverse according to its special needs or views. Then every State that wanted woman suffrage for its own affairs, could have it without affecting other States, and others need not have it in their affairs if they did not want it, while the whole nation might adopt it or not for its affairs according as the majority of the people, or of the States, of the whole nation approved or disapproved it. The initial mistake was made through too great a regard for States' rights; the second mistake was made through too great a disregard of States' rights: this proper arrangement alone holds the balance even. If such an amendment were now made, it is probable that many more States would adopt woman suffrage for their own affairs, perhaps all, and yet at the same time the whole nation would be saved from having any part of its national representation chosen by women.

For our nation would then be in somewhat the same position as the large nations of Europe, many of which allow representation to women on local matters, but none of which are likely to make the terrible blunder of letting their standing in the world of men be undermined by the votes of women. Unfortunately there is no prospect of this amendment either. The very idea of it is unfamiliar to our people, in spite of its simplicity and plainness. The prospect is, unless a permanent halt has come in the recent movement, that State after State will adopt woman suffrage for both its own and its share of the national representation, until at last our nation itself will have its policies determined by constituencies admitting women to the vote. Then ours will be the only great country in the world with the drag of women's control upon it. Its fate will then, for a while at least, be determined by women's wish, though not by women's will; for that will remain in abeyance when it comes to execution. There will be a divorce between decision and performance, that will not be conducive to efficiency.

Such is the immediate outlook for our country. If, however, we look further ahead, taking a large sweep through the future, the prospect is that before many generations the whole thing will be abandoned. Women will cease to care about the vote, will occupy themselves less and less with politics, and will be willing when men withdraw the suffrage from them, or may even themselves vote to deprive themselves of the vote. For this there are two reasons.

The one is that women's concern with the concerns of men is contrary to the nature of things, and the nature of things will prevail. The principle of the survival of the fit women, in the order of nature, means also the passing away of the unfit women — the "elimination of the wayward." The women who act the parts of men will not perform the function of women: they will not leave offspring. Their progeny will die out. Only the progeny of the women who remain women will abound. Thus feminism, in all its elements, is doomed. It would seem to be a law of progress that advancing civilisation tends to produce asexual women — female Urnings, as well as males of the same type. As the old customs compel these also to marry and to reproduce their kind, their numbers increase, till at last the old customs are broken down. Then the opening of men's professions to women, and the liberation of women from women's duties, acts as a safety-valve. The asexual women behave like sexless men, enter men's professions, support themselves, do not marry, or at all events produce next to no children, and — both they and

their male similars, who likewise refrain from marriage — die out. Then, the field being cleared of such creatures, the remaining women, produced from mothers and fathers who had the normal sex-instincts of men and women, will be such themselves, and will of themselves retire from competition with men, who in their turn will be virile, and the world will continue on its usual course.<sup>3</sup>

If this were all, we might be willing to wait for the automatic clearing, when its predestined time comes. But this is not all, and here comes in the second reason why, in particular, woman suffrage cannot last. The clearing itself is an evil that will weaken many a nation or race, and endanger its existence in the competition with other nations or races in the portentous times that are coming. Feminism, begun among the asexual, is spreading to those with normal sexual instincts, who, in a false imitation of the others, repress them. The virile men and feminine women of the upper or leading classes or races are likewise affected by the anti-child-bearing mania, and their progeny also will die off, leaving the world in the hands of inferior classes or races. The decline of civilisation will then be accomplished, and the usual course of things must begin again from a low plane. Such is the prospect ahead of us from continuance in the course already entered upon. Feminism we already have to the extent of the breaking down of old marriage customs and the introduction of female quasi independence. That is bad enough in itself, and we ought to fight against it with all our might and main; but, instead, the evil will be increased by the adoption of

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Pearson, on "Woman and Labour," in *Chances of Death*, i. 238-9: "Women who abstain from marriage and have not the sex-impulse strongly developed, women whose potentiality of child-bearing is not a trouble to them, may welcome equality of opportunity and compete with men on equal terms. The women with strong physique or strong intellect may, under these conditions, excel in any pursuit whatever her average male compeer. But this type of woman cannot become the prevalent type, nor indeed would it tend to social efficiency, if it could. Such women cannot transmit the asexualism which fits them for competition with men to a numerous offspring; they leave the women whose maternal and sexual instincts are strong to be the mothers of the coming generation, and to transmit these instincts to the women of the future. Indeed, it can hardly be doubted that the throwing open of professions and employments of all sorts to women, accompanied as it is at the present by a superabundance of women [he is speaking of England], must lead to a considerable development of the sex-instinct in woman. In the old days, when the proportion of the sexes was more nearly one of equality, and when marriage was practically the one career open to a woman, there was a much smaller selection of sex-instinct. Now, with the many possibilities of independent subsistence, the duty of maternity is not thrust so forcibly upon all women, whether inclined thereto or not, and the result must be a developed sexual instinct in the women of the future. . . . In this respect we may associate the maternal with the social instinct; for the fundamental law of inheritance will hardly allow of the one surviving without the other, if society as a whole is to survive." The last clause should have been, "in the societies that survive"; for some societies may not, or only in a much reduced extent, while others are sure to survive, having avoided these evils.—On the repeated giving out of "learned women," owing to their amaternity (but without notice of the evil to others), see also J. J. Walsh's article on "Cycles of Feminine Education and Influence" in his *Education How Old the New*, New York, 1911, pp. 262-7.

woman suffrage, with which we are now playing. Consequently the clearing will be sharper and quicker and altogether too thorough in the nation that adopts this mistaken measure; for women's participation in government will still more accentuate the degrading tendencies of feminism, still more weaken the fibre of the people, and still more effectually threaten the extinction of that nation. Women themselves will at last be made sensible of the evil consequences of their misplaced zeal; and when some preliminary calamity has overtaken their country, such as defeat, invasion, devastation, humiliation, pauperisation, then, after experiencing the treatment meted out to them by other men, they will be glad to resign themselves to the care of their own men, will spur them on to wake up and be men among men, themselves promising to be women to them, and to reassume the tasks of women.

With such a prospect ahead, made inevitable to us if we alone among the great countries of the world carry feminism out in the nation to the extent of adopting woman suffrage (for otherwise our own feminism is matched by the feminism in Europe at least), it would seem like madness on our part to incur this risk. Our only salvation will then be possible if women and their men abettors have their eyes opened to the impending disaster before it arrives, and withdraw from the error into which they have so lightly allowed themselves to enter. But why adopt a course that must be retired from in order to avoid its dangerous consequences? Let us open our eyes now.

We should consider also whether we have not already gone too far on the wrong road of feminism. It is beginning to be subject to question whether women have not of late abused the privileges accorded them. The women of the upper classes, whence springs the movement, have been so fed on the fat of the land and pampered, that they think themselves entitled to everything their sickly fancy may care for. The type of the American girl is one who takes, but gives not, and who does as she likes, with the means of others. Instead of the favours that have been showered upon them being extended, ought there not rather to be a retraction, for the purpose of discipline? It is inconsistent, say the feminists, for a woman like Miss Davis to be at the head of an establishment whose wards can vote when they come out, while she cannot. So be it, but instead of concluding that women should be allowed to vote, would it not be wiser to conclude that women should not be allowed to hold such offices? It is inconsistent, say they, again, for women to own large fortunes and not be able to vote, while men can vote who own

nothing. This inconsistency is not so flagrant, but if it exists, why allow men to give women large fortunes? There are two solutions also to the inconsistency pointed out by Elizabeth T. Erbey thus: "It is poor logic which argues that the home shall be ruled by the interaction of a man and a woman, but divorces their counsels in the community and the state."<sup>4</sup> It would be wise in women not to dwell very much on these incongruities, while profiting by them. The retraction and withdrawal from the excessive amount of feminism already fallen into need not be accomplished by legislation (apart from reform of our public schools and civil service), if only individual men would take it in hand, and introduce a new custom, more like the old, and better than the present. Perhaps the time is not prepared for such a course. But unless a return from the wrong way be not entered upon soon, degeneration will set in, if it has not already begun.

<sup>4</sup> In *The New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1915.

THE END

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NEW YORK.











